THE ART OF DECEPTION by KEVIN D. MITNICK & William L. Simon Foreword by Steve Wozniak [READ ONLINE FREE]

THE ART OF DECEPTION

Controlling the Human Element of Security

KEVIN D. MITNICK& William L. Simon

Foreword by Steve Wozniak

For Reba Vartanian, Shelly Jaffe, Chickie Leventhal, and Mitchell

Mitnick, and for the late Alan Mitnick, Adam Mitnick,

and Jack BielloFor Arynne, Victoria, and David, Sheldon,Vincent, and Elena.Social Engineering

Social Engineering uses influence and persuasion to deceive people

by convincing them that the social engineer is someone he is not,

or by manipulation. As a result, the social engineer is able to take

advantage of people to obtain information with or without the use of

technology.

Contents

Foreword

Preface

Introduction

Part 1 Behind the Scenes

Chapter 1 Security's Weakest Link

Part 2 The Art of the Attacker

Chapter 2 When Innocuous Information Isn't

Chapter 3 The Direct Attack: Just Asking for it

Chapter 4 Building Trust

Chapter 5 "Let Me Help You"

Chapter 6 "Can You Help Me?"

Chapter 7 Phony Sites and Dangerous Attachments

Chapter 8 Using Sympathy, Guilt and Intimidation

Chapter 9 The Reverse Sting

Part 3 Intruder Alert

Chapter 10 Entering the Premises

Chapter 11 Combining Technology and Social Engineering

Chapter 12 Attacks on the Entry-Level Employee

Chapter 13 Clever Cons

Chapter 14 Industrial Espionage

Part 4 Raising the Bar

Chapter 15 Information Security Awareness and Training

Chapter 16 Recommended Corporate Information Security PoliciesSecurity at a Glance

Sources

Acknowledgments

Foreword

We humans are born with an inner drive to explore the nature

of our surroundings. As young men, both Kevin Mitnick and

I were intensely curious about the world and eager to prove

ourselves. We were rewarded often in our attempts to learn new things,

solve puzzles, and win at games. But at the same time, the world around

us taught us rules of behavior that constrained our inner urge toward free

exploration. For our boldest scientists and technological entrepreneurs, as

well as for people like Kevin Mitnick, following this inner urge offers the

greatest thrills, letting us accomplish things that others believe cannot be

done.Kevin Mitnick is one of the finest people I know. Ask him, and he will

say forthrightly that what he used to do - social engineering - involes

conning people. But Kevin is no longer a social engineer. And even when

he was, his motive never was to enrich himself or damage others. That's

not to say that there aren't dangerous and destructive criminals out there

who use social engineering to cause real harm. In fact, that's exactly why

Kevin wrote this book - to warn you about them.The Art of Deception shows how vulnerable we all are - government,

business, and each of us personally - to the intrusions of the social

engineer. In this security-conscious era, we spend huge sums on

technology

to protect our computer networks and data. This book points out how easy

it is to trick insiders and circumvent all this technological protection.

Whether you work in business or government, this book provides a

powerful road map to help you understand how social engineers work and

what you can do to foil them. Using fictionalized stories that are both

entertaining and eye-opening, Kevin and co-author Bill Simon bring to

life

the techniques of the social engineering underworld. After each story,

they offer practical guidelines to help you guard against the breaches and

threats they're described.Technological security leaves major gaps that people like Kevin can help

us close. Read this book and you may finally realize that we all need to

turn to the Mitnick's among us for guidance.

-Steve Wozniak

PREFACE

Some hackers destroy people's files or entire hard drives; they're called

crackers or vandals. Some novice hackers don't bother learning the

technology, but simply download hacker tools to break into computer

systems; they're called script kiddies. More experienced hackers with

programming skills develop hacker programs and post them to the Web

and to bulletin board systems. And then there are individuals who have no

interest in the technology, but use the computer merely as a tool to aid

them in stealing money, goods, or services. Despite the media-created myth of Kevin Mitnick, I am not a malicious

hacker. But I'm getting ahead of myself. STARTING OUT 

My path was probably set early in life. I was a happy-go-lucky kid, but

bored. After my father split when I was three, my mother worked as a

waitress to support us. To see me then - an only child being raised by a

mother who put in long, harried days on a sometimes-erratic schedule -

would have been to see a youngster on his own almost all his waking

hours. I was my own babysitter. Growing up in a San Fernando Valley community gave me the whole of

Los Angeles to explore, and by the age of twelve I had discovered a way

to travel free throughout the whole greater L.A. area. I realized one day

while riding the bus that the security of the bus transfer I had purchased

relied on the unusual pattern of the paper-punch, that the drivers used to

mark day; time, and route on the transfer slips. A friendly driver,

answering my carefully planted question, told me where to buy that

special type of punch. The transfers are meant to let you change buses and continue a journey to

your destination, but I worked out how to use them to travel anywhere I

wanted to go for free. Obtaining blank transfers was a walk in the park. 

 

The trash bins at the bus terminals were always filled with only-partly

used books of transfers that the drivers tossed away at the end of the

shifts. With a pad of blanks and the punch, I could mark my own transfers

and travel anywhere that L.A. buses went. Before long, I had all but

memorized the bus schedules of the entire system. (This was an early

example of my surprising memory for certain types of information; I can

still, today, remember phone numbers, passwords, and other seemingly

trivial details as far back as my childhood.) Another personal interest that surfaced at an early age was my fascination

with performing magic. Once I learned how a new trick worked, would

practice, practice, and practice some more until I mastered it. To an

extent, it was through magic that I discovered the enjoyment in gaining

secret knowledge. From Phone Phreak to Hacker 

My first encounter with what I would eventually learn to call social

engineering came about during my high school years when I met another

student who was caught up in a hobby called phone phreakin. Phone

phreaking is a type of hacking that allows you to explore the telephone

network by exploiting the phone systems and phone company employees.

He showed me neat tricks he could do with a telephone, like obtaining any

information the phone company had on any customer, and using a secret

test number to make long-distance calls for free. (Actually it was free only

to us. I found out much later that it wasn't a secret test number at all. The

calls were, in fact, being billed to some poor company's MCI account.) That was my introduction to social engineering-my kindergarten, so to

speak. My friend and another phone phreaker I met shortly thereafter let

me listen in as they each made pretext calls to the phone company. I heard

the things they said that made them sound believable; I learned about

different phone company offices, lingo, and procedures. But that

"training" didn't last long; it didn't have to. Soon I was doing it all on my

own, learning as I went, doing it even better than my first teachers. 

The course my life would follow for the next fifteen years had been set. In

high school, one of my all-time favorite pranks was gaining unauthorized

access to the telephone switch and changing the class of service of a

fellow phone phreak. When he'd attempt to make a call from home, he'd

get a message telling him to deposit a dime because the telephone

company switch had received input that indicated he was calling from a

pay phone. 

I became absorbed in everything about telephones, not only the

electronics, switches, and computers, but also the corporate organization,

the procedures, and the terminology. After a while, I probably knew more

about the phone system than any single employee. And I had developed

my social engineering skills to the point that, at seventeen years old, I was

able to talk most telco employees into almost anything, whether I was

speaking with them in person or by telephone. My much-publicized hacking career actually started when I was in high

school. While I cannot describe the detail here, suffice it to say that one of

the driving forces in my early hacks was to be accepted by the guys in the

hacker group. Back then we used the term hacker to mean a person who spent a great

deal of time tinkering with hardware and software, either to develop more

efficient programs or to bypass unnecessary steps and get the job done

more quickly. The term has now become a pejorative, carrying the

meaning of "malicious criminal." In these pages I use the term the way I

have always used it - in its earlier, more benign sense. After high school I studied computers at the Computer Learning Center in

Los Angeles. Within a few months, the school's computer manager

realized I had found vulnerability in the operating system and gained full

administrative privileges on their IBM minicomputer. The best computer

experts on their teaching staff couldn't figure out how I had done this. In

what may have been one of the earliest examples of "hire the hacker," I

was given an offer I couldn't refuse: Do an honors project to enhance the

school's computer security, or face suspension for hacking the system. Of

course, I chose to do the honors project, and ended up graduating cum

laude with honors. Becoming a Social Engineer 

Some people get out of bed each morning dreading their daily work

routine at the proverbial salt mines. I've been lucky enough to enjoy my

work. n particular, you can't imagine the challenge, reward, and pleasure I

had the time I spent as a private investigator. I was honing my talents in

the performance art called social engineering (getting people to do things

they wouldn't ordinarily do for a stranger) and being paid for it. 

For me it wasn't difficult becoming proficient in social engineering. My

father's side of the family had been in the sales field for generations, so

the art of influence and persuasion might have been an inherited trait.

When you combine that trait with an inclination for deceiving people, you

have the profile of a typical social engineer. 

You might say there are two specialties within the job classification of

con artist. Somebody who swindles and cheats people out of their money

belongs to one sub-specialty, the grifter. Somebody who uses deception,

influence, and persuasion against businesses, usually targeting their

information, belongs to the other sub-specialty, the social engineer. From

the time of my bus-transfer trick, when I was too young to know there

was anything wrong with what I was doing, I had begun to recognize a

talent for finding out the secrets I wasn't supposed to have. I built on that

talent by using deception, knowing the lingo, and developing a well-

honed skill of manipulation. One way I worked on developing the skills of my craft, if I may call it a

craft, was to pick out some piece of information I didn't really care about

and see if I could talk somebody on the other end of the phone into

providing it, just to improve my skills. In the same way I used to practice

my magic tricks, I practiced pretexting. Through these rehearsals, I soon

found that I could acquire virtually any information I targeted.   As I described in Congressional testimony before Senators Lieberman and

Thompson years later: I have gained unauthorized access to computer systems at some of the

largest corporations on the planet, and have successfully penetrated some

of the most resilient computer systems ever developed. I have used both

technical and non-technical means to obtain the source code to various

operating systems and telecommunications devices to study their

vulnerabilities  and their inner workings. All of this activity was really to satisfy my own curiosity; to see what I

could do; and find out secret information about operating systems, cell

phones, and anything else that stirred my curiosity. FINAL THOUGHTS 

I've acknowledged since my arrest that the actions I took were illegal, and

that I committed invasions of privacy. My misdeeds were motivated by curiosity. I wanted to know as much as I

could about how phone networks worked and the ins-and-outs of

computer security. I went from being a kid who loved to perform magic

tricks to becoming the world's most notorious hacker, feared by

corporations and the government. As I reflect back on my life for the last

30 years, I admit I made some extremely poor decisions, driven by my

curiosity, the desire to learn about technology, and the need for a good

intellectual challenge. 

 

I'm a changed person now. I'm turning my talents and the extensive

knowledge I've gathered about information security and social

engineering tactics to helping government, businesses, and individuals

prevent, detect, and respond to information-security threats.This book is one more way that I can use my experience to help others

avoid the efforts of the malicious information thieves of the world. I think

you will find the stories enjoyable, eye-opening, and educational.

 

Introduction    

This book contains a wealth of information about information security and

social engineering. To help you find your way, here's a quick look at how

this book is organized: In Part 1 I'll reveal security's weakest link and show you why you and

your company are at risk from social engineering attacks. In Part 2 you'll see how social engineers toy with your trust, your desire to

be helpful, your sympathy, and your human gullibility to get what they

want. Fictional stories of typical attacks will demonstrate that social

engineers can wear many hats and many faces. If you think you've never

encountered one, you're probably wrong. Will you recognize a scenario

you've experienced in these stories and wonder if you had a brush with

social engineering? You very well might. But once you've read Chapters 2

through 9, you'll know how to get the upper hand when the next social

engineer comes calling.   Part 3 is the part of the book where you see how the social engineer ups

the ante, in made-up stories that show how he can step onto your

corporate premises, steal the kind of secret that can make or break your

company, and thwart your hi-tech security measures. The scenarios in this

section will make you aware of threats that range from simple employee

revenge to cyber terrorism. If you value the information that keeps your

business running and the privacy of your data, you'll want to read

Chapters 10 through 14 from beginning to end. It's important to note that unless otherwise stated, the anecdotes in this

book are purely fictional. In Part 4 I talk the corporate talk about how to prevent successful social

engineering attacks on your organization. Chapter 15 provides a blueprint

for a successful security-training program. And Chapter 16 might just

save your neck - it's a complete security policy you can customize for

your organization and implement right away to keep your company and

information safe. 

Finally, I've provided a Security at a Glance section, which includes

checklists, tables, and charts that summarize key information you can use

to help your employees foil a social engineering attack on the job. These

tools also provide valuable information you can use in devising your own

security-training program. Throughout the book you'll also find several useful elements: Lingo boxes

provide definitions of social engineering and computer hacker

terminology; Mitnick Messages offer brief words of wisdom to help

strengthen your security strategy; and notes and sidebars give interesting

background or additional information. 

Part 1

Behind The Scenes 

Chapter 1

Security's Weakest Link 

A company may have purchased the best security technologies that money

can buy, trained their people so well that they lock up all their secrets

before going home at night, and hired building guards from the best

security firm in the business. That company is still totally Vulnerable. Individuals may follow every best-security practice recommended by the

experts, slavishly install every recommended security product, and be

thoroughly vigilant about proper system configuration and applying

security patches. Those individuals are still completely vulnerable. THE HUMAN FACTOR 

Testifying before Congress not long ago, I explained that I could often get

passwords and other pieces of sensitive information from companies by

pretending to be someone else and just asking for it. It's natural to yearn for a feeling of absolute safety, leading many people

to settle for a false sense of security. Consider the responsible and loving

homeowner who has a Medico, a tumbler lock known as being pickproof,

installed in his front door to protect his wife, his children, and his home.

He's now comfortable that he has made his family much safer against

intruders. But what about the intruder-who breaks a window, or cracks the

code to the garage door opener? How about installing a robust security

system? Better, but still no guarantee. Expensive locks or no, the

homeowner remains vulnerable. Why? Because the human factor is truly security's weakest link. 

Security is too often merely an illusion, an illusion sometimes made even

worse when gullibility, naivete, or ignorance come into play. The world's

most respected scientist of the twentieth century, Albert Einstein, is

quoted as saying, "Only two things are infinite, the universe and human

stupidity, and I'm not sure about the former." In the end, social

engineering attacks can succeed when people are stupid or, more

commonly, simply ignorant about good security practices. With the same

attitude as our security-conscious homeowner, many information

technology (IT) professionals hold to the misconception that they've made

their companies largely immune to attack because they've deployed

standard security products - firewalls, intrusion detection systems, or

stronger authentication devices such as time-based tokens or biometric

smart cards. Anyone who thinks that security products alone offer true

security is settling for. the illusion of security. It's a case of living in a

world of fantasy: They will inevitably, later if not sooner, suffer a security

incident.As noted security consultant Bruce Schneier puts it, "Security is not a

product, it's a process." Moreover, security is not a technology problem -

it's a people and management problem. As developers invent continually better security technologies, making it

increasingly difficult to exploit technical vulnerabilities, attackers will

turn more and more to exploiting the human element. Cracking the human

firewall is often easy, requires no investment beyond the cost of a phone

call, and involves minimal risk. A CLASSIC CASE OF DECEPTION 

What's the greatest threat to the security of your business assets? That's

easy: the social engineer--an unscrupulous magician who has you

watching his left hand while with his right he steals your secrets. This

character is often so friendly, glib, and obliging that you're grateful for

having encountered him. Take a look at an example of social engineering. Not many people today

still remember the young man named Stanley Mark Rifkin and his little

adventure with the now defunct Security Pacific National Bank in Los

Angeles. Accounts of his escapade vary, and Rifkin (like me) has never

told his own story, so the following is based on published reports. 

Code Breaking 

One day in 1978, Rifkin moseyed over to Security Pacific's authorized-

personnel-only wire-transfer room, where the staff sent and received

transfers totaling several billion dollars every day. 

He was working for a company under contract to develop a backup

system for the wire room's data in case their main computer ever went

down. That role gave him access to the transfer procedures, including how

bank officials arranged for a transfer to be sent. He had learned that bank

officers who were authorized to order wire transfers would be given a

closely guarded daily code each morning to use when calling the wire

room.In the wire room the clerks saved themselves the trouble of trying to

memorize each day's code: They wrote down the code on a slip of paper

and posted it where they could see it easily. This particular November day

Rifkin had a specific reason for his visit. He wanted to get a glance at that

paper.Arriving in the wire room, he took some notes on operating procedures,

supposedly to make sure the backup system would mesh properly with the

regular systems. Meanwhile, he surreptitiously read the security code

from the posted slip of paper, and memorized it. A few minutes later he

walked out. As he said afterward, he felt as if he had just won the lottery.There's This Swiss Bank Account...

Leaving the room at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, he headed straight

for the pay phone in the building's marble lobby, where he deposited a

coin and dialed into the wire-transfer room. He then changed hats,

transforming himself from Stanley Rifkin, bank consultant, into Mike

Hansen, a member of the bank's International Department.According to one source, the conversation went something like this:"Hi, this is Mike Hansen in International," he said to the young woman

who answered the phone.

She asked for the office number. That was standard procedure, and he was

prepared: “286” he said.

The girl then asked, "Okay, what's the code?"Rifkin has said that his adrenaline-powered heartbeat "picked up its pace"

at this point. He responded smoothly, "4789." Then he went on to give

instructions for wiring "Ten million, two-hundred thousand dollars

exactly" to the Irving Trust Company in New York, for credit of the

Wozchod Handels Bank of Zurich, Switzerland, where he had already

established an account.The girl then said, "Okay, I got that. And now I need the interoffice

settlement number."Rifkin broke out in a sweat; this was a question he hadn't anticipated,

something that had slipped through the cracks in his research. But he

 

managed to stay in character, acted as if everything was fine, and on the

spot answered without missing a beat, "Let me check; I'll call you right

back." He changed hats once again to call another department at the bank,

this time claiming to be an employee in the wire-transfer room. He

obtained the settlement number and called the girl back. She took the number and said, "Thanks." (Under the circumstances, her

thanking him has to be considered highly ironic.) Achieving Closure 

A few days later Rifkin flew to Switzerland, picked up his cash, and

handed over $8 million to a Russian agency for a pile of diamonds. He

flew back, passing through U.S. Customs with the stones hidden in a

money belt. He had pulled off the biggest bank heist in history--and done

it without using a gun, even without a computer. Oddly, his caper

eventually made it into the pages of the Guinness Book of World Records

in the category of "biggest computer fraud." Stanley Rifkin had used the art of deception--the skills and techniques that

are today called social engineering. Thorough planning and a good gift of

gab is all it really took. And that's what this book is about--the techniques of social engineering

(at which yours truly is proficient) and how to defend against their being

used at your company. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 

The Rifkin story makes perfectly clear how misleading our sense of

security can be. Incidents like this - okay, maybe not $10 million heists,

but harmful incidents nonetheless - are happening every day. You may be

losing money right now, or somebody may be stealing new product plans,

and you don't even know it. If it hasn't already happened to your

company, it's not a question of if it will happen, but when. A Growing Concern 

The Computer Security Institute, in its 2001 survey of computer crime,

reported that 85 percent of responding organizations had detected

computer security breaches in the preceding twelve months. That's an

astounding number: Only fifteen out of every hundred organizations

responding were able to say that they had not had a security breach during

the year. Equally astounding was the number of organizations that

reported that they had experienced financial losses due to computer 

  

breaches: 64 percent. Well over half the organizations had suffered

financially. In a single year.My own experiences lead me to believe that the numbers in reports like

this are somewhat inflated. I'm suspicious of the agenda of the people

conducting the survey. But that's not to say that the damage isn't

extensive; it is. Those who fail to plan for a security incident are planning

for failure.Commercial security products deployed in most companies are mainly

aimed at providing protection against the amateur computer intruder, like

the youngsters known as script kiddies. In fact, these wannabe hackers

with downloaded software are mostly just a nuisance. The greater losses,

the real threats, come from sophisticated attackers with well-defined

targets who are motivated by financial gain. These people focus on one

target at a time rather than, like the amateurs, trying to infiltrate as many

systems as possible. While amateur computer intruders simply go for

quantity, the professionals target information of quality and value.Technologies like authentication devices (for proving identity), access

control (for managing access to files and system resources), and intrusion

detection systems (the electronic equivalent of burglar alarms) are

necessary to a corporate security program. Yet it's typical today for a

company to spend more money on coffee than on deploying

countermeasures to protect the organization against security attacks.Just as the criminal mind cannot resist temptation, the hacker mind is

driven to find ways around powerful security technology safeguards. And

in many cases, they do that by targeting the people who use the

technology.Deceptive Practices

There's a popular saying that a secure computer is one that's turned off.

Clever, but false: The pretexter simply talks someone into going into the

office and turning that computer on. An adversary who wants your

information can obtain it, usually in any one of several different ways. It's

just a matter of time, patience, personality, and persistence. That's where

the art of deception comes in.

To defeat security measures, an attacker, intruder, or social engineer must

find a way to deceive a trusted user into revealing information, or trick an

unsuspecting mark into providing him with access. When trusted

employees are deceived, influenced, or manipulated into revealing

sensitive information, or performing actions that create a security hole for

the attacker to slip through, no technology in the world can protect a

business. Just as cryptanalysts are sometimes able to reveal the plain text

of a coded message by finding a weakness that lets them bypass the

encryption

 

technology, social engineers use deception practiced on your employees

to bypass security technology. ABUSE OF TRUST 

In most cases, successful social engineers have strong people skills.

They're charming, polite, and easy to like--social traits needed for

establishing rapid rapport and trust. An experienced social engineer is

able to gain access to virtually any targeted information by using the

strategies and tactics of his craft. Savvy technologists have painstakingly developed information-security

solutions to minimize the risks connected with the use of computers, yet

left unaddressed the most significant vulnerability, the human factor.

Despite our intellect, we humans - you, me, and everyone else - remain

the most severe threat to each other's security.  

Our National Character 

We're not mindful of the threat, especially in the Western world. In the

United States most of all, we're not trained to be suspicious of each other.

We are taught to "love thy neighbor" and have trust and faith in each

other. Consider how difficult it is for neighborhood watch organizations

to get people to lock their homes and cars. This sort of vulnerability is

obvious, and yet it seems to be ignored by many who prefer to live in a

dream world - until they get burned. We know that all people are not kind and honest, but too often we live as

if they were. This lovely innocence has been the fabric of the lives of

Americans and it's painful to give it up. As a nation we have built into our

concept of freedom that the best places to live are those where locks and

keys are the least necessary. Most people go on the assumption that they will not be deceived by

others, based upon a belief that the probability of being deceived is very

low; the attacker, understanding this common belief, makes his request

sound so reasonable that it raises no suspicion, all the while exploiting the

victim's trust. Organizational Innocence 

That innocence that is part of our national character was evident back

when computers were first being connected remotely. Recall that the

ARPANet (the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects

Agency 

 

Network), the predecessor of the Internet, was designed as a way of

sharing research information between government, research, and

educational institutions. The goal was information freedom, as well as

technological advancement. Many educational institutions therefore set up

early computer systems with little or no security. One noted software

libertarian, Richard Stallman, even refused to protect his account with a

password.But with the Internet being used for electronic commerce, the dangers of

weak security in our wired world have changed dramatically. Deploying

more technology is not going to solve the human security problem.Just look at our airports today. Security has become paramount, yet we're

alarmed by media reports of travelers who have been able to circumvent

security and carry potential weapons past checkpoints. How is this

possible during a time when our airports are on such a state of alert? Are

the metal detectors failing? No. The problem isn't the machines. The

problem is the human factor: The people manning the machines. Airport

officials can marshal the National Guard and install metal detectors and

facial recognition systems, but educating the frontline security staff on

how to properly screen passengers is much more likely to help.The same problem exists within government, business, and educational

institutions throughout the world. Despite the efforts of security

professionals, information everywhere remains vulnerable and will

continue to be seen as a ripe target by attackers with social engineering

skills, until the weakest link in the security chain, the human link, has

been strengthened.Now more than ever we must learn to stop wishful thinking and become

more aware of the techniques that are being used by those who attempt to

attack the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of our computer

systems and networks. We've come to accept the need for defensive

driving; it's time to accept and learn the practice of defensive computing.The threat of a break-in that violates your privacy, your mind, or your

company's information systems may not seem real until it happens. To

avoid such a costly dose of reality, we all need to become aware,

educated, vigilant, and aggressively protective of our information assets,

our own personal information, and our nation's critical infrastructures.

And we must implement those precautions today.TERRORISTS AND DECEPTION

Of course, deception isn't an exclusive tool of the social engineer.

Physical terrorism makes the biggest news, and we have come to realize

as never

 

before that the world is a dangerous place. Civilization is, after all, just a

thin veneer. The attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., in September 2001

infused sadness and fear into the hearts of every one of us - not just

Americans, but well-meaning people of all nations. We're now alerted to

the fact that there are obsessive terrorists located around the globe, well -

trained and waiting to launch further attacks against us. The recently intensified effort by our government has increased the levels

of our security consciousness. We need to stay alert, on guard against all

forms of terrorism. We need to understand how terrorists treacherously

create false identities, assume roles as students and neighbors, and melt

into the crowd. They mask their true beliefs while they plot against us -

practicing tricks of deception similar to those you will read about in these

pages. And while, to the best of my knowledge, terrorists have not yet used

social engineering ruses to infiltrate corporations, water-treatment plants,

electrical generation facilities, or other vital components of our national

infrastructure, the potential is there. It's just too easy. The security

awareness and security policies that I hope will be put into place and

enforced by corporate senior management because of this book will come

none too  soon. ABOUT THIS BOOK   

Corporate security is a question of balance. Too little security leaves your

company vulnerable, but an overemphasis on security gets in the way of

attending to business, inhibiting the company's growth and prosperity.

The challenge is to achieve a balance between security and productivity. Other books on corporate security focus on hardware and software

technology, and do not adequately cover the most serious threat of all:

human deception. The purpose of this book, in contrast, is to help you

understand how you, your co-workers, and others in your company are

being manipulated, and the barriers you can erect to stop being victims.

Thebook focuses mainly on the non-technical methods that hostileintruders use to steal information, compromise the integrity of information

that is believed to be safe but isn't., or destroy company work product. 

My task is made more difficult by a simple truth: Every reader will have

been manipulated by the grand experts of all time in social engineering -

their parents. They found ways to get you - "for your own good" - to do  

what they thought best. Parents become great storytellers in the same way

that social engineers skillfully develop very plausible stories, reasons, and

justifications for achieving their goals. Yes, we were all molded by our

parents: benevolent (and sometimes not so benevolent) social engineers. Conditioned by that training, we have become vulnerable to manipulation.

We would live a difficult life if we had to be always on our guard,

mistrustful of others, concerned that we might become the dupe of

someone trying to take advantage of us. In a perfect world we would

implicitly trust others, confident that the people we encounter are going to

be honest and trustworthy. But we do not live in a perfect world, and so

we have to exercise a standard of vigilance to repel the deceptive efforts

of our adversaries. The main portions of this book, Parts 2 and 3, are made up of stories that

show you social engineers in action. In these sections you'll read about: •  What phone phreaks discovered years ago: A slick method for gettingan unlisted phone number from the telephone company. •  Several different methods used by attackers to convince even alert,suspicious employees to reveal their computer usernames and

passwords.   •  How an Operations Center manager cooperated in allowing an attackerto steal his company's most secret product information. •  The methods of an attacker who deceived a lady into downloadingsoftware that spies on every keystroke she makes and emails the

details to him. •  How private investigators get information about your company, andabout you personally, that I can practically guarantee will send a chill

up your spine. You might think as you read some of the stories in Parts 2 and 3 that

they're not possible, that no one could really succeed in getting away with

the lies, dirty tricks, and schemes de, scribed in these pages. The reality is

that in every case, these stories depict events that can and do happen;

many of them are happening every day somewhere on the planet, maybe

even to your business as you read this book. 

The material in this book will be a real eye-opener when it comes to

protecting your business, but also personally deflecting the advances of a

social engineer to protect the integrity of information in your private life.In Part 4 of this book I switch gears. My goal here is to help you create

the necessary business policies and awareness training to minimize the

chances of your employees ever being duped by a social engineer.

Understanding the strategies, methods, and tactics of the social engineer

will help prepare you to deploy reasonable controls to safeguard your IT

assets, without undermining your company's productivity.In short, I've written this book to raise your awareness about the serious

threat posed by social engineering, and to help you make sure that your

company and its employees are less likely to be exploited in this way.Or perhaps I should say, far less likely to be exploited ever again.

 

Part 2

The Art Of The Attacker

Chapter 2

When Innocuous Information Isn't What do most people think is the real threat from social engineers? What

should you do to be on your guard?If the goal is to capture some highly valuable prize--say, a vital

component of the company's intellectual capital - then perhaps what's

needed is, figuratively,  just a stronger vault and more heavily armed

guards. Right? But in reality penetrating a company's security often starts with the bad

guy obtaining some piece of information or some document that seems so

innocent, so everyday and unimportant, that most people in the

organization wouldn't  see any reason why the item should be protected

and restrictedHIDDEN VALUE OF INFORMATION 

Much of the seemingly innocuous information in a company's possession

is prized

by a social engineering attacker because it can play a vital role in his

effort to dress himself in a cloak of believability. Throughout these pages, I'm going to show you how social engineers do

what they do by letting you "witness" the attacks for yourself--sometimes

presenting the action from the viewpoint of the people being victimized,

allowing you to put yourself in their shoes and gauge how you yourself

(or maybe one of your employees or co-workers) might have responded.

In many cases you'll also experience the same events from the perspective

of the social engineer. The first story looks at a vulnerability in the financial industry.  

CREDITCHEX 

For a long time, the British put up with a very stuffy banking system. As

an ordinary, upstanding citizen, you couldn't walk in off the street and

open a bank account. No, the bank wouldn't consider accepting you as a

customer unless some person already well established as a customer

provided you with a letter of recommendation.Quite a difference, of course, in the seemingly egalitarian bankingworld of today. And our modern ease of doing business is nowhere more

in evidence than in friendly, democratic America, where almost anyone

can walk into a bank and easily open a checking account, right? Well, not

exactly. The truth is that banks understandably have a natural reluctance

to open. an account for somebody who just might have a history of

writing bad checks--that would be about as welcome as a rap sheet of

bank robbery or embezzlement charges. So it's standard practice at many

banks to get a quick thumbs-up or thumbs-down on a prospective new

customer. One of the major companies that banks contract with for this information

is an outfit we'll call CreditChex. They provide a valuable service to their

clients, but like many companies, can also unknowingly provide a handy

service to knowing social engineers. The First Call: Kim Andrews

"National Bank, this is Kim. Did you want to open an account today?" 

"Hi,  Kim. I have a question for you. Do you guys use CreditChex?" 

"Yes." 

"When you phone in to CreditChex, what do you call the number you give

them--is it a 'Merchant ID'?" A pause; she was weighing the question, wondering what this was about

and whether she should answer. The caller quickly continued without missing a beat:"Because, Kim, I'm working on a book. It deals with private

investigations." 

"Yes," she said, answering the question with new confidence, pleased tobe helping a writer. 

"So it's called a Merchant ID, right?" 

"Uh huh."  

"Okay, great. Because I wanted to male sure I had the lingo right. For the

book. Thanks for your help. Good-bye, Kim." The Second Call: Chris Talbert

"National Bank, New Accounts, this is Chris." 

"Hi,  Chris. This is Alex," the caller said. "I'm a customer service rep

with CreditChex. We're doing a survey to improve our services. Can you

spare me a couple of minutes?" She was glad to, and the caller went on: "Okay - what are the hours your branch is open for business?" She

answered, and continued answering his string of questions. 

"How many employees at your branch use our service?" 

"How often do you call us with an inquiry?" 

"Which of our 800-numbers have we assigned you for calling us?" 

"Have our representatives always been courteous?" 

"How's our response time?" 

"How long have you been with the bank?" 

"What Merchant ID are you currently using?" 

"Have you ever found any inaccuracies with the information we'veprovided you?" "If you had any suggestions for improving our service, what would theybe?" And: "Would you be willing to fill out periodic questionnaires if we send themto your branch?" She agreed, they chatted a bit, the caller rang off, and Chris went back to

work. The Third Call: Henry McKinsey

"CreditChex, this is Henry McKinsey, how can I help you?" The caller said he was from National Bank. He gave the proper Merchant

ID and then gave the name and social security number of the person he

was looking for information on. Henry asked for the birth date, and the

caller gave that, too. 

 

After a few moments, Henry read the listing from his computer screen. "Wells Fargo reported NSF in 1998, one time, amount of $2,066." NSF –

non sufficient funds - is the familiar banking lingo for checks that have

been written when there isn't enough money in the account to cover them. 

"Any activities since then?" 

"No activities." 

"Have there been any other inquiries?" 

"Let's see. Okay, two of them, both last month. Third United Credit Union

of Chicago." He stumbled over the next name, Schenectady Mutual

Investments, and had to spell it. "That's in New York State," he added. Private Investigator at Work 

All three of those calls were made by the same person: a private

investigator we'll call Oscar Grace. Grace had a new client, one of his

first. A cop until a few months before, he found that some of this new

work came naturally, but some offered a challenge to his resources and

inventiveness. This one came down firmly in the challenge category. The hardboiled private eyes of fiction - the Sam Spades and the Philip

Marlowes - spend long night time hours sitting in cars waiting to catch a

cheating spouse. Real-life PIs do the same. They also do a less written

about, but no less important kind of snooping for warring spouses, a

method that leans more heavily on social engineering skills than on

fighting off the boredom of night time vigils. Grace's new client was a lady who looked as if she had a pretty

comfortable budget for clothes and jewelry. She walked into his office

one day and took a seat in the leather chair, the only one that didn't have

papers piled on it. She settled her large Gucci handbag on his desk with

the logo turned to face him and announced she was planning to tell her

husband that she wanted a divorce, but admitted to "just a very little

problem." It seemed her hubby was one step ahead. He had already pulled the cash

out of their savings account and an even larger sum from their brokerage

account. She wanted to know where their assets had been squirreled away,

and her divorce lawyer wasn't any help at all. Grace surmised the lawyer

was one of those uptown, high-rise counselors who wouldn't get his hands

dirty on something messy like where did the money go. 

Could Grace help? 

He assured her it would be a breeze, quoted a fee, expenses billed at cost,

and collected a check for the first payment. Then he faced his problem. What do you do if you've never handled a

piece of work like this before and don't quite know how to go about

tracking down a money trail? You move forward by baby steps. Here,

accord- mg to our source, is Grace's story. I knew about CreditChex and how banks used the outfit - my ex-wife used

to work at a bank. But I didn't know the lingo and procedures, and trying

to ask my ex- would be a waste of time. Step one: Get the terminology straight and figure out how to make the

request so it sounds like I know what I'm talking about. At the bank I

called, the first young lady, Kim, was suspicious when I asked about how

they identify themselves when they phone CreditChex. She hesitated; she

didn't know whether to tell me. Was I put off by that? Not a bit. In fact,

the hesitation gave me an important clue, a sign that I had to supply a

reason she'd find believable. When I worked the con on her about doing

research for a book, it relieved her suspicions. You say you're an author or

a movie writer, and everybody opens up. She had other knowledge that would have helped - things like what

reformation CreditChex requires to identify the person you're calling

about, what information you can ask for, and the big one, what was Kim's

bank Merchant ID number. I was ready to ask those questions, but her

hesitation sent up the red flag. She bought the book research story, but she

already had a few niggling suspicions. If she'd been more willing right

way, I would have asked her to reveal more details about their procedures.LINGO  

MARK: The victim of a con. 

BURN THE SOURCE: An attacker is said to have burned the source

when he allows a victim to recognize that an attack has taken place. Once

the victim becomes aware and notifies other employees or management of

the attempt, it becomes extremely difficult to exploit the same source in

future attacks.

You have to go on gut instinct, listen closely to what the mark is saying

and how she's saying it. This lady sounded smart enough for alarm bells

to start going off if I asked too many unusual questions. And even though

she didn't know who I was or what number I was calling from, still in this  

business you never want anybody putting out the word to be on the look

out for someone calling to get information about the business. That’s

because you don't want to burn the source - you may want to call same

office back another time. I'm always on the watch for little signs that give me a read on how

cooperative a person is, on a scale that runs from "You sound like a nice

person and I believe everything you're saying" to "Call the cops, alert the

National Guard, this guy's up to no good." I read Kim as a little bit on edge, so I just called somebody at a different

branch. On my second call with Chris, the survey trick played like a

charm. The tactic here is to slip the important questions in among

inconsequential ones that are used to create a sense of believability.

Before I dropped the question about the Merchant ID number with

CreditChex, I ran a little last-minute test by asking her a personal question

about how long she'd been with the bank. A personal question is like a land mine - some people step right over it

and never notice; for other people, it blows up and sends them scurrying

for safety. So if I ask a personal question and she answers the question

and the tone of her voice doesn't change, that means she probably isn't

skeptical about the nature of the request. I can safely ask the sought after

question without arousing her suspicions, and she'll probably give me the

answer I'm looking for. One more thing a good PI knows: Never end the conversation after getting

the key information. Another two or three questions, a little chat, and then

it's okay to say good-bye. Later, if the victim remembers anything about

what you asked, it will probably be the last couple of questions. The rest

will usually be forgotten. So Chris gave me their Merchant ID number, and the phone number they

call to make requests. I would have been happier if I had gotten to ask

some questions about how much information you can get from

CreditChex. But it was better not to push my luck. It was like having a blank check on CreditChex. I could now call and get

information whenever I wanted. I didn't even have to pay for the service.

As it turned out, the CreditChex rep was happy to share exactly the

information I wanted: two places my client's husband had recently applied

to open an account. So where were the assets his soon-to-be ex-wife was

looking for? Where else but at the banking institutions the guy at

CreditChex listed? 

 

Analyzing the Con 

This entire ruse was based on one of the fundamental tactics of social

engineering: gaining access to information that a company employee

treats as innocuous, when it isn't. The first bank clerk confirmed the terminology to describe the identifying

number used when calling CreditChex: the Merchant ID. The second

provided the phone number for calling CreditChex, and the most vital

piece of information, the bank's Merchant ID number. All this information

appeared to the clerk to be innocuous. After all, the bank clerk thought

she was talking to someone from CreditChex -so what could be the harm

in disclosing the number? All of this laid the groundwork for the third call. Grace had everything he

needed to phone CreditChex, pass himself off as a rep from one of their

customer banks, National, and simply ask for the information he was

after. With as much skill at stealing information as a good swindler has at

stealing your money, Grace had well-honed talents for reading people. He

knew the common tactic of burying the key questions among innocent

ones. He knew a personal question would test the second clerk's

willingness to cooperate, before innocently asking for the Merchant ID

number. The first clerk's error in confirming the terminology for the CreditChex ID

number would be almost impossible to protect against. The information is

so widely known within the banking industry that it appears to be

unimportant - the very model of the innocuous. But the second clerk,

Chris, should not have been so willing to answer questions without

positively verifying that the caller was really who he claimed to be. She

should, at the very least, have taken his name and number and called

back; that way, if any questions arose later, she may have kept a record of

what phone number the person had used. In this case, making a call like

that would have made it much more difficult for the attacker to

masquerade as a representative from CreditChex. MITNICK MESSAGE

A Merchant ID in this situation is analogous to a password. If bank

personnel treated it like an ATM PIN, they might appreciate the sensitive

nature of the information. Is there an internal code or number in your

organization that people aren't treating with enough care? 

Better still would have been a call to CreditChex using a nun bank already

had on record - not a number provided by the caller – to verify that the

person really worked there, and that the company was really doing a

customer survey. Given the practicalities of the real world and the time

pressures that most people work under today, though, this kind of

verification phone call is a lot to expect, except when an employee is

suspicious that some kind of attack is being made. THE ENGINEER TRAP 

It is widely known that head-hunter firms use social engineering to recruit

corporate talent. Here's an example of how it can happen. In the late 1990s, a not very ethical employment agency signed a new

client, a company looking for electrical engineers with experience in the

telephone industry. The honcho on the project was a lady endowed with a

throaty voice and sexy manner that she had learned to use to develop

initial trust and rapport over the phone. The lady decided to stage a raid on a cellular phone service provider to

see if she could locate some engineers who might be tempted to walk

across the street to a competitor. She couldn't exactly call the switch board

and say, "Let me talk to anybody with five years of engineering

experience." Instead, for reasons that will become clear in a moment, she

began the talent assault by seeking a piece of information that appeared to

have no sensitivity at all, information that company people give out to

almost anybody who asks. The First Call: The receptionist

The attacker, using the name Didi Sands, placed a call to the corporate

offices of the cellular phone service. In part, the conversation went like

this: Receptionist: Good afternoon. This is Marie, how may I help you? 

Didi: Can you connect me to the Transportation Department? R:  I'm not sure if we have one, I'll look in my directory. Who's calling? D:  It's Didi. 

R:  Are you in the building, or... ? 

D:  No, I'm outside the building. 

 

R:   Didi who? 

D: Didi Sands. I had the extension for Transportation, but I forgot whatit was. R:   One moment. To allay suspicions, at this point Didi asked a casual, just making

conversation question designed to establish that she was on the "inside,"

familiar with company locations. D:  What building are you in - Lakeview or Main Place? 

R:   Main Place. (pause) It's 805 555 6469. To provide herself with a backup in case the call to Transportation didn't

provide what she was looking for, Didi said she also wanted to talk to

Real Estate. The receptionist gave her that number, as well. When Didi

asked to be connected to the Transportation number, the receptionist tried,

but the line was busy. At that point Didi asked for a third phone number, for Accounts

Receivable, located at a corporate facility in Austin, Texas. The

receptionist asked her to wait a moment, and went off the line. Reporting

to Security that she had a suspicious phone call and thought there was

something fishy going on? Not at all, and Didi didn't have the least bit of

concern. She was being a bit of a nuisance, but to the receptionist it was

all part of a typical workday. After about a minute, the receptionist came

back on the line, looked up the Accounts Receivable number, tried it, and

put Didi through. The Second Call: Peggy

The next conversation went like this: Peggy: Accounts Receivable, Peggy. 

Didi:    Hi, Peggy. This is Didi, in Thousand Oaks. 

P:   Hi, Didi. 

D:  How ya doing? 

P:   Fine. Didi then used a familiar term in the corporate world that describes the

charge code for assigning expenses against the budget of a specific

organization or workgroup: 

D: Excellent. I have a question for you. How do I find out the cost centerfor a particular department? P:   You'd have to get a hold of the budget analyst for the department. 

D:     Do you know who'd be the budget analyst

for Thousand Oaks - headquarters? I'm trying to

fill out a form and I don't know the proper cost

center. 

P:I just know when y'all need a cost center number, you call yourbudget analyst. 

D:     Do you have a cost center for your department there in   Texas? 

P:We have our own cost center but they don't give us a complete list ofthem. 

D:How many digits is the cost center? FOr example, what's your costcenter? 

P:     Well, like, are you with 9WC or with SAT? Didi had no idea what departments or groups these referred to, but it

didn't matter. She answered: D:     9WC. 

P:     Then it's usually four digits. Who did you say you were with? 

D:     Headquarters--Thousand Oaks. 

P:Well, here's one for Thousand Oaks. It's 1A5N, that's N like inNancy. By just hanging out long enough with somebody willing to be helpful,Didi had the cost center number she needed - one of those pieces of

information that no one thinks to protect because it seems like something

that couldn't be of any value to an outsider. The Third Call: A Helpful Wrong Number 

Didi's next step would be to parlay the cost center number into something

of real value by using it as a poker chip. She began by calling the Real Estate department, pretending she had

reached a wrong number. Starting with a "Sorry to bother you, but .... "

she claimed she was an employee who had lost her company directory,

and asked who you were supposed to call to get a new copy. The man said

the print copy was out of date because it was available on the company

intranet site. 

Didi said she preferred using a hard copy, and the man told her to call

Publications, and then, without being asked - maybe just to keep the sexy-

sounding lady on the phone a little longer - helpfully looked up the

number and gave it to her. 

 

The Fourth Call: Bart in PublicationsIn Publications, she spoke with a man named Bart. Didi said she was from

Thousand Oaks, and they had a new consultant who needed a copy of the

company directory. She told him a print copy would work better for the

consultant, even if it was somewhat out of date. Bart told her she'd have to

fill out a requisition form and send the form over to him.Didi said she was out of forms and it was a rush, and could Bart be a

sweetheart and fill out the form for her? He agreed with a little too much

enthusiasm, and Didi gave him the details. For the address of the fictional

contractor, she drawled the number of what social engineers call a mail

drop, in this case a Mail Boxes Etc.-type of commercial business where

her company rented boxes for situations just like this.The earlier spadework now came in handy: There would be a charge for

the cost and shipping of the directory. Fine - Didi gave the cost center for

Thousand Oaks:"IA5N, that's N like in Nancy."A few days later, when the corporate directory arrived, Didi found it was

an even bigger payoff than she had expected: It not only listed the names

and phone numbers, but also showed who worked for whom - the

corporate structure of the whole organization.The lady of the husky voice was ready to start making her head-hunter,

people-raiding phone calls. She had conned the information she needed to

launch her raid using the gift of gab honed to a high polish by every

skilled social engineer. Now she was ready for the payoff.LINGO

MAIL DROP: The social engineer’s term for a rental mailbox, typically

rented under an assumed name, which is used to deliver documents or

packages the victim has been duped into sendingMITNICK MESSAGE

Just like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, each piece of information may be

irrelevant by itself. However, when the pieces are put together, a clear

picture emerges. In this I case, the picture the social engineer saw was the

entire internal structure of the company .

Analyzing the Con

In this social engineering attack, Didi started by getting phone numbers

for three departments in the target company. This was easy, because the

numbers she was asking for were no secret, especially to employees. A

social engineer learns to sound like an insider, and Didi was skilled at this

game. One of the phone numbers led her to a cost center number, which

she then used to obtain a copy of the firm's employee directory. 

The main tools she needed: sounding friendly, using some corporate

lingo, and, with the last victim, throwing in a little verbal eyelash-batting. And one more tool, an essential element not easily acquired - the

manipulative skills of the social engineer, refined through extensive

practice and the unwritten lessons of bygone generations of confidence

men.MORE "WORTHLESS" INFO 

Besides a cost center number and internal phone extensions, what other

seemingly useless information can be extremely valuable to your enemy?.Peter Abel’s Phone Call

"Hi," the voice at the other end of the line says. "This is Tom at Parkhurst

Travel. Your tickets to San Francisco are ready. Do you want us to deliver

them, or do you want to pick them up?" 

"San Francisco?" Peter says. "I'm not going to San Francisco." "Is this

Peter Abels?" 

"Yes, but I don't have any trips coming up." 

"Well," the caller says with a friendly laugh, "you sure you don't want togo to San Francisco?" "If you think you can talk my boss into it..." Peter says, playing alongwith the friendly conversation. "Sounds like a mix-up," the caller says. "On our system, we book travel

arrangements under the employee number. Maybe somebody used the

wrong number. What's your employee number?" Peter obligingly recites his number. And why not? It goes on just about

every personnel form he fills out, lots of people in the company have

access to it - human resources, payroll, and, obviously, the outside travel

agency. No one treats an employee number like some sort of secret. What

difference could it make? 

 

The answer isn't hard to figure out. Two or three pieces of information

might be all it takes to mount an effective impersonation - the social

engineer cloaking himself in someone else's identity. Get hold of an

employee's name, his phone number, his employee number--and maybe,

for good measure, his manager's name and phone number--and a halfway-

competent social engineer is equipped with most of what he's likely to

need to sound authentic to the next target he calls. If someone who said he was from another department in your company

had called yesterday, given a plausible reason, and asked for your

employee number, would you have had any reluctance in giving it to him?And by the way, what is your social security number? MITNICK MESSAGE

The moral of the story is, don't give out any personal or internal company

information or identifiers to anyone, unless his or her voice is

recognizable and the requestor has a need to know. PREVENTING THE CON 

Your company has a responsibility to make employees aware of how a

serious mistake can occur from mishandling non public information. A

well thought-out information security policy, combined with proper

education and training, will dramatically increase employee awareness

about the proper handling of corporate business information. A data

classification policy will help you to implement proper controls with

respect to disclosing information. Without a data classification policy, all

internal information must be considered confidential, unless otherwise

specified. Take these steps to protect your company from the release of seemingly

innocuous information: The Information Security Department needs to conduct awareness training

detailing the methods used by social engineers. One method, as described

above, is to obtain seemingly non sensitive information and use it as a

poker chip to gain short-term trust. Each and every employee needs to be

aware that when a caller has knowledge about company procedures, lingo,

and internal identifiers it does not in any way, shape, or form authenticate

the requestor or authorize him or her as having a need to know. A caller

could be a former employee or 

 

contractor with the requisite insider information. Accordingly, each

corporation has a responsibility to determine the appropriate

authentication method to be used when employees interact with people

they don't recognize in person or over the telephone.The person or persons with the role and responsibility of drafting a data

classification policy should examine the types of details that may be used

to gain access for legitimate employees that seem innocuous, but could

lead to information that is, sensitive. Though you'd never give out the

access codes for your ATM card, would you tell somebody what server

you use to develop company software products? Could that information

be used by a person pretending to be somebody who has legitimate access

to the corporate network?Sometimes just knowing inside terminology can make the social engineer

appear authoritative and knowledgeable. The attacker often relies on this

common misconception to dupe his or her victims into compliance. For

example, a Merchant ID is an identifier that people in the New Accounts

department of a bank casually use every day. But such an identifier

exactly the same as a password. If each and every employee understands

the nature of this identifier - that it is used to positively authenticate a

requestor--they might treat it with more respect.MITNICK MESSAGE

As the old adage goes - even real paranoids probably have enemies. We

must assume that every business has its enemies, too - attackers that target

the network infrastructure to compromise business secrets. Don't end up

being a statistic on computer crime - it's high time to shore up the

necessary defenses by implementing proper controls through well-

thought-out security policies and procedures.No companies - well, very few, at least - give out the direct dial phone

numbers of their CEO or board chairman. Most companies, though, have

no concern about giving out phone numbers to most departments and

workgroups in the, organization - especially to someone who is, or

appears to be, an employee. A possible countermeasure: Implement a

policy 

that prohibits giving internal phone numbers of employees, contractors,

consultants, and temps to outsiders. More importantly, develop a step-by-

step procedure to positively identify whether a caller asking for phone

numbers is really an employee.Accounting codes for workgroups and departments, as well as copies of

the corporate directory (whether hard copy, data file, or electronic phone

book on the intranet) are frequent targets of social engineers. Every

company needs a written, well-publicized policy on disclosure of this type

of information. The safeguards should include maintaining an audit log

that records instances when sensitive information is disclosed to people

outside of the company.Information such as an employee number, by itself, should not be used as

any sort of authentication. Every employee must be trained to verify not

just the identity of a requestor, but also the requestor's need to know.In your security training, consider teaching employees this approach:

Whenever asked a question or asked for a favor by a stranger, learn first

to politely decline until the request can be verified. Then - before giving

in to the natural desire to be Mr. or Ms. Helpful - follow company policies

and procedures with respect to verification and disclosure of non public

information. This style may go against our natural tendency to help

others, but a little healthy paranoia may be necessary to avoid being the

social engineer's next dupe.As the stories in this chapter have shown, seemingly innocuous

information can be the key to your company's most prized secrets.

Chapter 3The Direct Attack: Just Asking for It

Many social engineering attacks are intricate, involving a number of steps

and elaborate planning, combining a mix of manipulation and

technological know-how.But I always find it striking that a skillful social engineer can often

achieve his goal with a simple, straightforward, direct attack. Just asking

outright for the information may be all that's needed - as you'll see.AN MLAC QUICKIE

Want to know someone's unlisted phone number? A social engineer can

tell you half a dozen ways (and you'll find some of them described in

other stories in these pages), but probably the simplest scenario is one that

uses a single phone call, like this one.Number, Please

The attacker dialed the private phone company number for the MLAC, the

Mechanized Line Assignment Center. To the woman who answered, he

said:"Hey, this is Paul Anthony. I'm a cable splicer. Listen, a terminal box out

here got fried in a fire. Cops think some creep tried to burn his own house

down for the insurance. They got me out here alone trying to rewire this

entire two hundred-pair terminal. I could really use some help right now.

What facilities should be working at 6723 South Main?"

In other parts of the phone company, the person called would know that

reverse lookup information on non pub (non published) numbers is

supposed to be given out only to authorized phone company MLAC is

supposed to be known only to company employees. And while they'd

never give out information to the public, who would want to refuse a little

help to a company man coping with that heavy-duty assignment?.  She

feels sorry for him, she's had bad days on the job herself, and she’ll

bend the rules a little to help out a fellow employee with a problem. She

gives him the cable and pairs and each working number assigned to the

address. MITNICK MESSAGE

It's human nature to trust our fellow man, especially when the request

meets the test of being reasonable. Social engineers use this knowledge to

exploit their victims and to achieve their goals.Analyzing the Con 

As you'll notice repeatedly in these stories, knowledge of a company’s

lingo, and of its corporate structure - its various offices and departments

what each does and what information each has - is part of the essential

bag of tricks of the successful social engineer. 

 YOUNG MAN ON THE RUN 

A man we'll call Frank Parsons had been on the run for years, still wanted

by the federal government for being part of an underground antiwar group

in the 1960s. In restaurants he sat facing the door and he had a way of

glancing over his shoulder every once in a while that other people found

disconcerting. He moved every few years. At one point Frank landed in a city he didn't know, and set about job

hunting. For someone like Frank, with his well-developed computer skills

(and social engineering skills as well, even ,though he never listed those

on a job application), finding a good job usually wasn't a problem. Except

in times when the economy is very tight, people with good technical

computer knowledge usually find their talents in high demand and they

have little problem landing on their feet. Frank quickly located a well –

paying job opportunity at a large, upscale, long-term care facility near

where he was living.

 

 

Just the ticket, he thought. But when he started plodding his way through

the application forms, he came upon an uh-oh: The employer required the

applicant to provide a copy of his state criminal history record, which he

had to obtain himself from the state police. The stack of employment

papers included a form to request this document, and the form had a little

box for providing a fingerprint. Even though they were asking for a print

of just the right index finger, if they matched his print with one in the

FBI's database, he'd probably soon be working in food service at a

federally funded resort. On the other hand, it occurred to Frank that maybe, just maybe, he might

still be able to get away with this. Perhaps the state didn't send those

fingerprint samples to the FBI at all. How could he find out? How? He was a social engineer--how do you think he found out? He

placed a phone call to the state patrol: "Hi. We're doing a study for the

State Department of Justice. We're researching the requirements to

implement a new fingerprint identification system. Can I talk to

somebody there that's really familiar with what you're doing who could

maybe help us out?" And when the local expert came on the phone, Frank asked a series of

questions about what systems they were using, and the capabilities to

search and store fingerprint data. Had they had any equipment problems?

Were they tied into the National Crime Information Center's (NCIC)

Fingerprint Search or just within the state? Was the equipment pretty easy

for everybody to learn to use? Slyly, he sneaked the key question in among the rest. The answer was music to his ears: No they weren't tied into the NCIC,

they only checked against the state's Criminal Information Index (CII). MITNICK MESSGAE

Savvy information swindlers have no qualms about ringing up federal,

state, or local government officials to learn about the procedures of law

enforcement. With such information in hand, the social engineer may be

able to circumvent your company's standard security checks. 

 

That was all Frank needed to know. He didn't have any record in that

state, so he submitted his application, was hired for the job, and nobody

ever showed up at his desk one day with the greeting, "These gentlemen,

are from the FBI and they'd like to have a little talk with you." And, according to him, he proved to be a model employee. ON THE DOORSTEP 

In spite of the myth of the paperless office, companies continue to print

out reams of paper every day. Information in print at your company may

be vulnerable, even if you use security precautions and stamp it

confidential. Here's one story that shows you how social engineers might obtain your

most secret documents. Loop-Around Deception 

Every year the phone company publishes a volume called the Test

Number Directory (or at least they used to, and because I am still on

supervised release, I'm not going to ask if they still do). This document

was highly prized by phone phreaks because it was packed with a list of

all the closely guarded phone numbers used by company craftsmen,

technicians, a others for things like trunk testing or checking numbers that

always ring busy. One of these test numbers, known in the lingo as a loop-around, was

particularly useful. Phone phreaks used it as a way to find other phone

phreaks to chat with, at no cost to them. Phone phreaks also used it a way

to create a call back number to give to, say, a bank. A social engineer

would tell somebody at the bank the phone number to call to reach at his

office. When the bank called back to the test number (loop-around) the

phone phreak would be able to receive the call, yet he had the protection

of having used a phone number that could not be traced back to him. A Test Number Directory provided a lot of neat information that could be

used by any information-hungry, testosteroned, phone phreak. So when

the new directories were published each year, they were coveted by a lot

of youngsters whose hobby was exploring the telephone network. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Security training with respect to company policy designed to protect

information assets needs to be for everyone in the company, not just any

employee who has electronic or physical access to the company's IT

assets. Stevie’s Scam 

Naturally phone companies don't make these books easy to get hold of, so

phone phreaks have to be creative to get one. How can they do this? An

eager youngster with a mind bent on acquiring the directory might enact a

scenario like this. Late one day, a mild evening in the southern California autumn, a guy I'll

call him Stevie phones a small telephone company central office, which is

the building from which phone lines run to all the homes and businesses

in the established service area. When the switchman on duty answers the call, Stevie announces that he's

from the division of the phone company that publishes and distributes

printed materials. "We have your new Test Number Directory," he says.

"But for security reasons, we cant deliver your copy until we pick up the

old one. And the delivery guy is running late. If you wanna leave your

copy just outside your door, he can swing by, pick up yours, drop the new

one and be on his way." The unsuspecting switchman seems to think that sounds reasonable. He

does exactly as asked, putting out on the doorstep of the building his copy

of the directory, its cover clearly marked in big red letters with the

"COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL - WHEN NO LONGER NEEDEDTHIS DOCUMENT MUST BE SHREDDED." Stevie drives by and looks around carefully to spot any cops or phone

company security people who might be lurking behind trees or watching

for him from parked cars. Nobody in sight. He casually picks up the

coveted directory and drives away.Here's just one more example of how easy it can be for a social engineer

to get what he wants by following the simple principle of "just ask for it." 

 

GAS ATTACK

Not only company assets are at risk in a social engineering scenario.

Sometimes it's a company's customers who are the victims.Working as a customer-service clerk brings its share of frustrations, its

share of laughs, and its share of innocent mistakes - some of which can

have unhappy consequences for a company's customers.Janie Acton's Story

Janie Acton had been manning a cubicle as a customer service rep f

Hometown Electric Power, in Washington, D.C., for just over three years.

She was considered to be one of the better clerks, smart and conscientiousIt was Thanksgiving week when this one particular call came in. The

caller, said, "This is Eduardo in the Billing Department. I've got a lady on

hold, she's a secretary in the executive offices that works for one of the

vice presidents, and she's asking for some information and I can't use my

computer I got an email from this girl in Human Resources that said

'ILOVEYOU.’ and when I opened the attachment, I couldn't use my

machine any more. A virus. I got caught by a stupid virus. Anyways,

could you look up some customer information for me?"

"Sure," Janie answered. "It crashed your computer? That's terrible."

"Yeah."

"How can I help?" Janie asked.Here the attacker called on information from his advance research to

make himself sound authentic. He had learned that the information he,

wanted was stored in something called the Customer Billing Information

System, and he had found out how employees referred to the system. He

asked, "Can you bring up an account on CBIS?""Yes, what's the account number.? "

"I don't have the number; I need you to bring it up by name."

"Okay, what's the name?"

"It's Heather Marning." He spelled the name, and Janie typed it in.

"Okay, I have it up."

"Great. Is the account current?"

"Uh huh, it's current."

"What's the account number?" he asked.

"Do you have a pencil?"

 

 "Ready to write." 

"Account number BAZ6573NR27Q." 

He read the number back and then said, "And what's the serviceaddress?" She gave him the address. 

"And what's the phone?" 

Janie obligingly read off that information, too. The caller thanked her, said good-bye, and hung up. Janie went on to the

next call, never thinking further about it. Art Sealy's Research Project 

Art Sealy had given up working as a freelance editor for small publishing

houses when he found he could make more money doing research for

writers and businesses. He soon figured out that the fee he could charge

went up in proportion to how close the assignment took him to the

sometimes hazy line between the legal and the illegal. Without ever

realizing it, certainly without ever giving it a name, Art became a social

engineer, using techniques familiar to every information broker. He

turned out to have a native talent for the business, figuring out for himself

techniques that most social engineers had to learn from others. After a

while, he crossed the line without the least twinge of guilt. A man contacted me who was writing a book about the Cabinet in the

Nixon years, and was looking for a researcher who could get the inside

scoop on William E. Simon, who had been Nixon's Treasury secretary.

Mr. Simon had died, but the author had the name of a woman who had

been on his staff. He was pretty sure she still lived in D.C., but hadn't

been able to get an address. She didn't have a telephone in her name, or at

least none that was listed. So that's when he called me. I told him, sure, no

problem. This is the kind of job you can usually bring off in a phone call or two, if

you know what you're doing. Every local utility company can generally

be counted on to give the information away. Of course, you have to BS a

little. But what's a little white lie now and then - right? I like to use a different approach each time, just to keep things interesting.

"This is so-and-so in the executive offices" has always worked well for

me. So has "I've got somebody on the line from Vice President

Somebody's office," which worked this time, too. 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Never think all social engineering attacks need to be

elaborate ruses so complex that they're likely to be

recognized before they can be completed. Some are in- and-

out, strike-and-disappear, very simple attacks that are no

more than.., well, just asking for it. You have to sort of develop the social engineer's instinct, get a sense of

how cooperative the person on the other end is going to be with you. This

time I lucked out with a friendly, helpful lady. In a single phone call, I had

the address and phone number. Mission accomplished. Analyzing the Con 

Certainly Janie knew that customer information is sensitive. She would 

never discuss one customer's account with another customer, or give out 

private information to the public. But naturally, for a caller from within the company, different rules apply. For a fellow employee it's all about being a team player and helping each 

other get the job done. The man from Billing could have looked up the details himself if his computer hadn't been down with a virus, and she wasglad to be able to help a co-worker. Art built up gradually to the key information he was really after, asking questions  along the way about things he didn't really need, such as the 

account number. Yet at the same time, the account number information 

provided a fallback: If the clerk had become suspicious, he'd call asecond time and stand a better chance of success, because knowing the account 

number would make him sound all the more authentic to the next clerk 

he reached. It never occurred to Janie that somebody might actually lie about something  like this, that the caller might not really be from the billingdepartment 

at all. Of course, the blame doesn't lie at Janie's feet. She wasn't well versed in the rule about making sure you know who you're talking to 

before discussing information in a customer's file. Nobody had ever told 

her about the danger of a phone call like the one from Art. It wasn't in the

company policy, it wasn't part of her training, and her supervisor had 

never mentioned it.  

PREVENTING THE CON

A point to include in your security training: Just because a caller or visitor

knows the names of some people in the company, or knows some of the

corporate lingo or procedures, doesn't mean he is who he claims to be.

And it definitely doesn't establish him as anybody authorized to be given

internal information, or access to your computer system or network.Security training needs to emphasize: When in doubt, verify, verify,

verify.In earlier times, access to information within a company was a mark of

rank and privilege. Workers stoked the furnaces, ran the machines, typed

the letters, and filed the reports. The foreman or boss told them what to

do, when, and how. It was the foreman or boss who knew how many

widgets each worker should be producing on a shift, how many and in

what colors and sizes the factory needed to turn out this week, next week,

and by the end of the month.Workers handled machines and tools and materials, and bosses handled

information. Workers needed only the information specific to their

specific jobs.The picture is a little different today, isn't it? Many factory workers use

some form of computer or computer-driven machine. For a large part of

the workforce, critical information is pushed down to the users' desktops

so that they can fulfill their responsibility to get their work done. In

today's environment, almost everything employees do involves the

handling of information.That's why a company's security policy needs to be distributed enterprise-

wide, regardless of position. Everybody must understand that it's not just

the bosses and executives who have the information that an attacker might

be after. Today, workers at every level, even those who don't use a

computer, are liable to be targeted. The newly hired rep in the customer

service group may be just the weak link that a social engineer breaks to

achieve his objective.

Security training and corporate security policies need to strengthen that

link.

Chapter 4

Building Trust 

Some of these stories might lead you to think that I believe everyone in

business is a complete idiot, ready, even eager, to give away every secret

in his or her possession. The social engineer knows isn't true. Why are

social engineering attacks so successful? It isn't because people are stupid

or lack common sense. But we, as human beings are all vulnerable to

being deceived because people can misplace their trust if manipulated in

certain ways. The social engineer anticipates suspicion and resistance, and he's always

prepared to turn distrust into trust. A good social engineer plans his attack

like a chess game, anticipating the questions his target might ask so he can

be ready with the proper answers. One of his common techniques involves building a sense of trust on the

part of his victims. How does a con man make you trust him? Trust me,

he can.TRUST: THE KEY TO DECEPTION 

The more a social engineer can make his contact seem like business as

usual, the more he allays suspicion. When people don't have a reason to

be suspicious, it's easy for a social engineer to gain their trust. Once he's got your trust, the drawbridge is lowered and the castle door

thrown open so he can enter and take whatever information he wants. 

NOTE

You may notice I refer to social engineers, phone phreaks, and con-

game operators as 'he" through most of these stories. This is not

chauvinism; it simply reflects the truth that most practitioners in

these fields are male. But though there aren’t many women social

engineers, the number is growing. There are enough female social

engineers out there that you shouldn’t let your guard down just

because you hear a women’s voice. In fact, female social engineers

have a distinct advantage because they can use their sexuality to

obtain cooperation. You’ll find a small number of the so-called

gentler sex represented in these pagesThe First Call: Andrea Lopez

Andrea Lopez answered the phone at the video rental store where she

worked, and in a moment was smiling: It's always a pleasure when a

customer takes the trouble to say he's happy about the service. This caller

said he had had a very good experience dealing with the store, and he

wanted to send the manager a letter about it. He asked for the manager's name and the mailing address, and she told

him it was Tommy Allison, and gave him the address. As he was about to

hang up, he had another idea and said, "I might want to write to your

company headquarters, too. What's your store number?" She gave him

that information, as well. He said thanks, added something pleasant about

how helpful she had been, and said goodbye. "A call like that," she thought, "always seems to make the shift go by

faster. How nice it would be if people did that more often." The Second Call: Ginny

"Thanks for calling Studio Video. This is Ginny, how can I help you?" 

"Hi,  Ginny," the caller said enthusiastically, sounding as if he talked to

Ginny every week or so. "It's Tommy Allison, manager at Forest Park,

Store 863. We have a customer in here who wants to rent Rocky 5 and

we're all out of copies. Can you check on what you've got?" 

She  came back on the line after a few moments and said, "Yeah, we've

got three copies." 

"Okay, I'll see if he wants to drive over there. Listen, thanks. If you ever

need any help from our store, just call and ask for Tommy. I'll be glad to

do whatever I can for you." 

 

Three or four times over the next couple of weeks, Ginny got calls from

Tommy for help with one thing or another. They were seemingly

legitimate requests, and he was always very friendly without sounding

like he was trying to come on to her. He was a little chatty along the way,

as well - "Did you hear about the big fire in Oak Park? Bunch of streets

closed over there," and the like. The calls were a little break from the

routine of the day, and Ginny was always glad to hear from him. One day Tommy called sounding stressed. He asked, "Have 

you guys been having trouble with your computers?" "No," Ginny answered. "Why?" 

"Some guy crashed his car into a telephone pole, and the phone company

repairman says a whole part of the city will lose their phones and Internet

connection till they get this fixed." 

"Oh, no. Was the man hurt?" 

"They took him away in an ambulance. Anyway, I could use a little help.

I've got a customer of yours here who wants to rent Godfather II and

doesn't have his card with him. Could you verify his information for me?"

"Yeah, sure." Tommy gave the customer's name and address, and Ginny 

found him in the computer. She gave Tommy the 

account number. 

"Any late returns or balance owed?" Tommy asked.

"Nothing showing." 

"Okay, great. I'll sign him up by hand for an account here and put it in our

database later on when the computers come back up again. And he wants

to put this charge on the Visa card he uses at your store, and he doesn't

have it with him. What's the card number and expiration date?" She gave it to him, along with the expiration date. Tommy said, "Hey,

thanks for the help. Talk to you soon," and hung up. Doyle Lonnegan's Story 

Lonnegan is not a young man you would want to find waiting when you

open your front door. A one-time collection man for bad gambling debts,

he still does an occasional favor, if it doesn't put him out very much. In

this case, he was offered a sizable bundle of cash for little more than

making 

 

some phone calls to a video store. Sounds easy enough. It's just that none

of his "customers" knew how to run this con; they needed somebody with

Lonnegan's talent and know-how. People don't write checks to cover their bets when they're unlucky orstupid 

at the poker table. Everybody knows that. Why did these friends of mine keep on playing with a cheat that didn't have green out on the table?Don't ask. Maybe they're a little light in the IQ department. But they're 

friends of mine--what can you do? 

This guy didn't have the money, so they took a check. I ask you! Should 

of drove him to an ATM machine, is what they should of done. But no, 

a check. For $3,230. 

Naturally, it bounced. What would you expect? So then they call me; 

can I help? I don't close doors on people's knuckles any more. Besides, 

there are better ways nowadays. I told them, 30 percent commission, I'd 

see what I could do. So they give me his name and address, and I go up 

on the computer to see what's the closest video store to him.   I wasn't in a big hurry. Four phone calls to cozy up to the store manager, and then, bingo, I've got the cheat's Visa card number.   Another friend of mine owns a topless bar. For fifty bucks, he put the guy's poker money through as a Visa charge from the bar. Let the cheat   explain that to his wife. You think he might try to tell Visa it's not his charge? Think again. He knows we know who he is. And if we could get 

his Visa number, he'll figure we could get a lot more besides. No worries 

on that score. Analyzing the Con 

Tommy's initial calls to Ginny were simply to build up trust. When time

came for the actual attack, she let her guard down and accepted Tommy

for who he claimed to be, the manager at another store in the chain. And why wouldn't she accept him--she already knew him. She'd onlymet him over the telephone, of course, but they had established a business

friendship that is the basis for trust. Once she had accepted him as an

authority figure, a manager in the same company, the trust had been

established and the rest was a walk in the park. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

The sting technique of building trust is one of the most effective social

engineering tactics. You have to think whether you really know the person

you're talking to. In some rare instances, the person might not be who he

claims to be. Accordingly, we all have to learn to observe, think, and

question authority. VARIATION ON A THEME: CARD CAPTURE  

Building a sense of trust doesn't necessarily demand a series of phone

calls with the victim, as suggested by the previous story. I recall one

incident I witnessed where five minutes was all it took. Surprise, Dad 

I once sat at a table in a restaurant with Henry and his father. In the course

of conversation, Henry scolded his father for giving out his credit card

number as if it were his phone number. "Sure, you have to give your card

number when you buy something," he said. "But giving it to a store that

files your number in their records - that's real dumb." The only place I do that is at Studio Video," Mr. Conklin said, naming

 the same chain of video stores. "But I go over my Visa bill every month.

If they started running up charges, I'd know it. 

Sure," said Henry, "but once they have your number, it's so easy for 

somebody to steal it " You mean a crooked employee." 

No, anybody - not just an employee." 

You're talking through your hat," Mr. Conklin said. 

I can call up right now and get them to tell me your Visa number," Henry

shot back. 

No, you can't, "his father said. 

"I can do it in five minutes, right here in front of you without ever leaving

 the table." 

Mr. Conklin looked tight around the eyes, the look of somebody feeling

sure of himself, but not wanting to show it. "I say you don't know  that

you're talking about," he barked, taking out his wallet and slapping  fifty

dollar bill down on the table. "If you can do what you say, that's 

yours.  

"I don't want your money, Dad," Henry said. 

He pulled out his cell phone, asked his father which branch he used, and

called Directory Assistance for the phone number, as well as the number

of the store in nearby Sherman Oaks. He then called the Sherman Oaks store. Using pretty much the same

approach described in the previous story, he quickly got the manager's

name and the store number. Then he called the store where his father had an account. He pulled the old impersonate-the-manager trick, using the manager's name as his own 

and giving the store number he had just obtained. Then he used the same 

ruse: "Are your computers working okay? Ours have been up and down."He listened to her reply and then said, "Well, look, I've got one of your 

customers here who wants to rent a video, but our computers are down 

right now. I need you to look up the customer account and make sure he'sa customer at your branch." 

Henry gave him his father's name. Then, using only a slight variation in 

technique, he made the request to read off the account information: 

address, phone number, and date the account was opened. And then he 

said, "Hey, listen, I'm holding up a long line of customers here. What'sthe 

  credit card number and expiration date?" Henry  held the cell phone to his ear with one hand while he wrote on a 

paper napkin with the other. As he finished the call, he slid the napkin in 

front of his father, who stared at it with his mouth hanging open. The to  poor guy looked totally shocked, as if his whole system of trust had

just gone down the drain. Analyzing the Con 

Think of your own attitude when somebody you don't know asks you for

something. If a shabby stranger comes to your door, you're not likely to

let him in; if a stranger comes to your door nicely dressed, shoes shined,

hair perfect, with polite manner and a smile, you're likely to be much less

suspicious. Maybe he's really Jason from the Friday the 13th movies, but

you're willing to start out trusting that person as long as he looks normal

and doesn't have a carving knife in his hand. 

What's less obvious is that we judge people on the telephone the same

way. Does this person sound like he's trying to sell me something? Is he

friendly and outgoing or do I sense some kind of hostility or pressure?

Does he or she have the speech of an educated person? We judge these

things and perhaps a dozen others unconsciously, in a flash, often in the

first few moments of the conversation. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

It's human nature to think that it's unlikely you're being deceived in any

particular transaction, at least until you have some reason to believe

otherwise. We weigh the risks and then, most of the time, give people the

benefit of the doubt. That's the natural behavior of civilized people.., at

least civilized people who have never been conned or manipulated or

cheated out of a large amount of money.

As children our parents taught us not to trust strangers. Maybe we should

all heed this age-old principle in today's workplace.At work, people make requests of us all the time. Do you have an email

address for this guy? Where's the latest version of the customer list?

Who's the subcontractor on this part of the project? Please send me the

latest project update. I need the new version of the source code.And guess what: Sometimes people who make those requests are people

your don't personally know, folks who work for some other part of the

company, or claim they do. But if the information they give checks out,

and they appear to be in the know ("Marianne said . . ."; "It's on the K-16

server..."; "... revision 26 of the new product plans"), we extend our circle

of trust to include them, and blithely give them what they're asking for.Sure, we may stumble a little, asking ourselves "Why does somebody in

the Dallas plant need to see the new product plans?" or "Could it hurt

anything to give out the name of the server it's on?" So we ask another

question or two. If the answers appear reasonable and the person's manner

is reassuring, we let down our guard, return to our natural inclination to

trust our fellow man or woman, and do (within reason) whatever it is

we're being asked to do.And don't think for a moment that the attacker will only target people 'ho

use company computer systems. What about the guy in the mail room?

"Will you do me a quick favor? Drop this into the intra company mail

pouch?" Does the mail room clerk know it contains a floppy disk with a

special little program for the CEO's secretary? Now that attacker gets his

own personal copy of the CEO's email. Wow! Could that really happen at

your company? The answer is, absolutely.THE ONE-CENT CELL PHONE

Many people look around until the); find a better deal; social engineers

don't look for a better deal, they find a way to make a deal better. For

example, sometimes a company launches a marketing campaign that's so

you can hardly bear to pass it up, while the social engineer looks at the

offer and wonders how he can sweeten the deal.

Not long ago, a nationwide wireless company had a major promotion

underway offering a brand-new phone for one cent when you signed up

for one of their calling plans. As lots of people have discovered too late, there are a good many

questions a prudent shopper should ask before signing up for a cell phone

calling plan whether the service is analog, digital, or a combination; the

number of anytime minutes you can use in a month; whether roaming

charges are included.., and on, and on. Especially important to understand

up front is the contract term of commitment--how many months or years

will you have to commit to? Picture a social engineer in Philadelphia who is attracted by a cheap

phone model offered by a cellular phone company on sign-up, but he

hates the calling plan that goes with it. Not a problem. Here's one way he

might handle the situation. The First Call: Ted

First, the social engineer dials an electronics chain store on West Girard. "Electron City. This is Ted." 

"Hi,  Ted. This is Adam. Listen, I was in a few nights ago talking to a

sales guy about a cell phone. I said I'd call him back when I decided on

the plan I wanted, and I forgot his name. Who's the guy who works in that

department on the night shift? 

"There's more than one. Was it William?" 

"I'm not sure. Maybe it was William. What's he look like?" "Tall guy.

Kind of skinny." 

"I think that's him. What's his last name, again? 

"Hadley. H--A--D--L--E-- Y." 

"Yeah, that sounds right. When's he going to be on?" 

"Don't know his schedule this week, but the evening people come in aboutfive." "Good. I'll try him this evening, then. Thanks, Ted." The Second Call: Katie

The next call is to a store of the same chain on North Broad Street. "Hi, Electron City. Katie speaking, how can I help you?" 

 

"Katie, hi. This is William Hadley, over at the West Girard store. How're

you today?" 

"Little slow, what's up?" 

"I've got a customer who came in for that one-cent cell phone program.You know the one I mean?" "Right. I sold a couple of those last week." 

"You still have some of the phones that go with that plan?" 

"Got a stack of them." 

"Great. 'Cause I just sold one to a customer. The guy passed credit; we

signed him up on the contract. I checked the damned inventory and we

don't have any phones left. I'm so embarrassed. Can you do me a favor?

I'll send him over to your store to pick up a phone. Can you sell him the

phone for one cent and write him up a receipt? And he's supposed to call

me back once he's got the phone so I can talk him through how to

program it." 

"Yeah, sure. Send him over." 

"Okay. His name is Ted. Ted Yancy." When the guy who calls himself Ted Yancy shows up at the 

North Broad St. store, Katie writes up an invoice and sells him 

the cell phone for one cent, just as she had been asked to do 

by her "co worker." She fell for the con hook, line, and sinker. When it's time to pay, the customer doesn't have any pennies in his

pocket, so he reaches into the little dish of pennies at the cashier's counter,

takes one out, and gives it to the girl at the register. He gets the phone

without paying even the one cent for it. He's then free to go to another wireless company that uses the same model

of phone, and choose any service plan he likes. Preferably one on a

month-to-month basis, with no commitment required. Analyzing the Con 

Its natural for people to have a higher degree of acceptance for anyone

who claims to be a fellow employee, and who knows company procedures

,d lingo. The social engineer in this story took advantage of that by

finding out the details of a promotion, identifying himself as a company 

employee, and asking for a favor from another branch. This happens 

between branches of retail stores and between departments in a company,

people are physically separated and deal with fellow employees they have

never actually met day in and day out. 

 

HACKING INTO THE FEDS

People often don't stop to think about what materials their organization is

making available on the Web. For my weekly show on KFI Talk Radio in

Los Angeles, the producer did a search on line and found a copy of an

instruction manual for accessing-the database of the National Crime

Information Center. Later he found the actual NCIC manual itself on line,

a sensitive document that gives all the instructions for retrieving

information from the FBI's national crime database.The manual is a handbook for law enforcement agencies that gives the

formatting and codes for retrieving information on criminals and crimes

from the national database. Agencies all over the country can search the

same database for information to help solve crimes in their own

jurisdiction. The manual contains the codes used in the database for

designating everything from different kinds of tattoos, to different boat

hulls, to denominations of stolen money and bonds.Anybody with access to the manual can look up the syntax and the

commands to extract information from the national database. Then,

following instructions from the procedures guide, with a little nerve,

anyone can extract information from the database. The manual also gives

phone numbers to call for support in using the system. You may have

similar manuals in your company offering product codes or codes for

retrieving sensitive information.The FBI almost certainly has never discovered that their sensitive manual

and procedural instructions are available to anyone on line, and I don't

think they'd be very happy about it if they knew. One copy was posted by

a government department in Oregon, the other by a law enforcement

agency in Texas. Why? In each case, somebody probably thought the

information was of no value and posting it couldn't do any harm. Maybe

somebody posted it on their intranet just as a convenience to their own

employees, never realizing that it made the information available to

everyone on the Internet who has access to a good search engine such as

Google - including the just-plain-curious, the wannabe cop, the hacker,

and the organized crime boss.Tapping into the System

The principle of using such information to dupe someone in the

government or a business setting is the same: Because a social engineer

knows how to access specific databases or applications, or knows the

names of a company's computer servers, or the like, he gains credibility.

Credibility leads to trust.

 

Once a social engineer has such codes, getting the information he needs 

is an easy process. In this example, he might begin by calling a clerk in a

local state police Teletype office, and asking a question about one of the

codes in the manual - for example, the offense code. He might say

something like, "When I do an OFF inquiry in the NCIC, I'm getting a

"System is down' error. Are you getting the same thing when you do an

OFF? Would you try it for me?" Or maybe he'd say he was trying to look

up a wpf - police talk for a wanted person's file. 

The Teletype clerk on the other end of the phone would pick up the cue 

that the caller was familiar with the operating procedures and the

commands to query the NCIC database. Who else other than someone

trained in using NCIC would know these procedures? After the clerk has confirmed that her system is working okay, theconversation might go something like this:

"I could use a little help." "What're you looking for?" 

"I need you to do an OFF command on Reardon, Martin. DOB

10118/66." 

"What's the sosh?" (Law enforcement people sometimes refer to the 

social security number as the sosh.) 

"700-14-7435." 

After looking for the listing, she might come back with something like, 

"He's got a 2602." 

The attacker would only have to look at the NCIC on line to find the

meaning of the number: The man has a case of swindling on his record. Analyzing the Con 

An accomplished social engineer wouldn't stop for a minute to ponder

ways of breaking into the NCIC database. Why should he, when a simple

call to his local police department, and some smooth talking so he sounds

convincingly like an insider, is all it takes to get the information he wants?

And the next time, he just calls a different police agency and uses the

same pretext. 

  

 LINGO 

 SOSH: Law enforcement slang for a social security number 

 

You might wonder, isn't it risky to call a police department, a sheriff's

station, or a highway patrol office? Doesn't the attacker run a huge risk? The answer is no . . . and for a specific reason. People in law enforcement,

like people in the military, have ingrained in them from the first day in the

academy a respect for rank. As long as the social engineer is posing as a

sergeant or lieutenant--a higher rank than the person he's talking to - the

victim will be governed by that well-learned lesson that says you don't

question people who are in a position of authority over you. Rank, in

other words, has its privileges, in particular the privilege of not being

challenged by people of lower rank. But don't think law enforcement and the military are the only places

where this respect for rank can be exploited by the social engineer. Social

engineers often use authority or rank in the corporate hierarchy as a

weapon in their attacks on businesses - as a number of the stories in these

pages demonstrate. PREVENTING THE CON 

What are some steps your organization can take to reduce the likelihood

that social engineers will take advantage of your employees' natural

instinct to trust people? Here are some suggestions. Protect Your Customers 

In this electronic age many companies that sell to the consumer keep

credit cards on file. There are reasons for this: It saves the customer the

nuisance of having to provide the credit card information each time he

visits the store or the Web site to make a purchase. However, the practice

should be discouraged. If you must keep credit card numbers on file, that process needs to be

accompanied by security provisions that go beyond encryption or using

access control. Employees need to be trained to recognize social

engineering scams like the ones in this chapter. That fellow employee

you've never met in person but who has become a telephone friend may

not be who he or she claims to be. He may not have the "need to know" to

access sensitive customer information, because he may not actually work

for the company at all.MITNICK MESSAGE

Everyone should be aware of the social engineer's modus operandi:

Gather as much information about the target as possible, and use that

information to gain trust as an insider. Then go for the jugular! 

 

 Trust Wisely 

It's not just the people who have access to clearly sensitive information -

the software engineers, the folks in R&D, and so on - who need to be on

the defensive against intrusions. Almost everyone in your organization

needs training to protect the enterprise from industrial spies and

information thieves. Laying the groundwork for this should begin with a survey of enterprise-

wide information assets, looking separately at each sensitive, critical, or

valuable asset, and asking what methods an attacker might use to

compromise those assets through the use of social engineering tactics.

Appropriate training for people who have trusted access to such

information should be designed around the answers to these questions. When anyone you don't know personally requests some information or

material, or asks you to perform any task on your computer, have your

employees ask themselves some. questions. If I gave this information to

my worst enemy, could it be used to injure me or my company? Do I

completely understand the potential effect of the commands I am being

asked to enter into my computer? We don't want to go through life being suspicious of every new person we

encounter. Yet the more trusting we are, the more likely that the next

social engineer to arrive in town will be able to deceive us into giving up

our company's proprietary information. What Belongs on Your Intranet? 

Parts of your intranet may be open to the outside world, other parts

restricted to employees. How careful is your company in making sure

sensitive information isn't posted where it's accessible to audiences you

meant to protect it from? When is the last time anyone in your

organization checked to see if any sensitive information on your

company's intranet had inadvertently been made available through the

public-access areas of your Web site? If your company has implemented proxy servers as intermediaries to

protect the enterprise from electronic security threats, have those servers

been checked recently to be sure they're configured properly? 

In fact, has anyone ever checked the security of your intranet?  

 Chapter 5  "Let Me Help You" 

We're all grateful when we're plagued by a problem and somebody with

the knowledge, skill, and willingness comes along offering to lend us a

hand. The social engineer understands that, and knows how to take

advantage of it. He also knows how to cause a problem for you.., then make you grateful

when he resolves the problem.., and finally play on your gratitude to

extract some information or a small favor from you that will leave your

company (or maybe you, individually) very much worse off for the

encounter. And you may never even know you've lost something of value.

Here are some typical ways that social engineers step forward to "help." THE NETWORK OUTAGE 

Day/Time: Monday, February 12, 3:25 p.m.  

Place: Offices of Starboard Shipbuilding The First Call: Tom Delay

"Tom DeLay, Bookkeeping." 

"Hey, Tom, this is Eddie Martin from the Help Desk. We're trying to

troubleshoot a computer networking problem. Do you know if anyone in

your group has been having trouble staying on line?" 

"Uh, not that I know of." 

"And you're not having any problems yourself." 

"No, seems fine."  

"Okay, that's good. Listen, we're calling people who might be affected

'cause itLs important you let us know right away if you lose your network

connection."

"That doesn't sound good. You think it might happen?"

"We hope not, but you'll call if it does, right?"

"You better believe it."

"Listen, sounds like having your network connection go down would be a

problem for you..."

"You bet it would."

"... so while we're working on this, let me give you my cell phone

number. Then you can reach me directly if you need to."

"That'd be great. Go ahead."

"It's 555 867 5309."

"555 867 5309. Got it. Hey, thanks. What was your name again?"

"It's Eddie. Listen, one other thing--I need to check which port your

computer is connected to. Take a look on your computer and see if there's

a sticker somewhere that says something like 'Port Number'."

"Hang on  No, don't see anything like that.""Okay, then in the back of the computer, can you recognize the networkcable."

"Yeah."

"Trace it back to where it's plugged in. See if there's a label on the jack it's

plugged into."

"Hold on a second. Yeah, wait a minute - I have to squat down here so I

can get close enough to read it. Okay - it says Port 6 dash 47."

"Good - that's what we had you down as, just making sure."The Second Call: The IT Guy

Two days later, a call came through to the same company's Network

Operations Center."Hi, this is Bob; I'm in Tom DeLay's office in Bookkeeping. We're trying

to troubleshoot a cabling problem. I need you to disable Port 6-47."The IT guy said it would be done in just a few minutes, and to let them

know when he was ready to have it enabled.

 

The Third Call: Getting Help from the Enemy 

 About an hour later, the guy who called himself Eddie Martin was

shopping at Circuit City when his cell phone rang. He checked the caller

ID, saw the call was from the shipbuilding company, and hurried to a

quiet spot before answering. "Help Desk, Eddie." 

"Oh, hey, Eddie. You've got an echo, where are you?" 

"I'm, uh, in a cabling closet. Who's this? 

"It's  Tom DeLay. Boy, am I glad I got ahold of you. Maybe you

remember you called me the other day? My network connection just went

down like you said it might, and I'm a little panicky here." 

"Yeah, we've got a bunch of people down right now. We should have it

taken care of by the end of the day. That okay?" 

"NO! Damn, I'll get way behind if I'm down that long. What's the best you

can do for me?" 

"How pressed are you?" 

"I could do some other things for right now. Any chance you could take

care of it in half an hour?" 

"HALF AN HOUR! You don't want much. Well, look, I'll drop what I'm

doing and see if I can tackle it for you." 

"Hey, I really appreciate that, Eddie." The Fourth Call: Gotcha! 

Forty-five minutes later..."Tom? It's Eddie. Go ahead and try your network connection." After a couple of moments: "Oh, good, it's working. That's just great." 

"Good, glad I could take care of it for you." 

"Yeah, thanks a lot." 

"Listen, if you want to make sure your connection doesn't go down again,

there's some software you oughta be running. Just take a couple of

minutes." 

"Now's not the best time." 

"I understand... It could save us both big headaches the next time thisnetwork problem happens."  

"Well . . . if it's only a few minutes." 

"Here's what you do..." Eddie then took Tom through the steps of downloading a small

application from a Web site. After the program had downloaded, Eddie

told Tom to double-click on it. He tried, but reported: "It's not working. It's not doing anything." 

"Oh, what a pain. Something must be wrong with the program. Let's just

get rid of it, we can try again another time." And he talked Tom through

the steps of deleting the program so it couldn't be recovered. Total elapsed time, twelve minutes. The Attacker's Story 

Bobby Wallace always thought it was laughable when he picked up a

good assignment like this one and his client pussyfooted around the

unasked but obvious question of why they wanted the information. In this

case he could only think of two reasons. Maybe they represented some

outfit that was interested in buying the target company, Starboard

Shipbuilding, and wanted to know what kind of financial shape they were

really in - especially all the stuff the target might want to keep hidden

from a potential buyer. Or maybe they represented investors who thought

there was something fishy about the way the money was being handled

and wanted to find out whether some of the executives had a case of

hands-in-the cookie-jar.    And maybe his client also didn't want to tell him the real reason because,

if Bobby knew how valuable the information was, he'd probably want

more money for doing the job. There are a lot of ways to crack into a company's most secret files. Bobby

spent a few days mulling over the choices and doing a little checking

around before he decided on a plan. He settled on one that called for an

approach he especially liked, where the target is set up so that he asks the

attacker for help. For starters, Bobby picked up a $39.95 cell phone at a convenience store.

He placed a call to the man he had chosen as his target, passed himself off

as being from the company help desk, and set things up so the man would

call Bobby's cell phone any time he found a problem with his network

connection. 

He left a pause of two days so as not to be too obvious, and then made a

call to the network operations center (NOC) at the company. He claimed

he was trouble-shooting a problem for Tom, the target, and asked to have

Tom's network connection disabled. Bobby knew this was the trickiest

part of the whole escapade - in many companies, the help desk people

work closely with the NOC; in fact, he knew the help desk is often part of

the IT organization. But the indifferent NOC guy he spoke with treated

the call as routine, didn't ask for the name of the help desk person who

was supposedly working on the networking problem, and agreed to

disable the target's network port. When done, Tom would be totally

isolated from the company's intranet, unable to retrieve files from the

server, exchange files with his co-workers, download his email, or even

send a page of data to the printer. In today's world, that's like living in a

cave. As Bobby expected, it wasn't long before his cell phone rang. Of course

he made himself sound eager to help this poor "fellow employee" in

distress. Then he called the NOC and had the man's network connection

turned back on. Finally, he called the man and manipulated him once

again, this time making him feel guilty for saying no after Bobby had

done him a favor. Tom agreed to the request that he download a piece of

software to his computer. Of course, what he agreed to wasn't exactly what it seemed. The software

that Tom was told would keep his network connection from going down,

was really a Trojan Horse, a software application that did for Tom's

computer what the original deception did for the Trojans: It brought the

enemy inside the camp. Tom reported that nothing happened when he

double-clicked on the software icon; the fact was that, by design, he

couldn't see anything happening, even though the small application was

installing a secret program that would allow the infiltrator covert access to

Tom's computer. With the software running, Bobby was provided with complete control

over Tom's computer, an arrangement known as a remote command shell.

When Bobby accessed Tom's computer, he could look for the accounting

files that might be of interest and copy them. Then, at his leisure, he'd

examine them for the information that would give his clients what they

were looking for.

LINGO

TROJAN HORSE: A program containing malicious or harmful code,

designed to damage the victim's computer or files, or obtain information

from the victim's computer or network. Some Trojans are designed to hide

within the computer's operating system and spy on every keystroke or

action, or accept instruction over a network connection to perform some

function, all without the victim being aware of its presence.

 

 

And that wasn't all. He could go back at any time to search through the

email messages and private memos of the company's executives, running

a text search for words that might reveal any interesting tidbits of

information. Late on the night that he conned his target into installing the Trojan Horse

software, Bobby threw the cell phone into a Dumpster. Of course he was

careful to clear the memory first and pull the battery out before he tossed

it - the last thing he wanted was for somebody to call the cell phone's

number by mistake and have the phone start ringing! Analyzing the Con 

The attacker spins a web to convince the target he has a problem that, in

fact, doesn't really exist - or, as in this case, a problem that hasn't

happened yet, but that the attacker knows will happen because he's going

to cause it. He then presents himself as the person who can provide the

solution. The setup in this kind of attack is particularly juicy for the attacker: 

Because of the seed planted in advance, when the target discovers he has 

a problem, he himself makes the phone call to plead for help. The attackerjust sits and waits for the phone to ring, a tactic fondly known in the trade 

as reverse social engineering. An attacker who can make the target call

him 

gains instant credibility: If I place a call to someone I think is on the help

desk,

I'm not going to start asking him to prove his identity. That's when the

attacker has it made.LINGO

REMOTE COMMAND SHELL: A non graphical interface that accepts

text based commands to perform certain functions or run programs. An

attacker who exploits technical vulnerabilities or is able to install a Trojan

Horse program on the victims computer may be able to obtain remote

access to a command shell

REVERSE SOCIAL ENGINEERING: A social

engineering attack in which the attacker sets up a

situation where the victim encounters a problem and

contacts the attacker for help. Another form of reverse

social engineering turns the tables on the attacker. The

target recognizes the attack, and uses psychological

principles of influence to draw out as much information

as possible from the attacker so that the business can

safeguard targeted assets.

MITNICK MESSAGE

If a stranger does you a favor, then asks you for a favor,

don't reciprocate without thinking carefully about what

he's asking for. In a con like this one, the social engineer tries to pick a target who is

likely to have limited knowledge of computers. The more he knows, the

more likely that he'll get suspicious, or just plain figure out that he's being

manipulated. What I sometimes call the computer-challenged worker,

who is less knowledgeable about technology and procedures, is more

likely to comply. He's all the more likely to fall for a ruse like "Just

download this little program," because he has no idea of the potential

damage a software program can inflict. What's more, there's a much

smaller chance he'll understand the value of the information on the

computer network that he's placing at risk. A LITTLE HELP FOR THE NEW GAL 

New employees are a ripe target for attackers. They don't know many

people yet, they don't know the procedures or the dos and don'ts of the

company. And, in the name of making a good first impression, they're

eager show how cooperative and quick to respond they can be. Helpful Andrea  

"Human Resources, Andrea Calhoun." 

"Andrea, hi, this is Alex, with Corporate Security." 

"Yes?" 

"How're you doing today?" 

"Okay. What can I help you with?" 

"Listen, we're developing a security seminar for new employees and we

need to round up some people to try it out on. I want to get the name and

phone number of all the new hires in the past month. Can you help me

with that?" 

"I won't be able to get to it 'til this afternoon. Is that okay? 

"What's your extension?" 

 

"Sure, okay, it's 52 . . . oh, uh, but I'll be in meetings most of today. I'll

call you when I'm back in my office, probably after four." When Alex called about 4:30, Andrea had the list ready, and read him the

names and extensions. A Message for Rosemary

Rosemary Morgan was delighted with her new job. She had never worked

for a magazine before and was finding the people much friendlier than she

expected, a surprise because of the never-ending pressure most of the staff

was always under to get yet another issue finished by the monthly

deadline. The call she received one Thursday morning reconfirmed that

impression of friendliness. 

"Is that Rosemary Morgan?" 

"Yes." 

"Hi,  Rosemary. This is Bill Jorday, with the Information Security

group." 

"Yes?" "Has anyone from our department discussed best security practices withyou?"   "I don't think so." "Well, let's see. For starters, we don't allow anybody to install software

brought in from outside the company. That's because we don't want any

liability for unlicensed use of software. And to avoid any problems with

software that might have a worm or a virus." 

"Okay." 

"Are you aware of our email policies?"   

"No." 

"What's your current email address?" "Rosemary@ttrzine.net." 

"Do you sign in under the username Rosemary?" 

"No, it's R underscore Morgan."   

"Right. We like to make all our new employees aware that it can be

dangerous to open any email attachment you aren't expecting. Lots of

viruses and worms get sent around and they come in emails that seem to

be from people you know. So if you get an email with an attachment you

weren't expecting you should always check to be sure the person listed as

sender really did send you the message. You understand?" 

"Yes, I've heard about that." 

 

"Good. And our policy is that you change your password every ninety

days. When did you last change your password?" 

"I've only been here three weeks; I'm still using the one I first set." 

"Okay, that's fine. You can wait the rest of the ninety days. But we need

to be sure people are using passwords that aren't too easy to guess. Are

you using a password that consists of both letters and numbers?" 

"No." 

We need to fix that. What password are you using now?" 

"It's my daughter's name - Annette." 

"That's really not a secure password. You should never choose a password

that's based on family information. Well, let's see.., you could do the same

thing I do. It's okay to use what you're using now as the first part of the

password, but then each time you change it, add a number for the current

month." "So if I did that now, for March, would I use three, or oh-three." "That's up to you. Which would you be more comfortable with?" 

"I guess Annette-three." 

"Fine. Do you want me to walk you through how to make the change?" 

"No, I know how." 

"Good. And one more thing we need to talk about. You have anti-virus

software on your computer and it's important to keep it up to date. You

should never disable the automatic update even if your computer slows

down every once in a while. Okay?" 

"Sure." 

"Very good. And do you have our phone number over here, 

so you can call us if you have any computer problems?" She didn't. He gave her the number, she wrote it down carefully, and went

back to work, once again, pleased at how well taken care of she felt. Analyzing the Con 

This story reinforces an underlying theme you'll find throughout this

book: The most common information that a social engineer wants from an

employee, regardless of his ultimate goal, is the target's authentication

credentials. With an account name and password in hand from a single

employee in the right area of the company, the attacker has what he needs

to get inside and locate whatever information he's after. Having this

information is like finding the keys to the kingdom; with them in hand, he

can move freely around the corporate landscape and find the treasure he

seeks.

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Before new employees are allowed access to any company

computer systems, they must be trained to follow good security

practices, especially policies about never disclosing their

passwords. NOT AS SAFE AS YOU THINK 

"The company that doesn't make an effort to protect its sensitiveinformation is just plain negligent." A lot of people would agree with that

statement. And the world would be a better place if life were so obvious

and so simple. The truth is that even those companies that do make an

effort to protect confidential information may be at serious risk. Here's a story that illustrates once again how companies fool themselves

every day into thinking their security practices, designed by experienced,

competent, professionals, cannot be circumvented. Steve Cramer's Story 

It wasn't a big lawn, not one of those expensively seeded spreads. It

garnered no envy. And it certainly wasn't big enough to give him an

excuse for buying a sit-down mower, which was fine because he wouldn't

have used one anyway. Steve enjoyed cutting the grass with a hand-

mower because it took longer, and the chore provided a convenient excuse

to focus on his own thoughts instead of listening to Anna telling him

stories about the people at the bank where she worked or explaining

errands for him to do. He hated those honey-do lists that had become an

integral part of his weekends. It flashed though his mind that 12-year-old

Pete was damn smart to join the swimming team. Now he'd have to be at

practice or a meet every Saturday so he wouldn't get stuck with Saturday

chores. Some people might think Steve's job designing new devices for

GeminiMed Medical Products was boring; Steve knew he was saving

lives. Steve thought of himself as being in a creative line of work. Artist,

music composer, engineer - in Steve's view they all faced the same kind

of challenge he did: They created something that no one had ever done

before. And his latest, an intriguingly clever new type of heart stent,

would be his proudest achievement yet. 

It was almost 11:30 on this particular Saturday, and Steve was annoyed

because he had almost finished cutting the grass and hadn't made any real

progress in figuring out how to reduce the power requirement on the heart

stent, the last remaining hurdle. A perfect problem to mull over while

mowing, but no solution had come. Anna appeared at the door, her hair covered in the red paisley cowboy

scarf she always wore when dusting. "Phone call," she shouted to him.

"Somebody from work." 

"Who?" Steve shouted back. 

"Ralph something. I think." 

Ralph? Steve couldn't remember anybody at GeminiMed named Ralph 

who might be calling on a weekend. But Anna probably had the name

wrong. "Steve, this is Ramon Perez in Tech Support." Ramon - how in the world

did Anna get from a Hispanic name to Ralph, Steve wondered. 

"This is just a courtesy call,, Ramon was saying. "Three of the servers 

are down, we think maybe a worm, and we have to wipe the drives and

restore from backup. We should be able to have your files up and running

by  Wednesday or Thursday. If we're lucky." "Absolutely unacceptable," Steve said firmly, trying not to let his

frustration take over. How could these people be so stupid? Did they

really think he could manage without access to his files all weekend and

most of next week? "No way. I'm going to sit down at my home terminal

in just about two hours and I will need access to my files. Am I making

this clear?" "Yeah, well, everybody I've called so far wants to be at the top of the list. 

I gave up my weekend to come in and work on this and it's no fun having

 everybody I talk to get pissed at me." "I'm on a tight deadline, the company is counting on this; I've got to get

work done this afternoon. What part of this do you not understand?" 

"I've still got a lot of people to call before I can even get started," Ramon 

laid. "How about we say you'll have your files by Tuesday?" 

"Not Tuesday, not Monday, today. NOW!" Steve said, wondering who he 

was going to call if he couldn't get his point through this guy's thick skull. 

"Okay, okay," Ramon said, and Steve could hear him breathe a sigh of

annoyance. "Let me see what I can do to get you going. You use the

RM22  server, right?" 

 

"RM22 and the GM16. Both." 

"Right. Okay, I can cut some corners, save some time--I'll need your 

username and password." 

Uh oh, Steve thought. What's going on here? Why would he need my pass

word? Why would IT, of all people, ask for it? 

"What did you say your last name was? And who's your supervisor?" 

"Ramon Perez. Look, I tell you what, when you were hired, there was a 

form you had to fill out to get your user account, and you had to put 

down a password. I could look that up and show you we've got it on file 

here. Okay?" 

Steve mulled that over for a few moments, then agreed. He hung on 

with growing impatience while Ramon went to retrieve documents from 

a file cabinet. Finally back on the phone, Steve could hear him shuffling 

through a stack of papers. 

"Ah, here it is," Ramon said at last. "You put down the password 

'Janice.'" 

Janice, Steve thought. It was his mother's name, and he had indeed 

sometimes used it as a password. He might very well have put that down 

for his password when filling out his new-hire papers. "Yes, that's right," he acknowledged. 

"Okay, we're wasting time here. You know I'm for real, you want me to 

use the shortcut and get your files back in a hurry, you re gonna have to 

help me out here." 

"My ID is s, d, underscore, cramer--c-r-a-m-e-r. The password is 'pelican1 .'" "I'll get right on it," Ramon said, sounding helpful at last. "Give me acouple of hours." Steve finished the lawn, had lunch, and by the time he got to hiscomputer found that his files had indeed been restored. He was pleased

with himself for handling that uncooperative IT guy so forcefully, and

hoped Anna had heard how assertive he was. Would be good to give the

guy or his boss an attaboy, but he knew it was one of those things he'd never getaround to doing. Craig Cogburne's Story 

Craig Cogburne had been a salesman for a high-tech company, and done

well at it. After a time he began to realize he had a skill for reading a

customer, understanding where the person was resistant and recognizing 

 

some weakness or vulnerability that made it easy to close the sale. He

began to think about other ways to use this talent, and the path eventually

led him into a far more lucrative field: corporate espionage. This one was a hot assignment. Didn't look to take me very long and

worth enough to pay for a trip to Hawaii. Or maybe Tahiti. The guy that hired me, he didn't tell me the client, of course, but it figured

to be some company that wanted to catch up with the competition in one

quick, big, easy leap. All I'd have to do is get the designs and product

specs for a new gadget called a heart stent, whatever that was. The

company was called GeminiMed. Never heard of it, but it was a Fortune

500 outfit with offices in half a dozen locations - which makes the job

easier than a smaller company where there's a fair chance the guy you're

talking to knows the guy you're claiming to be and knows you're not him.

This, like pilots say about a midair collision, can ruin your whole day. My client sent me a fax, a bit from some doctor's magazine that said

GeminiMed was working on a stent with a radical new design and it

would be called the STH-IO0. For crying out loud, some reporter has

already done a big piece of the legwork for me. I had one thing I needed

even before I got started, the new product name. First problem: Get names of people in the company who worked on the

STH-100 or might need to see the designs. So I called the switchboard

operator and said, "I promised one of the people in your engineering

group I'd get in touch with him and I don't remember his last name, but

his first name started with an S." And she said, "We have a Scott Archer

and a Sam Davidson." I took a long shot. "Which one works in the

STH100 group?" She didn't know, so I just picked Scott Archer at

random, and she rang his phone. When he answered, I said, "Hey, this is Mike, in the mail room. We've got

a FedEx here that's for the Heart Stent STH-100 project team. Any idea

who that should go to?" He gave me the name of the project leader, Jerry

Mendel. I even got him to look up the phone number for me. I called. Mendel wasn't there but his voice mail message said he'd be on

vacation till the thirteenth, which meant he had another week left for

skiing or whatever, and anybody who needed something in the meantime

should call Michelle on 9137. Very helpful, these people. Very helpful. 

I hung up and called Michelle, got her on the phone and said, "This is Bill

Thomas. Jerry told me I should call you when I had the spec ready 

 

that he wanted the guys on his team to review. You're working on the

heart stent, right?" She said they were. Now we were getting to the sweaty part of the scam. If she started

sounding suspicious, I was ready to play the card about how I was just

trying to 

do a favor Jerry had asked me for. I said, "Which system are you on?"

"System?" 

"Which computer servers does your group use?" 

"Oh," she said, "RM22. And some of the group also use GM16." Good. I

needed that, and it was a piece of information I could get from her without

making her suspicious. Which softened her up for the next bit, done as

casually as I could manage. "Jerry said you could give me a list of email

addresses for people on the development team," I said, and held my

breath. 

"Sure. The distribution list is too long to read off, can I email it to you?" Oops. Any email address that didn't end in GeminiMed.com would be 

a huge red flag. "How about you fax it to me?" I said. 

She had no problem with doing that. "Our fax machine is on the blink. I'll have to get the number of another

one. Call you back in a bit," I said, and hung up. Now, you might think I was saddled with a sticky problem here, but it's

just another routine trick of the trade. I waited a while so my voice

wouldn't sound familiar to the receptionist, then called her and said, "Hi,

it's Bill Thomas, our fax machine isn't working up here, can I have a fax

sent to your machine?" She said sure, and gave me the number. Then I just walk in and pick up the fax, right? Of course not. First rule:

Never visit the premises unless you absolutely have to. They have a hard

time identifying you if you're just a voice on the telephone. And if they

can't identify you, they can't arrest you. It's hard to put handcuffs around a

voice. So I called the receptionist back after a little while and asked her,

did my fax come? "Yes," she said. "Look," I told her, "I've got to get that to a consultant we're using. Could

you send it out for me?" She agreed. And why not--how could any

receptionist be expected to recognize sensitive data? While she sent the

fax out to the "consultant," I had my exercise for the day walking over to

a stationery store near me, the one with the sign out front "Faxes

Sent/Rcvd." My fax was supposed to arrive before I did, and as expected,

it was there waiting for me when I walked in. Six pages at $1.75. For a

$10 bill and change, I had the group's entire list of names and email

addresses. 

 

Getting Inside 

Okay, so I had by now talked to three or four different people in only a

few hours and was already one giant step closer to getting inside the

company's computers. But I'd need a couple more pieces before I was

home. Number one was the phone number for dialing into the Engineering server

from outside. I called GeminiMed again and asked the switchboard

operator for the IT Department, and asked the guy who answered for

somebody who could give me some computer help. He transferred me,

and I put on an act of being confused and kind of stupid about anything

technical. "I'm at home, just bought a new laptop, and I need to set it up o

I can dial in from outside." The procedure was obvious but I patiently let him talk me through it until

he got to the dial-in phone number. He gave me the number like it was

just another routine piece of information. Then I made him wait while I

tried it. Perfect.   So now I had passed the hurdle of connecting to the network. I dialed in

and found they were set up with a terminal server that would let a caller

connect to any computer on their internal network. After a bunch of tries

I stumbled across somebody's computer that had a guest account with no

password required. Some operating systems, when first installed, direct

the user to set up an ID and password, but also provide a guest account.

The user is supposed to set his or her own password for the guest account

or disable it, but most people don't know about this, or just don't bother.

This system was probably just set up and the owner hadn't bothered to

disable the guest account. LINGOPASSWOPRD HASH: A string of gibberish that results from processing a passwordthrough a one way encryption process. The process is supposedly irreversible; that is,its believed that it is not possible to reconstruct the password from the hashThanks to the guest account, I now had access to one computer, which

turned out to be running an older version of the UNIX operating system.

Under UNIX, the operating system maintains a password file which con-

rains the encrypted passwords of everybody authorized to access that

computer. The password file contains the one-way hash (that is, a form of

encryption that is irreversible) of every user's password. With a one-way

hash an actual password such as, say, "justdoit" would be represented by a

hash in encrypted form; in this case the hash would be converted by

UNIX to thirteen alphanumeric characters. When Billy Bob down the hall wants to transfer some files to a computer,

he's required to identify himself by providing a username and password.

The system program that" checks his authorization encrypts the password

he enters, and then compares the result to the encrypted password (the

hash) contained in the password file; if the two match, he's given access. Because the passwords in the file were encrypted, the file itself was made

available to any user on the theory that there's no known way to decrypt

the passwords. That's a laugh - I downloaded the file, ran a dictionary

attack on it (see Chapter 12 for more about this method) and found that

one of the engineers on the development team, a guy named Steven

Cramer, currently had an account on the computer with the password

"Janice." Just on the chance, I tried entering his account with that

password on one of the development servers; if it had worked, it would

have saved me some time and a little risk. It didn't. That meant I'd have to trick the guy into telling me his username and

password. For that, I'd wait until the weekend. 70 You already know the

rest. On Saturday I called Cramer and walked him through a ruse about a

worm and the servers having to be restored from backup to overcome his

suspicions. What about the story I told him, the one about listing a password when he

filled out his employee papers? I was counting on him not remembering

that had never happened. A new employee fills out so many forms that,

years later, who would remember? And anyway, if I had struck out with

him, I still had that long list of other names. With his username and password, I got into the server, fished around for a

little while, and then located the design files for the STH-100. I wasn't

exactly sure which ones were key, so I just transferred all the files to a

dead drop, a free FTP site in China, where they could be stored without

anybody getting suspicious. Let the client sort through the junk and find

what he wants. 

LINGO

DEAD DROP A place for leaving information where it is unlikely to be

found by others. In the world of traditional spies, this might be behind a

loose stone in a wall; in the world of the computer hacker, it's commonly

an Internet site in a remote country. 

 

Analyzing the Con

For the man we're calling Craig Cogburne, or anyone like him equally

skilled in the larcenous-but-not-always-illegal arts of social engineering,

the challenge presented here was almost routine. His goal was to locate

and download files stored on a secure corporate computer, protected by a

firewall and all the usual security technologies.Most of his work was as easy as catching rainwater in a barrel. He began

by posing as somebody from the mail room and furnished an added sense

of urgency by claiming there was a FedEx package waiting to be

delivered. This deception produced the name of the team leader for the

heart-stent engineering group, who was on vacation, but - convenient for

any social engineer trying to steal information - he had helpfully left the

name and phone number of his assistant. Calling her, Craig defused any

suspicions by claiming that he was responding to a request from the team

leader. With the team leader out of town, Michelle had no way to verify

his claim. She accepted it as the truth and had no problem providing a list

of people in the group - for Craig, a necessary and highly prized set of

information. She didn't even get suspicious when Craig wanted the list sent by fax

instead of by email, ordinarily more convenient on both ends. Why was

she so gullible? Like many employees, she didn't want her boss to return

to town and find she had stonewalled a caller who was just trying to do

something the boss had asked him for. Besides, the caller said that the

boss had not just authorized the request, but asked for his assistance. Once

again, here's an example of someone displaying the strong desire to be a

team player, which makes most people susceptible to deception.Craig avoided the risk of physically entering the building simply by

having the fax sent to the receptionist, knowing she was likely to be

helpful. Receptionists are, after all, usually chosen for their charming

personalities and their ability to make a good impression. Doing small

favors like receiving a fax and sending it on comes with the receptionist's

territory, a fact that Craig was able to take advantage of. What she was

ending out happened to be information that might have raised alarm bells

with anyone knowing the value of the information - but how could

receptionist be expected to know which information is benign and which

sensitive?Using a different style of manipulation, Craig acted confused and naive

to convince the guy in computer operations to provide him with the dial

up access number to the company's terminal server, the hardware used as

a connection point to other computer systems within the internal network.

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Everybody's first priority at work is to get the job done. Under that

pressure, security practices often take second place and are overlooked or

ignored. Social engineers rely on this when practicing their craft. Craig was able to connect easily by trying a default password that had 

never been changed, one of the glaring, wide-open gaps that exist 

throughout many internal networks that rely on firewall security. In fact, 

the default passwords for many operating systems, routers, and othertypes of products, including PBXs, are made available on line. Any socialengineer,  hacker, or industrial spy, as well as the just plain curious, can

find the list at http://www.phenoelit.de/dpl/dpl.html. (It's absolutely

incredible how easy the Internet makes life for those who know where to look. Andnow you know, too.) Cogburne then actually managed to convince a cautious, suspicious man ("What did you say your last name was? Who's your supervisor?")to divulge his username and password so that he could access servers usedby the heart-stent development team. This was like leaving Craig with an 

open door to browse the company's most closely guarded secrets and 

download the plans for the new product. What if Steve Cramer had continued to be suspicious about Craig's call? It was unlikely he would do anything about reporting his suspicions until 

he showed up at work on Monday morning, which would have been too 

late to prevent the attack. One key to the last part of the ruse: Craig at first made himself sound lackadaisical and uninterested in Steve's concerns, then changed his tune 

and sounded as if he was trying to help so Steve could get his work done. 

Most of the time, if the victim believes you're trying to help him or dohim some kind of favor, he will part with confidential information that he 

would have otherwise protected carefully. PREVENTING THE CON 

One of the most powerful tricks of the social engineer involves turning the

tables. That's what you've seen in this chapter. The social engineer creates

the problem, and then magically solves the problem, deceiving the victim

into providing access to the company's most guarded secrets. Would your

employees fall for this type of ruse? Have you bothered to draft and

distribute specific security rules that could help to prevent it? 

   

Educate, Educate, and Educate... 

There's an old story about a visitor to New York who stops a man on the

street and asks, "How do I get to Carnegie Hall?" The man answers,

"Practice, practice, practice." Everyone is so vulnerable to social

engineering attacks that a company's only effective defense is to educate

and train your people, giving them the practice they need to spot a social

engineer. And then keep reminding people on a consistent basis of what

they learned in the training, but are all too apt to forget. Everyone in the organization must be trained to exercise an appropriate

degree of suspicion and caution when contacted by someone he or she

doesn't personally know, especially when that someone is asking for any

sort of access to a computer or network. It's human nature to want to trust

others, but as the Japanese say, business is war. Your business cannot

afford to let down its guard. Corporate security policy must clearly define

appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Security is not one-size-fits-all. Business personnel usually have disparate

roles and responsibilities and each position has associated vulnerabilities.

There should be a base level of training that everyone in the company is

required to complete, and then people must also be trained according to

their job profile to adhere to certain procedures that will reduce the chance

that they will become part of the problem. People who work with

sensitive information or are placed in positions of trust should be given

additional specialized training. Keeping Sensitive Information Safe  

When people are approached by a stranger offering to help, as seen in the

stories in this chapter, they have to fall back on corporate security policy

that is tailored as appropriate to the business needs, size, and culture of

your company. NOTE

Personally, I don’t believe any business should allow any exchange of

passwords. Its much easier to establish a hard rule that forbids personnel

from ever sharing or exchanging confidential passwords. Its safer, too.

But each business has to assess its own culture and security concerns in

making this choiceNever cooperate with a stranger who asks you to look up information, 

enter unfamiliar commands into a computer, make changes to software

settings or - the most potentially disastrous of all - open an email

attachment  

or download unchecked software. Any software program - even one that

appears to do nothing at all - may not be as innocent as it appears to be.There are certain procedures that, no matter how good our training, we

tend to grow careless about over time. Then we forget about that training

at crunch time, just when we need it. You would think that not giving out

your account name and password is something that just about everybody

knows (or should know) and hardly needs to be told: it's simple common

sense. But in fact, every employee needs to be reminded frequently that

giving out the account name and password to their office computer, their

home computer, or even the postage machine in the mail room is

equivalent to giving out the PIN number for their ATM card.There is occasionally - very occasionally - a quite valid circumstance

when it's necessary, perhaps even important, to give someone else

confidential information. For that reason, it's not appropriate to make an

absolute rule about "never." Still, your security policies and procedures do

need to be very specific about circumstances under which an employee

may give out his or her password and - most importantly--who is

authorized to ask for the information.Consider the Source

In most organizations, the rule should be that any information that can

possibly cause harm to the company or to a. fellow employee may be

given only to someone who is known on a face-to-face basis, or whose

voice is so familiar that you recognize it without question.In high-security situations, the only requests that should be granted are

ones delivered in person or with a strong form of authentication--for

example, two separate items such as a shared secret and a time-based

token.Data classification procedures must designate that no information be

provided from a part of the organization involved with sensitive work to

anyone not personally known or vouched for in some manner.NOTE

Incredibly, even looking up the name and phone number of the caller in

the company's employee database and calling him back is not an absolute

guarantee social engineers know ways of planting names in a corporate

database or redirecting telephone calls.

So how do you handle a legitimate-sounding request for information from

another company employee, such as the list of names and email addresses

of people in your group? In fact, how do you raise awareness so that an

item like this, which is clearly less valuable than, say, a spec sheet for a

product under development, is recognized as something for internal use

only? One major part of the solution: Designate employees in each

department who will handle all requests for information to be sent outside

the group. An advanced security-training program must then be

 

provided to make these designated employees aware of the special

verification procedures they should follow.Forget Nobody

Anyone can quickly rattle off the identity of organizations within her

company that need a high degree of protection against malicious attacks.

But we often overlook other places that are less obvious, yet highly

vulnerable. In one of these stories, the request for a fax to be sent to a

phone number within the company seemed innocent and secure enough,

yet the attacker took advantage of this security loophole. The lesson here:

Everybody from secretaries and administrative assistants to company

executives and high-level managers needs to have special security training

so that they can be alert to these types of tricks. And don't forget to guard

the front door: Receptionists, too, are often prime targets for social

engineers and must also be made aware of the deceptive techniques used

by some visitors and callers.Corporate security should establish a single point of contact as a kind of

central clearinghouse for employees who think they may have been the

target of a social engineering ruse. Having a single place to report security

incidents will provide an effective early-warning system that will make it

dear when a coordinated attack is under way, so that any damage can be

controlled immediately.

 

Chapter 6 "Can You Help Me?"  You’ve seen how social engineers trick people by offering to help.Another favorite approach turns the tables: The social engineer manipulates by pretending he needs the other person to help 

him. We can all sympathize with people in a tight spot, and the approach 

proves effective over and over again in allowing a social engineer toreach 

his goal. THE OUT-OF TOWNER 

A story in Chapter 3 showed how an attacker can talk a victim into

revealing his employee number. This one uses a different approach for

achieving the same result, and then shows how the attacker can make use

of that Keeping Up with the Joneses 

In Silicon Valley there is a certain global company that shall be nameless. 

The scattered sales offices and other field installations around the world

are all connected to that company's headquarters over a WAN, a wide area

network. The intruder, a smart, feisty guy named Brian Atterby, knew 

it was almost always easier to break into a network at one of the remote 

sites where security is practically guaranteed to be more lax than at

headquarters. The intruder phoned the Chicago office and asked to speak with Mr Jones.The receptionist asked if he knew Mr. Jones's first name; he 

 

answered, "I had it here, I'm looking for it. How many Joneses do you

have?" She said, "Three. Which department would he be in?"

He said, "If you read me the names, maybe I'll recognize it." So she did:

"Barry, Joseph, and Gordon."

"Joe. I'm pretty sure that was it," he said. "And he was in . . . which

department?"

"Business Development."

"Fine. Can you connect me, please?"

She put the call through. When Jones answered, the attacker said, "Mr.

Jones? Hi, this is Tony in Payroll. We just put through your request to

have your paycheck deposited directly to your credit union account."

"WHAT???!!! You've got to be kidding. I didn't make any request like

that. I don't even have an account at a credit union."

"Oh, damn, I already put it through."

Jones was more than a little upset at the idea that his paycheck might be

going to someone else's account, and he was beginning to think the guy

on the other end of the phone must be a little slow. Before he could even

reply, the attacker said, "I better see what happened. Payroll changes are

 entered by employee number. What's your employee number?"

Jones gave the number. The caller said, "No, you're right, the request

wasn't from you, then." They get more stupid every year, Jones thought."Look, I'll see it's taken care of. I'll put in a correction right now. So

don't worry - you'll get your next paycheck okay," the guy said

reassuringly.A Business Trip

Not long after, the system administrator in the company's Austin, Texas,

sales office received a phone call. "This is Joseph Jones," the caller

announced. "I'm in Business Development at corporate. I'll be in to, for

the week, at the Driskill Hotel. I'd like to have you set me up with a

temporary account so I can access my email without making a long

distance call.""Let me get that name again, and give me your employee number," the

sys admin said. The false Jones gave the number and went on, "Do you

have any high speed dial-up numbers."Hold on, buddy. I gotta verify you in the database." After a bit, he said,

"Okay, Joe. Tell me, what's your building number?" The attacker had

done his homework and had the answer ready

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Don't rely on network safeguards and firewalls to protect your

information. Look to your most vulnerable spot. You'll usually find that

vulnerability lies in your people. "Okay," the sys admin told him, "you convinced me." It was as simple as that. The sys admin had verified the name Joseph

Jones, the department, and the employee number, and "Joe" had given the

right answer to the test question. "Your username's going to be the same

as your corporate one, jbjones," the sys admin said, "and I'm giving you

an initial password of 'changeme.'" Analyzing the Con 

With a couple of phone calls and fifteen minutes of time, the attacker had

gained access to the company's wide area network. This was a company

that, like many, had what I refer to as candy security, after a description

first used by two Bell Labs researchers, Steve Bellovin and Steven

Cheswick. They described such security as "a hard crunchy shell with a

oft chewy center" - like an M&M candy. The outer shell, the firewall,

Bellovin and Cheswick argued, is not sufficient protection, because once

an intruder is able to circumvent it, the internal computer systems have

soft, chewy security. Most of the time, they are inadequately protected. This story fits the definition. With a dial-up number and an account, 

the attacker didn't even have to bother trying to defeat an Internet firewall,

and, once inside, he was easily able to compromise most of the systems

on the internal network. Through my sources, I understand this exact ruse was worked on one of 

the largest computer software manufacturers in the world. You would

think the systems administrators in such a company would be trained to

detect this type of ruse. But in my experience, nobody is completely safe

if  a social engineer is clever and persuasive enough. LINGO

CANDY SECURITY A term coined by Bellovin and

Cheswick of Bell Labs to describe a security scenario

where the outer perimeter, such as firewall, is strong,

but the infrastructure behind it is weak. The term

refers to M&M candy, which has a hard outer shell

and soft center.  

LINGO

SPEAKEASY SECURITY  Security that relies on knowing where

desired information is, and using a word or name to gain access to that

information or computer system.SPEAKEASY SECURITY

In the old days of speakeasies - those Prohibition-era nightclubs where so-

called bathtub gin flowed--a would-be customer gained admission by

showing up at the door and knocking. After a few moments, a small flap

in the door would swing open and a tough, intimidating face would peer

out. If the visitor was in the know, he would speak the name of some

frequent patron of the place ("Joe sent me" was often enough), whereupon

the bouncer inside would unlatch the door and let him in.The real trick lay in knowing the location of the speakeasy because the

door was unmarked, and the owners didn't exactly hang out neon signs to

mark their presence. For the most part, just showing up at the right place

was about all it took to get in. The same degree of safekeeping is,

unhappily, practiced widely in the corporate world, providing a level of

non protection that I call speakeasy security.I Saw It at the Movies

Here's an illustration from a favorite movie that many people will

remember. In Three Days of the Condor the central character, Turner

(played by Robert Redford), works for a small research firm contracted by

the CIA. One day he comes back from a lunch run to find that all his co

workers have been gunned down. He's left to figure out who has done this

and why, all the while knowing that the bad guys, whoever they are, are

looking for him.Late in the story, Turner manages to get the phone number of one the bad

guys. But who is this person, and how can Turner pin down his location?

He's in luck: The screenwriter, David Rayfiel, has happily given Turner a

background that includes training as a telephone lineman with the Army

Signal Corps, making him knowledgeable about techniques and practices

of the phone company. With the bad guy's phone number in hand, Turner

knows exactly what to do. In the screenplay, the scene reads like this: 

TURNER RECONNECTS and TAPS OUT ANOTHER NUMBER. RING! RING! Then: WOMAN'S VOICE (FILTER)   CNA, Mrs. Coleman speaking.

TURNER (into test set) This is Harold Thomas, Mrs. Coleman. Customer Service. CNA on 202-555-7389, please. WOMAN'S VOICE (FILTER)   One moment, please.   (almost at once) Leonard Atwood, 765 MacKensie Lane, Chevy Chase, Maryland.   Ignoring the fact that the screenwriter mistakenly uses a Washington, 

D.C., area code for a Maryland address, can you spot what just happened here? Turner, because of his training as a telephone lineman, knew what number

to dial in order to reach a phone company office called CNA, the Customer Name and Address bureau. CNA is set up for the convenience 

of installers and other authorized phone company personnel. An installer 

could call CNA, and give them a phone number. The CNA clerk would

respond by providing the name of the person the phone belongs to andhis address. Fooling the Phone Company In  the real world, the phone number for CNA is a closely guarded secret.Although the phone companies finally caught on and these days are less generous about handing out information so readily, at the time theyoperatedon  a variation of speakeasy security that security professionals call 

security through obscurity. They presumed that anybody who calledCNA and knew the proper lingo ("Customer service. CNA on 555-1234, 

please for example) was a person authorized to have the information. LINGO

SECURITY THROUGH OBSCURITY An ineffective method of

computer security that relies on keeping secret the details of how the

system works (protocols, algorithms, and internal systems). Security

through obscurity relies on the false assumption that no one outside a

trusted group of people will be able to circumvent the system.

 

MITNICK MESSGAE

Security through obscurity does not have any effect in blocking social

engineering attacks. Every computer system in the world has at least one

human that use it. So, if the attacker is able to manipulate people who use

the systems, the obscurity of the system is irrelevant.There was no need to verify or identify oneself, no need to give an

employee number, no need for a password that was changed daily. If you

knew the number to call and you sounded authentic, then you must be

entitled to the information.That was not a very solid assumption on the part of the telephone

company. Their only effort at security was to change the phone number

on l periodic basis, at least once a year. Even so, the current number at

any particular moment was very widely known among phone phreaks,

who delighted in taking advantage of this convenient source of

information and in sharing the how-to-do-it with their fellow phreaks. The

CN,' Bureau trick was one of the first things I learned when I was in to the

hobby of phone phreaking as a teenager.Throughout the world of business and government, speakeasy security. isstill prevalent. It's likely that about your company's departments, people, and lingo. Sometimes les to

than that: Sometimes an internal phone number is all it takes.THE CARELESS COMPUTER MANAGER

Though many employees in organizations are negligent, unconcerned, or

unaware of security dangers, you'd expect someone with the title manager

in the computer center of a Fortune 500 corporation to be thoroughly

knowledgeable about best security practices, right?You would not expect a computer center manager - someone who is part

of his company's Information Technology department - to fall victim to a

simplistic and obvious social engineering con game. Especially not the

social engineer is hardly more than a kid, barely out of his teens. But

sometimes your expectations can be wrong.Tuning In

Years ago it was an amusing pastime for many people to keep a radio

tuned to the local police or fire department frequencies, listening in on the

 

occasional highly charged conversations about a bank robbery in progress,

an office building on fire, or a high-speed chase as the event unfolded.

The radio frequencies used by law enforcement agencies and fire

departments used to be available in books at the corner bookstore; today

they're provided in listings on the Web, and from a book you can buy at

Radio Shack frequencies for local, county, state, and, in some cases, even

federal agencies. Of course, it wasn't just the curious who were listening in. Crooks robbing

a store in the middle of the night could tune in to hear if a police car was

being dispatched to the location. Drug dealers could keep a check on

activities of the local Drug Enforcement Agency agents. An arsonist could

enhance his sick pleasure by lighting a blaze and then listening to all the

radio traffic while firemen struggled to put it out. Over recent years developments in computer technology have made it

possible to encrypt voice messages. As engineers found ways to cram

more and more computing power onto a single microchip, they began to

build small, encrypted radios for law enforcement that kept the bad guys

and the curious from listening in. Danny the Eavesdropper 

A scanner enthusiast and skilled hacker we'll call Danny decided to see if

he couldn't find a way to get his hands on the super-secret encryption

software - the source code - from one of the top manufacturers of secure

radio systems. He was hoping a study of the code would enable him to

learn how to eavesdrop on law enforcement, and possibly also use the

technology so that even the most powerful government agencies would

find it difficult to monitor his conversations with his friends. The Dannys of the shadowy world of hackers belong to a special categorythat falls somewhere in between the merely-curious but-entirely- benignand the dangerous. Dannys have the knowledge of the expert, combined

with the mischievous hacker's desire to break into systems and networks

for the intellectual challenge and for the pleasure of gaining insight into

how technology works. But their electronic breaking-and- entering stunts

are just that--stunts. These folks, these benign hackers, illegally enter sites

for the sheer fun and exhilaration of proving they can do it. They don't

steal anything, they don't make any money from their exploits; they don't

destroy any files, disrupt any network connections, or crash any computer

system. The mere fact of their being there, snaring copies of files and

searching emails for passwords behind the backs of curity and network

administrators, tweaks the noses of the people  

responsible for keeping out intruders like them. The one-upmanship is a

big part of the satisfaction. In keeping with this profile, our Danny wanted to examine the details of

his target company's most closely guarded product just to satisfy his own

burning curiosity and to admire whatever clever innovations the

manufacturer might have come up with. The product designs were, needless to say, carefully guarded trade secrets,

as precious and protected as just about anything in the company's

possession. Danny knew that. And he didn’t care a bit. After all, it was

just some big, nameless company. But how to get the software source code? As it turned out, grabbing the

crown jewels of the company's Secure Communications Group proved to

be all too easy, even though the company was one of those that used two-

factor authentication, an arrangement under which people are required to

use not one but two separate identifiers to prove their identity. Here's an example you're probably already familiar with. When your

renewal credit card arrives, you're asked to phone the issuing company to

let them know that the card is in possession of the intended customer, and

not somebody who stole the envelope from the mail. The instructions with

the card these days generally tell you to call from home. When you 

call, software at the credit card company analyzes the ANI, the automatic

number identification, which is provided by the telephone switch on toll-

free calls that the credit card company is paying for. 

 

A computer at the credit card company uses the calling party's number 

provided by the ANI, and matches that number against the company's 

database of cardholders. By the time the clerk comes on the line, her or 

his display shows information from the database giving details about the 

customer. So the clerk already knows the call is coming from the home of 

a customer; that's one form of authentication. LINGO

TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION The use of two different types

of authentication to verify identity. For example, a person might have to

identify himself by calling from a certain identifiable location and

knowing a password.

The clerk then picks an item from the information displayed about 

you - most often social security number, date of birth, or mother's maiden 

name - and asks you for this piece of information. If you give the right 

 

answer, that's a second form of authentication - based on information you

should know.At the company manufacturing the secure radio systems in our story,

every employee with computer access had their usual account name and

password, but in addition was provided with a small electronic device

called Secure ID. This is what's called a time-based token. These devices

come in two types: One is about half the size of a credit card but a little

thicker; another is small enough that people simply attach it to their key

chains.Derived from the world of cryptography, this particular gadget has a small

window that displays a series of six digits. Every sixty seconds, the

display changes to show a different six-digit number. When an authorized

person needs to access the network from offsite, she must first identify

herself as an authorized user by typing in her secret PIN and the digits

displayed on her token device. Once verified by the internal system, she

then authenticates with her account name and password.For the young hacker Danny to get at the source code he so coveted, he

would have to not only compromise some employee's account name and

password (not much of a challenge for the experienced social engineer)

but also get around the time-based token.Defeating the two-factor authentication of a time-based token combined

with a user's secret PIN code sounds like a challenge right out of Mission

Impossible. But for social engineers, the challenge is similar to that aced

by a poker player who has more than the usual skill at reading his

opponents. With a little luck, when he sits down at a table he knows he's

likely to walk away with a large pile of other people's money.Storming the Fortress

Danny began by doing his homework. Before long he had managed to put

together enough pieces to masquerade as a real employee. He had an

employee's name, department, phone number, and employee number, as

well as the manager's name and phone number.Now was the calm before the storm. Literally. Going by the plan he had

worked out, Danny needed one more thing before he could take the next

step, and it was something he had no control over: He needed a snow-

storm. Danny needed a little help from Mother Nature in the form of

weather so bad that it would keep workers from getting into the office. In

the winter in South Dakota, where the manufacturing plant in question

was located, anyone hoping for bad weather did not have very long 

to wait. On Friday night, a storm arrived. What had begun as snow

quickly turned to freezing rain so that, by morning, the roads were coated

with a slick, dangerous sheet of ice. For Danny, this was a perfect

opportunity. He telephoned the plant, asked for-the computer room and reached one of

the worker bees of IT, a computer operator who announced himself as

Roger Kowalski.Giving the name of the real employee he had obtained, Danny said, "This

is Bob Billings. I work in the Secure Communications Group. I'm at home

right now and I can't drive in because of the storm. And the problem is

that I need to access my workstation and the server from home, and I left

my Secure ID in my desk. Can you go fetch it for me? Or can somebody?

And then read off my code when I need to get in? Because my team has a

critical deadline and there's no way I can get my work done. And there's

no way I can get to the office--the roads are much too dangerous up my

way. The computer operator said, "I can't leave the Computer Center." Danny

jumped right in: "Do you have a Secure ID yourself?." "There's one here in the Computer Center," he said. "We keep one for the

operators in case of an emergency." "Listen," Danny said. "Can you do me a big favor? When I need to dial 

into the network, can you let me borrow your Secure ID? Just until it's

safe to drive in." 

"Who are you again?" Kowalski asked. 

"Who do you work for. 

"For Ed Trenton." 

"Oh, yeah, I know him." When he's liable to be faced with tough sledding, a good social engineer

does more than the usual amount of research. "I'm on the second floor,"

Danny went on. "Next to Roy Tucker." He knew that name, as well. Danny went back to work on him. "It'd be

much easier just to go to my desk and fetch my Secure ID for me." 

Danny was pretty certain the guy would not buy into this. First of all, he

would not want to leave in the middle of his shift to go traipsing down

corridors and up staircases to some distant part of the building. He would

also not want to have to paw through someone else's desk, violating

somebody's personal space. No, it was a safe bet he wouldn't want to do

that. 

Kowalski didn't want to say no to a guy who needed some help, but he

didn't want to say yes and get in trouble, either. So he sidestepped the

decision: I'll have to ask my boss. Hang on." He put the phone down, and

Danny could hear him pick up another phone, put in the call, and explain

the request. Kowalski then did something unexplainable: He actually

vouched for the man using the name Bob Billings. "I know him," he told

his manager. "He works for Ed Trenton. Can we let him use the Secure ID

in the Computer Center' Danny, holding on to the phone, was amazed to

overhear this extraordinary and unexpected support for his cause. He

couldn't believe his ears or his luck. After another couple of moments, Kowalski came back on the line and

said, "My manager wants to talk to you himself," and gave him the man's

name and cell phone number. Danny called the manager and went through the whole story one more

time, adding details about the project he was working or and why his

product team needed to meet a critical deadline. "It'd be easier if someone

just goes and fetches my card," he said. "I don't think the desk is locked,

it should be there in my upper left drawer." "Well," said the manager, "just for the weekend, I think we can let you

use the one in the Computer Center. I'll tell the guys on duty that when

you call, they should read off the random-access code for you," and he

gave him the PIN number to use with it. For the whole weekend, every time Danny wanted to get into the

corporate computer system, he only had to call the Computer Center and

ask them to read off the six digits displayed on the Secure ID token. An Inside Job 

Once he was inside the company's computer system, then what? How 

would Danny find his way to the server with the software he wanted? 

He had already prepared for this. Many computer users are familiar with newsgroups, that extensive set of

electronic bulletin boards where people can post questions that other

people answer, or find virtual companions who share an interest in music,

computers, or any of hundreds of other topics. What few people realize when they post any message on a newsgroup 

site is that their message remains on line and available for years. Google, 

for example, now maintains an archive of seven hundred million

messages, 

some dating back twenty years! Danny started by going to the Web

address 

http://groups.google.com. 

As search terms, Danny entered "encryption radio communications" and

the name of the company, and found a years-old message on the subject

from an employee. It was a posting that had been made back when the

company was first developing the product, probably long before police

departments and federal agencies had considered scrambling radio

signals. The message contained the sender's signature, giving not just the man's

name, Scott Press, but his phone number and even the name of his

workgroup,  the Secure Communications Group. Danny picked up the phone and dialed the number. It seemed like a long

shot--would he still be working in the same organization years later?

Would he be at work on such a stormy weekend? The phone rang once,

twice, three times, and then a voice came on the line. "This is Scott," he

said. Claiming to be from the company's IT Department, Danny manipulated

Press (in one of the ways now familiar to you from earlier chapters) into

revealing the names of the servers he used for development work. These

were the servers that could be expected to hold the source code containing

the proprietary encryption algorithm and firmware used in the company's

secure radio products. Danny was moving closer and closer, and his excitement was building. He

was anticipating the rush, the great high he always felt when he succeeded

at something he knew only a very limited number of people could

accomplish. Still, he wasn't home free yet. For the rest of the weekend he'd be able to

get into the company's network whenever he wanted to, thanks to that

cooperative computer center manager. And he knew which servers he

wanted to access. But when he dialed in, the terminal server he logged on

to would not permit him to connect to the Secure Communications Group

development systems. There must have been an internal firewall or router

protecting the computer systems of that group. He'd have to find some

other way in. The next step took nerve: Danny called back to Kowalski in Computer

Operations and complained "My server won't let me connect," and told

the IT guy, "I need you to set me up with an account on one of the

computers in your department so I can use Telnet to connect to my

system." The manager had already approved disclosing the access code displayed

on the time-based token, so this new request didn't seem unreasonable.

Kowalski set up a temporary account and password on one of the

Operation Center's computers, and told Danny to "call me back when you

don't need it any more and I'll remove it." 

Once logged into the temporary account, Danny was able to connect over

the network to the Secure Communications Group's computer systems.

After an hour of on-line searching for a technical vulnerability that would

give him access to a main development server, he hit the jackpot.

Apparently the system or network administrator wasn't vigilant in keeping

up with the latest news on security bugs in the operating system that

allowed remote access. But Danny was.Within a short time he had located the source code files that he was after

and was transferring them remotely to an e-commerce site that offered

free storage space. On this site, even if the files were ever discovered,

they would never be traced back to him.He had one final step before signing off: the methodical process of erasing

his tracks. He finished before the Jay Leno show had gone off the air for

the night. Danny figured this had been one very good weekend's work.

And he had never had to put himself personally at risk. It was an

intoxicating thrill, even better than snowboarding or skydiving.Danny got drunk that night, not on scotch, gin, beer, or sake, but on his

sense of power and accomplishment as he poured through the files he had

stolen, closing in on the elusive, extremely secret radio software.Analyzing the Con

As in the previous story, this ruse only worked because one company

employee was all too willing to accept at face value that a caller was

really the employee he claimed to be. That eagerness to help out a co

worker with a problem is, on the one hand, part of what greases the

wheels of industry, and part of what makes the employees of some

companies more pleasant to work with than employees of others. But on

the other hand, this helpfulness can be a major vulnerability that a social

engineer will attempt to exploit.One bit of manipulation Danny used was delicious: When he made the

request that someone get his Secure ID from his desk, he kept saying he

wanted somebody to "fetch" it for him. Fetch is a command you give your

dog. Nobody wants to be told to fetch something. With that one word,

Danny made it all the more certain the request would be refused and some

other solution accepted instead, which was exactly what he wanted.

The Computer Center operator, "Kowalski, was taken in by Danny

dropping the names of people Kowalski happened to know. But why

would Kowalski's manager - an IT manager, no less - allow some stranger

access to the company's internal network? Simply because the call for

help can be a powerful, persuasive tool in the social engineer's arsenal.

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

This story goes to show that time-based tokens and similar forms of

authentication are not a defense against the wily social engineer. The only

defense is a conscientious employee who follows security policies and

understands how others can maliciously influence his behavior.Could something like that ever happen in your company? Has it already?PREVENTING THE CON

It seems to be an often-repeated element in these stories that an attacker

arranges to dial in to a computer network from outside the company,

without the person who helps him taking sufficient measures to verify that

the caller is really an employee and entitled to the access. Why do I return

to this theme so often? Because it truly is a factor in so many social

engineering attacks. For the social engineer, it's the easiest way to reach

his goal. Why should an attacker spend hours trying to break in, when he

can do it instead with a simple phone call?One of the most powerful methods for the social engineer to carry outthis kind of attack is the simple ploy of pretending to need help - anapproach frequently used by attackers. You don't want to stop your

employees from being helpful to co workers or customers, so you need to

arm them with specific verification procedures to use with anybody

making a request for computer access or confidential information. That

way they can be helpful to those who deserve to be helped, but at the

same time protect the organization's information assets and computer

systems.Company security procedures need to spell out in detail what kind of

verification mechanisms should be used in various circumstances. Chapter

17 provides a detailed list of procedures, but here are some guidelines to

consider:One good way to verify the identity of a person making a

request is to call the phone number listed in the company

directory for that person. If the person making the request is

actually an attacker, the verification call will either let you

speak to the real person on the phone while the imposter is on

hold, or you will reach the employee's voice mail so that you

can listen to the sound of his voice, and compare it to the

speech of the attacker.

 

If employee numbers are used in your company for verifying identity,

then those numbers have to be treated as sensitive information, carefully

guarded and not given out to strangers. The same goes for all other kinds

of internal identifiers, such as internal telephone numbers, departmental

billing identifiers, and even email addresses.Corporate training should call everyone's attention to the common

practice of accepting unknown people as legitimate employees on the

grounds that they sound authoritative or knowledgeable. Just because

somebody knows a company practice or uses internal terminology is no

reason to assume that his identity doesn't need to be verified in other

ways.Security officers and system administrators must not narrow their focus so

that they are only alert to how security-conscious everyone else is being.

They also need to make sure they themselves are following the same

rules, procedures, and practices.Passwords and the like must, of course, never be shared, but the

restriction against sharing is even more important with time-based tokens

and other secure forms of authentication. It should be a matter of common

sense that sharing any of these items violates the whole point of the

company's having installed the systems. Sharing means there can be no

accountability. If a security incident takes place or something goes wrong,

you won't be able to determine who the responsible party is.As I reiterate throughout this book, employees need to be familiar with

social engineering strategies and methods to thoughtfully analyze requests

they receive. Consider using role-playing as a standard part of security

training, so that employees can come to a better understanding of how the

social engineer works. 

Chapter 7Phony Sites and Dangerous Attachments There’s an old saying that you never get something for nothing, 

Still, the ploy of offering something for free continues to be a big draw for

both legitimate ("But wait--there's more! Call right now and we'll throw in

a set of knives and a popcorn popper!") and not-so- legitimate ("Buy one

acre of swampland in Florida and get a second acre free!") businesses.   And most of us are so eager to get something free that we may be

distracted  from thinking clearly about the offer or the promise being

made. We know the familiar warning, "buyer beware," but it's time to heed

another warning: Beware of come-on email attachments and free

software. The savvy attacker will use nearly any means to break into the

corporate network, including appealing to our natural desire to get a free

gift. Here are a few examples. WOULDN'T YOU LIKE A FREE (BLANK)?" 

Just as viruses have been a curse to mankind and medical practitioners

since the beginning of time, so the aptly named computer virus represents

a similar curse to users of technology. The computer viruses that get most

of the attention and end up in the spotlight, not coincidentally, do the most

damage. These are the product of computer vandals. Computer nerds turned malicious, computer vandals strive to show off

how clever they are. Sometimes their acts are like a rite of initiation,

meant to impress older and more experienced hackers. These people are

motivated to create a worm or virus intended to inflict damage. If their

work 

  

destroys files, trashes entire hard drives, and emails itself to thousands of

unsuspecting people, vandals puff with pride at their accomplishment. If

the virus causes enough chaos that newspapers write about it and the

network news broadcasts warn against it, so much the better.Much has been written about vandals and their viruses; books, software

programs, and entire companies have been created to offer protection, and

we won't deal here with the defenses against their technical attacks. Our

interest at the moment is less in the destructive acts of the vandal than in

the more targeted efforts of his distant cousin, the social engineer.It Came in the Email

You probably receive unsolicited emails every day that carry advertising

messages or offer a free something-or-other that you neither need nor

want. You know the kind. They promise investment advice, discounts on

computers, televisions, cameras, vitamins, or travel, offers for credit cards

you don't need, a device that will let you receive pay television channels

free, ways to improve your health or your sex life, and on and on.But every once in a while an offer pops up in your electronic mailbox for

something that catches your eye. Maybe it's a free game, an offer of

photos of your favorite star, a free calendar program, or inexpensive

share" ware that will protect your computer against viruses. Whatever the

offer, the email directs you to download the file with the goodies that the

message has convinced you to try.Or maybe you receive a message with a subject line that reads Don, I miss

you," or "Anna, why haven't you written me," or "Hi, Tim, here's the sexy

photo I promised you." This couldn't be junk advertising mail, you think,

because it has your own name on it and sounds so personal. So you open

the attachment to see the photo or read the message.All of these actions--downloading software you learned about from an

advertising email, clicking on a link that takes you to a site you haven't

heard of before, opening an attachment from someone you don't really

know--are invitations to trouble. Sure, most of the time what you get is

exactly what you expected, or at worst something disappointing or

offensive, but harmless. But sometimes what you get is the handiwork of

a vandal.

Sending malicious code to your computer is only a small part of the

attack. The attacker needs to persuade you to download the attachment for

the attack to succeed.NOTE

One type of program know in the computer underground as a RAT, or

Remote Access Trojan, gives the attacker full access to your computer,

just as if he were sitting at your keyboard.The most damaging forms of malicious code - worms with names like

Love Letter, SirCam, and Anna Kournikiva, to name a few - have all

 

relied on social engineering techniques of deception and taking advantage

of our desire to get something for nothing in order to be spread. The worm

arrives as an attachment to an email that offers something tempting, such

as confidential information, free pornography, or - a very clever ruse - a

message saying that the attachment is the receipt for some expensive item

you supposedly ordered. This last ploy leads you to open the attachment

for fear your credit card has been charged for an item you didn't order.It's astounding how many people fall for these tricks; even after being told

and told again about the dangers of opening email attachments, awareness

of the danger fades over time, leaving each of us vulnerable.Spotting Malicious Software

Another kind of malware - short for malicious software - puts a program

onto your computer that operates without your knowledge or consent, or

performs a task without your awareness. Malware may look innocent

enough, may even be a Word document or PowerPoint presentation, or

any program that has macro functionality, but it will secretly install an

unauthorized program. For example, malware may be a version of the

Trojan Horse talked about in Chapter 6. Once this software is installed on

your machine, it can feed every keystroke you type back to the attacker,

including all your passwords and credit card numbers.There are two other types of malicious software you may find shocking.

One can feed the attacker every word you speak within range of your

computer microphone, even when you think the microphone is turned off.

Worse, if you have a Web cam attached to your computer, an attacker

using a variation of this technique may be able to capture everything that

takes place in front of your terminal, even when you think the camera is

off, day or night.LINGO

MALWARE Slang for malicious software, a computer program, such as

a virus, worm, or Trojan Horse, that performs damaging tasks.

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Beware of geeks bearing gifts, otherwise your company might endure the

same fate as the city of Troy. When in doubt, to avoid an infection, use

protection.A hacker with a malicious sense of humor might try to plant a little

program designed to be wickedly annoying on your computer. For

example, it might make your CD drive tray keep popping open, or the file

you're working on keep minimizing. Or it might cause an audio file to

play a scream at full volume in the middle of the night. None of these is

much fun when you're trying to get sleep or get work done.., but at least

they don't do any lasting damage.MESSAGE FROM A FRIEND

The scenarios can get even worse, despite your precautions. Imagine:

You've decided not to take any chances. You will no longer download any

files except from secure sites that you know and trust, such as

SecurityFocus.com or Amazon.com. You no longer click on links in email

from unknown sources. You no longer open attachments in any email that

you were not expecting. And you check your browser page to make sure

there is a secure site symbol on every site you visit for e-commerce

transactions or to exchange confidential information.And then one day you get an email from a friend or business associate that

carries an attachment. Couldn't be anything malicious if it comes from

someone you know well, right? Especially since you would know who to

blame if your computer data were damaged.You open the attachment, and... BOOM! You just got hit with a worm or

Trojan Horse. Why would someone you know do this to you? Because

some things are not as they appear. You've read about this: the worm that

gets onto someone's computer, and then emails itself to everyone in that

person's address book. Each of those people gets an email from someone

he knows and trusts, and each of those trusted emails contains the worm,

which propagates itself like the ripples from a stone thrown into a still

pond.The reason this technique is so effective is that it follows the theory of

killing two birds with one stone: The ability to propagate to other

unsuspecting victims, and the appearance that it originated from a trusted

person.

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Man has invented many wonderful things that have changed the world

and our way of life. But for every good use of technology, whether a

computer, telephone, or the Internet, someone will always find a way to

abuse it for his or her own purposes. It's a sad fact of life in the current state of technology that you may get an

email from someone close to you and still have to wonder if it's safe to

open. VARIATIONS ON A THEME 

In this era of the Internet, there is a kind of fraud that involves

misdirecting you to a Web site that is not what you expected. This

happens regularly, and it takes a variety of forms. This example, which is

based on an actual scam perpetrated on the Internet, is representative. Merry Christmas. . . 

A retired insurance salesman named Edgar received an email one day

from 

PayPal, a company that offers a fast and convenient way of making onlinepayments. This kind of service is especially handy when a person in one

part of the country (or the world, for that matter) is buying an item from an individual he doesn't know. PayPal charges the purchaser's credit card and transfers the money directly to the seller's account.

As a collector of antique glass jars Edgar did a lot of business through

the on-line auction company eBay. He used PayPal often, sometimes

several times a week. So Edgar was interested when he received an email

in 

the holiday season of 2001 that seemed to be from PayPal, offering him a 

reward for updating his PayPal account. The message read:Season's Greetings Valued PayPal Customer; 

As the New Year approaches and as we all get ready to move a year

ahead, PayPal would like to give you a $5   credit to your account! 

All you have to do to claim your $5 gift from us is updateyourinformation on our secure Pay Pal site by January 1st,2002. A yearbrings a lot of changes, by updating your information with us you will

allow for us to continue providing you and our valued customer service

with excellent service and in the meantime, keep our records straight! 

 

To update your information now and to receive $5 in your PayPal account

instantly,

click this link: http://www, paypal -secure. com/cgi bin Thank you for using PayPal.com and helping us grow to be the largest of

our kind! 

Sincerely wishing you a very "Merry Christmas and Happy New Year," 

PayPal Team A Note about E.commerce Web Sites You probably know people who are reluctant to buy goods on line, even

from brand-name companies such as Amazon and eBay, or the Web sites

of Old Navy, Target, or Nike. In a way, they're right to be suspicious. If

your browser uses today's standard of 128-bit encryption, the information

you send to any secure site goes out from your computer encrypted. This

data could be unencrypted with a lot of effort, but probably is not

breakable in a reasonable amount of time, except perhaps by the National

Security Agency (and the NSA, so far 98 as we know, has not shown any

interest in stealing credit card numbers of American citizens or trying to

find out who is ordering sexy videotapes or kinky underwear). These encrypted files could actually be broken by anyone with the time

and resources. But really, what fool would go to all that effort to steal one

credit card number when many e-commerce companies make the mistake

of storing all their customer financial information unencrypted in their

databases? Worse, a number of e-commerce companies that use a

particular SQL database software badly compound the problem: They

have never changed the default system administrator password for the

program. When they took the software out of the box, the password was

"null," and it's still "null" today. So the contents of the database are

available to anyone on the Internet who decides to try to connect to the

database server. These sites are under attack all the time and information

does get stolen, without anyone being the wiser, On the other hand, the same people who won't buy on the Internet because

they're afraid of having their credit card information stolen 

 

have no problem buying with that same credit card in a brick-and- mortar

store, or paying for lunch, dinner, or drinks with the card 

even in a back-street bar or restaurant they wouldn't take their mother to.

Credit card receipts get stolen from these places all the time, or fished out

of trash bins in the back alley. And any unscrupulous clerk or waiter can

jot down your name and card info, or use a gadget readily available on the

Internet, a card-swiping device that stores data from any credit card

passed through it, for later retrieval. There are some hazards to shopping on line, but it's probably as safe as

shopping in a bricks-and-mortar store. And the credit card companies

offer you the same protection when using your card on line--if any

fraudulent charges get made to the account, you're only responsible for

the first $50. 

So in my opinion, fear of shopping online is just another misplaced   

worry. Edgar didn't notice any of the several tell-tale signs that something was

wrong with this email (for example, the semicolon after the greeting line,

and the garbled text about "our valued customer service with excellent

service"). He clicked on the link, entered the information requested -

name, address, phone number, and credit card information - and sat. back

to wait for the five-dollar credit to show up on his next credit-card bill.

What showed up instead was a list of charges for items he never

purchased. Analyzing the Con 

Edgar had been taken in by a commonplace Internet scam. It's a scam that

comes in a variety of forms. One of them (detailed in Chapter 9) involves

a decoy login screen created by the attacker that looks identical to the real

thing. The difference is that the phony screen doesn't give access to the

computer system that the user is trying to reach, but instead feeds his

username  and password to the hacker. Edgar had been taken in by a scam in which the crooks had registered a

Web site with the name "paypal-secure.com"- which sounds as if it should

have been a secure page on the legitimate PayPal site, but it isn't. When

he entered information on that site, the attackers got just what they

wanted. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

While not foolproof (no security is), whenever visiting a site that requests

information you consider private, always ensure that the connection is

authenticated and encrypted. And even more important, do not

automatically click Yes in any dialog box that may indicate a security

issue, such as an invalid, expired, or revoked digital certificate. VARIATIONS ON THE VARIATION 

How many other ways are there to deceive computer users into going to a

bogus Web site where they provide confidential information? I don't

suppose anyone has a valid, accurate answer, but "lots and lots" will serve

the purpose. The Missing Link 

One trick pops up regularly: Sending out an email that offers a tempting

reason to visit a site, and provides a link for going directly to it. Except

that the link doesn't take you to the site you think you're going to, because

the link actually only resembles a link for that site. Here's another exam-

pie that has actually been used on the Internet, again involving misuse of

the name PayPal: www. PayPai. com At a quick glance, this looks as if it says PayPal. Even if the victim

notices, he may think it's just a slight defect in the text that makes the "I"

of Pal look like an "i." And who would notice at a glance that: www. PayPal. com uses the number 1 instead of a lowercase letter L? There are enough

people who accept misspellings and other misdirection to make this

gambit continually popular with credit card bandits. When people go to

the phony site, it looks like the site they expected to go to, and they

blithely enter their credit card information. To set up one of these scares,

an attacker only needs to register the phony domain name, send out his

emails, and wait for suckers to show up, ready to be cheated. In mid-2002, I received an email, apparently part of a mass mailing that

was marked as being from "Ebay@ebay.com." The message is shown in

Figure 8.1. 

 

Figure 8.1. The link in this or any other email should be used with

caution.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------

msg: Dear eBay User,It has become very noticeable that another party has

been corrupting your eBay account and has violated our User Agreement

policy listed:4. Bidding and BuyingYou are obligated to complete the transaction with the

seller if you purchase an item through one of our fixed price formats or

are the highest bidder as described below. If you are the highest bidder at

the end of an auction (meeting the applicable minimum bid or reserve

requirements) and your bid is accepted by the seller, you are obligated to

complete the transaction with the seller, or the transaction is prohibited by

law or by this Agreement.You received this notice from eBay because it has come

to our attention that your current account has caused interruptions with

other eBay members and eBay requires immediate verification for your

account. Please verify your account or the account may become disabled.

Click Here To Verify Your Account - http://error ebay.tripod.comDesignated trademarks and brands are the property of

their respective owners, eBay and the eBay logo are trademarks of eBay

Inc.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------Victims who clicked on the link went to a Web page that looked very

much like an eBay page. In fact, the page was well designed, with an

authentic eBay logo, and "Browse," "Sell" and other navigation links that,

if clicked, took the visitor to the actual eBay site. There was also a

security logo in the bottom right corner. To deter the savvy victim, the

designer had even used HTML encryption to mask where the user-

provided information was being sent.

It was an excellent example of a malicious computer-based social

engineering attack. Still, it was not without several flaws.The email message was not well written; in particular, the paragraph

beginning "You received this notice" is clumsy and inept (the people

responsible for these hoaxes never hire a professional to edit their copy,

and it always shows). Also, anybody who was paying close attention

would have become suspicious about eBay asking for the visitor's PayPal

information; there is no reason eBay would ask a customer for this private

information involving a different company.And anyone knowledgeable about the Internet would probably recognize

that the hyperlink connects not to the eBay domain but to tripod.com,

which is a free Web hosting service. This was a dead giveaway that the

email was not legitimate. Still, I bet a lot of people entered their

information, including a credit card number, onto this page.

 

NOTE

Why are people allowed to register deceptive or inapproprate domain

names?. Because under current law and on-line policy, anyone can

register any site names that’ not already in use.Companies try to fight this use of copycat addresses, but consider what

they’re up against. General Motors filed suit against a company that

registered f**kgeneralmotors.com (but without the asterisks) and pointed

the URL to General Motor's Web site. GM lost.

 Be Alert

As individual users of the Internet, we all need to be alert, making a

conscious decision about when it's okay to enter personal information,

passwords, account numbers, PINs, and the like.How many people do you know who could tell you whether a particular

Internet page they're looking at meets the requirements of a secure page?

How many employees in your company know what to look for?Everyone who uses the Internet should know about the little symbol that

often appears somewhere on a Web page and looks like a drawing of a

padlock. They should know that when the hasp is closed, the site has been

certified as being secure. When the hasp is open or the lock icon is

missing, the Web site is not authenticated as genuine, and any information

transmitted is in the clear--that is, unencrypted.However, an attacker who manages to compromise administrative

privileges on a company computer may be able to modify or patch the

operating system code to change the user's perception of what is really

happening. For example, the programming instructions in the browser

software that indicate a Web site's digital certificate is invalid can be

modified to bypass the check. Or the system could be modified with

something called a root kit, installing one or more back doors at the

operating system level, which are harder to detect.A secure connection authenticates the site as genuine, and encrypts the

information being communicated, so an attacker cannot make use of any

data that is intercepted. Can you trust any Web site, even one that uses a

secure connection? No, because the site owner may not be vigilant about

applying all the necessary security patches, or forcing users or

administrators to respect good password practices. So you can't assume

that any supposedly secure site is invulnerable to attack.

 

LINGO

BACK DOOR A covert entry point that provides a secret way into a

user’s computer that is unkown to the user. Also used by programmers

while developing a software program so that they can go into the program

to fix problemsSecure HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol) or SSL (secure sockets layer)

provides an automatic mechanism that uses digital certificates not only to

encrypt information being sent to the distant site, but also to provide

authentication (an assurance that you are communicating with the genuine

Web site). However, this protection mechanism does not work for users

who fail to pay attention to whether the site name displayed in the address

bar is in fact the correct address of the site they're trying to access.Another security issue, mostly ignored, appears as a warning message that

says something like "This site is not secure or the security certificate has

expired. Do you want to go to the site anyway?" Many Internet users don't

understand the message, and when it appears, they simply click Okay or

Yes and go on with their work, unaware that they may be on quicksand.

Be warned: On a Web site that does not use a secure protocol, you should

never enter any confidential information such as your address or phone

number, credit card or bank account numbers, or anything else you want

to keep private.Thomas Jefferson said maintaining our freedom required "eternal

vigilance." Maintaining privacy and security in a society that uses

information as currency requires no less.Becoming Virus Savvy

A special note about virus software: It is essential for the corporate

intranet, but also essential for every employee who uses a computer.

Beyond just having anti virus software installed on their machines, users

obviously need to have the software turned on (which many people don't

like because it inevitably slows down some computer functions).With anti virus software there's another important procedure to keep in

mind, as well: Keeping the virus definitions up to date. Unless your

company is set up to distribute software or updates over the network to

every user, each individual user must carry the responsibility of

downloading the

 

latest set of virus definitions on his own. My personal recommendation is

to have everyone set the virus software preferences so that new virus

definitions are automatically updated every day.LINGO

SECURE SOCKETS LAYER A protocol developed by Netscape that

provides authentication of both client and server in a secure

communication on the internet.Simply put, you're vulnerable unless the virus definitions are updated

regularly. And even so, you're still not completely safe from viruses or

worms that the anti virus software companies don't yet know about or

haven't yet published a detection pattern file for.All employees with remote access privileges from their laptops or home

computers need to have updated virus software and a personal firewall on

those machines at a minimum. A sophisticated attacker will look at the

big picture to seek out the weakest link, and that's where he'll attack.

Reminding people with remote computers regularly about the need for

personal firewalls and updated, active virus software is a corporate

responsibility, because you can't expect that individual workers,

managers, sales people, and others remote from an IT department will

remember the dangers of leaving their computers unprotected.Beyond these steps, I strongly recommend use of the less common, but no

less important, software packages that guard against Trojan Horse attacks,

so-called anti-Trojan software. At the time of this writing, two of the

better-known programs are The Cleaner (www.moosoft.com), and Trojan

Defense Sweep (www.diamondcs.com.au).Finally, what is probably the most important security message of all for

companies that do not scan for dangerous emails at the corporate gateway:

Since we all tend to be forgetful or negligent about things that seem

peripheral to getting our jobs done, employees need to be reminded over

and over again, in different ways, about not opening email attachments

unless they are certain that the source is a person or organization they can

trust. And management also needs to remind employees that they must

use active virus software and anti-Trojan software that provides

invaluable protection against the seemingly trustworthy email that may

contain a destructive payload.

 

Chapter 8Using Sympathy, Guilt, and IntimidationAs discussed in Chapter 15, a social engineer uses the psychology of

influence to lead his target to comply with his request. Skilled social

engineers are very adept at developing a ruse that stimulates emotions,

such as fear, excitement, or guilt. They do this by using psychological

triggers--automatic mechanisms that lead people to respond to requests

without in-depth analysis of all the available information.We all want to avoid difficult situations for ourselves and others. Based

on this positive impulse, the attacker can play on a person's sympathy,

make his victim feel guilty, or use intimidation as a weapon.Here are some graduate-school lessons in popular tactics that play on the

emotions.A VISIT TO THE STUDIO

Have you ever noticed how some people can walk up to the guard at the

door of, say, a hotel ballroom where some meeting, private party, or book-

launching function is under way, and just walk past that person without

being asked for his ticket or pass?In much the same way, a social engineer can talk his way into places that

you would not have thought possible - as the following story about the

movie industry makes clear.

 

The Phone Call

"Ron Hillyard's office, this is Dorothy." 

"Dorothy, hi. My name is Kyle Bellamy. I've just come on board to work

in Animation Development on Brian Glassman's staff. You folks sure do

things different over here." 

"I guess. I never worked on any other movie lot so I don't really know.What can I do for you?" "To tell you the truth, I'm feeling sort of stupid. I've got a writer coming

over this afternoon for a pitch session and I don't know who I'm supposed

to talk to about getting him onto the lot. The people over here in Brian's

office are really nice but I hate to keep bothering them, how do I do this,

how do I do that. It's like I just started junior high and can't find my way

to the bathroom. You know what I mean?" Dorothy laughed. "You want to talk to Security. Dial 7, and then 6138. If you 

get Lauren, tell her Dorothy said she should take good 

care of you." 

"Thanks, Dorothy. And if I can't find the men's room, I may call youback!" They chuckled together over the idea, and hung up. David Harold's Story I love the movies and when I moved to Los Angeles, I thought I'd get to 

meet all kinds of people in the movie business and they'd take me along 

to parties and have me over to lunch at the studios. Well, I was there for 

a year, I was turning twenty-six years old, and the closest I got was goingon the Universal Studios tour with all the nice people from Phoenix and 

Cleveland. So finally it got to the point where I figured, if they won't invite me in, I'll invite myself. Which is what I did. I bought a copy of the Los Angeles Times and read the entertainment

column

for a couple of days, and wrote down the names of some producers at different studios. I decided I'd try hitting on one of the big studios first.So I called the switchboard and asked for the office of this producer I 

had read about in the paper. The secretary that answered sounded like themotherly type, so I figured I had gotten lucky; if it was some young girl 

who was just there hoping she'd be discovered, she probably wouldn'thave 

given me the time of day. 

But this Dorothy, she sounded like somebody that would take in a stray

kitten, somebody who'd feel sorry for the new kid that was feeling a little

overwhelmed on the new job. And I sure got just the right touch with her.

It's not every day you try to trick somebody and they give you even more

than you asked for. Out of pity, she not only gave me the name of one of

the people in Security, but said I should tell the lady that Dorothy wanted

her to help me. Of course I had planned to use Dorothy's name anyway. This made it even

better. Lauren opened right up and never even bothered to look up the

name I gave to see if it was really in the employee database. When I drove up to the gate that afternoon, they not only had my name on

the visitor's list, they even had a parking space for me. I had a late lunch

at the commissary, and wandered the lot until the end of the day. I even

sneaked into a couple of sound stages and watched them shooting movies.

Didn't leave till 7 o'clock. It was one of my most exciting days ever. Analyzing the Con 

Everybody was a new employee once. We all have memories of what that

first day was like, especially when we were young and inexperienced. So

when a new employee asks for help, he can expect that many people--

especially entry-level people--will remember their own new-kid on-the-

block feelings and go out of their way to lend a hand. The social engineer

knows this, and he understands that he can use it to play on the

sympathies of his victims. We make it too easy for outsiders to con their way into our company 

plants and offices. Even with guards at entrances and sign-in procedures

for anyone who isn't an employee, any one of several variations on the

ruse used in this story will allow an intruder to obtain a visitor's badge and

walk right in. And if your company requires that visitors be escorted?

That's a good rule, but it's only effective if your employees are truly

conscientious about stopping anyone with or without a visitor's badge

who is on his own, and questioning him. And then, if the answers aren't

satisfactory, your employees have to be willing to contact security. Making it too easy for outsiders to talk their way into your facilities

endangers your company's sensitive information. In today's climate, with

the threat of terrorist attacks hanging over our society, it's more than just

information that could be at risk. 

 

"DO IT NOW"

Not everyone who uses social engineering tactics is a polished social

engineer. Anybody with an insider's knowledge of a particular company

can turn dangerous. The risk is even greater for any company that holds in

its files and databases any personal information about its employees,

which, of course, most companies do.When workers are not educated or trained to recognize social engineering

attacks, determined people like the jilted lady in the following story can

do things that most honest people would think impossible.Doug's Story

Things hadn't been going all that well with Linda anyway, and I knew as

soon as I met Erin that she was the one for me. Linda is, like, a little bit...

well, sort of not exactly unstable but she can sort of go off the deep end

when she gets upset.I told her as gentle as I could that she had to move out, and I helped her

pack and even let her take a couple of the Queensryche CDs that were

really mine. As soon as she was gone I went to the hardware store for a

new Medico lock to put on the front door and put it on that same night.

The next morning I called the phone company and had them change my

phone number, and made it unpublished.

That left me free to pursue Erin.Linda's Story

I was ready to leave, anyway, I just hadn't decided when. But nobody

likes to feel rejected. So it was just a question of, what could I do to let

him know what a jerk he was?It didn't take long to figure out. There had to be another girl, otherwise he

wouldn't of sent me packing in such a hurry. So I'd just wait a bit and then

start calling him late in the evening. You know, around the time they

would least want to be called.I waited till the next weekend and called around 11 o'clock on Saturday

night. Only he had changed his phone number. And the new number was

unlisted. That just shows what kind of SOB the guy was.It wasn't that big of a setback. I started rummaging through the papers I

had managed to take home just before I left my job at the phone company.

And there it was--I had saved a repair ticket from once when there was a

problem with the telephone line at Doug's, and the printout listed

 

the cable and pair for his phone. See, you can change your phone numberall you want, but you still have the same pair of copper wires runningfrom your house to the telephone company switching office, called the Central 

Office, or CO. The set of copper wires from every house and apartment 

is identified by these numbers, called the cable and pair. And if you knowhow the phone company does things, which I do, knowing the target's 

cable and pair is all you need to find out the phone number. I had a list giving all the COs in the city, with their addresses and phone numbers. I looked up the number for the CO in the neighborhood where 

I used to live with Doug the jerk, and called, but naturally nobody was 

there. Where's the switchman when you really need him? Took me all of 

about twenty seconds to come up with a plan. I started calling around to 

the other COs and finally located a guy. But he was miles away and hewas probably sitting there with his feet up. I knew he wouldn't want to do what I needed. I was ready with my plan. "This is Linda, Repair Center," I said. "We have an emergency. Service for a paramedic unit has gone down. We have a field tech trying torestore service but he can't find the problem. We need you to drive over to the 

Webster CO immediately and see if we have dial tone leaving the central office." And then I told him, 'I'll call you when you get there," because of course I couldn't have him calling the Repair Center and asking for me. I knew he wouldn't want to leave the comfort of the central office to bundle up and go scrape ice off his windshield and drive through theslush late at night. But it was an emergency, so he couldn't exactly say he was too busy. When I reached him forty-five minutes later at the Webster CO, I told him to check cable 29 pair 2481, and he walked over to the flame and 

checked and said, Yes, there was dial tone. Which of course I already

knew. So then I said, "Okay, I need you to do an LV," which means line

verification,

which is asking him to identify the phone number. He does this by dialing a special number that reads back the number he called from. 

He doesn't know anything about if it's an unlisted number or that it's just

been changed, so he did what I asked and I heard the number being 

announced over his lineman's test set. Beautiful. The whole thing had worked like a charm. I told him, "Well, the problem must be out in the field," like I knew the

,,umber all along. I thanked him and told him we'd keep working on it,

and said good night. 

     

MITNICK MESSAGE

Once a social engineer knows how things work inside the targeted

company, it becomes easy to use that knowledge to develop rapport with

legitimate employees. Companies need to prepare for social engineering

attacks from current or former employees who may have an axe to grind.

Background checks may be helpful to weed out prospects who may have a

propensity toward this type of behavior. But in most cases, these people

will be extremely difficult to detect. The only reasonable safeguard in

these cases is to enforce and audit procedures for verifying identity,

including the person's employment status, prior to disclosing any

information to anyone not personally known to still be with the company.So much for that Doug and trying to hide from me behind an unlisted

number. The fun was about to begin.Analyzing the Con

The young lady in this story was able to get the information she wanted to

carry out her revenge because she had inside knowledge: the phone

numbers, procedures, and lingo of the telephone company. With it she

was not only able to find out a new, unlisted phone number, but was able

to do it in the middle of a wintry night, sending a telephone switchman

chasing across town for her."MR. BIGG WANTS THIS"

A popular and highly effective form of intimidation--popular in large

measure because it's so simple--relies on influencing human behavior by

using authority.Just the name of the assistant in the CEO's office can be valuable. Private

investigators and even head-hunters do this all the time. They'll call the

switchboard operator and say they want to be connected to the CEO's

office. When the secretary or executive assistant answers, they'll say they

have a document or package for the CEO, or if they send an email

attachment, would she print it out? Or else they'll ask, what's the fax

number? And by the way, what's your name?Then they call the next person, and say, "Jeannie in Mr. Bigg's office told

me to call you so you can help me with something."

The technique is called name-dropping, and it's usually used as a method

to quickly establish rapport by influencing the target to believe that the

attacker is connected with somebody in authority. A target is more likely

to do a favor for someone who knows somebody he knows.

If the attacker has his eyes set on highly sensitive information, he may use

this kind of approach to stir up useful emotions in the victim, such as fear

of getting into trouble with his superiors. Here's an example. Scott's Story 

"Scott Abrams." "Scott, this is Christopher Dalbridge. I just got off the phone with Mr.

Biggley, and he's more than a little unhappy. He says he sent a note ten

days ago that you people were to get copies of all your market penetration

research over to us for analysis. We never got a thing." "Market penetration research? Nobody said anything to me about it. 

What department are you in?" 

"We're a consulting firm he hired, and we're already behind schedule."

"Listen, I'm just on my way to a meeting. Let me get your phone number

 and . . ." The attacker now sounded just short of truly frustrated: "Is that what 

you want me to tell Mr. Biggley?! Listen, he expects our analysis by

tomorrow morning and we have to work on it tonight. Now, do you want

me to tell him we couldn't do it 'cause we couldn't get the report from you,

or do you want to tell him that yourself?." An angry CEO can ruin your week. The target is likely to decide that

maybe this is something he better take care of before he goes into that

meeting. Once again, the social engineer has pressed the right button to

get the response he wanted. Analyzing the Con 

The ruse of intimidation by referencing authority works especially well if

the other person is at a fairly low level in the company. The use of an

important person's name not only overcomes normal reluctance or

suspicion, but often makes the person eager to please; the natural instinct

of wanting to be helpful is multiplied when you think that the person

you're helping is important or influential. The social engineer knows, though, that it's best when running this

particular deceit to use the name of someone at a higher level than the

person's own boss. And this gambit is tricky to use within a small

organization: The attacker doesn't want his victim making a chance

comment to the VP of marketing. "I sent out the product marketing plan

you had that guy call me about," can too easily produce a response of

"What marketing plan? What guy?" And that could lead to the discovery

that the company has been victimized.

 

MITNICKS MESSAGE

Intimidation can create a fear of punishment, influencing people to

cooperate. Intimidation can also raise the fear of embarrassment or of

being disqualified from that new promotion. 

People must be trained that it's not only acceptable but expected to

challenge authority when security is at stake. Information security training

should include teaching people how to challenge authority in customer-

friendly ways, without damaging relationships. Moreover, this expectation

must be supported from the top down. If an employee is not going to be

backed up for challenging people regardless of their status, the normal

reaction is to stop challenging--just the opposite of what you want. WHAT THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION KNOWSABOUT YOU We like to think that government agencies with les on us keep theinformation  safely locked away from people without an authentic need to

know. The reality is that even the federal government isn't as immune to

penetration as we would like to imagine. May Linn’s Phone Call

Place: A regional office of the Social Security Administration 

Time: 1 0:1 8 A.M., Thursday morning "Mod Three. This is May Linn Wang." The voice on the other end of the phone sounded apologetic, almost timid."Ms. Wang, this is Arthur Arondale, in the Office of the Inspector

General. Can I call you 'May'? 

"It's 'May Linn'," she said. 

 "Well, it's like this, May Linn. We've got a new guy in here who there's

no computer for yet, and right now he's got a priority project and he's

using mine. We're the government of the United States, for cryin' out

loud, and they say they don't have enough money in the budget to buy a

computer for this guy to use. And now my boss thinks I'm falling behind

and doesn't want to hear any excuses, you know?" 

 

"I know what you mean, all right." 

"Can you help me with a quick inquiry on MCS?" he asked, using the

name of the computer system for looking up taxpayer information. 

"Sure, what'cha need?" 

"The first thing I need you to do is an alphadent on Joseph Johnson, DOB

7/4/69." (Alphadent means to have the computer search for an account

alphabetically by taxpayer name, further identified by date of birth.) After a brief pause, she asked: "What do you need to know?" 

"What's his account number?" he said, using the insider's shorthand for the social security number. She read it off. "Okay, I need you to do a numident on that account number,"

 the caller said. That was a request for her to read off the basic taxpayer data, 

and May Linn responded by giving the taxpayer's place of 

birth, mother's maiden name, and father's name. The caller 

listened patiently while she also gave him the month and year 

the card was issued, and the district office it was issued by. He next asked for a DEQY. (Pronounced "DECK-wee," it's short 

for "detailed earnings query.") The DEQY request brought the response, "For what year?" 

The caller replied, "Year 2001 ." 

May Linn said, "The amount was $190,286, the payer was Johnson

MicroTech." 

"Any other wages?"

"No." 

"Thanks," he said. "You've been very kind." 

Then he tried to arrange to call her whenever he needed information and

couldn't get to his computer, again using the favorite trick of social

engineers of always trying to establish  a  connection so that he can keep

going back to the same person,  avoiding the nuisance of having to find a

new mark each 

time. "Not next week," she told him, because she was going to Kentucky for hersister's wedding.' Any other time, she'd do whatever she could. 

When she put the phone down, May Linn felt good that she 

had been able to offer a little help to a fellow unappreciated 

public servant. 

    

Keith Carter's Story 

To judge from the movies and from best-selling crime novels, a private

investigator is short on ethics and long on knowledge of how to get the

juicy facts on people. They do this by using thoroughly illegal methods,

while just barely managing to avoid getting arrested. The truth, of course,

is that most PIs run entirely legitimate businesses. Since many of them

started their working lives as sworn law enforcement officers, they know

perfectly well what's legal and what isn't, and most are not tempted to

cross the line. There are, however, exceptions. Some Pis - more than a few - do indeed

fit the mold of the guys in the crime stories. These guys are known in the

trade as information brokers, a polite term for people who are willing to

break the rules. They know they can get any assignment done a good deal

faster and a good deal easier if they take some shortcuts. That these

shortcuts happen to be potential felonies that might land them behind bars

for a few years doesn't seem to deter the more unscrupulous ones. Meanwhile the upscale PIs--the ones who work out of a fancy office suite

in a high-rent part of town--don't do this kind of work themselves. They

simply hire some information broker to do it for them. The guy we'll call Keith Carter was the kind of private eye unencumbered

by ethics. It was a typical case of "Where's he hiding the money?" Or sometimes it's

"Where's she hiding the money?" Sometimes it was a rich lady who

wanted to know where her husband had hidden her money (though why a

woman with money ever marries a guy without was a riddle Keith Carter

wondered about now and then but had never found a good answer for). In this case the husband, whose name was Joe Johnson, was the one

keeping the money on ice. He "was a very smart guy who had started a

high-tech company with ten thousand dollars he borrowed from his wife's

family and built into a hundred-million dollar firm. According to her

divorce lawyer, he had done an impressive job of hiding his assets, and

the lawyer wanted a complete rundown. Keith figured his starting point would be the Social Security

Administration, targeting their files on Johnson, which would be packed

with highly useful information for a situation like this. Armed with their

info, Keith could pretend to be the target and get the banks, brokerage

firms, and offshore institutions to tell him everything. His first phone call was to a local district office, using the same 800

number  that any member of the public uses, the number listed in the local

 

phone book. When a clerk came on the line, Keith asked to be connected

to someone in Claims. Another wait, and then a voice. Now Keith shifted

gears; "Hi," he began. "This is Gregory Adams, District Office 329.

Listen, I'm trying to reach a claims adjuster that handles an account

number that ends in 6363, and the number I have goes to a fax machine." "That's Mod 2," the man said. He looked up the number and gave it to

Keith. Next he called Mod 2. When May Linn answered, he switched hats and

went through the routine about being from the Office of the Inspector

General, and the problem about somebody else having to use his

computer. She gave him the information he was looking for, and agreed to

do whatever she could when he needed help in the future. Analyzing the Con 

What made this approach effective was the play on the employee's

sympathy with the story about someone else using his computer and "my

boss is not happy with me." People don't show their emotions at work

very often; when they do, it can roll right over someone else's ordinary

defenses against social engineering attacks. The emotional ploy of "I'm in

trouble, won't you help me?" was all it took to win the day. Social Insecurity 

Incredibly, the Social Security Administration has posted a copy of their

entire Program Operations Manual on the Web, crammed with

information that's useful for their people, but also incredibly valuable to

social engineers. It contains abbreviations, lingo, and instructions for how

to request what you want, as described in this story. Want to learn more inside information about the Social Security

Administration? Just search on Google or enter the following address into

your browser: http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/. Unless the agency has

already read this story and removed the manual by the time you read this,

you'll find on-line instructions that even give detailed information on what

data an SSA clerk is allowed to give to the law enforcement community.

In practical terms, that community includes any social engineer who can

convince an SSA clerk that he is from a law enforcement organization. 

The attacker could not have been successful in obtaining this information

from one of the clerks who handles phone calls from the general public.

The kind of attack Keith used only works when the person on the

receiving end of the call is someone whose phone number is unavailable

to the public, and who therefore has the expectation that anyone calling

must be somebody on the inside--another example of speakeasy security'.

The elements that helped this attack to work included: Knowing the phone number to the Mod. Knowing the terminology they used--numident, alphadent, and DEQY. Pretending to be from the Office of the Inspector General, which every

federal government employee knows as a government-wide investigative

agency with broad powers. This gives the attacker an aura of authority. One interesting sidelight: Social engineers seem to know how to make

requests so that hardly anyone ever thinks, "Why are you calling me.'-

even when, logically; it would have made more sense if the call had gone

to some other person in some completely different department. Perhaps it

simply offers such a break in the monotony of the daily grind to help the

caller that the victim discounts how unusual the call seems. Finally, the attacker in this incident, not satisfied with getting the

information just for the case at hand, wanted to establish a contact he

could call on regularly. He might otherwise have been able to use a

common ploy for the sympathy attack--"I spilled coffee on my keyboard."

That was no good here, though, because a keyboard can be replaced in a

day. Hence he used the story about somebody else using his computer, whichhe could reasonably string out for weeks: "Yep, I thought he'd have his

own computer yesterday, but one came in and another guy pulled some

kind of deal and got it instead. So this joker is still showing up in my

cubicle."  And so on. Poor me, I need help. Works like a charm. ONE SIMPLE CALL 

One of an attacker's main hurdles is to make his request sound reasonable

something typical of requests that come up in the victim's workday,

something that doesn't put the victim out too much. As with a lot of other

things in life, making a request sound logical may be a challenge one day,

but the next, it may be a piece of cake. 

 

Mary H's Phone Call

Date/Time: Monday, November 23, 7:49 A.M.

Place: Mauersby & Storch Accounting, New YorkTo most people, accounting work is number crunching and bean counting,

generally viewed as being about as enjoyable as having a root canal.

Fortunately, not everyone sees the work that way. Mary Harris, for

example, found her work as a senior accountant absorbing, part of the

reason she was one of the most dedicated accounting employees at her

firm.On this particular Monday, Mary arrived early to get a head start on what

she expected to be a long day, and was surprised to find her phone

ringing. She picked it up and gave her name."Hi, this is Peter Sheppard. I'm with Arbuclde Support, the company that

does tech support for your firm. We logged a couple of complaints over

the weekend from people having problems with the computers there. I

thought I could troubleshoot before everybody comes into work this

morning. Are you having any problems with your computer or connecting

to the network?"She told him she didn't know yet. She turned her computer on and while it

was booting, he explained what he wanted to do."I'd like to run a couple of tests with you, he said. "I'm able to see on my

screen the keystrokes you type, and I want to make sure they're going

across the network correctly. So every time you type a stroke, I want you

to tell me what it is, and I'll see if the same letter or number is appearing

here. Okay?"With nightmare visions of her computer not working and a frustrating day

of not being able to get any work done, she was more than happy to have

this man help her. After a few moments, she told him, "I have the login

screen, and I'm going to type in my ID. I'm typing it now--

M...A...R...Y...D.""Great so far," he said. "I'm seeing that here. Now, go ahead and type

your password but don't tell me what it is. You should never tell anybody

your password, not even tech support. I'll just see asterisks here--your

password is protected so I can't see it.': None of this was true, but it made

sense to Mary. And then he said, "Let me know once your computer has

started up."When she said it was running, he had her open two of her applications,

and she reported that they launched "just fine."

Mary was relieved to see that everything seemed to be working normally.

Peter said, "I'm glad I could make sure you'll be able to use your computer

okay. And listen," he went on, "we just installed an update that allow

people to change their passwords. Would you be willing to take a couple

of minutes with me so I can see if we got it working right? She was grateful for the help he had given her and readily agreed. Peter

talked her through the steps of launching the application that allows a user

to change passwords, a standard element of the Windows 2000 operating

system. "Go ahead and enter your password," he told her. "But remember

not to say it out loud." When she had done that, Peter said, "Just for this quick test, when it asks

for your new password, enter 'test123.' Then type it again in the

Verification box, and click Enter." He walked her through the process of disconnecting from the server. He

had her wait a couple of minutes, then connect again, this time trying to

log on with her new password. It worked like a charm, Peter seemed very

pleased, and talked her through changing back to her original password or

choosing a new one--once more cautioning her about not saying the

password out loud. "Well, Mary," Peter told her. "We didn't find any trouble, and that's great.

Listen, if any problems do come up, just call us over here at Arbuckle. I'm

usually on special projects but anybody here who answers can help you."

She thanked him and they said goodbye. Peter's Story 

The word had gotten around about Peter--a number of the people in his

community who had gone to school with him had heard he turned into

some kind of a computer whiz who could often find out useful

information that other people couldn't get. When Alice Conrad came to

him to ask a favor, he said no at first. Why should he help? When he ran

into her once and tried to ask for a date, she had turned him down cold. But his refusal to help didn't seem to surprise her. She said she didn't think

it was something he could do anyway. That was like a challenge, because

of course he was sure he could. And that was how he came to 

agree. 

Alice had been offered a contract for some consulting work for a

marketing company, but the contract terms didn't seem very good. Before

she went back to ask for a better deal, she wanted to know what terms

other consultants had on their contracts. 

 

This is how Peter tells the story. I wouldn't tell Alice but I got off on people wanting me to do something

they didn't think I could, when I knew it would be easy. Well, not easy,

exactly, not this time. It would take a bit of doing. But that was okay. I could show her what smart was really all about. A little after 7:30 Monday morning, I called the marketing company's

offices and got the receptionist, said that I was with the company that

handled their pension plans and I need to talk to somebody in Accounting.

Had she noticed if any of the Accounting people had come in yet? She

said, "I think I saw Mary come in a few minutes ago, I'll try her for you." When Mary picked up the phone, I told her my little story about computer

problems, which was designed to give her the jitters so she'd be glad to

cooperate. As soon as I had talked her through changing her password, I

then quickly logged onto the system with the same temporary password I

had asked her to use, test123. Here's where the mastery comes in--I installed a small program that 

allowed me to access the company's computer system whenever I wanted,

using a secret password of my own. After I hung up with Mary, my first

step was to erase the audit trail so no one would even know I had been on

his or her system. It was easy. After elevating my system privileges, I was

able to download a free program called clearlogs that I found on a

security- related Web site at www.ntsecurity.nu. Time for the real job. I ran a search for any documents with the word

contract" in the filename, and downloaded the files. Then I searched some

more and came on the mother lode--the directory containing all the

consultant payment reports. So I put together all the contract files and a

list of payments. Alice could pore through the contracts and see how much they were

paying other consultants. Let her do the donkeywork of poring through all

those files. I had done what she asked me to. From the disks I put the data onto, I printed out some of the files so I 

could show her the evidence. I made her meet me and buy dinner. You

should have seen her face when she thumbed through the stack of papers.

"No way," she said. "No way." I didn't bring the disks with me. They were the bait. I said she'd have to

come over to get them, hoping maybe she'd want to show her gratitude for

the favor I just did her. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

It's amazing how easy it is for a social engineer to get people to do things

based on how he structures the request. The premise is to trigger an

automatic response based on psychological principles, and rely on the

mental shortcuts people take when they perceive the caller as an ally.Analyzing the Con

Peter's phone call to the marketing company represented the most basic

form of social engineering--a simple attempt that needed little preparation,

worked on the first attempt, and took only a few minutes to bring off.Even better, Mary, the victim, had no reason to think that any sort of trick

or ruse had been played on her, no reason to file a report or raise a ruckus.The scheme worked through Peter's use of three social engineering tactics.

First he got Mary's initial cooperation by generating fear--making her

think that her computer might not be usable. Then he took the time to

have her open two of her applications so she could be sure they were

working okay, strengthening the rapport between the two of them, a sense

of being allies. Finally, he got her further cooperation for the essential part

of his task by playing on her gratitude for the help he had provided in

making sure her computer was okay.By telling her she shouldn't ever reveal her password, should not reveal it

even to him, Peter did a thorough but subtle job of convincing her that he

was concerned about the security of her company's files. This boosted her

confidence that he must be legitimate because he was protecting her and

the company.THE POLICE RAID

Picture this scene: The government has been trying to lay a trap for a man

named Arturo Sanchez, who has been distributing movies free over the

Internet. The Hollywood studios say he's violating their copyrights, he

says he's just trying to nudge them to recognize an inevitable market so

they'll start doing something about making new movies available for

download. He points out (correctly) that this could be a huge source of

revenue for the studios that they seem to be completely ignoring.

 

Search Warrant, Please

Coming home late one night, he checks the windows of his apartment

from across the street and notices the lights are off, even though he always

leaves one on when he goes out.He pounds and bangs on a neighbor's door until he wakes the man up, and

learns that there was indeed a police raid in the building. But they made

the neighbors stay downstairs, and he still isn't sure what apartment they

went into. He only knows they left carrying some heavy things, only they

were wrapped up and he couldn't tell what they were. And they didn't take

anybody away in handcuffs.Arturo checks his apartment. The bad news is that there's a paper from

the police requiring that he call immediately and set up an appointment

for an interview within three days. The worse news is that his computers

are missing.Arturo vanishes into the night, going to stay with a friend. But the

uncertainty gnaws at him. How much do the police know? Have they

caught up with him at last, but left him a chance to flee? Or is this about

something else entirely, something he can clear up without having to

leave town?Before you read on, stop and think for a moment: Can you imagine any

way you could find out what the police know about you? Assuming you

don't have any political contacts or friends in the police department or the

prosecutor s office, do you imagine there's any way that you, as an

ordinary citizen, could get this information? Or that even someone with

social engineering skills could?Scamming the Police

Arturo satisfied his need to know like this: To start with, he got the phone

number for a nearby copy store, called them, and asked for their fax

number.Then he called the district attorney's office, and asked for Records. When

he was connected with the records office, he introduced himself as an

investigator with Lake County, and said he needed to speak with the clerk

who files the active search warrants."I do," the lady said. "Oh, great," he answered. "Because we raided a

suspect last night and I'm trying to locate the affidavit.""We file them by address," she told him.He gave his address, and she sounded almost excited. "Oh, yeah," she

bubbled, "I know about that one. 'The Copyright Caper.'"

"That's the one," he said. "I'm looking for the affidavit and copy of the

warrant. "Oh, I have it right here." "Great," he said. "Listen, I'm out in the field and I have a meeting with the

Secret Service on this case if I fifteen minutes. I've been so absentminded

lately, I left the file at home, and I'll never make it there and back in time.

Could I get copies from you?" "Sure, no problem. I'll make copies; you can come right over and pick

them up." "Great," he said. "That's great. But listen, I'm on the other side of town. Is

it possible you could fax them to me?" That created a small problem, but not insurmountable. "We don't have a

fax up here in Records," she said. "But they have one downstairs in the

Clerk's office they might let me use." He said, "Let me call the Clerk's office and set it up." The lady in the Clerk's office said she'd be glad to take care of it but

wanted to know "Who's going to pay for it?" She needed an accounting

code. "I'll get the code and call you back," he told her. He then called the DA's office, again identified himself as a police officerand simply asked the receptionist, "What's the accounting code for the

DA's office?" Without hesitation, she told him. Calling back to the Clerk's office to provide the accounting number gave

him the excuse for manipulating the lady a little further: He talked her

into walking upstairs to get the copies of the papers to be faxed. NOTE

How does a social engineer know the details of so many operation –

police departments, prosecutors offices, phone company practices, the

organization of specific companies that are in fields useful in his attacks,

such as telecommunications and computers ? Because it’s his business to

find out. This knowledge is a social engineers stock in the trade because

information can aid him in his efforts to deceive.Covering His Tracks 

Arturo still had another couple of steps to take. There was always a

possibility that someone would smell something fishy, and he might

arrive at the copy store to find a couple of detectives, casually dressed and

trying to 

 

look busy until somebody showed up asking for that particular fax. He

waited a while, and then called the Clerk's office back to verify that the

lady had sent the fax. Fine so far.He called another copy store in the same chain across town and used the

ruse about how he was "pleased with your handling of a job and want to

write the manager a letter of congratulations, what's her name?" With that

essential piece of information, he called the first copy store again and said

he wanted to talk to the manager. When the man picked up the phone,

Arturo said, "Hi, this is Edward at store 628 in Hartfield. My manager,

Anna, told me to call you. We've got a customer who's all upset--

somebody gave him the fax number of the wrong store. He's here waiting

for an important fax, only the number he was given is for your store." The

manager promised to have one of his people locate the fax and send it on

to the Hartfield store immediately.Arturo was already waiting at the second store when the fax arrived there.

Once he had it in hand, he called back to the Clerk's office to tell the lady

thanks, and 'It's not necessary to bring those copies back upstairs, you can

just throw them away now." Then he called the manager at the first store

and told him, too, to throw away their copy of the fax. This way there

wouldn't be any record of what had taken place, just in case somebody

later came around asking questions. Social engineers know you can never

be too careful.Arranged this way, Arturo didn't even have to pay charges at the first

copy store for receiving the fax and for sending it out again to the second

store. And if it turned out that the police did show up at the first store,

Arturo would already have his fax and be long gone by the time they

could arrange to get people to the second location.The end of the story: The affidavit and warrant showed that the police had

well-documented evidence of Arturo's movie-copying activities. That was

what he needed to know. By midnight, he had crossed the state line.

Arturo was on the way to a new life, somewhere else with a new identity,

ready to get started again on his campaign.Analyzing the Con

The people who work in any district attorney's office, anywhere, are in

constant contact with law enforcement officers--answering questions,

making arrangements, taking messages. Anybody gutsy enough to call

and claim to be a police officer, sheriff's deputy, or whatever will likely

be taken at his word. Unless it's obvious that he doesn't know the

terminology, or if he's nervous and stumbles over his words, or in some

other way 

doesn't sound authentic, he may not even be asked a single question to

verify his claim. That's exactly what happened here, with two different

workers.MITNICK MESSAGE

The truth of the matter is that no one is immune to being duped by a good

social engineer. Because of the pace of normal life, we don't always take

the time for thoughtful decisions, even on matters that are important to us.

Complicated situations, lack of time, emotional state, or mental fatigue

can easily distract us. So we take a mental shortcut, making our decisions

without analyzing the information carefully and completely, a mental

process known as automatic responding. This is even true for federal,

state, and local law enforcement officials. We're all human.Obtaining a needed charge code was handled with a single phone call.

Then Arturo played the sympathy card with the story about "a meeting

with the Secret Service in fifteen minutes, I've been absent-minded and

left the file at home." She naturally felt sorry for him, and went out of her

way to help.Then by using not one but two copy stores, Arturo made himself extra

safe when he went to pick up the fax. A variation on this that makes the

fax even more difficult to trace: Instead of having the document sent to

another copy store, the attacker can give what appears to be a fax number,

but is really an address at a free Internet service that will receive a fax for

you and automatically forward it to your email address. That way it can be

downloaded directly to the attacker's computer, and he never has to show

his face anyplace where someone might later be able to identify him. And

the email address and electronic fax number can be abandoned as soon as

the mission has been accomplished.TURNING THE TABLES

A young man I'll call Michael Parker was one of those people who figured

out a bit late that the better-paying jobs mostly go to people with college

degrees. He had a chance to attend a local college on a partial scholarship

plus education loans, but it meant working nights and weekends to pay his

rent, food, gas, and car insurance. Michael, who always liked to find

shortcuts, thought maybe there was another way, one that paid off faster

and with less effort. Because he had been learning about computers from

the time he got to play with one at age ten and became fascinated with

finding out how they worked, he decided to see if he could "create" his

own accelerated bachelor's degree in computer science.

 

Graduating--Without Honors

He could have broken into the computer systems of the state university,

found the record of someone who had graduated with a nice B+ or A-

average, copied the record, put his own name on it, and added it to the

records of that year's graduating class. Thinking this through, feeling

somehow uneasy about the idea, he realized there must be other records of

a student having been on campus--tuition payment records, the housing

office, and who knows what else. Creating just the record of courses and

grades would leave too many loopholes.Plotting further, feeling his way, it came to him that he could reach his

goal by seeing if the school had a graduate with the same name as his,

who had earned a computer science degree any time during an appropriate

span of years. If so, he could just put down the other Michael Parker's

social security number on employment application forms; any company

that checked the name and social security number with the university

would be told that, yes, he did have the claimed degree. (It wouldn't be

obvious to most people but was obvious to him that he could put one

social security number on the job application and then, if hired, put his

own real number on the new-employee forms. Most companies would

never think to check whether a new hire had used a different number

earlier in the hiring process.)Logging In to Trouble

How to find a Michael Parker in the university's records? He went about it

like this:Going to the main library on the university campus, he sat down at a

computer terminal, got up on the Internet, and accessed the university's

Web site. He then called the Registrar's office. With the person who

answered, he went through one of the by-now-familiar social engineering

routines: "I'm calling from the Computer Center, we're making some

changes to the network configuration and we want to make sure we don't

disrupt your access. Which server do you connect to?""What do you mean, server, he was asked."What computer do you connect to when you need to look up student

academic information.

The answer, admin.rnu.edu, gave him the name of the computer where

student records were stored. This was the first piece of the puzzle: He now

knew his target machine. 

LINGO

DUMB TERMINALA terminal that doesn’t contain its ownmicroprocessor. Dumb terminals can only accept simple commands and

display text characters and numbers.He typed that URL into the computer and got no response--as expected,

there was a firewall blocking access. So he ran a program to see if he

could connect to any of the services running on that computer, and found

an open port with a Telnet service running, which allows one computer to

connect remotely to another computer and access it as if directly

connected using a dumb terminal. All he would need to gain access would

be the standard user ID and password.He made another call to the registrar's office, this time listening carefully

to make sure he was talking to a different person. He got a lady, and again

he claimed to be from the university's Computer Center. They were

installing a new production system for administrative records, he told her.

As a favor, he'd like her to connect to the new system, still in test mode, to

see if she could access student academic records okay. He gave her the IP

address to connect to, and talked her through the process.In fact, the IP address took her to the computer Michael was sitting at in

the campus library. Using the same process described in Chapter 8, he had

created a login simulator--a decoy sign-in screen--looking just like the one

she was accustomed to seeing when going onto the system for student

records. "It's not working," she told him. "It keeps saying 'Login incorrect.By now the login simulator had fed the keystrokes of her account name

and password to Michael's terminal; mission accomplished. He told her,

"Oh, some of the accounts haven't been brought over yet to this machine.

Let me set up your account, and I'll call you back." Careful about tying up

loose ends, as any proficient social engineer needs to be, he would make a

point of phoning later to say that the test system wasn't working right yet,

and if it was okay with her, they'd call back to her or one of the other

folks there when they had figured out what was causing the problem.The Helpful Registrar

Now Michael knew what computer system he needed to access, and he

had a user's ID and password. But what commands would he need in

 

order to search the files for information on a computer science graduate

with the right name and graduation date? The student database would be a

proprietary one, created on campus to meet the specific requirements of

the university and the Registrar's office, and would have a unique way of

accessing information in the database. First step in clearing this last hurdle: Find out who could guide him

through the mysteries of searching the student database. He called the

Registrar's office again, this time reaching a different person. He was

from the office of the Dean of Engineering, he told the lady, and he asked,

"Who are we supposed to call for help when we're having problems

accessing the student academic rues. Minutes later he was on the phone with the college's database

administrator, pulling the sympathy act: "I'm Mark Sellers, in the

registrar's office. You feel like taking pity on a new guy? Sorry to be

calling you but they're all in a meeting this afternoon and there's no one

around to help me. I need to retrieve a list of all graduates with a

computer science degree, between 1990 and 2000. They need it by the end

of the day and if I don't have it, I may not have this job for long. You

willing to help out a guy in trouble?" Helping people out was part of what

this database administrator did, so he was extra patient as he talked

Michael step by step through the process. By the time they hung up, Michael had downloaded the entire list of

computer science graduates for those years. Within a few minutes he had

run a search, located two Michael Parkers, chosen one of them, and

obtained the guy's social security number as well as other pertinent

information stored in the database. He had just become "Michael Parker, B.S. in Computer Science,

graduated with honors, 1998." In this case, the "B.S." was uniquely

appropriate. Analyzing the Con 

This attack used one ruse I haven't talked about before: The attacker

asking the organization's database administrator to walk him through the

steps of carrying out a computer process he didn't know how to do. A

powerful and effective turning of the tables, this is the equivalent of

asking the owner of a store to help you carry a box containing items

you've  just  stolen from his shelves out to your car. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Computer users are sometimes clueless about the threats and

vulnerabilities associated with social engineering that exist in our world of

technology. They have access to information, yet lack the detailed

knowledge of what might prove to be a security threat. A social engineer

will target an employee who has little understanding of how valuable the

information being sought is, so the target is more likely to grant the

stranger's request.PREVENTING THE CON

Sympathy, guilt, and intimidation are three very popular psychological

triggers used by the social engineer, and these stories have demonstrated

the tactics in action. But what can you and your company do to avoid

these types of attacks?Protecting Data

Some stories in this chapter emphasize the danger of sending a file to

someone you don't know, even when that person is (or appears to be) an

employee, and the file is being sent internally, to an email address or tax

machine within the company.Company security policy needs to be very specific about the safeguards

for surrendering valued data to anyone not personally known to the

sender. Exacting procedures need to be established for transferring files

with sensitive information. When the request is from someone not

personally known, there must be clear steps to take for verification, with

different levels of authentication depending on the sensitivity of the

information.Here are some techniques to consider:Establish the need to know (which may require obtaining authorization

from the designated information owner).Keep a personal or departmental log of these transactions.Maintain a list of people who have been specially trained in the

procedures and who are trusted to authorize sending out sensitive

information. Require that only these people be allowed to send

information to anyone outside the workgroup.

If a request for the data is made in writing (email, fax, or mail) take

additional security steps to verify that the request actually came from the

person it appears to have come from.

 

About Passwords

All employees who are able to access any sensitive information--and

today that means virtually every worker who uses a computer--need to

understand that simple acts like changing your password, even for a few

moments, can lead to a major security breach.Security training needs to cover the topic of passwords, and that has to

focus in part on when and how to change your password, what constitutes

an acceptable password, and the hazards of letting anyone else become

involved in the process. The training especially needs to convey to all

employees that they should be suspicious of any request that involves

their passwords.On the surface this appears to be a simple message to get across to

employees. It's not, because to appreciate this idea requires that

employees grasp how a simple act like changing a password can lead to a

security compromise. You can tell a child "Look both ways before

crossing the street," but until the child understands why that's important,

you're relying on blind obedience. And rules requiring blind obedience are

typically ignored or forgotten.NOTE

Passwords are such a central focus of social engineering attacks that we

devote a separate section to the topic in Chapter 16, where you will find

specific recommended policies on managing passwords.A Central Reporting Point

Your security policy should provide a person or group designated as a

central point for reporting suspicious activities that appear to be attempts

to infiltrate your organization. All employees need to know who to call

any time they suspect an attempt at electronic or physical intrusion. The

phone number of the place to make these reports should always be close

at hand so employees don't have to dig for it if they become suspicious

that an attack is taking place.Protect Your Network

Employees need to understand that the name of a computer server or

network is not trivial information, but rather it can give an attacker

essential knowledge that helps him gain trust or find the location of the

information he desires.

In particular, people such as database administrators who work with

software belong to that category of those with technology expertise, and

they need to operate under special and very restrictive rules about

verifying the identity of people who call them for information or advice.People who regularly provide any. kind of computer help need to be well

trained in what kinds of requests should be red flags, suggesting that the

caller may be attempting a social engineering attack.It's worth noting, though, that from the perspective of the database

administrator in the last story in this chapter, the caller met the criteria for

being legitimate: He was calling from on campus, and he was obviously

on a site that required an account name and password. This just makes

clear once again the importance of having standardized procedures for

verifying the identity of anybody requesting information, especially in a

case like this where the caller was asking for help in obtaining access to

confidential records.All of this advice goes double for colleges and universities. It's not news

that computer hacking is a favorite pastime for many college students, and

it should also be no surprise that student records--and sometimes faculty

records, as well--are a tempting target. This abuse is so rampant that some

corporations actually consider campuses a hostile environment, and create

firewall rules that block access from educational institutions with

addresses that end in .edu.The long and short of it is that all student and personnel records of any

kind should be seen as prime targets of attack, and should be well

protected as sensitive information.Training Tips

Most social engineering attacks are ridiculously easy to defend against...

for anyone who knows what to be on the lookout for.From the corporate perspective, there is a fundamental need for good

training. But there is also a need for something else: a variety of ways to

remind people of what they've learned.Use splash screens that appear when the user's computer is turned on, with

a different security message each day. The message should be designed so

that it does not disappear automatically, but requires the user to click on

some kind of acknowledgement that he/she has read it.Another approach I recommend is to start a series of security reminders.

Frequent reminder messages are important; an awareness program needs

to be ongoing and never-ending. In delivering content, the reminders

 

should not be worded the same in every instance. Studies have shown that

these messages are more effectively received when they vary in wording

or when used in different examples.One excellent approach is to use short blurbs in the company newsletter.

This should not be a full column on the subject, although a security

column would certainly be valuable. Instead, design a two- or three-

column-wide insert, something like a small display ad in your local

newspaper. In each issue of the newsletter, present a new security

reminder in this short, attention-catching way.

 

Chapter 9The Reverse Sting The sting, mentioned elsewhere in this book (and in my opinion probably

the best movie that s ever been made about a con operation),  lays out its

tricky plot in fascinating detail. The sting operationin the movie is an exact depiction of how top grifters run "the wire," oneof the three types of major swindles referred to as "big cons." If you want

to know how a team of professionals pulls off a scam raking in a great

deal of money in a single evening, there's no better textbook. But traditional cons, whatever their particular gimmick, run according 

to a pattern. Sometimes a ruse is worked in the opposite direction, which

is called a reverse sting. This is an intriguing twist in which the attacker

sets up the situation so that the victim calls on the attacker for help, or a

co worker has made a request, which the attacker is responding to. 

How does this work? You're about to find out. LINGO

REVERSE STING A con in which the person being attacked asks the

attacker for helpTHE ART OF FRIENDLY PERSUASION 

When the average person conjures up the picture of a computer hacker,

what usually comes to mind is the uncomplimentary image of a lonely,

introverted nerd whose best friend is his computer and who has difficulty

carrying on a conversation, except by instant messaging. The social

engineer, who often has hacker skills, also has people skills at the

opposite end 

 

of the spectrum--well-developed abilities to use and manipulate people

that allow him to talk his way into getting information in ways you would

never have believed possible.Angela's Caller

Place: Valley branch, Industrial Federal Bank.

Time: 11:27 A.M.Angela Wisnowski answered a phone call from a man who said he was

just about to receive a sizeable inheritance and he wanted information on

the different types of savings accounts, certificates of deposit, and

whatever other investments she might be able to suggest that would be

safe, but earn decent interest. She explained there were quite a number of

choices and asked if he'd like to come in and sit down with her to discuss

them. He was leaving on a trip as soon as the money arrived, he said, and

had a lot of arrangements to make. So she began suggesting some of the

possibilities and giving him details of the interest rates, what happens if

you sell a CD early, and so on, while trying to pin down his investment

goals.She seemed to be making progress when he said, "Oh, sorry, I've got to

take this other call. What time can I finish this conversation with you so I

can make some decisions? When do you leave for lunch?" She told him

12:30 and he said he'd try to call back before then or the following day.Louis’s Caller

Major banks use internal security codes that change every day. When

somebody from one branch needs information from another branch, he

proves he's entitled to the information by demonstrating he knows the

day's code. For an added degree of security and flexibility, some major

banks issue multiple codes each day. At a West Coast outfit I'll call

Industrial Federal Bank, each employee finds a list of five codes for the

day, identified as A through E, on his or her computer each morning.Place: Same.

Time: 12:48 '.M., same day.Louis Halpburn didn't think anything of it when a call came in that

afternoon, a call like others he handled regularly several times a week. 

'Hello," the caller said. "This is Neil Webster. I'm calling from branch

3182 in Boston. Angela Wisnowski, please." 

"She's at lunch. Can I help?" 

"Well, she left a message asking us to fax some information on one of ourcustomers." The caller sounded like he had been having a bad day. "The person who normally handles those requests is out sick," he said.

"I've got a stack of these to do, it's almost 4 o'clock here and I'm supposed

to be out of this place to go to a doctor's appointment in half an hour." The manipulation--giving all the reasons why the other person should feel

sorry for him--was part of softening up the mark. He went on, "Whoever

took her phone message, the fax number is unreadable. It's 213-

something. What's the rest?" Louis gave the fax number, and the caller said, "Okay, thanks. 

Before I can fax this, I need to ask you for Code B." "But you called me," he said with just enough chill so the man fromBoston would get the message. This is good, the caller thought. It's so cool when people don't fall over at

the first gentle shove. If the, don't resist a little, the job is too easy and I

could start getting lazy. To Louis, he said, "I've got a branch manager that's just turned paranoid

about getting verification before we send anything out, is all. But listen, if

you don't need us to fax the information, it's okay. No need to verify." 

"Look," Louis said, "Angela will be back in half an hour or so. I can haveher call you back." "I'll just tell her I couldn't send the information today because youwouldn't identify this as a legitimate request by giving me the code. If

I'm not out sick tomorrow, I'll call her back then." "The message says 'Urgent.' Never mind, without verification my handsare tied. You'll tell her I tried to send it but you wouldn't give the code,

okay?" Louis gave up under the pressure. An audible sigh of annoyance

 came winging its way down the phone line. "Well," he said, "wait a minute; I have to go to my computer. Which code did you want?" "B," the caller said. 

 

He put the call on hold and then in a bit picked up the line again. "It's

3184." "That's not the right code." 

"Yes it is--B is 3184." 

"I didn't say B, I said E." 

"Oh, damn. Wait a minute." 

Another pause while he again looked up the codes. 

"E is 9697." 

"9697--right. I'll have the fax on the way. Okay?" 

"Sure. Thanks." Walter’s Call

"Industrial Federal Bank, this is Walter." 

"Hey, Walter, it's Bob Grabowski in Studio City, branch 38," the caller

said. "I need you to pull a sig card on a customer account and fax it to

me." The sig card, or signature card, has more than just the customer's

signature on it; it also has identifying information, familiar items such as

the social security number, date of birth, mother's maiden name, and

sometimes even a driver's license number. Very handy to a social

engineer. "Sure thing. What's Code C?" "Another teller is using my computer right now," the caller said. "But I

just used B and E, and I remember those. Ask me one of those." "Okay, what's E?" "E is 9697." A few minutes later, Walter faxed the sig card as requested. Donna Plaice’s Call

"Hi, this is Mr. Anselmo." 

"How can I help you today?" 

"What's that 800 number I'm supposed to call when I want to see if adeposit has been credited yet?" "You're a customer of the bank?" 

"Yes, and I haven't used the number in a while and now I don't knowwhere I wrote it down." "The number is 800-555-8600." "Okay, thanks." 

 

Vince Capelli's Tale

The son of a Spokane street cop, Vince knew from an early age that he

wasn't going to spend his life slaving long hours and risking his neck for

minimum wage. His two main goals in life became getting out of

Spokane, and going into business for himself. The laughter of his homies

all through high school only fired him up all the more--they thought it was

hilarious that he was so busted on starting his own business but had no

idea what business it might be.Secretly Vince knew they were right. The only thing he was good at was

playing catcher on the high school baseball team. But not good enough to

capture a college scholarship, no way good enough for professional

baseball. So what business was he going to be able to start?One thing the guys in Vince's group never quite figured out: Anything

one of them had---a new switchblade knife, a nifty pair of warm gloves, a

sexy new girlfriend if Vince admired it, before long the item was his. He

didn't steal it, or sneak behind anybody's back; he didn't have to. The guy

who had it would give it up willingly, and then wonder afterward how it

had happened. Even asking Vince wouldn't have gotten you anywhere: He

didn't know himself. People just seemed to let him have whatever he

wanted.Vince Capelli was a social engineer from an early age, even though he

had never heard the term.His friends stopped laughing once they all had high school diplomas in

hand. While the others slogged around town looking for jobs where you

didn't have to say "Do you want fries with that?" Vince's dad sent him off

to talk to an old cop pal who had left the force to start his own private

investigation business in San Francisco. He quickly spotted Vince's talent

for the work, and took him on.That was six years ago. He hated the part about getting the goods on

unfaithful spouses, which involved achingly dull hours of sitting and

watching, but felt continually challenged by assignments to dig up asset

information for attorneys trying to figure out if some miserable stiff was

rich enough to be worth suing. These assignments gave him plenty of

chances to use his wits.

Like the time he had to look into the bank accounts of a guy named Joe

Markowitz. Joe had maybe worked a shady deal on a one-time friend of

his, which friend now wanted to know, if he sued, was Markowitz flush

enough that the friend might get some of his money back?Vince's first step would be to find out at least one, but preferably two, of

the bank's security codes for the day. That sounds like a nearly impossible

 

challenge: What on earth would induce a bank employee to knock a chink

in his own security system? Ask yourself--if you wanted to do this, would

you have any idea of how to go about it?

For people like Vince, it's too easy.People trust you if you know the inside lingo of their job and their

company. It's like showing you belong to their inner circle. It's like a

secret handshake.I didn't need much of that for a job like this. Definitely not brain surgery.

All's I needed to get started was a branch number. When I dialed the

Beacon Street office in Buffalo, the guy that answered sounded like a

teller."This is Tim Ackerman," I said. Any name would do, he wasn't going to

write it down. "What's the branch number there?""The phone number or the branch number, he wanted to know, which

was pretty stupid because I had just dialed the phone number, hadn't I?"Branch number.""3182," he said. Just like that. No, "Whad'ya wanna know for?" or

anything. 'Cause it's not sensitive information, it's written on just about

every piece of paper they use.Step Two, call the branch where my target did his banking, get the name

of one of their people, and find out when the person would be out for

lunch. Angela. Leaves at 12:30. So far, so good.Step Three, call back to the same branch during Angela's lunch break, say

I'm calling from branch number such-and-such in Boston, Angela needs

this information faxed, gimme a code for the day. This is the tricky part;

it's where the rubber meets the road. If I was making up a test to be a

social engineer, I'd put something like this on it, where your victim gets

suspicious--for good reason--and you still stick in there until you break

him down and get the information you need. You can't do that by reciting

lines from a script or learning a routine, you got to be able to read your

victim, catch his mood, play him like landing a fish where you let out a

little line and reel in, let out and reel in. Until you get him in the net and

flop him into the boat, splat!

So I landed him and had one of the codes for the day. A big step. With

most banks, one is all they use, so I would've been home flee. Industrial

Federal Bank uses five, so having just one out of five is long odds. With

two out of five, I'd have a much better chance of getting through the next

 

act of this little drama. I love that part about "I didn't say B, I said E."

When it works, it's beautiful. And it works most of the time.Getting a third one would have been even better. I've actually managed to

get three on a single call--"B," "D," and "E" sound so much alike that you

can claim they misunderstood you again. But you have to be talking to

somebody who's a real pushover. This man wasn't. I'd go with two.The day codes would be my trump to get the signature card. I call, and the

guy asks for a code. C he wants, and I've only got B and E. But it's not the

end of the world. You gotta stay cool at a moment like this, sound

confident, keep right on going, Real smooth, I played him with the one

about, "Somebody's using my computer, ask me one of these others."We're all employees of the same company, we're all in this together, make

it easy on the guy--that's what you're hoping the victim is thinking at a

moment like this. And he played it right by the script. He took one of the

choices I offered, I gave him the right answer, he sent the fax of the sig

card.Almost home. One more call gave me the 800 number that customers use

for the automated service where an electronic voice reads you off the

information you ask for. From the sig card, I had all of my target's

account numbers and his PIN number, because that bank used the first

five or last four digits of the social security number. Pen in hand, I called

the 800 number and after a few minutes of pushing buttons, I had the

latest balance in all four of the guy's accounts, and just for good measure,

his most recent deposits and withdrawals in each.Everything my client had asked for and more. I always like to give a little

extra for good measure. Keep the clients happy. After all, repeat business

is what keeps an operation going, right?Analyzing the Con

The key to this entire episode was obtaining the all-important day codes,

and to do that the attacker, Vince, used several different techniques.He began with a little verbal arm-twisting when Louis proved reluctant to

give him a code. Louis was right to be suspicious--the codes are designed

to be used in the opposite direction. He knew that in the usual flow of

things, the unknown caller would be giving him a security code. This was

the critical moment for Vince, he hinge on which the entire success of his

effort depended.In the face of Louis's suspicion, Vince simply laid it on with

manipulation, using an appeal to sympathy ("going to the doctor"), and

pressure ("I've got a stack to do, it's almost 4 o'clock"), and manipulation

("Tell her 

you wouldn't give me the code"). Cleverly, Vince didn't actually make a

threat, he just implied one: If you don't give me the security code, I won't

send the customer information that your co worker needs, and I'll tell her I

would have sent it but you wouldn't cooperate.Still, let's not be too hasty in blaming Louis. After all, the person on the

phone knew (or at least appeared to know) that co worker Angela had

requested a fax. The caller knew about the security codes, and knew they

were identified by letter designation. The caller said his branch manager

was requiring it for greater security. There didn't really seem any reason

not to give him the verification he was asking for.Louis isn't alone. Bank employees give up security codes to social

engineers every day. Incredible but true.There's a line in the sand where a private investigator's techniques stop

being legal and start being illegal. Vince stayed legal when he obtained

the branch number. He even stayed legal when he conned Louis into

giving him two of the day's security codes. He crossed the line when he

had confidential information on a bank customer faxed to him.But for Vince and his employer, it's a low-risk crime. When you steal

money or goods, somebody will notice it's gone. When you steal

information, most of the time no one will notice because the information

is still in their possession.MITNICK MESSAGE

Verbal security codes are equivalent to passwords in providing a

convenient and reliable means of protecting data. But employees need to

be knowledgeable about the tricks that social engineers use, and trained

not to give up the keys to the kingdom.COPS AS DUPES

For a shady private investigator or social engineer, there are frequent

occasions when it would be handy to know someone's driver's license

number--for example, if you want to assume another person's identity in

order to obtain information about her bank balances.Short of lifting the person's wallet or peering over her shoulder at an

opportune moment, finding out the driver's license number ought to be

next to impossible. But for anyone with even modest social engineering

skills, it's hardly a challenge.

 

One particular social engineer--Eric Mantini, I'll call him, needed to get

driver's license and vehicle registration numbers on a regular basis. Eric

figured it was unnecessarily increasing his risk to call the Department of

Motor Vehicles (DMV) and go through the same ruse time after time

whenever he needed that information. He wondered whether there wasn't

some way to simplify the process. Probably no one had ever thought of it before, but he figured out a way 

to get the information in a blink, whenever he wanted it. He did it by

taking advantage of a service provided by his state's Department of Motor

Vehicles. Many state DMVs (or whatever the department may be called in

your state) make otherwise-privileged information about citizens available

to insurance firms, private investigators, and certain other groups that the

state legislature has deemed entitled to share it for the good of commerce

and the society at large. The DMV, of course, has appropriate limitations on which types of data

will be given out. The insurance industry can get certain types of

information from the files, but not others. A different set of limitations

applies to PIs, and so on. For law enforcement officers, a different rule generally applies: The DMV

will supply any information in the records to any sworn peace officer who

properly identifies himself. In the state Eric then lived in, the required

identification was a Requestor Code issued by the DMV, along with the

officer's driver's license number. The DMV employee would always

verify by matching the officer's name against his driver's license number

and one other piece of information--usually date of birth-- before giving

out any information. What social engineer Eric wanted to do was nothing less than cloak

himself in the identity of a law enforcement officer. 

How did he manage that? By running a reverse sting on the cops! Eric’s Sting 

First he called telephone information and asked for the phone number of

DMV headquarters in the state capitol. He was given the number 503555-

5000; that, of course, is the number for calls from the general public. He

then called a nearby sheriff's station and asked for Teletype--the office

where communications are sent to and received from other law

enforcement agencies, the national crime database, local warrants, and so

forth. When he reached Teletype, he said he was looking for the phone

number for law enforcement to use when calling the DMV state

headquarters. 

 

"Who are you?" the police officer in Teletype asked."This is Al. I was calling 503-555-5753," he said. This was partly an

assumption, and partly a number he pulled out of thin air; certainly the

special DMV office set up to take law enforcement calls would be in the

same area code as the number gtyen out for the public to call, and it was

almost as certain that the next three digits, the prefix, would be the same.

as well. All he really needed to find out was the last four.A sheriff's Teletype room doesn't get calls from the public. And the caller

already had most of the number. Obviously he was legitimate."It's 503-555-6127," the officer said.So Eric now had the special phone number for law enforcement officers to

call the DMV. But just the one number wasn't enough to satisfy him; the

office would have a good many more than the single phone line, and Eric

needed to know how many lines there were, and the phone number of

each.The Switch

To carry out his plan, he needed to gain access to the telephone switch

that handled the law enforcement phone lines into DMV. He called the

state Telecommunications Department and claimed he was from Nortel,

the manufacturer of the DMS-100, one of the most widely used

commercial telephone switches. He said, "Can you please transfer me to

one of the switch technicians that works on the DMS-100?"When he reached the technician, he claimed to be with the Nortel

Technical Assistance Support Center in Texas, and explained that they

were creating a master database to update all switches with the latest

software upgrades. It would all be done remotely--no need for any switch

technician to participate. But they needed the dial-in number to the switch

so that they could perform the updates directly from the Support Center.It sounded completely plausible, and the technician gave Eric the phone

number. He could now dial directly into one of the state's telephone

switches.To defend against outside intruders, commercial switches of this type are

password-protected, just like every corporate computer network. Any

good social engineer with a phone-phreaking background knows that

Nortel switches provide a default account name for software updates:

NTAS (the abbreviation for Nortel Technical Assistance Support; not

very subtle). But what about a password? Eric dialed in several times,

each time

 

trying one of the obvious and commonly used choices. Entering the same

as the account name, NTAS, didn't work. Neither did "helper." Nor did

"patch." Then he tried "update" . . . and he was in. Typical. Using an obvious,

easily guessed password is only very slightly better than having no

password at all. It helps to be up to speed in your field; Eric probably knew as much about

that switch and how to program and troubleshoot it as the technician.

Once he was able to access the switch as an authorized user, he would

gain full control over the telephone lines that were his target. From his

computer, he queried the switch for the phone number he had been given

for law enforcement calls to the DMV, 555-6127. He found there were

nineteen other phone lines into the same department. Obviously they

handled a high volume of calls. For each incoming call, the switch was programmed to "hunt" through the

twenty lines until it found one that wasn't busy. He picked line number eighteen in the sequence, and entered the code that

added call forwarding to that line. For the call-forwarding number, he

entered the phone number of his new, cheap, prepaid cell phone, the kind

that drug dealers are so fond of because they're inexpensive enough to

throw away after the job is over. With call forwarding now activated on the eighteenth line, as soon as the

office got busy enough to have seventeen calls in progress, the next call to

come in would not ring in the DMV office but would instead be

forwarded to Eric's cell phone. He sat back and waited. A Call to DMV 

Shortly before 8 o'clock that morning, the cell phone rang. This part was

the best, the most delicious. Here was Eric, the social engineer, talking to

a cop, someone with the authority to come and arrest him, or get a search

warrant and conduct a raid to collect evidence against him. And not just one cop would call, but a string of them, one after another. 

On one occasion, Eric was sitting in a restaurant having lunch with

friends, fielding a call every five minutes or so, writing the information on

a paper napkin using a borrowed pen. HE still finds this hilarious. 

But talking to police officers doesn't faze a good social engineer in the

least. In fact, the thrill of deceiving these law enforcement agencies

probably added to Eric s enjoyment of the act.  

According to Eric, the calls went something like this: 

"DMV, may I help you?" 

"This is Detective Andrew Cole." 

"Hi, detective. What can I do for you today?" "I need a Soundex on driver's license 005602789," he might say, using the

term familiar in law enforcement to ask for a photo--useful, for example,

when officers are going out to arrest a suspect and want to know what he

looks like. 

"Sure, let me bring up the record," Eric would say. "And, Detective Cole,

what's your agency?" 

"Jefferson County." And then Eric would ask the hot questions: 

"Detective, what's your requestor code?

What's your driver's license number. "What's your date of birth" The caller would give his personal identifying information. Eric would gothrough some pretense of verifying the information, and then tell the

caller that the identifying information had been confirmed, and ask for the

details of what the caller wanted to find out from the DMV. He'd pretend

to start looking up the name, with the caller able to hear the clicking  of

the keys, and then say something like, "Oh, damn, my computer just went down again. Sorry, detective, my computer has been on the blink, 

all week. Would you mind calling back and getting another clerk to helpyou?" This way he'd end the call tying up the loose ends without arousing any

suspicion about why he wasn't able to assist the officer with his request.

Meanwhile Eric had a stolen identity--details he could use to obtain

confidential  DMV information whenever he needed to. After taking calls for a few hours and obtaining dozens of requestor

codes, Eric dialed into the switch and deactivated the call forwarding. For months after that, he'd carry on the assignments jobbed out to him bylegitimate PI firms that didn't want to know how he was getting his information. Whenever he needed to, he'd dial back into the switch, turnon call forwarding, and gather another stack of police officer credentials. Analyzing the Con 

Let's run a playback on the ruses Eric pulled on a series of people to make

this deceit work. In the first successful step, he got a sheriff's deputy in a

Teletype room to give out a confidential DMV phone number to a 

    

complete stranger, accepting the man as a deputy without requesting any

verification. Then someone at the state Telecom Department did the same thing,

accepting Eric's claim that he was with an equipment manufacturer, and

providing the stranger with a phone number for dialing into the telephone

switch serving the DMV. Eric was able to get into the switch in large measure because of weak

security practices on the part of the switch manufacturer in using the same

account name on all their switches. That carelessness made it a walk in

the park for the social engineer to guess the password, knowing once

again that switch technicians, just like almost everybody else, choose

passwords that will be a cinch for them to remember. With access to the switch, he set up call forwarding from one of the DMV

phone lines for law enforcement to his own cell phone. And then, the capper and most blatant part, he conned one law

enforcement officer after another into revealing not only their requestor

codes but their own personal identifying information, giving Eric the

ability to impersonate them. While there was certainly technical knowledge required to pull off this

stunt, it could not have worked without the help of a series of people who

had no clue that they were talking to an imposter. This story was another illustration of the phenomenon of why people don't

ask "Why me?" Why would the Teletype officer give this information to

some sheriff's deputy he didn't know--or, in this case, a stranger passing

himself off as a sheriff's deputy--instead of suggesting he get the

information from a fellow deputy or his own sergeant? Again, the only

answer I can offer is that people rarely ask this question. It doesn't occur

to them to ask? They don't want to sound challenging and unhelpful?

Maybe. Any further explanation would just be guesswork. But social

engineers don't care why; they only care that this little fact makes it easy

to get information that otherwise might be a challenge to obtain. MITNICK MESSAGE

If you have a telephone switch at your company facilities, what would the

person in charge do if he received a call from the vendor, asking for the

dial-in number? And by the way, has that person ever changed the default

password for the switch? Is that password an easy-to-guess word found in

any dictionary? 

 

PREVENTING THE CON

A security code, properly used, adds a valuable layer of protection. A

security code improperly used can be worse than none at all because it

gives the illusion of security where it doesn't really exist. What good are

codes if your employees don't keep them. secret?Any company with a need for verbal security codes needs to spell out

clearly for its employees when and how the codes are used. Properly

trained, the character in the first story in this chapter would not have had

to rely on his instincts, easily overcome, when asked to give a security

code to a stranger. He sensed that he should not be asked for this

information under the circumstances, but lacking a clear security policy--

and good common sense--he readily gave in.Security procedures should also set up steps to follow when an employee

fields an inappropriate request for a security code. All employees should

be trained to immediately report any request for authentication

credentials, such as a daily code or password, made under suspicious

circumstances. They should also report when an attempt to verify the

identity of a requestor doesn't check out.At the very least, the employee should record the caller's name, phone

number, and office or department, and then hang up. Before calling back

he should verify that the organization really does have an employee of

that name, and that the call back phone number matches the phone

number in the on-line or hard-copy company directory. Most of the time,

this simple tactic will be all that's needed to verify that the caller is who

he says he is.Verifying becomes a bit trickier when the company has a  published

phone directory instead of an on-line version. People get hired; people

leave; people change departments, job positions, and phone. The hard-

copy directory is already out of date the day after it's published, even

before being distributed. Even on-line directories can't always be relied

on, because social engineers know how to modify them. If an employee

can't verify the phone number from an independent source, she should be

instructed to verify by some other means, such as contacting the

employee's manager.  

Part 3

Intruder Alert  

Entering the PremisesWhy is it so easy for an outsider to assume the identity of a company

employee and carry off an impersonation so convincingly that even

people who are highly security conscious are taken in? Why is it so easy

to dupe individuals who may be fully aware of security procedures,

suspicious of people they don't personally know, and protective of their

company's interests?Ponder these questions as you read the stories in this chapter.THE EMBARRASSED SECURITY GUARD

Date/Time: Tuesday, October 17, 2:16 A.M.

Place: Skywatcher Aviation, Inc. manufacturing plant on the outskirts of

Tucson, Arizona.The Security Guard's Story

Hearing his leather heels click against the floor in the halls of the nearly

deserted plant made Leroy Greene feel much better than spending the

night hours of his watch in front of the video monitors in the security

office. There he wasn't allowed to do anything but stare at the screens, not

even read a magazine or his leather-bound Bible. You just had to sit there

looking at the displays of still images where nothing ever moved.But walking the halls, he was at least stretching his legs, and when he

remembered to throw his arms and shoulders into the walk, it got him a

little exercise, too. Although it didn't really count very much as exercise

for a man who had played right tackle on the All-City champion high

school football team. Still, he thought, a job is a job. 

He turned the southwest corner and started along the gallery overlooking

the half-mile-long production floor. He glanced down and saw two people

walking past the line of partly built copters. The pair stopped and seemed

to be pointing things out to each other. A strange sight at this time of

night. 'Better check, "he thought.Leroy headed for a staircase that would bring him onto the production-

line floor behind the pair, and they didn't sense his approach until he

stepped alongside. "Morning. Can I see your security badges, please," he

said. Leroy always tried to keep his voice soft at moments like this; he

knew that the sheer size of him could seem threatening."Hi, Leroy," one of them said, reading the name off his badge. "I'm Tom

Stilton, from the Marketing office at corporate in Phoenix. I'm in town for

meetings and wanted to show my friend here how the world's greatest

helicopters get built.""Yes, sir. Your badge, please," Leroy said. He couldn't help noticing how

young they seemed. The Marketing guy looked barely out of high school,

the other one had hair down to his shoulders and looked about fifteen.The one with the haircut reached into his pocket for his badge, then

started patting all his pockets. Leroy was suddenly beginning to have a

bad feeling about this. "Damn," the guy said. "Must've left it in the car. I

can get it--just take me ten minutes to go out to the parking lot and back."Leroy had his pad out by this time. "What'd you say your name was, sr. he

asked, and carefully wrote down the response. Then he asked them to go

with him to the Security Office. On the elevator to the third floor, Tom

chatted about having been with the company for only six months and

hoped he wasn't going to get in any trouble for this.In the Security monitoring room, the two others on the night shift with

Leroy joined him in questioning the pair. Stilton gave his telephone

number, and said his boss was Judy Underwood and gave her telephone

number, and the information all checked out on the computer. Leroy took

the other two security people aside and they talked about what to do.

Nobody wanted to get this wrong; all three agreed they better call the

guy's boss even though it would mean waking her in the middle of the

night.

Leroy called Mrs. Underwood himself, explained who he was and did she

have a Mr. Tom Stilton working for her? She sounded like she was still

half-asleep. "Yes," she said.

 

"Well, we found him down on the production line at 2:30 in the morning

with no ID badge." 

Mrs. Underwood said, "Let me talk to him." Stilton got on the phone and said, "Judy, I'm really sorry about these 

guys waking you up in the middle of the night. I hope you're not going to 

hold this against me." He listened and then said, "It was just that I had to be here in the morninganyway, for that meeting on the new press release. Anyway, did you getthe email about the Thompson deal? We need to meet with Jim on

Monday morning so we don't lose this. And I'm still having lunch with

you on Tuesday, right?" He listened a bit more and said good-bye and hung up. That caught Leroy by surprise; he had thought he'd get the phone back 

so the lady could tell him everything was okay. He wondered if maybe he

should call her again and ask, but thought better of it. He had already

bothered her once in the middle of the night; if he called a second time,

maybe she might get annoyed and complain to his boss. "Why make

waves?" he thought. Okay if I show my friend the rest of the production line? Stilton asked

Leroy 

You want to come along, keep an eye on us ?"Go on, Leroy said. "Look around. Just don't forget your badge next 

time. And let Security know if you need to be on the plant floor after

hours--it's the rule." 

I'll remember that, Leroy," Stilton said. And they left. Hardly ten minutes had gone by before the phone rang in the Security

Office. Mrs. Underwood was on the line. "Who was that guy?!" she

wanted to know. She said she kept trying to ask questions but he just kept

on talking about having lunch with her and she doesn't know who the hell

he is. The security guys called the lobby and the guard at the gate to the parking

lot. Both reported the two young men had left some minutes before. 

Telling the story later, Leroy always finished by saying, "Lordy, did boss

chew me up one side and down the other. I'm lucky I still have a job."  

Joe Harper's Story

Just to see what he could get away with, seventeen-year-old Joe Harper

had been sneaking into buildings for more than a year, sometimes in the

daytime, sometimes at night. The son of a musician and a cocktail

waitress, both working the night shift, Joe had too much time by himself.

His story of that same incident sheds instructive light on how it all

happened.I have this friend Kenny who thinks he wants to be a helicopter pilot. He

asked me, could I get him into the Skywatcher factory to see the

production line where they make the choppers. He knows I've got into

other places before. It's an adrenaline rush to see if you can slip into

places you're not supposed to be.But you don't just walk into a factory or office building. Got to think it

through, do a lot of planning, and do a full reconnaissance on the target.

Check the company's Web page for names and titles, reporting structure,

and telephone numbers. Read press clippings and magazine articles.

Meticulous research is my own brand of caution, so I could talk to

anybody that challenged me, with as much knowledge as any employee.So where to start? First I looked up on the Internet to see where the

company had offices, and saw the corporate headquarters was in Phoenix.

Perfect. I called and asked for Marketing; every company has a marketing

department. A lady answered, and I said I was with Blue Pencil Graphics

and we wanted to see if we could interest them in using our services and

who would I talk to. She said that would be Tom Stilton. I asked for his

phone number and she said they didn't give out that information but she

could put me through. The call rang into voice mail, and his message said,

"This is Tom Stilton in Graphics, extension 3147, please leave a

message." Sure--they don't give out extensions, but this guy leaves his

right on his voice mail. So that was cool. Now I had a name and

extension.Another call, back to the same office. "Hi, I was looking for Tom Stilton.

He's not in. I'd like to ask his boss a quick question." The boss was out,

too, but by the time I was finished, I knew the boss's name. And she had

nicely left her extension number on her voice mail, too.I could probably get us past the lobby guard with no sweat, but I've driven

by that plant and I thought I remembered a fence around the parking lot.

A fence means a guard who checks you when you try to drive in. And at

night, they might be writing down license numbers, too, so I'd have to buy

an old license plate at a flea market. 

But first I'd have to get the phone number in the guard shack. I waited a

little so if I got the same operator when I dialed back in, she wouldn't

recognize my voice. After a bit I called and said, "We've got a complaint

that the phone at the Ridge Road guard shack has reported intermittent

problems--are they still having trouble?" She said she didn't know but

would connect me.The guy answered, "Ridge Road gate, this is Ryan." I said, "Hi, Ryan,

this is Ben. Were you having problems with your phones there?" He's just

a low-paid security guard but I guess he had some training because he

right away said, "Ben who--what's your last name?" I just kept right on as

if I hadn't even heard him. "Somebody reported a problem earlier."I could hear him holding the phone away and calling out, "Hey, Bruce,

Roger, was there a problem with this phone. He came back on and said,

"No, no problems we know about.""How many phone lines do you have there?"

He had forgotten about my name. "Two," he said. "Which one are you on

now?" "3140."

Gotcha! "And they're both working okay?"

"Seems like."

Okay, I said. Listen, Tom, if you have any phone problems, just call

us in Telecom any time. We're here to help."My buddy and I decided to visit the plant the very next night. Late that

afternoon I called the guard booth, using the name of the Marketing guy. I

said, "Hi, this is Tom Stilton in Graphics. We're on a crash deadline and I

have a couple of guys driving into town to help out. Probably won't be

here till one or two in the morning. Will you still be on then?"

He was happy to say that, no, he got off at midnight.

I said, "Well, just leave a note for the next guy, okay? When two guys

show up and say they've come to see Tom Stilton, just wave 'em on in--

okay?"Yes, he said, that was fine. He took down my name, department, and

extension number and said he'd take care of it.We drove up to the gate a little after two, I gave Tom Stilton's name,

and a sleepy guard just pointed to the door we should go in and where I

should park.

When we walked into the building, there was another guard station in

the lobby, with the usual book for after-hours sign-ins. I told the guard I 

had a report that needed to be ready in the morning, and this friend of

mine wanted to see the plant. "He's crazy about helicopters," I said

"Thinks he wants to learn to pilot one." He asked me for my badge. I

reached into a pocket, then patted around and said I must have left it in

car; I’ll go get it. I said, "It'll take about ten minutes." He said, Never

mind, it's okay, just sign in."Walking down that production line--what a gas. Until that tree-trunk of a

Leroy stopped us.In the security office, I figured somebody who didn't really belong would

look nervous and frightened. When things get tight, I just start sounding

like I'm really steamed. Like I'm really who I claimed to be and it's

annoying they don't believe me.When they started talking about maybe they should call the lady I said

was my boss and went to get her home phone number from the computer,

I stood there thinking, "Good time to just make a break for it." But there

was that parking-lot gate--even if we got out of the building, they'd close

the gate and we'd never make it out.When Leroy called the lady who was Stilton's boss and then gave me the

phone, the lady started shouting at me "Who is this, who are you!" and I

just kept on talking like we were having a nice conversation, and then

hung up.How long does it take to find somebody who can give you a company

phone number in the middle of the night? I figured we had less than

fifteen minutes to get out of there before that lady was ringing the security

office and putting a bug in their ears.We got out of there as fast as we could without looking like we were in a

hurry. Sure was glad when the guy at the gate just waved us through.Analyzing the Con

It's worth noting that in the real incident this story is based on, the

intruders actually were teenagers. The intrusion was a lark, just to see if

they could get away with it. But if it was so easy for a pair of teenagers, it

would have been even easier for adult thieves, industrial spies, or

terrorists.

How did three experienced security officers allow a pair of intruders to

just walk away? And not just any intruders, but a pair so young that any

reasonable person should have been very suspicious?Leroy was appropriately suspicious, at first. He was correct in taking them

to the Security Office, and in questioning the guy who called 

himself Tom Stilton and checking the names and phone numbers he gave.

He was certainly correct in making the phone call to the supervisor.But in the end he was taken in by the young man's air of confidence and

indignation. It wasn't the behavior he would expect from a thief or

intruder--only a real employee would have acted that way.., or so he

assumed. Leroy should have been trained to count on solid identification,

not perceptions.Why wasn't he more suspicious when the young man hung up the phone

without handing it back so Leroy could hear the confirmation directly

from Judy Underwood and receive her assurance that the kid had a reason

for being in the plant so late at night?Leroy was taken in by a ruse so bold that it should have been obvious. But

consider the moment from his perspective: a high-school graduate,

concerned for his job, uncertain whether he might get in trouble for

bothering a company manager for the second time in the middle of the

night. If you had been in his shoes, would you have made the follow-up

call?But of course, a second phone call wasn't the only possible action. What

else could the security guard have done?Even before placing the phone call, he could have asked both of the pair

to show some kind of picture identification; they drove to the plant, so at

least one of them should have a driver's license. The fact that they had

originally given phony names would have been immediately obvious (a

professional would have come equipped with fake ID, but these teenagers

had not taken that precaution). In any case, Leroy should have examined

their identification credentials and written down the information. If they

both insisted they had no identification, he should then have walked them

o the car to retrieve the company ID badge that "Tom Stilton" claimed he

had left there.MITNICK MESSAGE

Manipulative people usually have very attractive personalities. They are

typically fast on their feet and quite articulate. Social engineers are also

skilled at distracting people's thought processes so that they cooperate. To

think that any one particular person is not vulnerable to this manipulation

is to underestimate the skill and the killer instinct of the social engineer.

A good social engineer, on the other hand, never underestimates his

adversary.Following the phone call, one of the security people should have stayed

with the pair until they left the building. And then walked them to their 

car and written down the license-plate number. If he had been observant

enough, he would have noted that the plate (the one that the attacker had

purchased at a flea market) did not have a valid registration sticker -  and

that should have been reason enough to detain the pair for further

investigation. DUMPSTER DIVING 

Dumpster diving is a term that describes pawing through a target's

garbage in search of valuable information. The amount of information you

can learn about a target is astounding. Most people don't give much thought to what they're discarding at home:

phone bills, credit card statements, medical prescription bottles, bank

statements, work-related materials, and so much more. At work, employees must be made aware that people do look through

trash to obtain information that may benefit them. During my high school years, I used to go digging through the trash

behind the local phone company buildings--often alone but occasionally

with friends who shared an interest in learning more about the telephone

company. Once you became a seasoned Dumpster diver, you learn a few

tricks, such as how to make special efforts to avoid the bags from the

restrooms,  and the necessity of wearing gloves. Dumpster diving isn't enjoyable, but the payoff was extraordinary--

internal company telephone directories, computer manuals, employee

lists, discarded printouts showing how to program switching equipment,

and more--all there for the taking. I'd schedule visits for nights when new manuals were being issued,

because the trash containers would have plenty of old ones, thoughtlessly

thrown away. And I'd go at other odd times as well, looking for any

memos, letters, reports, and so forth, that might offer some interesting

gems of information. On arriving I'd find some cardboard boxes, pull them out and set them

aside. If anyone challenged me, which happened now and then, I'd say

that a friend was moving and I was just looking for boxes to help him

pack. The guard never noticed all the documents I had put in the boxes to

take home. In some cases, he'd tell me to get lost, so I'd just move to

another phone company central office.LINGO

DUMPSTER DRIVING Going through a company’s garbage (often in

an outside and vulnerable Dumpster) to find discarded information that

either itself has value, or provides a tool to use in a social engineering

attack, such as internal phone numbers or titles 

I don't know what it's like today, but back then it was easy to tell which

bags might contain something of interest. The floor sweepings and

cafeteria garbage were loose in the large bags, while the office

wastebaskets were all lined with white disposable trash bags, which the

cleaning crew would lift out one by one and wrap a tie around.One time, while searching with some friends, we came up with some

sheets of paper torn up by hand. And not just torn up: someone had gone

to the trouble of ripping the sheets into tiny pieces, all conveniently

thrown out in a single five-gallon trash bag. We took the bag to a local

donut shop, dumped the pieces out on a table, and started assembling

them one by one.We were all puzzle-doers, so this offered the stimulating challenge of a

giant jigsaw puzzle . . . but turned out to have more than a childish

reward. When done, we had pieced together the entire account name and

password list for one of the company's critical computer systems.Were our Dumpster-diving exploits worth the risk and the effort? You bet

they were. Even more than you would think, because the risk is zero. It

was true then and still true today: As long as you're not trespassing,

poring through someone else's trash is 100 percent legal.Of course, phone phreaks and hackers aren't the only ones with their

heads in trash cans. Police departments around the country paw through

trash regularly, and a parade of people from Mafia dons to petty

embezzlers have been convicted based in part on evidence gathered from

their rubbish. Intelligence agencies, including our own, have resorted to

this method for years.It may be a tactic too low down for James Bond--movie-goers would

much rather watch him outfoxing the villain and bedding a beauty than

standing up to his knees in garbage. Real-life spies are less squeamish

when something of value may be bagged among the banana peels and

coffee grounds, the newspapers and grocery lists. Especially if gathering

the information doesn't put them in harm's way.Cash for Trash

Corporations play the Dumpster-diving game, too. Newspapers had a field

day in June 2000, reporting that Oracle Corporation (whose CEO,

 

Larry Ellison, is probably the nation's most outspoken foe of Microsoft)

had hired an investigative firm that had been caught with their hands in

the cookie jar. It seems the investigators wanted trash from a Microsoft-

supported lobbying outfit, ACT, but they didn't want to risk getting

caught. According to press reports, the investigative firm sent in a woman

who offered the janitors $60 to let her have the ACT trash. They turned

her down. She was back the next night, upping the offer to $500 for the

cleaners and $200 for the supervisor.The janitors turned her down and then turned her in.Leading on-line journalist Declan McCullah, taking a leaf from literature,

titled his Wired News story on the episode, "'Twas Oracle That Spied on

MS." Time magazine, nailing Oracle's Ellison, titled their article simply

"Peeping Larry."Analyzing the Con

Based on my own experience and the experience of Oracle, you might

wonder why anybody would bother taking the risk of stealing someone's

trash.The answer, I think, is that the risk is nil and the benefits can be

substantial. Okay, maybe trying to bribe the janitors increases the chance

of consequences, but for anyone who's willing to get a little dirty, bribes

aren't necessary.For a social engineer, Dumpster diving has its benefits. He can get enough

information to guide his assault against the target company, including

memos, meeting agendas, letters and the like that reveal names,

departments, titles, phone numbers, and project assignments. Trash can

yield company organizational charts, information about corporate

structure, travel schedules, and so on. All those details might seem trivial

to insiders, yet they may be highly valuable information to an attacker.Mark Joseph Edwards, in his book Internet Security with Windows NT,

talks about "entire reports discarded because of typos, passwords written

on scraps of paper, 'While you were out' messages with phone numbers,

whole file folders with documents still in them, diskettes and tapes that

weren't erased or destroyed--all of which could help a would-be intruder."

The writer goes on to ask, "And who are those people on your cleaning

crew? You've decided that the cleaning crew won't [be permitted to] enter

the computer room but don't forget the other trash cans. If federal

agencies deem it necessary to do background checks on people who have

access to their wastebaskets and shredders, you probably should as well."

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Your trash may be your enemy's treasure. We don't give much

consideration to the materials we discard in our personal lives, so why

should we believe people have a different attitude in the workplace? It all

comes down to educating the workforce about the danger (unscrupulous

people digging for valuable information) and the vulnerability (sensitive

information not being shredded or properly erased). THE HUMILIATED BOSS 

Nobody thought anything about it when Harlan Fortis came to work on

Monday morning as usual at the County Highway Department, and said

he'd left home in a hurry and forgotten his badge. The security guard had

seen Harlan coming in and going out every weekday for the two years she

had been working there. She had him sign for a temporary employee's

badge, gave it to him, and he went on his way. It wasn't until two days later that all hell started breaking loose. The 

story spread through the entire department like wildfire. Half the people

who heard it said it couldn't be true. Of the rest, nobody seemed to know

whether to laugh out loud or to feel sorry for the poor soul. After all, George Adamson was a kind and compassionate person, the 

best head of department they'd ever had. He didn't deserve to have this

happen to him. Assuming that the story was true, of course. The trouble had begun when George called Harlan into his office late 

one Friday and told him, as gently as he could, that come Monday Harlan

would be reporting to a new job. With the Sanitation Department. To

Harlan, this wasn't like being fired. It was worse; it was humiliating. He

wasn't going to take it lying down. That same evening he seated himself on his porch to watch the

homeward- bound traffic. At last he spotted the neighborhood boy named

David who everyone called "The War Games Kid" going by on his moped

on the way home from high school. He stopped David, gave him a Code

Red Mountain Dew he had bought especially for the purpose, and offered

him a deal: the latest video game player and six games in exchange for

some computer help and a promise of keeping his mouth shut. 

After Harlan explained the project - without giving any of the

compromising specifics--David agreed. He described what he wanted

Harlan to do. He was to buy a modem, go into the office, find somebody's

computer where there was a spare phone jack nearby, and plug in the

modem. Leave the modem under the desk where nobody would be likely

to see it. Then 

 

came the risky part. Harlan had to sit down at the computer, install a

remote-access software package, and get it running. Any moment the man

who worked in the office might show up, or someone might walk by and

see him in another person's office. He was so uptight that he could hardly

read the instructions that the kid had written down for him. But he got it

done, and slipped out of the building without being noticed. Planting the Bomb 

David stopped over after dinner that night. The two sat down at Harlan's 

computer and within in a few minutes the boy had dialed into the 

modem, gained access, and reached George Adamson's machine. Notvery difficult, since George never had time for precautionary things likechanging 

passwords, and was forever asking this person or that to download or email a file for him. In time, everyone in the office knew his password. 

A bit of hunting turned up the file called BudgetSlides2002.ppt, which 

the boy downloaded onto Harlan's computer. Harlan then told the kid to 

go on home, and come back in a couple of hours. 

When David returned, Harlan asked him to reconnect to the Highway 

Department computer system and put the same file back where they had 

found it, overwriting the earlier version. Harlan showed David the video 

game player, and promised that if things went well, he'd have it the nextday. Surprising George 

You wouldn't think that something sounding as dull as budget hearings 

would be of much interest to anyone, but the meeting chamber of the 

County Council was packed, filled with reporters, representatives ofspecial 

interest groups, members of the public, and even two television news

crews. George always felt much was at stake for him in these sessions. The County Council held the purse strings, and unless George could put on a 

convincing presentation, the Highways budget would be slashed. Then 

everyone would start complaining about potholes and stuck traffic lights 

and dangerous intersections, and blaming him, and life would be miser

able  for the whole coming year. But when he was introduced thatevening, 

he stood up feeling confident. He had worked six weeks on thispresentation 

and the PowerPoint visuals, which he had tried out on his wife, his top staff people, and some respected friends. Everyone agreed it was hisbest presentation ever. 

The first three PowerPoint images played well. For a change, every

Council member was paying attention. He was making his points

effectively. And then all at once everything started going wrong. The fourth image

was supposed to be a beautiful photo at sunset of the new highway

extension opened last year. Instead it was something else, something very

embarrassing. A photograph out of a magazine like Penthouse or Hustler.

He could hear the audience gasp as he hurriedly hit the button on his

laptop  to move to the next image. This one was worse. Not a thing was left to the imagination. He was still trying to click to another image when someone in the

audience pulled out the power plug to the projector while the chairman

banged loudly with his gavel and shouted above the din that the meeting

was adjourned. Analyzing the Con 

Using a teenage hacker's expertise, a disgruntled employee managed to

access the computer of the head of his department, download an important

PowerPoint presentation, and replace some of the slides with images

certain to cause grave embarrassment. Then he put the presentation back

on the man's computer. With the modem plugged into a jack and connected to one of the office

computers, the young hacker was able to dial in from the outside. The kid

had set up the remote access software in advance so that, once connected

to the computer, he would have full access to every file stored on the

entire system. Since the computer was connected to the organization's

network and he already knew the boss's username and password, he could

easily gain access to the boss's files. Including the time to scan in the magazine images, the entire effort had

taken only a few hours. The resulting damage to a good man's reputation

was beyond imagining. MITNICK MESSAGE

The vast majority of employees who are transferred, fired, or let go in a

downsizing are never a problem. Yet it only takes one to make a

company realize too late what steps they could have taken to prevent

disaster. 

Experience and statistics have clearly shown that the greatest threat to the

enterprise is from insiders. It's the insiders who have intimate knowledge

of where the valuable information resides, and where to hit the company

to cause the most harm. 

 

THE PROMOTION SEEKER 

Late in the morning of a pleasant autumn day, Peter Milton walked into

the lobby of the Denver regional offices of Honorable Auto Parts, a

national parts wholesaler for the automobile aftermarket. He waited at the

reception desk while the young lady signed in a visitor, gave driving

directions to a caller, and dealt with the UPS man, all more or less at the

same time. "So how did you learn to do so many things at once?" Pete said when she

had time to help him. She smiled, obviously pleased he had noticed. He

was from Marketing in the Dallas office, he told her, and said that Mike

Talbott from Atlanta field sales was going to be meeting him. "We have a

client to visit together this afternoon," he explained. I'll just wait here in

the lobby." "Marketing." She said the word almost wistfully, and Pete smiled at her,

waiting to hear what was coming. "If I could go to college, that's what I'd

take," she said. "I'd love to work in Marketing." He smiled again. "Kaila," he said, reading her name off the sign on the

counter, "We have a lady in the Dallas office who was a secretary. She

got herself moved over to Marketing. That was three years ago, and now

she's an assistant marketing manager, making twice what she was." 

Kaila looked starry-eyed. He went on, "Can you use a computer?" "Sure,"

she said. "How would you like me to put your name in for a secretary's job in

Marketing. 

She beamed. "For that I'd even move to Dallas." "You're going to love Dallas," he said. "I can't promise an opening right

away, but I'll see what I can do." She thought that this nice man in the suit and tie and with the neatly

trimmed, well-combed hair might make a big difference in her working

life. Pete sat down across the lobby, opened his laptop, and started getting

some work done. After ten or fifteen minutes, he stepped back up to the

counter. "Listen," he said, "it looks like Mike must've been held up. Is

there a conference room where I could sit and check my emails while I'm

waiting?" Kaila called the man who coordinated the conference room scheduling

and arranged for Pete to use one that wasn't booked. Following a pattern

picked up from Silicon Valley companies (Apple was probably the first to

 

do this) some of the conference rooms were named after cartoon

characters, others after restaurant chains or movie stars or comic book

heroes. He was told to look for the Minnie Mouse room. She had him sign

in, and gave him directions to find Minnie Mouse. He located the room, settled in, and connected his laptop to the Ethernet

port. Do you get the picture yet? Right--the intruder had connected to the network behind the corporate

firewall. Anthony's Story 

I guess you could call Anthony Lake a lazy businessman. Or maybe

"bent" comes closer. Instead of working for other people, he had decided he wanted to go towork for himself; he wanted to open a store, where he could be at one

place all day and not have to run all over the countryside. Only he wanted

to have a business that he could be as sure as possible he could make

money at. What kind of store? That didn't take long to figure out. He knew about

repairing cars, so an auto parts store.And how do you build in a guarantee of success? The answer came to him

in a flash: convince auto parts wholesaler Honorable Auto Parts to sell

him  all the merchandise he needed at their cost. Naturally they wouldn't do this willingly. But Anthony knew how to con

people, his friend Mickey knew about breaking into other people's

computers, and together they worked out a clever plan. That autumn day he convincingly passed himself off as an employee

named Peter Milton, and he had conned his way inside the Honorable

Auto Parts offices and had already plugged his laptop into their network.

So far, so good, but that was only the first step. What he still had to do

wouldn't be easy, especially since Anthony had set himself a fifteen-

minute time limit--any longer and he figured that the risk of discovery

would be too high. 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Train your people not to judge a book solely by its cover--just because

someone is well-dressed and well-groomed he shouldn't be any more

believable.In an earlier phone call pretexting as a support person from their computer

supplier, he had put on a song-and-dance act. "Your company has

purchased a two-year support plan and we're putting you in the database

so we can know when a software program you're using has come out with

a patch or a new updated version. So I need to have you tell me what 

 

 applications you're using." The response gave him a list of programs, and

an accountant friend identified the one called MAS 90 as the #page-the

program that would hold their list of vendors and the discount and

payment  terms for each. With that key knowledge, he next used a software program to identifiy,"

all the working hosts on the network, and it didn't take him long to locate

the correct server used by the Accounting department. From the arsenal of

hacker tools on his laptop, he launched one program and used it to

identify all of the authorized users on the target server. With another, he

then ran a list of commonly used passwords, such as "blank," and

"password"  itself. "Password" worked. No surprise there. People just lose

all creativity when it comes to choosing passwords. Only six minutes gone, and the game was half over. He was in. Another three minutes to very carefully add his new company, address,

phone number, and contact name to the list of customers. And then for the

crucial entry, the one that would make all the difference, the entry that

said all items were to be sold to him at 1 percent over Honorable Auto

Parts' cost. In slightly under ten minutes, he was done. He stopped long enough to tell

Kaila thanks, he was through checking his emails. And he had reached

Mike Talbot, change of plans, he was on the way to a meeting at a client's

office. And he wouldn't forget about recommending her for that job in

Marketing, either. Analyzing the Con 

The intruder who called himself Peter Milton used two psychological

subversion techniques--one planned, the other improvised on the spur of

the moment. He dressed like a management worker earning good money. Suit and tie,

hair carefully styled--these seem like small details, but they make an

impression. I discovered this myself, inadvertently. In a short time as a

programmer at GTE California--a major telephone company no longer in

existence--I discovered that if I came in one day without a badge, 

 

neatly dressed but casual--say, sports shirt, chinos, and Dockers--I'd be

stopped and questioned. Where's your badge, who are you, where do you

work? Another day I'd arrive, still without a badge but in a suit and tie,

looking very corporate. I'd use a variation of the age-old piggybacking

technique, blending in with a crowd of people as they walk into a building

or a secure entrance. I would latch onto some people as they approached

the main entrance, and walk in chatting with the crowd as if I was one of

them. I walked past, and even if the guards noticed I was badge-less, they

wouldn't bother me because I looked like management and I was with

people who were wearing badges. From this experience, I recognized how predictable the behavior of

security guards is. Like the rest of us, they were making judgments based

on appearances--a serious vulnerability that social engineers learn to take

advantage of. The attacker's second psychological weapon came into play when he

noticed the unusual effort that the receptionist was making. Handling

several things at once, she didn't get testy but managed to make everyone

feel they had her full attention. He took this as the mark of someone

interested in getting ahead, in proving herself. And then when he claimed

to work in the Marketing department, he watched to see her reaction,

looking for clues to indicate if he was establishing a rapport with her. He

was. To the attacker, this added up to someone he could manipulate

through a promise of trying to help her move into a better job. (Of course,

if she had said she wanted to go into the Accounting department, he

would have claimed he had contacts for getting her a job there, instead.) Intruders are also fond of another psychological weapon used in this

story: building trust with a two-stage attack. He first used that chatty

conversation about the job in Marketing, and he also used "name-

dropping"--giving the name of another employee--a real person,

incidentally, just as the name he himself used was the name of a real

employee. He could have followed up the opening conversation right away with a

request to get into a conference room. But instead he sat down for a while

and pretended to work, supposedly waiting for his associate, another way

of allaying any possible suspicions because an intruder wouldn't hang

around. He didn't hang around for very long, though; social engineers

know better than to stay at the scene of the crime any longer than

necessary. MITNICK MESSAGE

Allowing a stranger into an area where he can plug a laptop into the

corporate network increases the risk of a security incident. It's perfectly

reasonable for an employee, especially one from offsite, to want to check

his or her email from a conference room, but unless the visitor is

established as a trusted employee or the network is segmented to prevent

unauthorized connections, this may be the weak link that allows company

files to be compromised.Just for the record: By the laws on the books at the time of this writing,

Anthony had not committed a crime when he entered the lobby. He had

not committed a crime when he used the name of a real employee. He had

 

 not committed a crime when he talked his way into the conference room.

He had not committed a crime when he plugged into the company's

network and searched for the target computer. Not until he actually broke in to the computer system did he break the

law. SNOOPING ON KEVIN 

Many years ago when I was working in a small business, I began tonotice that each time I walked into the office that I shared with the three other computer people who made up the IT department, this one particular guy (Joe,  I'll call him here) would quickly toggle the display on his computerto a different window. I immediately recognized this as suspicious. Whenit happened two more times the same day, I was sure something wasgoing on that I should know about. What was this guy up to that he didn't want 

me to see? Joe's computer acted as a terminal to access the company's

minicomputers, 

so I installed a monitoring program on the VAX minicomputer that allowed me to spy on what he was doing. The program acted as if a 

TV camera was looking over his shoulder, showing me exactly what he 

was seeing on his computer. My desk was next to Joe's; I turned my monitor as best I could to partly mask his view, but he could have looked over at any moment andrealized I was spying on him. Not a problem; he was too enthralled in what hewas doing to notice. What I saw made my jaw drop. I watched, fascinated, as the bastard called up my payroll data. He was looking up my salary! 

I had only been there a few months at the time and I guessed Joe couldn't 

stand the idea that I might have been making more than he was. 

 

A few minutes later I saw that he was downloading hacker tools used by

less experienced hackers who don't know enough about programming to

devise the tools for themselves. So Joe was clueless, and had no idea that

one of American's most experienced hackers was sitting right next to him.

I thought it was hilarious.He already had the information about my pay; so it was too late to stop

him. Besides, any employee with computer access at the IRS or the Social

Security Administration can look your salary up. I sure didn't want to tip

my hand by letting him know I'd found out what he was up to. My main

goal at the time was maintaining a low profile, and a good social engineer

doesn't advertise his abilities and knowledge. You always want people to

underestimate you, not see you as a threat.So I let it go, and laughed to myself that Joe thought he knew some secret

about me, when it was the other way around: I had the upper hand by

knowing what he had been up to.In time I discovered that all three of my co-workers in the IT group

amused themselves by looking up the take-home pay of this or that cute

secretary or (for the one girl in the group) neat-looking guy they had

spotted. And they were all finding out the salary and bonuses of anybody

at the company they were curious about, including senior management.Analyzing the Con

This story illustrates an interesting problem. The payroll files were

accessible to the people who had the responsibility of maintaining the

company's computer systems. So it all comes down to a personnel issue:

deciding who can be trusted. In some cases, IT staff might find it

irresistible to snoop around. And they have the ability to do so because

they have privileges allowing them to bypass access controls on those

files.One safeguard would be to audit any access to particularly sensitive files,

such as payroll. Of course, anyone with the requisite privileges could

disable auditing or possibly remove any entries that would point back to

them, but each additional step takes more effort to hide on the part of an

unscrupulous employee.PREVENTING THE CON

From pawing through your trash to duping a security guard or

receptionist, social engineers can physically invade your corporate space.

But you'll be glad to hear that there are preventive measures you can take. 

Protection After Hours

All employees who arrive for work without their badges should be

required to stop at the lobby desk or security office to obtain a temporary

badge for the day. The incident in the first story of this chapter could have

come to a much different conclusion if the company security guards had

had a specific set of steps to follow when encountering anyone without

the required employee badge.For companies or areas within a company where security is not a high-

level concern, it may not be important to insist that every person have a

badge visible at all times. But in companies with sensitive areas, this

should be a standard requirement, rigidly enforced. Employees must be

trained and motivated to challenge people who do not display a badge,

and higher-level employees must be taught to accept such challenges

without causing embarrassment to the person who stops them.Company policy should advise employees of the penalties for those who

consistently fail to wear their badges; penalties might include sending the

employee home for the day without pay, or a notation in his personnel

file. Some companies institute a series of progressively more stringent

penalties that may include reporting the problem to the person's manager,

then issuing a formal warning.In addition, where there is sensitive information to protect, the company

should establish procedures for authorizing people who need to visit

during non-business hours. One solution: require that arrangements be

made through corporate security or some other designated group. This

group would routinely verify the identity of any employee calling to

arrange an off-hours visit by a call back to the person's supervisor or some

other reasonably secure method.Treating Trash with Respect

The Dumpster-diving story dug into the potential misuses of your

corporate trash. The eight keys to wisdom regarding trash:Classify all sensitive information based on the degree of sensitivity.Establish company-wide procedures for discarding sensitive information.

 

Insist that all sensitive information to be discarded first be shredded, and

provide for a safe way for getting rid of important information on scraps

of paper too small for shredding. Shredders must not be the low-end

budget type, which turn out strips of paper that a determined attacker,

given enough patience, can reassemble. Instead, they need to be the kind

called cross-shredders, or those that render the output into useless pulp. Provide a way for rendering unusable or completely erasing computer

media--floppy disks, Zip disks, CDs and DVDs used for storing files,

removable tapes, old hard drives, and other computer media--before they

are discarded. Remember that deleting files does not actually remove

them; they can still be recovered--as Enron executives and many others

have learned to their dismay. Merely dropping computer media in the

trash is an invitation to your local friendly Dumpster diver. (See Chapter

16 for specific guidelines on disposal of media and devices.) Maintain an appropriate level of control over the selection of people on

your cleaning crews, using background checks if appropriate. Remind employees periodically to think about the nature of the materials

they are tossing into the trash. Lock trash Dumpsters. Use separate disposal containers for sensitive materials, and contract to

have the materials disposed of by a bonded company  that specializes in

this work. Saying Good-Bye to Employees 

The point has been made earlier in these pages about the need for ironclad

procedures when a departing employee has had access to sensitive

information, passwords, dial-in numbers, and the like. Your security

procedures need to provide a way to keep track of who has authorization

to various systems. It may be tough to keep a determined social engineer

from slipping past your security barriers, but don't make it easy for an ex-

employee. 

Another step easily overlooked: When an employee who was authorized

to retrieve backup tapes from storage leaves, a written policy must call for

the storage company to be immediately notified to remove her name from

its authorization list. Chapter 16 of this book provides .detailed information on this vital

subject, but it will be helpful to list here some of the key security

provisions that should be in place, as highlighted by this story: A complete and thorough checklist of steps to be taken upon thedeparture of an employee, with special provisions for workers  who had

access to sensitive data. A policy of terminating the employee's computer access immediately--

preferably before the person has even left the building. A procedure to recover the person's ID badge, as well as any keys or

electronic access devices. Provisions that require security guards to see photo ID before admitting

any employee who does not have his or her security pass, and for

checking the name against a list to verify that the person is still employed

by the organization. Some further steps will seem excessive or too expensive for some

companies, but they are appropriate to others. Among these more

stringent security measures are:   Electronic ID badges combined with scanners at entrances; each

employee swipes his badge through the scanner for an instantaneous

electronic determination that the person is still a current employee and

entitled to enter the building. (Note, however, that security guards must

still be trained to be on the alert for piggybacking--an unauthorized person

slipping by in the wake of a legitimate employee.) A requirement that all employees in the same workgroup as the personleaving (especially if the person is being fired) change their passwords.

(Does this seem extreme? Many years after my short time working at

General Telephone, I learned that the Pacific Bell security people, when

they heard General 

Telephone had hired me, "rolled on the ground with laughter." But toGeneral Telephone's credit when they realized they had  

a reputed hacker working for them after they laid me off, they then

required that passwords be changed for everyone in the company!)You don't want your facilities to feel like jails, but at the same time you

need to defend against the guy who was fired yesterday but is back today

intent on doing damage.Don't Forget Anybody

Security policies tend to overlook the entry-level worker, people like

receptionists who don't handle sensitive corporate information. We've

seen elsewhere that receptionists are a handy target for attackers, and the

story of the break-in at the auto parts company provides another example:

A friendly person, dressed like a professional, who claims to be a

company employee from another facility may not be what he appears.

Receptionists need to be well-trained about politely asking for company

ID when appropriate, and the training needs to be not just for the main

receptionist but also for everyone who sits in as relief at the reception

desk during lunchtime or coffee breaks.For visitors from outside the company, the policy should require that a

photo ID be shown and the information recorded. It isn't hard to get fake

ID, but at least demanding ID makes pre-texting one degree harder for the

would-be attacker.In some companies, it makes sense to follow a policy requiring that

visitors be escorted from the lobby and from meeting to meeting.

Procedures should require that the escort make clear when delivering the

visitor to his first appointment that this person has entered the building as

an employee , or non-employee. Why is this important? Because, as we've

seen in earlier

stories, an attacker will often pass himself off in one guise to the first

person encountered, and as someone else to the next. It's too easy for an

attacker to show up in the lobby, convince the receptionist that he has an

appointment with, say, an engineer.., then be escorted to the engineer's

office where he claims to be a rep from a company that wants to sell some

product to the company.., and then, after the meeting with the engineer, he

has free access to roam the building.Before admitting an off-site employee to the premises, suitable procedures

must be followed to verify that the person is truly an employee;

receptionists and guards must be aware of methods used by attackers to

pretext the identity of an employee in order to gain access to company

buildings. 

How about protecting against the attacker who cons his way inside the

building and manages to plug his laptop into a network port behind the

corporate firewall? Given today's technology, this is a challenge:

conference rooms, training rooms, and similar areas should not leave

network ports unsecured but should protect them with firewalls or routers.

But better protection would come from the use of a secure method to

authenticate any users who connect to the network.Secure IT!

A word to the wise: In your own company, every worker in IT probably

knows or can find out in moments how much you are earning, how much

the CEO takes home, and who's using the corporate jet to go on skiing

vacations.It's even possible in some companies for IT people or accounting people

to increase their own salaries, make payments to a phony vendor, remove

negative ratings from HR records, and so on. Sometimes it's only the fear

of getting caught that keeps them honest.., and then one day along comes

somebody whose greed or native dishonesty makes him (or

her) ignore the risk and take whatever he thinks he can get away with.There are solutions, of course. Sensitive files can be protected by

installing proper access controls so that only authorized people can open

them. Some operating systems have audit controls that can be configured

to maintain a log of certain events, such as each person who attempts to

access a protected file, regardless of whether or not the attempt succeeds.If your company has understood this issue and has implemented proper

access controls and auditing that protects sensitive files--you're taking

powerful steps in the right direction. 

Chapter 11Combining Technology and Social Engineering

A social engineer lives by his ability to manipulate people into doing

things that help him achieve his goal, but success often also requires a

large measure of knowledge and skill with computer systems and

telephone systems.Here's a sampling of typical social engineering scams where technology

played an important role.HACKING BEHIND BARS

What are some of the most secure installations you can think of, protected

against break-in, whether physical, telecommunications, or electronic in

nature? Fort Knox? Sure. The White House? Absolutely. NORAD, the

North American Air Defense installation buried deep under a mountain?

Most definitely.How about federal prisons and detention centers? They must be about as

secure as any place in the country, right? People rarely escape, and when

they do, they are normally caught in short order. You would think that a

federal facility would be invulnerable to social engineering attacks. But

you would be wrong--there is no such thing as foolproof security,

anywhere.A few years ago, a pair of grifters (professional swindlers) ran into a

problem. It turned out they had lifted a large bundle of cash from a local

judge. The pair had been in trouble with the law on and off through the

years, but this time the federal authorities took an interest. They nabbed

one of the grifters, Charles Gondorff, and tossed him into a correctional 

center near San Diego. The federal magistrate ordered him detained as 

flight risk and a danger to the community. His pal Johnny Hooker knew that Charlie was going to need a defense

attorney. But where was the money going to come from? most grifters,

their money had always gone for good clothes, fancy cam and the ladies

as fast as it came in. Johnny larely had enough to live on. The money for a good lawyer would have to come from running another

scam. Johnny wasn't up to doing this on this own. Charlie Gondorff had

always been the brains behind their cons. But Johnny didn't dare visit the

detention center to ask Charlie what to do, not when the Feds knew there

had been two men involved in the scam and were so eager to lay their

hands on the other one. Especially since only family can visit. which

meant he'd have to show fake identification and claim to be a family

member. Trying to use fake ID in a federal prison didn't sound like a

smart idea. No, he'd have to get in touch with Gondorff some other way. It wouldn't be easy. No inmate in any federal, state, or local facility is allowed to receive phone calls. A sign posted by every inmate telephonein a federal detention center says something like, "This notice is to advisethe user that all conversations from this telephone are subject to monitoring. 

and the use of the telephone constitutes consent to the monitoring. 

Having  government officials listen in on your phone calls whilecommitting 

a crime has a way of extending your federally funded vacation plans. Johnny knew, though, that certain phone calls were not monitored: calls between a prisoner and his attorney, protected by the Constitution as 

client-attorney communications, for example. In fact, the facility where 

Gondorff was being held had telephones connected directly to the federal 

Public Defender's Office. Pick up one of those phones, and a directconnection

is made to the corresponding telephone in the PDO. The phone company calls this service Direct Connect. The unsuspecting authorities 

assume the service is secure and invulnerable to tampering becauseoutgoing

calls can only go to the PDO, and incoming calls are blocked. Even if someone were somehow able to find out the phone number, the phones 

are programmed in the telephone company switch as deny terminate, 

which is a clumsy phone company term for service where incoming calls 

are not permitted. Since any halfway decent grifter is well versed in the art of

deception, Johnny figured there had to be a way around thisproblem. From the inside, Gondorff had already tried picking up one ofthe PDO phones and saying, "This is Tom, at the phone company repaircenter. 

LINGO

DIRECT CONNECT Phone company term for a phone line that goes

directly to a specific number when picked up

DENY TERMINATE A phone company service option where switching

equipment is set that incoming calls cannot be received at a phone numberWe're running a test on this line and I need you to try dialing nine, and

then zero-zero." The nine would have accessed an outside line, the zero-

zero would then have reached a long-distance operator. It didn't work the

person answering the phone at the PDO was already hip to that trick. Johnny was having better success. He readily found out that there were

ten housing units in the detention center, each with a direct connect

telephone line to the Public Defender's Office. Johnny encountered some

obstacles, but like a social engineer, he was able to think his way around

these annoying stumbling blocks. Which unit was Gondorff in? What was

the telephone number to the direct connect services in that housing unit?

And how would he initially get a message to Gondorff without it being

intercepted by prison officials? What may appear to be the impossible to average folks, like obtaining the

secret telephone numbers located in federal institutions, is very often no

more than a few phone calls away for a con artist. After a couple of

tossing-and-turning nights brainstorming a plan, Johnny woke up one

mormng with the whole thing laid out in his mind, in five steps. First, he'd find out the phone numbers for those ten direct-connect

telephones to the PDO. He'd have all ten changed so that the phones would allow incoming calls. He'd find out which housing unit Gondorff was on. Then he'd find out which phone number went to that unit. Finally, he'd arrange with Gondorff when to expect his call, without the

government suspecting a thing. Piece a' cake, he thought. 

Calling Ma Bell... 

Johnny began by calling the phone company business office under the

pretext of being from the General Services Administration, the agency 

  

responsible for purchasing goods and services for the federalgovernment. 

He said he was working on an acquisition order for additional

services and needed to know the billing information for any

direct connect services currently in use, including the working

telephone numbers and monthly cost at the San Diego

detention center. The lady was happy to help. Just to make sure, he tried dialing into one of those lines and

was answered by the typical audichron recording, "This line

has been disconnected or is no longer in service"—which he

knew meant nothing of kind but instead meant that the line

was programmed to block incoming calls, just as he expected. He knew from his extensive knowledge of phone companyoperations and procedures that he'd need to reach a department

called the Recent  Change Memory Authorization Center or

RCMAC (I will always wonder  who makes up these names!).

He began by calling the phone company  Business Office, said

he was in Repair and needed to know the number for the

RCMAC that handled the service area for the area code and

prefix he gave, which was served out of the same central

office for all the to telephone lines in the detention center. It

was a routine request, the kind provided for technicians out in

the field in need of some assistance, and the clerk had no

hesitation in giving him the number. He called RCMAC, gave a phony name and again said he wasin Repair He had the lady who answered access one of the telephonenumbers he had conned out of the business office a few calls

earlier; when she had it  up, Johnny asked, "Is the number set

to deny termination? "Yes," she said. "Well, that explains why the customer isn't able to receivecalls!" Johnny said. "Listen, can you do me a favor. I need you

to change the line class  code or remove the deny terminate

feature, okay?" There was a pause as she  checked another

computer system to verify that a service order had been placed

to authorize the change. She said, "That number is supposed to

be  restricted for outgoing calls only. There's no service order

for a change."   "Right, it's a mistake. We were supposed to process the orderyesterday but the regular account rep that handles this

customer went home sick and forgot to have someone else

take care of the order for her. So now of course the customer

is up in arms about it." After a momentary pause while the lady pondered this request,

which would be out of the ordinary and against standard

operating procedures,  she said, "Okay." He could hear her

typing, entering the change. And  a few seconds later, it was

done.    

The ice had been broken, a kind of collusion established between them.

Reading the woman's attitude and willingness to help, Johnny didn't

hesitate to go for it all. He said, "Do you have a few minutes more to help

me?" "Yeah," she answered. "What do you need?" "I've got a several other lines that belong to the same customer, and all

have the same problem. I'll read off the numbers, so you can make sure

that they're not set for deny terminate--okay?" She said that was fine. A few minutes later, all ten phone lines had been "fixed" to accept

incoming calls. Finding Gondorff 

Next, find out what housing unit Gondorff was on. This is information

that the people who run detention centers and prisons definitely don't want

outsiders to know. Once again Johnny had to rely on his social

engineering skills. He placed a call to a federal prison in another city--he called Miami, 

but any one would have worked--and claimed he was calling from the

detention center in New York. He asked to talk to somebody who worked

with the Bureau's Sentry computer, the computer system that contains

information on every prisoner being held in a Bureau of Prisons facility

anywhere in the country. When that person came on the phone, Johnny put on his Brooklyn accent.

"Hi," he said. "This is Thomas at the FDC New York. Our connection to

Sentry keeps going down, can you find the location of a prisoner for me, I

think this prisoner may be at your institution," and gave Gondorff's name

and his registration number. "No, he's not here," the guy said after a couple of moments. "He's at the

correctional center in San Diego." Johnny pretended to be surprised. "San Diego! He was supposed to be

transferred to Miami on the Marshal's airlift last week! Are we talking

about the same guy--what's the guy's DOB?" 

12/3/60," the man read from his screen. "Yeah, that's the same guy. What housing unit is he on?" "He's on Ten North," the man said--blithely answering the question 

even though there isn't any conceivable reason why a prison employee in 

New York would need to know this.   

Johnny now had the phones turned on for incoming calls, and knew which

housing unit Gondorff was on. Next, find out which phone number

connected to unit Ten North. This one was a bit difficult. Johnny called one of the numbers. He knew

the ringer of the phone would be turned off; no one would know it was

ringing. So he sat there reading Fodor's Europe} Great Cities travel guide.

while listening to the constant ringing on speakerphone until finally

somebody picked up. The inmate on the other end would, of course, be

trying to reach his court-appointed lawyer. Johnny was prepared with the

expected response. "Public Defender's Office," he announced. When the man asked for his attorney, Johnny said, "I'll see if he's

available, what housing unit are you calling from?" He jotted down the

man's answer, clicked onto hold, came back after half a minute and said,

"He's in court, you'll have to call back later," and hung up. He had spent the better part of a morning, but it could have been worse;

his fourth attempt turned out to be from Ten North. So Johnny now knew

the phone number to the PDO phone on Gondorff's housing unit. Synchronize Your Watches 

Now to get a message through to Gondorff on when to pick up the

telephone line that connects inmates directly to the Public Defender's

Office. ]'his was easier than it might sound. Johnny called the detention center using his official-sounding voice,

identified himself as an employee, and asked to be transferred to Ten

North. The call was put right through. When the correctional officer there

picked up, Johnny conned him by using the insider's abbreviation for

Receiving and Discharge, the unit that processes new inmates in, and

departing ones out: "This is Tyson in R&D," he said. "I need to speak to

inmate Gondorff. We have some property of his we have to ship and we

need an address where he wants it sent. Could you call him to the phone

for me?" Johnny could hear the guard shouting across the day room. After an

impatient several minutes, a familiar voice came on the line. 

Johnny told him, "Don't say anything until I explain what this is." He

explained the pretext so Johnny could sound like he was discussing where

his property should be shipped. Johnny then said, "If you can get to the

Public Defender phone at one this afternoon, don't respond. If you can't,

then say a time that you can be there." Gondorff didn't reply. Johnny went

on, "Good. Be there at one o'clock. I'll call you then. Pick up the phone. 

 

 

If it starts to ring to the Public Defenders Office, flash the switch hook

every twenty seconds. Keep trying till you hear me on the other end." At one o'clock, Gondorff picked up the phone, and Johnny was there

waiting for him. They had a chatty, enjoyable, unhurried conversation,

leading to a series of similar calls to plan the scam that would raise the

money to pay Gondorff's legal fees--all free from government

surveillance. Analyzing the Con 

This episode offers a prime example of how a social engineer can make

the seemingly impossible happen by conning several people, each one

doing something that, by itself, seems inconsequential. In reality, each

action provides one small piece of the puzzle until the con is complete. The first phone company employee thought she was giving information 

to someone from the federal government's General Accounting Office. The next phone company employee knew she wasn't supposed to change

the class of telephone service without a service order, but helped out the

friendly man anyway. This made it possible to place calls through to all

ten of the public defender phone lines in the detention center. For the man at the detention center in Miami, the request to help someoneat another federal facility with a computer problem seemed perfectlyreasonable. And even though there didn't seem any reason he would want

to know the housing unit, why not answer the question? And the guard on Ten North who believed that the caller was really from

within the same facility, calling on official business? It was a perfectly

reasonable request, so he called the inmate Gondorff to the telephone. No

big deal. A series of well-planned stories that added up to completing the sting. THE SPEEDY DOWNLOAD 

Ten years after they had finished law school, Ned Racine saw his

classmates living in nice homes with front lawns, belonging to country

clubs, playing golf once or twice a week, while he was still handling

penny-ante cases for the kind of people who never had enough money to

pay his bill. Jealousy can be a nasty companion. Finally one day, Ned had

had enough. The one good client he ever had was a small but very successful

accounting firm that specialized in mergers and acquisitions. They hadn't

used Ned for long, just long enough for him to realize they were involved

in   

deals that, once they hit the newspapers, would affect the stock price of

one or two publicly traded companies. Penny-ante, bulletin-board stocks,

but in some ways that was even better--a small jump in price could

represent a big percentage gain on an investment. If he could only tap into

their files and find out what they were working on...He knew a man who knew a man who was wise about things not exactly

in the mainstream. The man listened to the plan, got fired up and agreed to

help. For a smaller fee than he usually charged, against a percentage of

Ned's stock market killing, the man gave Ned instructions on what to do.

He also gave him a handy little device to use, something brand-new on the

market.For a few days in a row Ned kept watch on the parking lot of the small

business park where the accounting company had its unpretentious,

storefront-like offices. Most people left between 5:30 and 6. By 7, the lot

was empty. The cleaning crew showed up around 7:30. Perfect.The next night at a few minutes before 8 o'clock, Ned parked across the

street from the parking lot. As he expected, the lot was empty except for

the truck from the janitorial services company. Ned put his ear to the door

and heard the vacuum cleaner running. He knocked at the door very

loudly, and stood there waiting in his suit and tie, holding his well-worn

briefcase. No answer, but he was patient. He knocked again. A man from

the cleaning crew finally appeared. "Hi," Ned shouted through the glass

door, showing the business card of one of the partners that he had picked

up some time earlier. "I locked my keys in my car and I need to get to my

desk."The man unlocked the door, locked it again behind Ned, and then went

down the corridor turning on lights so Ned could see where he was going.

And why not--he was being kind to one of the people who helped put food

on his table. Or so he had every reason to think.MITNICK MESSAGE

Industrial spies and computer intruders will sometimes make a physical

entry into the targeted business. Rather than using a crowbar to break in,

the social engineer uses the art of deception to influence the person on the

other side of the door to open up for him.

Ned sat down at the computer of one of the partners, and turned it on.

While it was starting up, he installed the small device he had been given

into the USB port of the computer, a gadget small enough to carry on a

 

key ring, yet able to hold more than 120 megabytes of data. He logged

into the network with the username and password of the partner's

secretary, which were conveniently written down on a Post-it note stuck

to the display. In less than five minutes, Ned had downloaded every

spreadsheet and document file stored on the workstation and from the

partner's network directory and was on his way home.EASY MONEY

When I was first introduced to computers in high school, we had to

connect over a modem to one central DEC PDP 11 minicomputer in

downtown Los Angeles that all the high schools in L.A. shared. The

operating system on that computer was called RSTS/E, and it was the

operating system I first learned to work with.At that time, in 1981, DEC sponsored an annual conference for its product

users, and one year I read that the conference was going to be held in L.A.

A popular magazine for users of this operating system carried an

announcement about a new security product, LOCK-11. The product was

being promoted with a clever ad campaign that said something like, "It's

3:30 ,.M. and Johnny down the street found your dial-in number, 555-

0336, on his 336th try. He's in and you're out. Get LOCK-11." The

product, the ad suggested, was hacker-proof. And it was going to be on

display at the conference.I was eager to see the product for myself. A high school buddy and friend,

Vinny, my hacking partner for several years who later became a federal

informant against me, shared my interest in the new DEC product, and

encouraged me to go to the conference with him.Cash on the Line

We arrived to find a big buzz already going around the crowd at the trade

show about LOCK-11. It seemed that the developers were staking cash on

the line in a bet that no one could break into their product. Sounded like a

challenge I could not resist.We headed straight for the LOCK-11 booth and found it manned by

three guys who were the developers of the product; I recognized them and

they recognized me--even as a teen, I already had a reputation as a

phreaker and hacker because of a big story the LA Times had run about

my first juvenile brush with the authorities. The article reported that I had

talked my way into a Pacific Telephone building in the middle of the

night and walked out with computer manuals, right under the nose of their  

security guard. (It appears the Times wanted to run a sensationalist story

and it served their purposes to publish my name; because I was still a

juvenile, the article violated the custom if not the law of withholding the

names of minors accused of wrongdoing.)When Vinny and I walked up, ir created some interest on both sides.

There was an interest on their side because they recognized me as the

hacker they had read about and they were a bit shocked to see me. It

created an interest on our side because each of the three developers was

standing there with a $100 bill sticking out of his tradeshow badge. The

prize money for anybody who could defeat their system would be the

whole $300--which sounded like a lot of money to a pair of teenagers. We

could hardly wait to get started.LOCK-11 was designed on an established principle that relied on two

levels of security. A user had to have a valid ID and password, as usual,

but in addition that ID and password would only work when entered from

authorized terminals, an approach called terminal-based security. To

defeat the system, a hacker would need not only to have knowledge of an

account ID and password, but would also have to enter that information

from the correct terminal. The method was well established, and the

inventors of LOCK-11 were convinced it would keep the bad guys out.

We decided we were going to teach them a lesson, and earn three hundred

bucks to boot.A guy I knew who was considered an RSTS/E guru had already beaten us

to the booth. Years before he had been one of the guys who had

challenged me to break into the DEC internal development computer,

after which his associates had turned me in. Since those days he had

become a respected programmer. We found out that he had tried to defeat

the LOCK-11 security program not long before we arrived, but had been

unable to. The incident had given the developers greater confidence that

their product really was secure.LINGO

TERMINAL-BASED SECURITY Security based in part on the

identification of the particular computer terminal being used; this method

of security was especially popular with IBM mainframe computers.

The contest was a straightforward challenge: You break in, you win the

bucks. A good publicity stunt.., unless somebody was able to embarrass

them and take the money. They were so sure of their product that they

 

 

were even audacious enough to have a printout posted at the booth giving

the account numbers and corresponding passwords to some accounts on

the system. And not just regular user accounts, but all the privileged

accounts.That was actually less daring than it sounds: In this type of set-up, I knew,

each terminal is plugged into a port on the computer itself. It wasn't rocket

science to figure out they had set up the five terminals in the conference

hall so a visitor could log in only as a non-privileged user--that is, logins

were possible only to accounts without system administrator privileges. It

looked as if there were only two routes: either bypass the security

software altogether--exactly what the LOCK-11 was designed to prevent;

or somehow get around the software in a way that the developers hadn't

imagined.Taking Up the Challenge

Vinny and I walked away and talked about the challenge, and I came up

with a plan. We wandered around innocently, keeping an eye on the booth

from a distance. At lunchtime, when the crowd thinned out, the three

developers took advantage of the break and took off together to get

something to eat, leaving behind a woman who might have been the wife

or girlfriend of one of them. We sauntered back over and I distracted the

woman, chatting her up about this and that, "How long have you been

with the company? "What other products does your company have on the

market?" and so on.Meanwhile Vinny, out of her sight line, had gone to work, making use of

a skill he and I had both developed. Besides the fascination of breaking

into computers, and my own interest in magic, we had both been intrigued

by learning how to open locks. As a young kid, I had scoured the shelves

of an underground bookstore in the San Fernando Valley that had

volumes on picking locks, getting out of handcuffs, creating fake

identities--all kinds of things a kid was not supposed to know about.Vinny, like me, had practiced lock-picking until we were pretty good with

any run-of-the-mill hardware-store lock. There had been a time when I got

a kick out of pranks involving locks, like spotting somebody who was

using two locks for extra protection, picking the locks, and put-ring them

back in the opposite places, which would baffle and frustrate the owner

when he tried to open each with the wrong key.

In the exhibit hall, I continued to keep the young woman distracted while

Vinny, squatting down at the back of the booth so he couldn't be

 

 

seen, picked the lock on the cabinet that housed their PDP-11minicomputer  and the cable terminations. To call the cabinet locked was

almost a joke. It was secured with what locksmiths refer to as a wafer

lock, notoriously  easy to pick, even for fairly clumsy, amateur lock-

pickers like us. It took Vinny all of about a minute to open the lock. Inside the cabinet he

found just what we had anticipated: the strip of ports for plugging in user

terminals, and one port for what's called the console terminal. This was

the terminal used by the computer operator or system administrator to

control all the computers. Vinny plugged the cable leading from the

console port into one of the terminals on the show floor. That meant this one terminal was now recognized as a console terminal. I

sat down at the recabled machine and logged in using a password the

developers had so audaciously provided. Because the LOCK-11 software

now identified that I was logging in from an authorized terminal, it

granted me access, and I was connected with system administrator

privileges.  I patched the operating system by changing it so that from any

of the terminals on the floor, I would be able to log in as a privileged user.Once my secret patch was installed, Vinny went back to work

disconnecting  the terminal cable plugging it back in where it had been

originally.  Then he picked the lock once again, this time to fasten the

cabinet door closed. I did a directory listing to find out what files were on the computer,

looking for the LocK-11 program and associated files and stumbled on

something I found shocking: a directory that should not have been on this

machine. The developers had been so overconfident, so certain their

software was invincible, that they hadn't bothered to remove the source

code of their new product. Moving to the adjacent hard-copy terminal, I

started printing out portions of the source code onto the continuous sheets

of the green-striped computer paper used in those days. Vinny had only just barely finished picking the lock closed and rejoined

me when the guys returned from lunch. They found me sitting at the

computer pounding the keys while the printer continued to churn away.

"What'cha doing, Kevin?" one of them asked. 

"Oh, just printing out your source code," I said. They assumed I was

joking, of course. Until they looked at the printer and saw that it really u,

as the jealously guarded source code for their product. They didn't believe it was possible that I was logged in as a privileged

user. "Type a Control-T," one of the developers commanded. I did. The

display that appeared on the screen confirmed my claim. The guy

smacked his forehead, as Vinny said, "Three hundred dollars, please." 

  

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Here's another example of smart people underestimating the enemy. How

about you--are you so certain about your company's security safeguards

that you would bet $300 against an attacker breaking in? Sometimes the

way around a technological security device is not the one you expect. They paid up. Vinny and I walked around the tradeshow floor for the rest

of the day with the hundred-dollar bills stuck into our conference badges.

Everyone who saw the bills knew what they represented. Of course, Vinny and I hadn't defeated their software, and if the developer

team had thought to set better rules for the contest, or had used a really

secure lock, or had watched their equipment more carefully, they wouldn't

have suffered the humiliation of that day--humiliation at the hands of a

pair of teenagers. I found out later that the developer team had to stop by a bank to get some

cash: those hundred-dollar bills represented all the spending money they

had brought with them. THE DICTIONARY AS AN ATTACK TOOL 

When someone obtains your password, he's able to invade your system. In

most circumstances, you never even know that anything bad has

happened. A young attacker I'll call Ivan Peters had a target of retrieving the source

code for a new electronic game. He had no trouble getting into the

company's wide area network, because a hacker buddy of his had already

compromised one of the company's Web servers. After finding an un-

patched vulnerability in the Web server software, his buddy had just about

fallen out of his chair when he realized the system had been set up as a

dual-homed host, which meant he had an entry point into the internal

network. .But once Ivan was connected, he then faced a challenge that was like

being inside the Louvre and hoping to find the Mona Lisa. Without a floor

plan, you could wander for weeks. The company was global, with

hundreds of offices and thousands of computer servers, and they didn't

exactly provide an index of development systems or the services of a tour

guide to steer him to the right one. Instead of using a technical approach to finding out what server he needed

to target, Ivan used a social engineering approach. He placed phone calls

based on methods similar to those described elsewhere in this 

   

 

book. First, calling IT technical support, he claimed to be a company

employee having an interface issue on a product his group was designing.

and asked for the phone number of the project leader for the gaming

development team.Then he called the name he'd been given, posing as a guy from IT. "Later

tonight," he said, "we're swapping out a router and need to make sure the

people on your team don't lose connectivity to your server. So we need to

know which servers your team uses." The network was being upgraded all

the time. And giving the name of the server wouldn't hurt anything

anyway, now would it? Since it was password-protected, just having the

name couldn't help anybody break in. So the guy gave the attacker the

server name. Didn't even bother to call the man back to verify his story, or

write down his name and phone number. He just gave the name of the

servers, ATM5 and ATM6.The Password Attack

At this point, Ivan switched to a technical approach to get the

authentication information. The first step with most technical attacks on

systems that provide remote access capability is to identify an account

with a weak password, which provides an initial entry point into the

system.When an attacker attempts to use hacking tools for remotely identifying

passwords, the effort may require him to stay connected to the company's

network for hours at a time. Clearly he does this at his peril: The longer he

stays connected, the greater the risk of detection and getting caught.As a preliminary step, Ivan would do an enumeration, which reveals

details about a target system. Once again the Internet conveniently

provides software for the purpose (at http://ntsleuth.0catch.com; the

character before "catch" is a zero). Ivan found several publicly available

hacking tools on the Web that automated the enumeration process,

avoiding the need to do it by hand, which would take longer and thus run

a higher risk. Knowing that the organization mostly deployed Windows-

based servers, he downloaded a copy of NBTEnum, a NetBIOS (basic

input/output system) enumeration utility. He entered the IP (Internet

protocol) address of the ATM5 server, and started running the program.

The enumeration tool was able to identify several accounts that existed on

the server.

 

 

LINGO

ENUMERATION A process that reveals the service enabled on the

target system, the operating system platform, and a list of accounts names

of the users who have access to the system.Once the existing accounts had been identified, the same enumeration tool

had the ability to launch a dictionary attack against the computer system.

A dictionary attack is something that many computer security folks and

intruders are intimately familiar with, but that most other people will

probably be shocked to learn is possible. Such an attack is aimed at

uncovering the password of each user on the system by using commonly

used words.We're all lazy about some things, but it never ceases to amaze me that

when people choose their passwords, their creativity and imagination

seem to disappear. Most of us want a password that gives us protection

but that is at the same time easy to remember, which usually means

something closely connected to us. Our initials, middle name, nickname,

spouse's name, favorite song, movie, or brew, for example. The name of

the street we live on or the town we live in, the kind of car we drive, the

beachfront village we like to stay at in Hawaii, or that favorite stream with

the best trout fishing around. Recognize the pattern here? These are

mostly personal names, place names, or dictionary words. A dictionary

attack runs through common words at a very rapid pace, trying each as a

password on one or more user accounts.Ivan ran the dictionary attack in three phases. For the first, he used a

simple list of some 800 of the most common passwords; the list includes

secret, work, and password. Also the program permutated the dictionary

words to try each word with an appended digit, or appending the number

of the current month. The program tried each attempt against all of the

user accounts that had been identified. No luck.For the next attempt, Ivan went to Google's search engine and typed,

"wordlists dictionaries," and found thousands of sites with extensive

wordlists and dictionaries for English and several foreign languages. He

downloaded an entire electronic English dictionary. He then enhanced this

by downloading a number of word lists that he found with Google. Ivan

chose the site at www.outpost9.com/files/WordLists.html.

This site allowed him to download (all of this for free) a selection of files

including family names, given namek, congressional names and words,

actor's names, and words and names from the Bible.Another of the many sites offering word lists is actually provided through

Oxford University, at ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/wordlists. 

Other sites offer lists with the names of cartoon characters, words used in

Shakespeare, in the Odyssey, Tolkien, and the Star Trek series, as well as

in science and religion, and on and on. (One on-line company sells a list

containing 4.4 million words and names for only $20.) The attack

program can be set to test the anagrams of the dictionary words, as well--

another favorite method that many computer users think increases their

safety. Faster Than You Think 

Once Ivan had decided which wordlist to use, and started the attack, thesoftware ran on autopilot. He was able to turn his attention to other things.

And here's the incredible part: You would think such an attack would

allow the hacker to take a Rip van Winkle snooze and the software would

still have made little progress when he awoke. In fact, depending on the

platform being attacked, the security configuration of the system, and

network connectivity, every word in an English dictionary can, incredibly,

be attempted in less than thirty minutes! While this attack was running, Ivan started another computer running a

similar attack on the other server used by the development group, ATM6.

Twenty minutes later, the attack software had done what most

unsuspecting users like to think is impossible: It had broken a password,

revealing that one of the users had chosen the password "Frodo," one of

the Hobbits in the book The Lord of the Rings. With this password in hand, Ivan was able to connect to the ATM6 server

using the user's account. There was good news and bad news for our attacker. The good news was

that the account he cracked had administrator privileges, which would be

essential for the next step. The bad news was that the source code for the

game was not anywhere to be found. It must be, after all, on the other

machine, the ATM5, which he already knew was resistant to a dictionary

attack. But Ivan wasn't giving up just yet; he still had a few more tricks to

try. On some Windows and UNIX operating systems, password hashes

(encrypted passwords) are openly available to anyone who has access to

the computer they're stored on. The reasoning is that the encrypted

passwords  cannot be broken and therefore do not need to be protected.

The theory is wrong. Using another tool called pwdump3, also available

on the Internet, he was able to extract the password hashes from the

ATM6 machine and download them.      

A typical file of password hashes looks like this:Administrator:

500:95E4321A38AD8D6AB75EOC8D76954A50:2E48927AO

BO4F3BFB341E26F6D6E9A97 : : : akasper :

1110:5A8D7E9E3C3954F642C5C736306CBFEF:393CE7F90A8357

F157873D72D0490821: : :digger: 1111:5D15COD58DD216C525AD3B83FA6627C7 :

17AD564144308B4 2B8403DOIAE256558: : :ellgan :

1112:2017D4A5D8D1383EFF17365FAFIFFE89:O7AEC950C22CBB

9 C2C734EB89320DB13: : : tabeck: 1115:9F5890B3FECCAB7EAAD3B435B51404EE:

1FO115A72844721 2FCO5EID2D820B35B: : : vkantar :

1116:81A6A5DO35596E7DAAD3B435B51404EE:B933D36DD1225

8 946FCC7BD153F1CD6E : : : vwallwick: 1119 :

25904EC665BA30F4449AF42E1054F192:15B2B7953FB6

32907455D2706A432469 : : : mmcdonald: 1121:A4AEDO98D29A3217AAD3B435B51404EE:

E40670F936B7 9C2ED522F5ECA9398A27 : : : kworkman : 1141:C5C598AF45768635AAD3B435B51404EE:

DEC8E827A1212 73EFO84CDBF5FD1925C : : :With the hashes now downloaded to his computer, Ivan used another tool

that performed a different flavor of password attack known as brute force.

This kind of attack tries every combination of alphanumeric characters

and most special symbols.

Ivan used a software utility called L0phtcrack3 (pronounced loft-crack;

available at www.atstake.com; another source for some excellent

password recovery tools is www.elcomsoft.com). System administrators

use L0pht-crack3 to audit weak passwords; attackers use it to crack

passwords. The brute force feature in LC3 tries passwords with

combinations of letters, numerals, and most symbols including

!@#$%^&. It systematically tries every possible combination of most

characters. (Note, however, that if nonprintable characters are used, LC3

will be unable to discover the password )The program has a nearly unbelievable speed, which can reach to as high

as 2.8 million attempts a second on a machine with a 1 GHz processor.

Even with this speed, and if the system administrator has configured the

Windows operating system properly (disabling the use of LANMAN

hashes), breaking a password can still take an excessive amount of time.

 

 LINGO

BRUTE FORCE ATTACK A password detection stategy that tries

every possible combination of alphanumeric characters and special

symbols.

For that reason the attacker often downloads the hashes and runs the

attack on his or another machine, rather than staying on line on the target

company's network and risking detection. For Ivan, the wait was not that long. Several hours later the program

presented him with passwords for every one of the development team

members. But these were the passwords for users on the ATM6 machine,

and he already knew the game source code he was after was not on this

server. What now? He still had not been able to get a password for an account on

the ATM5 machine. Using his hacker mindset, understanding the poor

security habits of typical users, he figured one of the team members might

have chosen the same password for both machines. In fact, that's exactly what he found. One of the team members was using

the password "garners" on both ATM5 and ATM6. The door had swung wide open for Ivan to hunt around until he found the

programs he was after. Once he located the source-code tree and gleefully

downloaded it, he took one further step typical of system crackers: He

changed the password of a dormant account that had administrator rights,

just in case he wanted to get an updated version of the software at some

time in the future. Analyzing the Con 

In this attack that called on both technical and people-based

vulnerabilities, the attacker began with a pretext telephone call to obtain

the location and host names of the development servers that held the

proprietary information. He then used a software utility to identify valid account-user names for

everyone who had an account on the development server. Next he ran two

successive password attacks, including a dictionary attack, which searches

for commonly used passwords by trying all of the words in an English

dictionary, sometimes augmented by several word lists containing names,

places, and items of special interest. Because both commercial and public-domain hacking tools can be

obtained by anyone for whatever purpose they have in mind, it's all the

more important that you be vigilant in protecting enterprise computer

systems and your network infrastructure. The magnitude of this threat cannot be overestimated. According to

Computer World magazine, an analysis at New York-based Oppenheimer

Funds led to a startling discovery. The firm's Vice President of Network

Security and Disaster Recovery ran a password attack against the

employees of his firm using one of the standard software packages. The

magazine reported that within three minutes he managed to crack the

passwords of 800 employees.

 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

In the terminology of the game Monopoly, if you use a dictionary word

for your password--Go directly to Jail. Do not pass Go, do not collect

$200. You have to teach your employees how to choose passwords that

truly protect your assets.PREVENTING THE CON

Social engineering attacks may become even more destructive when the

attacker adds a technology element. Preventing this kind of attack

typically involves taking steps on both human and technical levels.Just Say No

In the first story of the chapter, the telephone company RCMAC clerk

should not have removed the deny terminate status from the ten phone

lines when no service order existed authorizing the change. It's not

enough for employees to know the security policies and procedures;

employees must understand how important these policies are to the

company in preventing damage.Security policies should discourage deviation from procedure through a

system of rewards and consequences. Naturally, the policies must be

realistic, not calling on employees to carry out steps so burdensome that

they are likely to be ignored. Also, a security awareness program needs to

convince employees that, while it's important to complete job assignments

in a timely manner, taking a shortcut that circumvents proper security

procedures can be detrimental to the company and co workers.The same caution should be present when providing information to a

stranger on the telephone. No matter how persuasively the person presents

himself, regardless of the person's status or seniority in the company,

absolutely no information should be provided that is not designated as

publicly available until the caller's identity has been positively verified. If

this policy had been strictly observed, the social engineering scheme in

this story would have failed and federal detainee Gondorff would never

have been able to plan a new scare with his pal Johnny. 

This one point is so important that I reiterate it throughout this book:

Verify, verify, verify. Any request not made in person should never be

accepted without verifying the requestor's identity--period. Cleaning Up 

For any company that does not have security guards around the clock, the

scheme wherein an attacker gains access to an office after hours presents a

challenge. Cleaning people will ordinarily treat with respect anyone who

appears to be with the company and appears legitimate. After all, this is

someone who could get them in trouble or fired. For that reason, cleaning

crews, whether internal or contracted from an outside agency, must be

trained on physical security matters. Janitorial work doesn't exactly require a college education, or even the

ability to speak English, and the usual training, if any, involves non-

security related issues such as which kind of cleaning product to use for

different tasks. Generally these people don't get an instruction like, "If

someone asks you to let them in after hours, you need to see their

company ID card, and then call the cleaning company office, explain the

situation, and wait for authorization." An organization needs to plan for a situation like the one in this chapter

before it happens and train people accordingly. In my personal

experience, I have found that most, if not all, private sector businesses are

very lax in this area of physical security. You might try to approach the

problem from the other end, putting the burden on your company's own

employees. A company without 24-hour guard service should tell its

employees that to get in after hours, they are to bring their own keys or

electronic access cards, and must never put the cleaning people in the

position of deciding who it is okay to admit. Then tell the janitorial

company that their people must always be trained that no one is to be

admitted to your premises by them at any time. This is a simple rule: Do

not open the door for anyone. If appropriate, this could be put into writing

as a condition of the contract with the cleaning company. Also, cleaning crews should be trained about piggybacking techniques

(unauthorized persons following an authorized person into a secure

entrance). They should also be trained not to allow another person to

follow them into the building just because the person looks like they

might be an employee. 

Follow up every now and then--say, three or four times a year--by staging

a penetration test or vulnerability assessment. Have someone show up 

 

 

at the door when the cleaning crew is at work and try to talk her way into

the building. Rather than using your own employees, you can hire a firm

that specializes in this kind of penetration testing. Pass It On: Protect Your Passwords 

More and more, organizations are becoming increasingly vigilant about

enforcing security policies through technical means--for example,

configuring the operating system to enforce password policies and limit

the number of invalid login attempts that can be made before locking out

the account. In fact, Microsoft Windows business platforms generally

have this feature built in. Still, recognizing how easily annoyed customers

are by features that require extra effort, the products are usually delivered

with security features turned off. It's really about time that software

manufacturers stop delivering products with security features disabled by

default when it should be the other way around. (I suspect they'll figure

this out soon enough.) Of course, corporate security policy should mandate system

administrators to enforce security policy through technical means

whenever possible, with the goal of not relying on fallible humans any

more than necessary. It's a no-brainer that when you limit the number of

successive invalid login attempts to a particular account, for example, you

make an attacker's life significantly more difficult. Every organization faces that uneasy balance between strong security and

employee productivity, which leads some employees to ignore security

policies, not accepting how essential these safeguards are for protecting

the integrity of sensitive corporate information. If a company's policies leave some issues un-addressed, employees may

use the path of least resistance and do whatever action is most convenient

and makes their job easier. Some employees may resist change and openly

disregard good security habits. You may have encountered such an

employee, who follows enforced rules about password length and

complexity but then writes the password on a Post-it note and defiantly

sticks it to his monitor. A vital part of protecting your organization is the use of hard-to-discover

passwords, combined with strong security settings in your technology. 

For a detailed discussion of recommended password policies, see Chapter

16. 

Chapter 12

Attacks on the Entry-Level EmployeeAs many of the stories here demonstrate, the skilled social engineer often

targets lower-level personnel in the organizational hierarchy. It can be

easy to manipulate these people into revealing seemingly innocuous

information that the attacker uses to advance one step closer to obtaining

more sensitive company information.An attacker targets entry-level employees because they are typically

unaware of the value of specific company information or of the possible

results of certain actions. Also, they tend to be easily influenced by some

of the more common social engineering approaches--a caller who invokes

authority; a person who seems friendly and likeable; a person who

appears to know people in the company who are known to the victim; a

request that the attacker claims is urgent; or the inference that the victim

will gain some kind of favor or recognition.Here are some illustrations of the attack on the lower-level employee in

action.THE HELPFUL SECURITY GUARD

Swindlers hope to find a person who's greedy because they are the ones

most likely to fall for a con game. Social engineers, when targeting

someone such as a member of a sanitation crew or a security guard, hope

to find someone who is good-natured, friendly, and trusting of others.

They are the ones most likely to be willing to help. That's just what the

attacker had in mind in the following story.  

Elliot's View

Date/time: 3:26 a.m. on a Tuesday morning in February 1998.

Location: Marchand Microsystems facility, Nashua, New HampshireElliot Staley knew he wasn't supposed to leave his station when he wasn't

on his scheduled rounds. But it was the middle of the night, for crying out

loud, and he hadn't seen a single person since he had come on duty. And it

was nearly time to make his rounds anyway. The poor guy on the

telephone sounded like he really needed help. And it makes a person feel

fine when they can do a little good for somebody.Bill's Story

Bill Goodrock had a simple goal, one he had held on to, unaltered, since

age twelve: to retire by age twenty-four, not ever touching a penny of his

trust fund. To show his father, the almighty and unforgiving banker, that

he could be a success on his own.Only two years left and it's by now perfectly clear he won't make his

fortune in the next twenty-four months by being a brilliant businessman

and he won't do it by being a sharp investor. He once wondered about

robbing banks with a gun but that's just the stuff of fiction--the risk-

benefittrade-off is so lousy. Instead he daydreams about doing a Rifkin--robbinga bank electronically. The last time Bill was in Europe with the family, he

opened a bank account in Monaco with 100 Francs. It still has only 100

francs in it, but he has a plan that could help it reach seven digits in a

hurry. Maybe even eight if he's lucky.Bill's girlfriend Anne-marie worked in M&A for a large Boston bank.

One day while waiting at her offices until she got out of a late meeting, he

gave in to curiosity and plugged his laptop into an Ethernet port in the

conference room he was using. Yes!--he was on their internal network,

connected inside the bank's network.., behind the corporate firewall. That

gave him an idea.He pooled his talent with a classmate who knew a young woman named

Julia, a brilliant computer science Ph.D. candidate doing an internship at

Marchand Microsystems. Julia looked like a great source for essential

insider information. They told her they were writing a script for a movie

and she actually believed them. She thought it was fun making up a story

with them and giving them all the details about how you could actually

bring off the caper they had described. She thought the idea was brilliant,

actually, and kept badgering them about giving her a screen credit, too.

 

 

They warned her about how often screenplay ideas get stolen and made 

her swear she'd never tell anyone. Suitably coached by Julia, Bill did the risky part himself and never

doubted he could bring it off. I called in the afternoon and managed to find out that the night supervisor

of the security force was a man named Isaiah Adams. At 9:30 that night I

called the building and talked to the guard on the lobby security desk. My

story was all based on urgency and I made myself sound a little panicky.

"I'm having car trouble and I can't get to the facility," I said. "I have this

emergency and I really need your help. I tried calling the guard

supervisor, Isaiah, but he's not at home. Can you just do me this onetime

favor, I'd really appreciate it?" The rooms in that big facility were each labeled with a mail-stop code so I

gave him the mail-stop of the computer lab and asked him if he knew

where that was. He said yes, and agreed to go there for me. He said it

would take him a few minutes to get to the room, and I said I'd call him in

the lab, giving the excuse that I was using the only phone line available to

me and I was using it to dial into the network to try to fix the problem. He was already there and waiting by the time I called, and I told him

where to find the console I was interested in, looking for one with a paper

banner reading "elmer"--the host that Julia had said was used to build the

release versions of the operating system that the company marketed.

When he said he had found it, I knew for sure that Julia had been feeding

us good information and my heart skipped a beat. I had him hit the Enter

key a couple of times, and he said it printed a pound sign. Which told me

the computer was logged in as root, the super-user account with all system

privileges. He was a hunt-and-peck typist and got all in a sweat when I

tried to talk him through entering my next command, which was more

than a bit tricky: echo 'fix:x:0:0::/:/bin/sh' >> /etc/passwd Finally he got it right, and we had now provided an account with a name

fix. And then I had him type echo 'fix: :10300:0:0' 55 /etc/shadow 

This established the encrypted password, which goes between the double

colon. Putting nothing between those two colons meant the account would

have a null password. So just those two commands was all it took 

 

 

to append the account fix to the password file, with a null password. Best

of all, the account would have the same privileges as a super-user. The next thing I had him do was to enter a recursive directory command

that printed out a long list of file names. Then I had him feed the paper

forward, tear it off, and take it with him back to his guard desk because "I

may need you to read me something from it later on." The beauty of this was that he had no idea he had created a new account.

And I had him print out the directory listing of filenames because I

needed to make sure the commands he typed earlier would leave the

computer room with him. That way the system administrator or operator

wouldn't spot anything the next morning that would alert them there had

been a security breach. I was now set up with an account, a password, and full privileges. A little

before midnight I dialed in and followed the instructions Julia had

carefully typed up "for the screenplay." In a blink I had access to one of

the development systems that contained the master copy of the source

code for the new version of the company's operating system software. I uploaded a patch that Julia had written, which she said modified a

routine in one of the operating system's libraries. That patch would, in

effect, create a covert backdoor that would allow remote access into the

system with a secret password. NOTE

The type of backdoor used here does not change the operating system

login program itself Rather, a specific function contained within the

dynamic library used by the login program is replaced to create the secret

entry point. In typical attacks, computer intruders often replace or patch

the login program itself, but sharp system administrators can detect the

change by comparing it to the version shipped on media such as cd , or by

other distribution methods. I carefully followed the instructions she had written down for me, first

installing the patch, then taking steps that removed the fix account and

wiped clean all audit logs so there would be no trace of my activities,

effectively erasing my tracks. 

Soon the company would begin shipping the new operating system

upgrade to their customers: Financial institutions all over the world. And

every copy they sent out would include the backdoor I had placed into the

master distribution before it was sent out, allowing me to access any

computer system of every bank and brokerage house that installed the

upgrade.  

LINGO

PATCH Traditionally a piece of code that , when placed in an executable

program, fixes a problem.Of course, I wasn't quite home free--there would still be work to do. I'd

still have to gain access to the internal network of each financial

institution I wanted to "visit." Then I'd have to find out which of their

computers was used for money transfers, and install surveillance software

to learn the details of their operations and exactly how to transfer funds.All of that I could do long distance. From a computer located anywhere.

Say, overlooking a sandy beach. Tahiti, here I come.I called the guard back, thanked him for his help, and told him he could

go ahead and toss the printout.Analyzing the Con

The security guard had instructions about his duties, but even thorough,

well-thought-out instructions can't anticipate every possible situation.

Nobody had told him the harm that could be done by typing a few

keystrokes on a computer for a person he thought was a company

employee.With the cooperation of the guard, it was relatively easy to gain access to

a critical system that stored the distribution master, despite the fact that it

was behind the locked door of a secure laboratory. The guard, of course,

had keys to all locked doors.Even a basically honest employee (or, in this case, the Ph.D. candidate

and company intern, Julia) can sometimes be bribed or deceived into

revealing information of crucial importance to a social engineering attack,

such as where the target computer system is located and--the key to the

success of this attack---when they were going to build the new release of

the software for distribution. That's important, since a change of this kind

made too early has a higher chance of being detected or being nullified if

the operating system is rebuilt from a clean source.Did you catch the detail of having the guard take the printout back to the

lobby desk and later destroying it? This was an important step. When the

computer operators came to work the next workday, the attacker didn't

want them to find this damning evidence on the hard-copy terminal, or

notice it in the trash. Giving the guard a plausible excuse to take the

printout with him avoided that risk.

 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

When the computer intruder cannot gain physical access to a computer

system or network himself, he will try to manipulate another person to do

it for him. In cases where physical access is necessary for the plan, using

the victim as a proxy is even better than doing it himself, because the

attacker assumes much less risk of detection and apprehension.THE EMERGENCY PATCH

You would think a tech support guy would understand the dangers of

giving access to the computer network to an outsider. But when that

outsider is a clever social engineer masquerading as a helpful software

vendor, the results might not be what you expect.A Helpful Call

The caller wanted to know Who's in charge of computers there? and the

telephone operator put him through to the tech support guy, Paul Ahearn.The caller identified himself as "Edward, with SeerWare, your database

vendor. Apparently a bunch of our customers didn't get the email about

our emergency update, so we're calling a few for a quality control check

to see whether there was a problem installing the patch. Have you

installed the update yet?"Paul said he was pretty sure he hadn't seen anything like that.Edward said, "Well, it could cause intermittent catastrophic loss of data,

so we recommend you get it installed as soon as possible." Yes, that was

something he certainly wanted to do, Paul said. "Okay," the caller

responded. "We can send you a tape or CD with the patch, and I want to

tell you, it's really critical--two companies already lost several days of

data. So you really should get this installed as soon as it arrives, before it

happens to your company.""Can't I download it from your Web site?" Paul wanted to know."It should be available soon--the tech team has been putting out all these

fires. If you want, we can have our customer support center install it for

you, remotely. We can either dial up or use Telnet to connect to the

system, if you can support that."

"We don't allow Telnet, especially from the Internet--it's not secure," Paul

answered. "If you can use SSH, that'd be okay," he said, naming a product

that provides secure file transfers.

 

 

"Yeah. We have SSH. So what's the IP address?" Paul gave him the IP address, and when Andrew asked, "and what

username  and password can I use," Paul gave him those, as well. Analyzing the Con 

Of course that phone call might really have come from the database

manufacturer. But then the story wouldn't belong in this book. The social engineer here influenced the victim by creating a sense of fear

that critical data might be lost, and offered an immediate solution that

would resolve the problem. Also, when a social engineer targets someone who knows the value of the

information, he needs to come up with very convincing and persuasive

arguments for giving remote access. Sometimes he needs to add the

element of urgency so the victim is distracted by the need to rush, and

complies before he has had a chance to give much thought to the request. THE NEW GIRL 

What kind of information in your company's files might an attacker want

to gain access to? Sometimes it can be something you didn't think you

needed to protect at all. Sarah’s Call

"Human Resources, this is Sarah." "Hi,  Sarah. This is George, in the parking garage. You know the access

card you use to get into the parking garage and elevators? Well, we had a

problem and we need to reprogram the cards for all the new hires from the

last fifteen days." "So you need their names?" "And their phone numbers." "I can check our new hire list and call you back. What's your phone

number?" 

"I'm at 73 . . . Uh, I'm going on .break, how about if I call you back in a

half-hour?" "Oh. Okay." When he called back, she said: 

 

 

"Oh, yes. Well, there's just two. Anna Myrtle, in Finance, she's a

secretary. And that new VP, Mr. Underwood."

"And the phone numbers?"

"Right  Okay, Mr. Underwood is 6973. Anna Myrtle is 2127."

"Hey, you've been a big help. "thanks."Anna’s Call

"Finance, Anna speaking.""I'm glad I found somebody working late. Listen, this is Ron Vittaro, I'm

publisher of the business division. I don't think we've been introduced.

Welcome to the company.""Oh, thank you.""Anna, I'm in Los Angeles and I've got a crisis. I need to take about ten

minutes of your time.""Of course. What do you need?""Go up to my office. Do you know where my office is?"No.""Okay, it's the corner office on the fifteenth floor—room 1502. I'll call

you there in a few minutes. When you get to the office, you'll need to

press the forward button on the phone so my call won't go directly to my

voice mail.""Okay, I'm on my way now."Ten minutes later she was in his office, had cancelled his call forwarding

and was waiting when the phone rang. He told her to sit down at the

computer and launch Internet Explorer. When it was running he told her

to type in an address: www.geocities.com/ron-insen/manuscript.doc.exe.A dialog box appeared, and he told her to click Open. The computer

appeared to start downloading the manuscript, and then the screen went

blank. When she reported that something seemed to be wrong, he replied,

"Oh, no. Not again. I've been having a problem with downloading from

that Web site every so often but I thought it was fixed. Well, okay, don't

worry, I'll get the file another way later." Then he asked her to restart his

computer so he could be sure it would start up properly after the problem

she had just had. He talked her through the steps for rebooting.When the computer was running again properly, he thanked her warmly

and hung up, and Anna went back to the Finance department to finish the

job she had been working on.

 

 

Kurt Dillon's Story 

Millard-Fenton Publishers was enthusiastic about the new author they

were just about to sign up, the retired CEO of a Fortune 500 company

who had a fascinating story to tell. Someone had steered the man to a

business manager for handling his negotiations. The business manager

didn't want to admit he knew zip about publishing contracts, so he hired

an old friend to help him figure out what he needed to know. The old

friend, unfortunately, was not a very good choice. Kurt Dillon used what

we might call unusual methods in his research, methods not entirely

ethical. Kurt signed up for a free site on Geocities, in the name of Ron Vittaro,

and loaded a spy-ware program onto the new site. He changed the name

of the program to manuscript.doc.exe, so the name would appear to be a

Word document and not raise suspicion. In fact, this worked even better

than Kurt had anticipated; because the real Vittaro had never changed a

default setting in his Windows operating system called "Hide file

extensions for known file types." Because of that setting the file was

actually displayed with the name manuscript.doc. Then he had a lady friend call Vittaro's secretary. Following Dillon's

coaching, she said, "I'm the executive assistant to Paul Spadone, president

of Ultimate Bookstores, in Toronto. Mr. Vittaro met my boss at a book

fair a while back, and asked him to call to discuss a project they might do

together. Mr. Spadone is on the road a lot, so he said I should find out

when Mr. Vittaro will be in the office." By the time the two had finished comparing schedules, the lady friend had

enough information to provide the attacker with a list of dates when Mr.

Vittaro would be in the office. Which meant he also knew when Vittaro

would be out of the office. It hadn't required much extra conversation to

find out that Vittaro's secretary would be taking advantage of his absence

to get in a little skiing. For a short span of time, both would be out of the

office. Perfect. LINGO 

SPYWARE Specialized software used to covertly monitor a targets

computer activities. One form used to track the sites visited by internet

shoppers so that on-line advertisements can be tailored to their surfing

habits. The other form is analogous to a wiretap, except that the target

device is a computer. The software captures the activities of the user,

including passwords and keystrokes typed, email, chat conversations,

instant messenger, all the web sites visited, and screenshots of the display

screen.

 

 

LINGO

SILENT INSTALL A method of installing a software application

without the computer user or operator being aware that such a action is

taking place.The first day they were supposed to be gone he placed a pretext urgentcall just to make sure, and was told by a receptionist that "Mr. Vittaro is not in the office and neither is his secretary. Neither of them is expectedany time today or tomorrow or the next day." His very first try at conning a junior employee into taking part in his

scheme was successful, and she didn't seem to blink an eye at being told

to help him by downloading a "manuscript," which was actually a

popular,  commercially available spyware program that the attacker had

modified  for a silent install. Using this method, the installation would not

be  detected by any antivirus software. For some strange reason, antivirus

manufacturers do not market products that will detect commercially

available  spyware. Immediately after the young woman had loaded the software ontoVittaro's computer, Kurt went back up to the Geocities site and replaced

the doc.exe file with a book manuscript he found on the Internet. Just in

case anyone stumbled on the ruse and returned to the site to investigate

what had taken place, all they'd find would be an innocuous, amateurish,

un-publishable book manuscript. Once the program had been installed and the computer rebooted, it wasset to immediately become active. Ron Vittaro would return to town in a few days, start to work, and the spyware would begin forwarding all thekeystrokes typed on his computer, including all outgoing emails and

screen shots showing what was displayed on his screen at that moment. It

would all be sent at regular intervals to a free email service provider in the

Ukraine. Within a few days after Vittaro's return, Kurt was plowing through the log

files piling up in his Ukrainian mailbox and before long had located

confidential emails that indicated just how far Millard-Fenton Publishing

was willing to go in making a deal with the author. Armed with that

knowledge, it was easy for the author's agent to negotiate much better

terms than originally offered, without ever running the risk of losing the

deal altogether. Which, of course, meant a bigger commission for the

agent. 

 

 

Analyzing the Con

In this ruse, the attacker made his success more likely by picking a new

employee to act as his proxy, counting on her being more willing to

cooperate and be a team player, and being less likely to have knowledge

of the company, its people, and good security practices which could

thwart the attempt.Because Kurt was pretexting as a vice president in his conversation with

Anna, a clerk in Finance, he knew that it would be very unlikely that she

would question his authority. On the contrary, she might entertain the

thought that helping a VP could gain her favor.And the process he walked Anna through that had the effect of installing

the spyware appeared innocuous on its face. Anna had no idea that her

seemingly innocent actions had set an attacker up to gain valuable

information that could be used against the interests of the company.And why did he choose to forward the VP's message to an email account

in the Ukraine? For several reasons a far-off destination makes tracing or

taking action against an attacker much less likely. These types of crimes

are generally considered low priority in countries like this, where the

police tend to hold the view that committing a crime over the Internet isn't

a noteworthy offense. For that reason, using email drops in countries that

are unlikely to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement is an attractive

strategy.PREVENTING THE CON

A social engineer will always prefer to target an employee who is unlikely

to recognize that there is something suspicious about his requests. It

makes his job not only easier, but also less risky--as the stories in this

chapter illustrate.MITNICK MESSAGE

Asking a co-worker or subordinate to do a favor is a common practice.

Social engineers know how to exploit people's natural desire to help and

be a team player. An attacker exploits this positive human trait to deceive

unsuspecting employees into performing actions that advance him toward

his goal. It's important to understand this simple concept so you will be

more likely to recognize when another person is trying to manipulate you. 

 

Deceiving the UnwaryI've emphasized earlier the need to train employees thoroughly enough

that they will never allow themselves to be talked into carrying out the

instructions of a stranger. All employees also need to understand the

danger of carrying out a request to take any action on another person's

computer. Company policy should prohibit this except when specifically

approved by a manager. Allowable situations include:When the request is made by a person well known to you, with the request

made either face-to-face, or over the telephone when you unmistakably

recognize the voice of the caller.When you positively verify the identity of the requestor through approved

procedures.When the action is authorized by a supervisor or other person in authority

who is personally familiar with the requestor.Employees must be trained not to assist people they do not personally

know, even if the person making the request claims to be an executive.

Once security policies concerning verification have been put in place,

management must support employees in adhering to these policies, even

when it means that an employee challenges a member of the executive

staff who is asking the employee to circumvent a security policy.Every company also needs to have policies and procedures that guide

employees in responding to requests to take any action with computers or

computer-related equipment. In the story about the publishing company,

the social engineer targeted a new employee who had not been trained on

information security policies and procedures. To prevent this type of

attack, every existing and new employee must be told to follow a simple

rule: Do not use any computer system to perform an action requested by a

stranger. Period.Remember that any employee who has physical or electronic access to a

computer or an item of computer-related equipment is vulnerable to being

manipulated into taking some malicious action on behalf of an attacker.

Employees, and especially IT personnel, need to understand that allowing

an outsider to gain access to their computer networks is like giving your

bank account number to a telemarketer or giving your telephone calling

card number to a stranger in jail. Employees must give thoughtful

attention to whether carrying out a request can lead to disclosure of

sensitive information or the compromising of the corporate computer

system. 

IT people must also be on their guard against unknown callers posing as

vendors. In general, a company should consider having specific people

designated as the contacts for each technology vendor, with a policy in

place that other employees will not respond to vendor requests for

information about or changes to any telephone or computer equipment.

That way, the designated people become familiar with the vendor

personnel who call or visit, and are less likely to be deceived by an

imposter. If a vendor calls even when the company does not have a

support contract, that should also raise suspicions. Everyone in the organization needs to be made aware of information

security threats and vulnerabilities. Note that security guards and the like

need to be given not just security training, but training in information

security, as well. Because security guards frequently have physical access

to the entire facility, they must be able to recognize the types of social

engineering attacks that may be used against them. Beware Spyware 

Commercial spyware was once used mostly by parents to monitor what

their children were doing on the Internet, and by employers, supposedly to

determine which employees were goofing off by surfing the Internet. A

more serious use was to detect potential theft of information assets or

industrial espionage. Developers market their spyware by offering it as a

tool to protect the children, when in fact their true market is people who

want to spy on someone. Nowadays, the sale of spyware is driven to a

great extent by people's desire to know if their spouse or significant other

is cheating on them. Shortly before I began writing the spyware story in this book, the person

who receives email for me (because I'm not allowed to use the Internet)

found a spam email message advertising a group of spyware products.

One of the items offered was described like this: FAVORITE! MUST HAVE:This powerful monitoring and spy program secretly captures all

keystrokes and the time and title of all active windows to a text file, while

running hidden in the background. Logs can be encrypted and

automatically sent to a specified email address, or just recorded on the

hard drive. Access to the program is password protected and it can be

hidden from the CTRL+ALT+DEL menu. 

Use it to monitor typed URLs, chat sessions, emails and many other

things (even passwords). Install without detection on ANY PC and email yourself the logs!   

Antivirus Gap?

Antivirus software doesn't detect commercial spyware, thereby treating

the software as not malicious even though the intent is to spy on other

people. So the computer equivalent of wiretapping goes unnoticed,

creating the risk that each of us might be under illegal surveillance at any

time. Of course, the antivirus software manufacturers may argue that

spyware can be used for legitimate purposes, and therefore should not be

treated as malicious. But the developers of certain tools once used by the

hacking community, which are now being freely distributed or sold as

security-related software, are nonetheless treated as malicious code.

There's a double standard here, and I'm left wondering why.Another item offered in the same email promised to capture screen shots

of the user's computer, just like having a video camera looking over his

shoulder. Some of these software products do not even require physical

access to the victim's computer. Just install and configure the application

remotely, and you have an instant computer wiretap! The FBI must love

technology.With spyware so readily available, your enterprise needs to establish two

levels of protection. You should install spyware-detection software such

as SpyCop (available from www.spycop.com) on all workstations, and

you should require that employees initiate periodic scans. In addition, you

must train employees against the danger of being deceived into

downloading a program, or opening an email attachment that could install

malicious software.In addition to preventing spyware from being installed while an employee

is away from his desk for a coffee break, lunch, or a meeting, a policy

mandating that all employees lock their computer systems with a screen

saver password or similar method will substantially mitigate the risk of an

unauthorized person being able to access a worker's computer. No one

slipping into the person's cubicle or office will be able to access any of

their files, read their email, or install spyware or other malicious software.

The resources necessary to enable the screensaver password are nil, and

the benefit of protecting employee workstations is substantial. The cost-

benefit analysis in this circumstance should be a no-brainer.

 

 

Chapter 13Clever Cons

By now you've figured out that when a stranger calls with a request for

sensitive information or something that could be of value to an attacker,

the person receiving the call must be trained to get the caller's phone

number, and call back to verify that the person is really who he claims to

be--a company employee, or an employee of a business partner, or a

technical support representative from one of your vendors, for example.Even when a company has an established procedure that the employees

follow carefully for verifying callers, sophisticated attackers are still able

to use a number of tricks to deceive their victims into believing they are

who they claim to be. Even security conscious employees can be duped

by methods such as the following.THE MISLEADING CALLER ID

Anyone who has ever received a call on a cell phone has observed the

feature known as caller ID--that familiar display showing the telephone

number of the caller. In a business setting, it offers the advantage of

allowing a worker to tell at a glance whether the call coming in is from a

fellow employee or from outside the company.Many years ago some ambitious phone phreakers introduced themselves

to the wonders of caller ID before the phone company was even allowed

to offer the service to the public. They had a great time freaking people

out by answering the phone and greeting the caller by name before they

said a word. 

Just when you thought it was safe, the practice of verifying identity by

trusting what you see--what appears on the caller ID display--is exactly

what the attacker may be counting on.Linda's Phone Call

Day/Time: Tuesday, July 23, 3:12 P.M.

Place." The offices of the Finance Department, Starbeat AviationLinda Hill's phone rang just as she was in the middle of writing a memo to

her boss. She glanced at her caller ID, which showed that the call was

from the corporate office in New York, but from someone named Victor

Martin--not a name she recognized.She thought of letting the call roll over to voice mail so she wouldn't

break the flow of thought on the memo. But curiosity got the better of her.

She picked up the phone and the caller introduced himself and said he was

from PR, and working on some material for the CEO. "He's on his way to

Boston for meetings with some of our bankers. He needs the top-line

financials for the current quarter," he said. "And one more thing. He also

needs the financial projections on the Apache project," Victor added,

using the code name for a product that was to be one of the company's

major releases in the spring.She asked for his email address, but he said he was having a problem

receiving email that tech support was working on, so could she fax it

instead? She said that would be fine, and he gave her the internal phone

extension to his fax machine.She sent the fax a few minutes later.But Victor did not work for the PR department. In fact, he didn't even

work for the company.Jack's Story

Jack Dawkins had started his professional career at an early age as a

pickpocket working games at Yankee Stadium, on crowded subway

platforms, and among the night-time throng of Times Square tourists. He

proved so nimble and artful that he could take a watch off a man's wrist

without his knowing. But in his awkward teenage years he had grown

clumsy and been caught. In Juvenile Hall, Jack learned a new trade with a

much lower risk of getting nabbed.His current assignment called for him to get a company's quarterly profit

and loss statement and cash flow information, before the data was

 

 

filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and made

public.  His client was a dentist who didn't want to explain why he wanted

the information. To Jack the man's caution was laughable. He'd seen it all

before--the guy probably had a gambling problem, or else an expensive

girlfriend his wife hadn't found out about yet. Or maybe he had just been

bragging to his wife about how smart he was in the stock market; now he

had lost a bundle and wanted to make a big investment on a sure thing by

knowing which way the company's stock price was going to go when they

announced their quarterly results. People are surprised to find out how little time it takes a thoughtful social

engineer to figure out a way of handling a situation he's never faced

before. By the time Jack got home from his meeting with the dentist, he

had already formed a plan. His friend Charles Bates worked for a

company,  Panda Importing, that had its own telephone switch, or PBX. In terms familiar to people knowledgeable about phone systems, the PBX

was connected to a digital telephone service known as a T1, configured

as Primary Rate Interface ISDN (integrated services digital network) or

PRI ISDN. What this meant was that every time a call was placed from

Panda, setup and other call processing information went out over a data

channel to the phone company's switch; the information included the calling party number, which (unless blocked) is delivered to the caller IDdevice at the receiving end. Jack's friend knew how to program the switch so the person receiving 

the call would see on his caller ID, not the actual phone number at the Panda office, but whatever phone number he had programmed into theswitch. This trick works because local phone companies do not bother to

validate the calling number received from the customer against the actual

phone numbers the customer is paying for. All Jack Dawkins needed was access to any such telephone service.

Happily his friend and sometime partner in crime, Charles Bates, was

always glad to lend a helping hand for a nominal fee. On this occasion,

Jack and Charles temporarily reprogrammed the company's telephone

switch so that calls from a particular telephone line located on the Panda

premises would spoof Victor Martin's internal telephone number, making

the call appear to be coming from within Starbeat Aviation. 

The idea that your caller ID can be made to show any number you wish is

so little known that it's seldom questioned. In this case, Linda was happy

to fax the requested information to the guy she thought was from PR. When Jack hung up, Charles reprogrammed his company's telephone

switch, restoring the telephone number to the original settings. 

 

 

Analyzing the Con

Some companies don't want customers or vendors to know the telephone

numbers of their employees. For example, Ford may decide that calls

from their Customer Support Center should show the 800-number for the

Center and a name like "Ford Support," instead of the real direct-dial

phone number of each support representative placing a call. Microsoft

may want to give their employees the option of telling people their phone

number, instead of having everyone they call be able to glance at their

caller ID and know their extension. In this way the company is able to

maintain the confidentiality of internal numbers.But this same capability of reprogramming provides a handy tactic for the

prankster, bill collector, telemarketer, and, of course, the social engineer.VARIATION: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS

CALLING

As co-host of a radio show in Los Angeles called "Darkside of the

Internet" on KFI Talk Radio, I worked under the station's program

director. David, one of the most committed and hardworking people I've

ever met, is very difficult to reach by telephone because he's so busy. He's

one of those people who doesn't answer a call unless he sees from the

caller ID that it's someone he needs to talk to.When I'd phone him, because I have call blocking on my cell phone, he

could not tell who was calling and wouldn't pick up the call. It would roll

over to voice mail, and it became very frustrating for me.I talked over what to do about this with a long-time friend who is the

cofounder of a real estate firm that provides office space for high-tech

companies. Together we came up with a plan. He had access to his

company's Meridian telephone switch, which gives him the ability to

program the calling party number, as described in the previous story.

Whenever I needed to reach the program director and couldn't get a call

through, I would ask my friend to program any number of my choosing to

appear on the caller ID. Sometimes I'd have him make the call look as if it

was coming from David's office assistant, or sometimes from the holding

company that owns the station.But my favorite was programming the call to appear from David's own

home telephone number, which he always picked up. H1 give the guy

credit, though. He always had a good sense of humor about it when he'd

pick up the phone and discover I had fooled him once again. The best part

 

 

was that he'd then stay on the line long enough to find out what I wanted

and resolve whatever the issue was. When I demonstrated this little trick on the Art Bell Show, I spoofed my

caller ID to display the name and number of the Los Angeles headquarters

of the FBI. Art was quite shocked about the whole affair and admonished

me for doing something illegal. But I pointed out to him that it's perfectly

legal, as long as it's not an attempt to commit fraud. After the program I

received several hundred emails asking me to explain how I had done it.

Now you know. This is the perfect tool to build credibility for the social engineer. If, for

example, during the research stage of the social engineering attack cycle,

it was discovered that the target had caller ID, the attacker could spoof his

or her own number as being from a trusted company or employee. A bill

collector can make his or her calls appear to come from your place of

business. But stop and think about the implications. A computer intruder can call

you at home claiming to be from the IT department at your company. The

person on the line urgently needs your password to restore your files from

a server crash. Or the caller ID displays the name and number of your

bank or stock brokerage house, the pretty sounding girl just needs to

verify your account numbers and your mother's maiden name. For good

measure, she also needs to verify your ATM PIN because of some system

problem. A stock market boiler-room operation can make their calls seem

to come from Merrill Lynch or Citibank. Someone out to steal your

identity could call, apparently from Visa, and convince you to tell him

your Visa card number. A guy with a grudge could call and claim to be

from the IRS or the FBI. If you have access to a telephone system connected to a PRI, plus a bit of

programming knowledge that you can probably acquire from the system

vendor's Web site, you can use this tactic for playing cool tricks on  your

friends. Know anybody with overblown political aspirations? You could

program the referral number as 202 456-1414, and his caller ID will

display the name "WHITE HOUSE." He'll think he's getting a call from the president! 

The moral of the story is simple: Caller ID cannot be trusted, except when

being used to identify internal calls. Both at work and at home, everyone

needs to become aware of the caller ID trick and recognize that the name

or phone number shown in a caller ID display cannot ever be trusted for

verification of identity. 

 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

The next time you receive a call and your caller ID shows it's from your

dear old mom, you never know--it might be from a sweet little old social

engineer. THE INVISIBLE EMPLOYEE 

Shirley Cutlass has found a new and exciting way to make fast money. No

more putting in long hours at the salt mine. She has joined the hundreds of

other scam artists involved in the crime of the decade. She is an identity

thief. Today she has set her sights on getting confidential information from the

customer service department of a credit card company. After doing the

usual kind of homework, she calls the target company and tells the

switchboard operator who answers that she'd like to be connected to the

Telecom Department. Reaching Telecom, she asks for the voice mail

administrator. Using information gathered from her research, she explains that her name

is Norma Todd from the Cleveland office. Using a ruse that should by

now be familiar to you, she says she'll be traveling to corporate

headquarters for a week, and she'll need a voice mailbox there so she

won't have to make long distance calls to check her voice mail messages.

No need for a physical telephone connection, she says, just a voice

mailbox. He says he'll take care of it, he'll call her back when it's set up to

give her the information she'll need. In a seductive voice, she says "I'm on my way into a meeting, can I call

you back in an hour. When she calls back, he says it's all set up, and gives her the information--

her extension number and temporary password. He asks whether she

knows how to change the voice mail password, and she lets him talk her

through the steps, though she knows them at least as well as he does. "And by the way," she asks, "from my hotel, what number do I call to

check my messages?" He gives her the number. Shirley phones in, changes the password, and records her new outgoing

greeting. 

Shirley Attacks 

So far it's all been an easy setup. She's now ready to use the art of

deception.  

She calls the customer service department of the company. "I'm with

Collections, in the Cleveland office," she says, and then launches into a

variation on the by-now familiar excuse. "My computer is being fixed by

technical support and I need your help looking up this information." And

she goes on to provide the name and date of birth of the person whose

identity she is intent on stealing. Then she lists the information she wants:

address, mother's maiden name, card number, credit limit, available

credit, and payment history. "Call me back at this number," she says,

giving the internal extension number that the voice mail administrator set

up for her. "And if I'm not available, just leave the information on my

voice mail." She keeps busy with errands for the rest of the morning, and then checks

her voice mail that afternoon. It's all there, everything she asked for.

Before hanging up, Shirley clears the outgoing message; it would be

careless to leave a recording of her voice behind. And identify theft, the fastest growing crime in America, the "in" crime of

the new century, is about to have another victim. Shirley uses the credit-

card and identity information she just obtained, and begins running up

charges on the victim's card. Analyzing the Con 

In this ruse, the attacker first duped the company’s voice mail

administrator into believing she was an employee, so that he would set up

a temporary voice mailbox. If he bothered to check at all, he would have

found that the name and telephone number she gave matched the listings

in the corporate employee database. The rest was simply a matter of giving a reasonable excuse about a

computerproblem, asking for the desired information, and requesting that theresponse be left on voice mail. And why would any employee be reluctant

to share information with a co-worker? Since the phone number that

Shirley provided was clearly an internal extension, there was no reason

for any suspicion. 

MITNICK MESSAGE

Try calling your own voice mail once in a while; if you hear an outgoing

message that's not yours, you may have just encountered your first social

engineer. 

 

THE HELPFUL SECRETARY 

Cracker Robert Jorday had been regularly breaking into the computer net

works of a global company, Rudolfo Shipping, Inc. The company

eventually recognized that someone was hacking into their terminal

server, an, that through that server the user could connect to any computer

system at the company. To safeguard the corporate network, the company

decide, to require a dial-up password on every terminal server. Robert called the Network Operations Center posing as an attorney with

the Legal Department and said he was having trouble connecting to the

network. The network administrator he reached explained that there had

been some recent security issues, so all dial-up access users would need to

obtain the monthly password from their manager. Robert wondered what

method was being used to communicate each month's password to the

managers and how he could obtain it. The answer, it turned out, was that

the password for the upcoming month was sent in a memo via office, mail

to each company manager. That made things easy. Robert did a little research, called the company

just after the first of the month, and reached the secretary of one manager

who gave her name as Janet. He said, "Janet, hi. This is Randy Goldstein

in Research and Development. I know I probably got the memo with this

month's password for logging into the terminal server from outside the

company but I can't find it anywhere. Did you get your memo for this,

month?" Yes, she said, she did get it. He asked her if she would fax it to him, and she agreed. He gave her the

fax number of the lobby receptionist in a different building on the

company campus, where he had already made arrangements for faxes to

be held for him, and would then arrange for the password fax to be

forwarded. This time, though, Robert used a different fax-forwarding

method. He gave the receptionist a fax number that went to an on-line fax

service. When this service receives a fax, the automated system sends it to

the subscriber's email address. The new password arrived at the email dead drop that Robert set up on a

free email service in China. He was sure that if the fax was ever traced,

the investigator would be pulling out his hair trying to gain cooperation

from Chinese officials, who, he knew, were more than a little reluctant to

be helpful in matters like this. Best of all, he never had to show up

physically at the location of the fax machine. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

The skilled social engineer is very clever at influencing other people to do

favors for him. Receiving a fax and forwarding it to another location

appears so harmless that it's all too easy to persuade a receptionist or

someone else to agree to do it. When somebody asks for a favor involving

information, if you don't know him or can't verify his identity, just say no.TRAFFIC COURT 

Probably everyone who has ever been given a speeding ticket has

daydreamed about some way of beating it. Not by going to traffic school,

or simply paying the fine, or taking a chance on trying to convince the

judge about some technicality like how long it has been since the police-

car speedometer or the radar gun was checked. No, the sweetest scenario

would be beating the ticket by outsmarting the system. The Con 

Although I would not recommend trying this method of beating a traffic

ticket (as the saying goes, don't try this at home) still, this is a good

example of how the art of deception can be used to help the social

engineer. Let's call this traffic violater Paul Durea.  First Steps

"LAPD, Hollenbeck Division." 

"Hi, I'd like to talk to the Subpoena Control." 

"I'm the subpoena clerk." 

"Fine. This is Attorney John Leland, of Meecham, Meecham, and Talbott.

I need to subpoena an officer on a case." 

"Okay, which officer?" 

"Do you have Officer Kendall in your division?" 

"What's his serial number?" 

"21349." 

"Yes. When do you need him?" 

"Some time next month, but I need to subpoena several other witnesses on

the case and then tell the court what days will work for us. Are there any

days next month Officer Kendall won't be available?" 

 

"Let's see... He has vacation days on the 20th through the 23rd, and he has

training days on the 8th and 16th." 

"Thanks. That's all I need right now. I'll call you back when the court dateis set." Municipal Court, Clerk’s Counter

Paul: "I'd like to schedule a court date on this traffic ticket."  

Clerk: "Okay. I can give you the 26th of next month." "Well, I'd like to schedule an arraignment." 

"You want an arraignment on a traffic ticket?" 

"Yes." 

"Okay. We can set the arraignment tomorrow in the morning or afternoon.What would you like?" "Afternoon." 

"Arraignment is tomorrow at 1:30 P.M. in Courtroom Six." "Thanks. I'll

be there."  Municipal Court, Courtroom SixDate: Thursday, 1:45 P.M. 

Clerk:  "Mr. Durea, please approach the bench." 

    

Judge: "Mr. Durea, do you understand the rights that have been explainedto you this afternoon?" Paul: "Yes, your honor." Judge: "Do you want to take the opportunity to attend traffic  school?

Your case will be dismissed after successful completion of an eight-hour

course. I've checked your record and you are presently eligible." Paul: "No, your honor. I respectfully request that the case be set for trial.

One more thing, your honor, I'll be travelling  out of the country, but I'm

available on the 8th or 9th. Would it be possible to set my case for trial on

either of those days? I'm leaving on a business trip for Europe tomorrow,

and I return in four weeks." Judge: "Very well. Trial is set for June 8th, 8:30 A.M., Courtroom Four."Paul: "Thank you, your honor." 

 

Municipal  Court, Courtroom Four

Paul arrived at court early on the 8th. When the judge came in, the clerk

gave him a list of the cases for which the officers had not appeared. The

judge called the defendants, including Paul, and told them their cases

were dismissed. Analyzing the Con 

When an officer writes a ticket, he signs it with his name and his badge

number (or whatever his personal number is called in his agency). Finding

his station is a piece of cake. A call to directory assistance with the name

of the law enforcement agency shown on the citation (highway patrol,

county sheriff, or whatever) is enough to get a foot in the door. Once the

agency is contacted, they can refer the caller to the correct telephone

number for the subpoena clerk serving the geographical area where the

traffic stop was made. Law enforcement officers are subpoenaed for court appearances with

regularity; it comes with the territory. When a district attorney or a

defense lawyer needs an officer to testify, if he knows how the system

works, he first checks to make sure the officer will be available. That's

easy to do; it just takes a call to the subpoena clerk for that agency. Usually in those conversations, the attorney asks if the officer in question

will be available on such-and-such a date. For this ruse, Paul needed a bit

of tact; he had to offer a plausible reason why the clerk should tell him

what dates the officer would not be available. When he first went to the court building, why didn't Paul simply tell the 

court clerk what date he wanted? Easy--from what I understand, traffic-

court clerks in most places don't allow members of the public to select

court dates. If a date the clerk suggests doesn't work for the person, she'll

offer an alternative or two, but that's as far as she will bend. On the other

hand, anyone who is willing to take the extra time of showing up for an

arraignment is likely to have better luck. Paul knew he was entitled to ask for an arraignment. And he knew the

judges are often willing to accommodate a request for a specific date. He

carefully asked for dates that coincided with the officer's training days,

knowing that in his state, officer training takes precedence over an

appearance in traffic court. 

 

MITNICK MESSAGE

The human mind is a marvelous creation. It's interesting to note how

imaginative people can be at developing deceptive ways to get what they

want or to get out of a sticky situation. You have to use the same

creativity and imagination to safeguard information and computer systems

in the public and private sectors. So, folks, when devising your company's

security policies--be creative and think outside the box. And in traffic court, when the officer does not show up--case dismissed.No fines. No traffic school. No points. And, best of all, no record of a

traffic offense! My guess is that some police officials, court officers, district attorneys

and the like will read this story and shake their heads because they know that this ruse does work. But shaking their heads is all they'll do. Nothingwill change. I'd be willing to bet on it. As the character Cosmo says in the

1992 movie Sneakers, "It's all about the ones and zeros"--meaning that in

the end, everything comes down to information. As long as law enforcement agencies are willing to give informationabout an officer's schedule to virtually anyone who calls, the ability to get

out of traffic tickets will always exist. Do you have similar gaps in your company or organization's procedures that a clever social engineer cantake advantage of to get information you'd rather they didn't have? SAMANTHA'S REVENGE 

Samantha Gregson was angry.   She had worked hard for her college degree in business, and stacked up a

pile of student loans to do it. It had always been drummed into her that a

college degree was how you got a career instead of a job, how you earned

the big bucks. And then she graduated and couldn't find a decent job

anywhere. How glad she had been to get the offer from Lambeck Manufacturing.

Sure, it was humiliating to accept a secretarial position, but Mr. Cartright

had said how eager they were to have her, and taking the secretarial job

would put her on the spot when the next non-administrative position

opened up. 

Two months later she heard that one of Cartright's junior product

managers was leaving. She could hardly sleep that night, imagining

herself on the fifth floor, in an office with a door, attending meetings and

making decisions. 

The next morning she went first thing to see Mr. Cartright. He said they

felt she needed to learn more about the industry before she was ready for a

professional position. And then they went and hired an amateur from

outside the company who knew less about the industry than she did. It was about then that it began to dawn on her: The company had plenty of

women, but they were almost all secretaries. They weren't going to give

her a management job. Ever. Payback 

It took her almost a week to figure out how she was going to pay them

back. About a month earlier a guy from an industry trade magazine had

tried to hit on her when he came in for the new product launch. A few

weeks later he called her up at work and said if she would send him some

advance information on the Cobra 273 product, he'd send her flowers, and

if it was really hot information that he used in the magazine, he'd make a

special trip in from Chicago just to take her out to dinner. She had been in young Mr. Johannson's office one day shortly after that

when he logged onto the corporate network. Without thinking, she had

watched his fingers (shoulder surfing, this is sometimes called). He had

entered "marty63" as his password. Her plan was beginning to come together. There was a memo she

remembered typing not long after she came to the company. She found a

copy in the files and typed up a new version, using language from the

original  one. Her version read: TO: C. Pelton, IT dept. 

FROM: L. Cartright, Development 

Martin Johansson will be working with a special projects team in my

department. I hereby authorize him to have access to the servers used by the

engineering group. Mr. Johansson's security profile is to be updated to

grant him the same access rights as a product developer. Louis Cartright LINGO

SHOULDER SURFING The act of watching a person type at his

computer keyboard to detect and steal his password or other user

information.

When most everybody was gone at lunch, she cut Mr. Cartright's

signature from the original memo, pasted it onto her new version, and

daubed Wite-Out around the edges. She made a copy of the result, and

then made a copy of the copy. You could barely see the edges around the

signature. She sent the fax from the machine "near Mr. Cartright's office. Three days later, she stayed after hours and waited till everyone left. She

walked into Johannson's office, and tried logging onto the network with

his username and the password, marry63. It worked. In minutes she had located the product specification files for the Cobra

273, and downloaded them to a Zip disk. The disk was safely in her purse as she walked in the cool night-time

breeze to the parking lot. It would be on its way to the reporter that night. Analyzing the Con 

A disgruntled employee, a search through the files, a quick cut-paste-and

Wite-Out operation, a little creative copying, and a fax. And, voila!--she

has access to confidential marketing and product specifications.   And a few days later, a trade magazine journalist has a big scoop with the

specs and marketing plans of a hot new product that will be in the hands

of magazine subscribers throughout the industry months in 

advance of the product's release. Competitor companies will have several

months head start on developing equivalent products and having their ad

campaigns ready to undermine the Cobra 273. Naturally the magazine will never say where they got the scoop. PREVENTING THE CON 

When asked for any valuable, sensitive, or critical information that could

be of benefit to a competitor or anyone else, employees must be aware

that using caller ID as a means of verifying the identity of an outside

caller is not acceptable. Some other means of verification must be used,

such as checking with the person's supervisor that the request was

appropriate and that the user has authorization to receive the information. The verification process requires a balancing act that each Company must

define for itself: Security versus productivity. What priority is going to be

assigned to enforcing security measures? Will employees be resistant to

following security procedures, and even circumvent them in order to

complete their job responsibilities? Do employees understand why

security is important to the company and themselves? These questions

need to  

be answered to develop a security policy based on corporate culture and

business needs.Most people inevitably see anything that interferes with getting their work

done as an annoyance, and may circumvent any security measures that

appear to be a waste of time. Motivating employees to make security part

of their everyday responsibilities through education and awareness is key.Although caller ID service should never be used as a means of

authentication for voice calls from outside the company, another method

called automatic number identification (ANI) can. This service is

provided when a company subscribes to toll-flee services where the

company pays for the incoming calls and is reliable for identification.

Unlike caller ID, the telephone company switch does not use any

information that is sent from a customer when providing the calling

number. The number transmitted by ANI is the billing number assigned to

the calling party.Note that several modem manufacturers have added a caller ID feature

into their products, protecting the corporate network by allowing remote-

access calls only from a list ofpreauthorized telephone numbers. Caller ID

modems are an acceptable means of authentication in a low-security

environment but, as should be clear by now, spoofing caller ID is a

relatively easy technique for computer intruders, and so should not be

relied on for proving the caller's identity or location in a high-security

setting.To address the case of identity theft, as in the story about deceiving an

administrator to create a voice mailbox on the corporate phone system,

make it a policy that all phone service, all voice mailboxes, and all entries

to the corporate directory, both in print and on line, must be requested in

writing, on a form provided for the purpose. The employee's manager

should sign the request, and the voice mail administrator should verify the

signature.Corporate security policy should require that new computer accounts or

increases in access rights be granted only after positive verification of the

person making the request, such as a callback to the system manager or

administrator, or his or her designee, at the phone number listed in the

print or on-line company directory. If the company uses secure email

where employees can digitally sign messages, this alternative verification

method may also be acceptable.Remember that every employee, regardless of whether he has access to

company computer systems, may be duped by a social engineer. Everyone

must be included in security awareness training. Administrative assistants,

 

receptionists, telephone operators, and security guards must be made

familiar with the types of social engineering attack most likely to be

directed against them so that they will be better prepared to defend against

those attacks. 

Chapter 14

Industrial Espionage

The threat of information attacks against government, corporations, and

university systems is well established. Almost every day, the media

reports a new computer virus, denial of service attack, or theft of credit

card information from an e-commerce Web site.We read about cases of industrial espionage such as Borland accusing

Symantec of stealing trade secrets, Cadence Design Systems filing a suit

charging the theft of source code by a competitor. Many business people

read these stories and think it could never happen at their company.

It's happening every day.VARIATION ON A SCHEME

The ruse described in the following tale has probably been pulled off

many times, even though it sounds like something taken out of a

Hollywood movie like The Insider, or from the pages of a John Grisham

novel.Class Action

Imagine that a massive class-action lawsuit is raging against a major

pharmaceutical company, Pharmomedic. The suit claims that they knew

one of their very popular drugs had a devastating side effect, but one that

would not be evident until a patient had been on the medication for years.

The suit alleges that they had results from a number of research studies

that revealed this danger, but suppressed the evidence and never turned it

over to the FDA as required. 

William ("Billy") Chaney, the attorney of record on the masthead of the

New York law firm that filed the class-action suit, has depositions from

two Pharmomedic doctors supporting the claim. But both are retired,

neither has any files or documentation, and neither would make a strong,

convincing witness. Billy knows he's on shaky ground. Unless he can get

a copy of one of those reports, or some internal memo or communication

between company executives, his whole case will fall apart.So he hires a firm he's used before: Andreeson and Sons, private

investigators. Billy doesn't know how Pete and his people get the stuff

they do, and he doesn't want to know. All he knows is that Pete

Andreeson is one good investigator.To Andreeson, an assignment like this is what he calls a black bag job.

The first rule is that the law firms and companies that hire him never learn

how he gets his information so that they always have complete, plausible

deniability. If anybody is going to have his feet shoved into boiling water,

it's going to be Pete, and for what he collects in fees on the big jobs, he

figures it's worth the risk. Besides, he gets such personal satisfaction from

outsmarting smart people.If the documents that Chaney wants him to find actually existed and

haven't been destroyed, they'll be somewhere in the files of Pharmomedic.

But finding them in the massive files of a large corporation would be a

huge task. On the other hand, suppose they've turned copies over to their

law firm, Jenkins and Petry? If the defense attorneys knew those

documents existed and didn't turn them over as part of the discovery

process, then they have violated the legal profession's canon of ethics, and

violated the law, as well. In Pete's book, that makes any attack fair game.Pete's Attack

Pete gets a couple of his people started on research and within days he

knows what company Jenkins and Petty uses for storing their offsite

backups. And he knows that the storage company maintains a list of the

names of people whom the law firm has authorized to pick up tapes from

storage. He also knows that each of these people has his or her own

password. Pete sends two of his people out on a black bag job.The men tackle the lock using a lock pick gun ordered on the Web at

www.southord.com. Within several minutes they slip into the offices of

the storage firm around 3 a.m. one night and boot up a PC. They smile

when they see the Windows 98 logo because it means this will be a piece

of cake. Windows 98 does not require any form of authentication. After a

 

bit of searching, they locate a Microsoft Access database with the names

of people authorized by each of the storage company customers to pick up

tapes. They add a phony name to the authorization list for Jenkins and

Petry, a name matching one on a phony driver's license one of the men

has already obtained. Could they have broken into the locked storage area

and tried to locate the tapes their client wanted? Sure--but then all the

company's customers, including the law firm, would have certainly been

notified of the breach. And the attackers would have lost an advantage:

Professionals always like to leave an opening for future access, should the

need arise. Following a standard practice of industrial spies to keep something in the

back pocket for future use, just in case, they also made a copy of the file

containing the authorization list onto a floppy disk. None of them had any

idea how it might ever prove useful, but it's just one of those "We're here,

we might just as well" things that every now and then turns out to be

valuable. The next day, one of the same men called the storage company, used the

name they had added to the authorization list, and gave the corresponding

password. He asked for all the Jenkins and Petry tapes dated within the

last month, and said that a messenger service would come by to pick up

the package. By mid-afternoon, Andreeson had the tapes. His people

restored all the data to their own computer system, ready to search at

leisure. Andreeson was very pleased that the law firm, like most other

businesses, didn't bother encrypting their backup data. The tapes were delivered back to the storage company the next day and no

one was the wiser. MITNICK MESSAGE

Valuable information must be protected no matter what form it takes or

where it is located. An organization's customer list has the same value

whether in hardcopy  form or an electronic file at your office or in a

storage box. Social engineers always prefer the easiest to circumvent,

least defended point of attack. A company's offsite backup storage facility

is seen as having less risk of detection or getting caught. Every

organization that stores any valuable, sensitive, or critical data with third

parties should encrypt their data to protect its confidentiality.Analyzing the Con 

Because of lax physical security, the bad guys were easily able to pick the

lock of the storage company, gain access to the computer, and modify the 

database containing the list of people authorized to have access to the

storage unit. Adding a name to the list allowed the imposters to obtain the

computer backup tapes they were after, without having to break into the

firm's storage unit. Because most businesses don't encrypt backup data,

the information was theirs for the taking. This incident provides one more example of how a vendor company that

does not exercise reasonable security precautions can make it easy for an

attacker to compromise their customer's information assets. THE NEW BUSINESS PARTNER 

Social engineers have a big advantage over con men and grifters, and the

advantage is distance. A grifter can only cheat you by being in your

presence, allowing you to give a good description of him afterward or

even call the cops if you catch on to the ruse early enough. Social engineers ordinarily avoid that risk like the plague. Sometimes,

though, the risk is necessary, and justified by the potential reward. Jessica's Story 

Jessica Andover was feeling very good about getting a job with a hotshot

robotics company. Sure, it was only a start-up and they couldn't pay very

much, but it was small, the people were friendly, and there was the

excitement of knowing her stock options just might turn out to make her

rich. Okay, maybe not a millionaire like the company founders would be,

but rich enough. Which was how it happened that Rick Daggot got a glowing smile when

he walked into the lobby that Tuesday morning in August. In his

expensive- looking suit (Armani) and his heavy gold wrist-watch (a Rolex

President), with his immaculate haircut, he had that same manly, self-

confident air that had driven all the girls crazy when Jessica was in high

school. "Hi," he said. "I'm Rick Daggot and I'm here for my meeting with Larry." Jessica's smile faded. "Larry?" she said. "Larry's on vacation all week." "I

have an appointment with him at one o'clock. I just flew in from

Louisville to meet with him," Rick said, as he drew out his Palm, turned it

on, and showed her. 

She looked at it and gave a small shake of her head. "The 20th," she said.

"That's next week." He took the palmtop back and stared at it. "Oh, no!"

he groaned. "I can't believe what a stupid mistake I made." 

"Can I book a return flight for you, at least?" she asked, feeling sorry for 

him. While she made the phone call, Rick confided that he and Larry had

arranged to set up a strategic marketing alliance. Rick's company was

producing products for the manufacturing and assembly line, items that

would perfectly complement their new product, the C2Alpha. Rick's

products and the C2Alpha together would make a strong solution that

would open up important industrial markets for both companies. When Jessica had finished making his reservation on a late afternoon

flight, Rick said, "Well, at least I could talk to Steve if he's available." But

Steve, the company's VP and cofounder, was also out of the office. Rick, being very friendly to Jessica and flirting just a little, then suggested

that, as long as he was there and his flight home wasn't till late afternoon,

he'd like to take some of the key people to lunch. And he added,

"Including you, of course--is there somebody who can fill in for you at

lunchtime. Flushed at the idea of being included, Jessica asked, "Who do you wantto come?" He tapped his palmtop again and named a few people--two

engineers from R&D, the new sales and marketing man, and the finance

guy assigned to the project. Rick suggested she tell them about his

relationship with the company, and that he'd like to introduce himself to

them. He named the best restaurant in the area, a place where Jessica had

always wanted to go, and said he'd book the table himself, for 12:30, and

would call back later in the morning to make sure everything was all set. When  they gathered at the restaurant--the four of them plus Jessica their

table wasn't ready yet, so they settled at the bar, and Rick made it   clear

that drinks and lunch were on him. Rick was a man with style and  class,

the kind of person who makes you feel comfortable from the very first,

the same way you feel with someone you've known for years. He always

seemed to know just the right thing to say, had a lively remark or

something funny whenever the conversation lagged, and made you feel

good just being around him. He shared just enough details about his own company's products that they

could envision the joint marketing solution he seemed so animated about.

He named several Fortune 500 companies that his firm was already

selling to, until everyone at the table began to picture their product

becoming a success from the day the first units rolled out of the factory. Then Rick walked over to Brian, one of the engineers. While the others

chatted among themselves, Rick shared some ideas privately with Brian,

and drew him out about the unique features of the C2Alpha and what set 

 

it apart from anything the competition had. He found out about a coupleof features the company was downplaying that Brian was proud of and

thought really "neat." Rick worked his way along the line, chatting quietly with each. The

marketing guy was happy for a chance to talk about the roll-out date and

marketing plans. And the bean counter pulled an envelope from his pocket

and wrote down details of the material and manufacturing costs, price

point and expected margin, and what kind of deal he was trying to work

out with each of the vendors, which he listed by name. By the time their table was ready, Rick had exchanged ideas with

everybody  and had won admirers all along the line. By the end of the

meal, they each shook hands with Rick in turn and thanked him. Rick swapped business cards with each and mentioned in passing to Brian, theengineer, that he wanted to have a longer discussion as soon as Larry

returned. The following day Brian picked up his telephone to find that the caller

was Rick, who said he had just finished speaking with Larry. I'll be

coming  back in on Monday to work out some of the specifics with him,"

Rick said, "and he wants me to be up to speed on your product. He said

you should email the latest designs and specs to him. He'll pick out the

parts he wants me to have and forward them on to me." The engineer said that would be fine. Good, Rick answered. He went on,

"Larry wanted you to know he's having a problem retrieving his email.

Instead of sending the stuff to his regular account, he arranged with the

hotel's business center to set up a Yahoo mail account for him. He says

you should send the files to larryrobotics@yahoo.com." The following Monday morning, when Larry walked into the office

looking tanned and relaxed, Jessica was primed and eager to gush over

Rick. "What a great guy. He took a bunch of us to lunch, even me." Larry

looked confused. "Rick? Who the hell is Rick?" "What're you talking about?--your new business partner." "What!!!???" "And everybody was so impressed with what good questions he asked." "I

don't know any Rick ..." 

"What's the matter with you? Is this a joke, Larry--you're just fooling with

me, right?" "Get the executive team into the conference room. Like now. No matter

what they're doing. And everybody who was at that lunch. Including you." 

They sat around the table in a somber mood, hardly speaking. Larry

walked in, sat down and said, "I do not know anybody named Rick. I do

not have a new business partner I've been keeping secret from all of you.

Which I would have thought was obvious. If there's a practical ,joker in

our midst, I want him to speak up now." Not a sound. The room seemed to be growing darker moment by moment.Finally Brian spoke. "Why didn't you say something when I sent you 

that email with the product specs and source code?" "What email! ?" Brian stiffened. "Oh... shit!" Cliff, the other engineer, chimed in. "He gave us all business cards. We

just need to call him and see what the bell's going on." Brian pulled out his palmtop, called up an entry, and scooted the device 

across the table to Larry. Still hoping against hope, they all watched as if

entranced while Larry dialed. After a moment, he stabbed the

speakerphone button and everyone heard a busy signal. After trying the

number several times over a period of twenty minutes, a frustrated Larry

dialed the operator to ask for an emergency interruption. A few moments later, the operator came back on the line. She said in a

challenging tone, "Sir, where did you get this number?" Larry told her it

was on the business card of a man he needed to contact urgently. The

operator, said, "I'm sorry. That's a phone company test number. It always

rings busy." Larry started making a list of what information had been shared with 

Rick. The picture was not pretty. Two police detectives came and took a report. After listening to the story,

they pointed out that no state crime had been committed; there was

nothing they could do. They advised Larry to contact the FBI because

they have jurisdiction over any crimes involving interstate commerce.

When Rick Daggot asked the engineer to forward the test results by

misrepresenting himself, he may have committed a federal crime, but

Rick would have to speak with the FBI to find out. 

Three months later Larry was in his kitchen reading the morning paper

over breakfast, and almost spilled his coffee. The thing he had been

dreading since he had first heard about Rick had come true, his worst

nightmare. There it was in black and white, on the front page of the

business section: A company he'd never heard of was announcing the

release of a new product that sounded exactly like the C2Alpha his

company had been developing for the past two years.  

Through deceit, these people had beaten him to market. His dream was

destroyed. The millions of dollars invested in research and development

wasted. And he probably couldn't prove a single thing against them.Sammy Sanford's Story

Smart enough to be earning a big salary at a legitimate job, but crooked

enough to prefer making a living as a con man, Sammy Sanford had done

very well for himself. In time he came to the attention of a spy who had

been forced into early retirement because of a drinking problem; bitter

and revengeful, the man had found a way of selling the talents that the

government had made him an expert in. Always on the lookout for people

he could use, he had spotted Sammy the first time they met. Sammy had

found it easy, and very profitable, to shift his focus from lifting people's

money to lifting company secrets.Most people wouldn't have the guts to do what I do. Try to cheat people

over the telephone or over the Internet and nobody ever gets to see you.

But any good con man, the old-fashioned, face-to-face kind (and there are

plenty of them still around, more than you would think) can look you in

the eye, tell you a whopper, and get you to believe it. I've known a

prosecutor or two who think that's criminal. I think it's a talent.But you can't go walking in blind, you have to size things up first. A street

con, you can take a man's temperature with a little friendly conversation

and couple of carefully worded suggestions. Get the right responses and

Bingo!--you've bagged a pigeon.A company job is more like what we call a big con. You've got setup to

do. Find out what their buttons are, find out what they want. What they

need. Plan an attack. Be patient, do your homework. Figure out the role

you're going to play and learn your lines. And don't walk in the door until

you're ready.I spent better than three weeks getting up to speed for this one. The client

gave me a two-day session in what I should say "my" company did and

how to describe why it was going to be such a good joint marketing

alliance.Then I got lucky. I called the company and said I was from a venture

capital firm and we were interested in setting up a meeting and I was

juggling schedules to find a time when all of our partners would be

available sometime in the next couple of months, and was there any time

slot I 

should avoid, any period when Larry wasn't going to be in town? And she

said, Yes, he hadn't had any time off in the two years since they started

the company but his wife was dragging him away on a golf vacation the

first week in August.That was only two weeks away. I could wait.Meanwhile an industry magazine gave me the name of the firm's PR

company. I said I liked the amount of space they were getting for their

robotics company client and I wanted to talk to whoever was handling that

account about handling my company. It turned out to be an energetic

young lady who liked the idea she might be able to bring in a new

account. Over a pricey lunch with one more drink than she really wanted,

she did her best to convince me they were oh, so good at understanding a

client's problems and finding the right PR solutions. I played hard to

convince. I needed some details. With a little prodding, by the time the

plates were being cleared she had told me more about the new product

and the company's problems than I could have hoped for.The thing went like clockwork. The story about being so embarrassed that

the meeting was next week but I might as well meet the team as long as

I'm here, the receptionist swallowed whole. She even felt sorry for me

into the bargain. The lunch set me back all of $150. With tip. And I had

what I needed. Phone numbers, job titles, and one very key guy who

believed I was who I said I was.Brian had me fooled, I admit. He seemed like the kind of guy who'd just

email me anything I asked for. But he sounded like he was holding back a

little when I brought up the subject. It pays to expect the unexpected. That

email account in Larry's name, I had it in my back pocket just in case. The

Yahoo security people are probably still sitting there waiting for

somebody to use the account again so they can trace him. They'll have a

long wait. The fat lady has sung. I'm off on another project.Analyzing the Con

Anyone who works a face-to-face con has to cloak himself in a look that

will make him acceptable to the mark. He'll put himself together one way

to appear at the race track, another to appear at a local watering hole, still

another for an upscale bar at a fancy hotel.

It's the same way with industrial espionage. An attack may call for a suit

and tie and an expensive briefcase if the spy is posing as an executive of

an established firm, a consultant, or a sales rep. On another job, trying to 

pass as a software engineer, a technical person, or someone from the mail

room, the clothes, the uniform--the whole look would be different.For infiltrating the company, the man who called himself Rick Daggot

knew he had to project an image of confidence and competence, backed

by a thorough knowledge of the company's product and industry.Not much difficulty laying his hands on the information he needed in

advance. He devised an easy ruse to find out when the CEO would be

away. A small challenge, but still not very tough, was finding out enough

details about the project that he could sound "on the inside" about what

they were doing. Often this information is known to various company

suppliers, as well as investors, venture capitalists they've approached

about raising money, their banker, and their law firm. The attacker has to

take care, though: Finding someone who will part with insider knowledge

can be tricky, but trying two or three sources to turn up someone who can

be squeezed for information runs the risk that people will catch on to the

game. That way lies danger. The Rick Daggots of the world need to pick

carefully and tread each information path only once.The lunch was another sticky proposition. First there was the problem of

arranging things so he'd have a few minutes alone with each person, out

of earshot of the others. He told Jessica 12:30 but booked the table for 1

P.M., at an upscale, expense-account type of restaurant. He hoped that

would mean they'd have to have drinks at the bar, which is exactly what

happened. A perfect opportunity to move around and chat with each

individual.Still, there were so many ways that a misstep--a wrong answer or a

careless remark could reveal Rick to be an imposter. Only a supremely

confident and wily industrial spy would dare take a chance of exposing

himself that way. But years of working the streets as a confidence man

had built Rick's abilities and given him the confidence that, even if he

made a slip, he'd be able to cover it up well enough to quiet any

suspicions. This was the most challenging, most dangerous time of the

entire operation, and the elation he felt at bringing off a sting like this

made him realize why he didn't have to drive fast cars or skydive or cheat

on his wife--he got plenty of excitement just doing his job. How many

people, he wondered, could say as much?

 

 MITNICK MESSAGEWhile most social engineering attacks occur over the telephone or email,

don't assume that a bold attacker will never appear in person at your

business. In most cases, the imposter uses some form of social

engineering to gain access to a building after counterfeiting an employee

badge using a commonly available software program such as Photoshop.

What about the business cards with the phone company test line? The

television show The Rockford Files, which was a series about a private

investigator, illustrated a clever and somewhat humorous technique.

Rockford (played by actor James Garner) had a portable business card

printing machine in his car, which he used to print out a card appropriate

to whatever the occasion called for. These days, a social engineer can get

business cards printed in an hour at any copy store, or print them on a

laser printer.NOTE

John Le Carre, author of The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, A Perfect

Spy, and many other remarkable books, grew up as the son of a polished,

engaging lifelong can man. Le Carre was struck as a youngster to discover

that, successful as his father was in deceiving other, he was also gullible, a

victim more than once to another con man or woman. Which just goes to

show that everyone is at risk of being taken in by a social engineer, even

another social engineer.What leads a group of smart men and women to accept an imposter? We

size up a situation by both instinct and intellect. If the story adds up--

that's the intellect part--and a con man manages to project a believable

image, we're usually willing to let down our guard. It's the believable

image that separates a successful con man or social engineer from one

who quickly lands behind bars. Ask yourself: How sure am I that I would never fall for a story like

Rick's? If you're sure you wouldn't, ask yourself whether anyone has ever

put anything over on you. If the answer to this second question is yes, it's

probably the correct answer to the first question, as well. LEAPFROG 

A challenge: The following story does not involve industrial espionage.

As you read it, see if you can understand why I decided to put it in this

chapter! 

Harry Tardy was back living at home, and he was bitter. The Marine

Corps had seemed like a great escape until he washed out of boot camp.

Now he had returned to the hometown he hated, was taking computer

courses at the local community college," and looking for a way to strike

out at the world. 

Finally he hit upon a plan. Over beers with a guy in one of his classes,

he'd been complaining about their instructor, a sarcastic know-it-all, and

together they cooked up a wicked scheme to burn the guy: They'd grab  

the source code for a popular personal digital assistant (PDA) and have it

sent to the instructor's computer, and make sure to leave a trail so the

company would think the instructor was the bad guy.The new friend, Karl Alexander, said he "knew a few tricks" and would

tell Harry how to bring this off. Arid get away with it.Doing Their Homework

A little initial research showed Harry that the product had been

engineered at the Development Center located at the PDA manufacturer's

headquarters overseas. But there was also an R&D facility in the United

States. That was good, Karl pointed out, because for the attempt to work

there had to be some company facility in the United States that also

needed access to the source code.At that point Harry was ready to call the overseas Development Center.

Here's where a plea for sympathy came in, the "Oh, dear, I'm in trouble, I

need help, please, please, help me." Naturally the plea was a little more

subtle than that. Karl wrote out a script, but Harry sounded completely

phony trying to read it. In the end, he practiced with Karl so he could say

what he needed to in a conversational tone.What Harry finally said, with Karl sitting by his side, went something like

this:"I'm calling from R&D Minneapolis. Our server had a worm that infected

the whole department. We had to install the operating system again and

then when we went to restore from backup, none of the backups was any

good. Guess who was supposed to be checking the integrity of the

backups? Yours truly. So I'm getting yelled at by my boss, and

management is up in arms that we've lost the data. Look, I need to have

the latest revision of the source-code tree as quick as you can. I need you

to gzip the source code and send it to me."At this point Karl scribbled him a note, and Harry told the man on the

other end of the phone that he just wanted him to transfer the file

internally, to Minneapolis R&D. This was highly important: When the

man on the other end of the phone was clear that he was just being asked

to send the file to another part of the company, his mind was at ease--what

could be wrong with that?

LINGO

GZIP To archive files in a single compressed file using a Linux GNU

utility. 

He agreed to gzip and send it. Step by step, with Karl at his elbow, Harry

talked the man there through getting started on the procedure for

compressing the huge source code into a single, compact file. He also

gave him a file name to use on the compressed file, "newdata," explaining

that this name would avoid any confusion with their old, corrupted files.Karl had to explain the next step twice before Harry got it, but it was

central to the little game of leapfrog Karl had dreamed up. Harry was to

call R&D Minneapolis and tell somebody there "I want to send a file to

you, and then I want you to send it somewhere else for me"—of course all

dressed up with reasons that would make it all sound plausible. What

confused Harry was this: He was supposed to say "I’m going to send you

a file," when it wasn't going to be Harry sending the file at all. He had to

make the guy he was talking to at the R&D Center think the file was

coming from him, when what the Center was really going to receive was

the file of proprietary source code from Europe. "Why would I tell him it's

coming from me when it's really coming from overseas?" Harry wanted to

know."The guy at the R&D Center is the linchpin," Karl explained. "He's got to

think he's just doing a favor for a fellow employee here in the U.S.,

getting a file from you and then just forwarding it for you."Harry finally understood. He called the R&D Center, where he asked the

receptionist to connect him to the Computer Center, where he asked to

speak to a computer operator. A guy came on the line who sounded as

young as Harry himself. Harry greeted him, explained he was calling from

the Chicago fabricating division of the company and that he had this file

he'd been trying to send to one of their partners working on a project with

them, but, he said, "We've got this router problem and can't reach their

network. I'd like to transfer the file to you, and after you receive it, I'll

phone you so I can walk you through transferring it to the partner's

computer.So far, so good. Harry then asked the young man whether his computer

center had an anonymous FTP account, a setup that allows anyone to

transfer files in and out of a directory where no password is required. Yes,

an anonymous FTP was available, and he gave Harry the internal Internet

Protocol (IP) address for reaching it.LINGO

ANONYMOUS FTP A program that provides access to a remote

computer even though you don’t have an account by using the File

Transfer protocol (FTP). Although anonymous FTP can be accessed

without a password, generally user-access rights to certain folders are

restricted.

 

 With that information in hand, Harry called back the Development Center

overseas. By now the compressed file was ready, and Harry gave the

instructions for transferring the file to the anonymous FTP site. In less

than five minutes, the compressed source-code file was sent to the kid at

the R&D Center. Setting Up the Victim 

Halfway to the goal. Now Harry and Karl had to wait to make sure the file

had arrived before proceeding. During the wait, they walked across the

room to the instructor's desk and took care of two other necessary steps.

They first set up an anonymous FTP server on his machine, which would

serve as a destination for the file in the last leg of their scheme. The second step provided a solution for an otherwise tricky problem.

Clearly they couldn't tell their man at the R&D Center to send the file to

an address such as, say, warren@rms.ca.edu. The ".edu" domain would be

a dead giveaway, since any half-awake computer guy would recognize it

as the address of a school, immediately blowing the whole operation. To

avoid this, they went into Windows on the instructor's computer and

looked up the machine's IP address, which they would give as the address

for sending the file. By then it was time to call back the computer operator at the R&D Center.

Harry got him on the phone and said, "I just transferred the file that I

talked to you about. Can you check that you received it "

Yes, it had arrived. Harry then asked him to try forwarding it, and gave

him the IP address. He stayed on the phone while the young man made

the connection and started transmitting the file, and they watched with big

grins from across the room as the light on the hard drive of the instructor's

computer blinked and blinked--busy receiving the download. Harry exchanged a couple of remarks with the guy about how maybe one

day computers and peripherals would be more reliable, thanked him and

said goodbye. The two copied the file from the instructor's machine onto a pair of Zip

disks, one for each of them, just so they could look at it later, like stealing

a painting from a museum that you can enjoy yourself but don't dare show

to your friends. Except, in this case, it was more like they had taken a

duplicate original of the painting, and the museum still had their own

original. 

Karl then talked Harry through the steps of removing the FTP server from

the instructor's machine, and erasing the audit trail so there would be no

evidence of what they had done--only the stolen file, left where it could be

located easily. As a final step, they posted a section of the source code on Usenet directly

from the instructor's computer. Only a section, so they wouldn't do any

great damage to the company, but leaving clear tracks directly back to the

instructor. He would have some difficult explaining to do. Analyzing the Con 

Although it took the combination of a number of elements to make this

escapade work, it could not have succeeded without some skill-ful

playacting of an appeal for sympathy and help: I'm getting yelled at by my

boss, and management is up in arms, and so on. That, combined with a

pointed explanation of how the man on the other end of the phone could

help solve the problem, proved to be a powerfully convincing con. It

worked here, and has worked many other times. The second crucial element: The man who understood the value of the file

was asked to send it to an address within the company. And the third piece of the puzzle: The computer operator could see that

the file had been transferred to him from within the company. That could

only mean--or so it seemed--that the man who sent it to him could himself

have sent it on to the final destination if only his external network

connection had been working. What could possibly be wrong with helping

him out by sending it for him? But what about having the compressed file assigned a different name?

Seemingly a small item, but an important one. The attacker couldn't afford

taking a chance of the file arriving with a name identifying it as source

code, or a name related to the product. A request to send a file with a

name like that outside the company might have set off alarm bells. Having

the file re-labeled with an innocuous name was crucial. As worked out by

the attackers, the second young man had no qualms about sending the file

outside the company; a file with a name like new data, giving no clue as

to the true nature of the information, would hardly make him suspicious. MITNICK MESSGAE

The underlying rule that every employee should have firmly planted in his

or her brain: Except with management approval, don't transfer files to

people you don't personally know, even if the destination appears to be

within your company's internal network. 

 Finally, did you figure out what this story is doing in a chapter onindustrial espionage? If not, here's the answer: What these two students

did as a malicious prank could just as easily have been done by a

professional industrial spy, perhaps in the pay of a competitor, or perhaps

in the pay of a foreign government. Either way, the damage could have

been devastating to the company, severely eroding the sales of their new

product once the competitive product reached the market. How easily could the same type of attack be carried out against your

company? PREVENTING THE CON 

Industrial espionage, which has long been a challenge to businesses, has

now become the bread and butter of traditional spies who have focused

their efforts on obtaining company secrets for a price, now that the Cold

War has ended. Foreign governments and corporations are now using

freelance industrial spies to steal information. Domestic companies also

hire information brokers who cross the line in their efforts to obtain

competitive intelligence. In many cases these are former military spies

turned industrial information brokers who have the prerequisite

knowledge and experience to easily exploit organizations, especially those

that have failed to deploy safeguards to protect their information and

educate their people. Safety Off-Site 

What could have helped the company that ran into problems with their

off-site storage facility? The danger here could have been avoided if the

company had been encrypting their data. Yes, encryption requires extra

time and expense, but it's well worth the effort. Encrypted files need to be

spot-checked regularly to be sure that the encryption/decryption is

working smoothly. There's always the danger that the encryption keys will be lost or that the

only person who knows the keys will be hit by a bus. But the nuisance

level can be minimized, and anyone who stores sensitive information off-

site with a commercial firm and does not use encryption is, excuse me for

being blunt, an idiot. It's like walking down the street in a bad 

 

neighborhood with twenty-dollar bills sticking out of your pockets,

essentially  asking to be robbed. Leaving backup media where someone could walk off with it is a

common  flaw in security. Several years ago, I was employed at a firm

that could have made better efforts to protect client information. The

operation's  staff left the firm's backup tapes outside the locked computer

room door for a messenger to pick up each day. Anyone could have

walked off with the backup tapes, which contained all of the firm's word-

processed documents in unencrypted text. If backup data is encrypted,

loss of the material is a nuisance; if it's not encrypted--well, you can

envision the impact on your company better than I can. The need in larger companies for reliable offsite storage is pretty much a

given. But your company's security procedures need to include an

investigation  of your storage company to see how conscientious they are

about their own security policies and practices. If they're not as dedicated

as your own company, all your security efforts could be undermined. Smaller companies have a good alternate choice for backup: Send the new

and changed files each night to one of the companies offering online

storage. Again, it's essential that the data be encrypted. Otherwise, the

information is available not just to a bent employee at the storage

company but to every computer intruder who can breach the on-line

storage companys computer systems or network. And of course, when you set up an encryption system to protect the

security of your backup files, you must also set up a highly secure procedure  for storing the encryption keys or the pass phrases that unlock them.Secret keys used to encrypt data should be stored in a safe or vault.

Standard company practice needs to provide for the possibility that the

employee handling this data could suddenly leave, die, or take another

job. There must always be at least two people who know the storage place

and the encryption/decryption procedures, as well as the policies for how

and when keys are to be changed. The policies must also require that

encryption keys be changed immediately upon the departure of any 

employee who had access to them. Who Is That? 

The example in this chapter of a slick con artist who uses charm to get

employees to share information reinforces the importance of verification

of identity. The request to have source code forwarded to an FTP site also

points to the importance of knowing your requester.  

In Chapter 16 you will find specific policies for verifying the identity of

any stranger who makes a request for information or a request that some

action be taken. We've talked about the need for verification throughout

the book; in Chapter 16 you'll get specifics of how this should be done. Part 4

Raising the bar

Information Security Awareness and

Training 

A social engineer has been given the assignment of obtaining the plans to

your hot new product due for release in two months. What's going to stop him? Your firewall? No. Strong authentication devices? No. Intrusion detection systems? No.

Encryption? No. Limited access to phone numbers for dial-up modems? No. Code names for servers that make it difficult for an outsider to determine

which server might contain the product plans? No. The truth is that there is no technology in the world that can prevent a

social engineering attack. SECURITY THROUGH TECHNOLOGY, TRAINING, AND

PROCEDURES 

Companies that conduct security penetration tests report that their

attempts to break into client company computer systems by social

engineering methods are nearly 100 percent successful. Security

technologies can make these types of attacks more difficult by removing

people from the decision-making process. However the only truly

effective way to mitigate the threat of social engineering is through the

use of security technologies combined with security policies that set

ground rules for employee behavior, and appropriate education and

training for employees.  

There is only one way to keep your product plans safe and that is by

having a trained, aware, and a conscientious workforce. This involves

training on the policies and procedures, but also--and probably even more

important--an ongoing awareness program. Some authorities recommend

that 40 percent of a company's overall security budget be targeted to

awareness training.The first step is to make everyone in the enterprise aware that

unscrupulous people exist who will use deception to psychologically

manipulate them. Employees must be educated about what information

needs to be protected, and how to protect it. Once people have a better

understanding of how they can be manipulated, they are in a far better

position to recognize that an attack is underway.Security awareness also means educating everyone in the enterprise on the

company's security policies and procedures. As discussed in Chapter 17,

policies are necessary rules to guide employee behavior to protect

corporate information systems and sensitive information.This chapter and the next one provide a security blueprint that could save

you from costly attacks. If you don't have trained and alert employees

following well-thought-out procedures, it's not a matter of if, but when

you will lose valuable information to a social engineer. Don't wait for an

attack to happen to you before instituting these policies: It could be

devastating to your business and to your employees' welfare.UNDERSTANDING HOW ATTACKERS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF

HUMAN NATURE

To develop a successful training program, you have to understand why

people are vulnerable to attacks in the first place. By identifying these

tendencies in your training--for example, by drawing attention to them in

role-playing discussions--you can help your employees to understand why

we can all be manipulated by social engineers.Manipulation has been studied by social scientists for at least fifty years.

Robert B. Cialdini, writing in Scientific American (February 2001),

summarized this research, presenting six "basic tendencies of human

nature" that are involved in an attempt to obtain compliance to a request.

These six tendencies are those that social engineers rely on (consciously

or, most often, unconsciously) in their attempts to manipulate.

 

 

Authority

People have a tendency to comply when a request is made by a person in

authority. As discussed elsewhere in these pages, a person can be

convinced to comply with a request if he or she believes the requestor is a

person in authority or a person who is authorized to make such a request.In his book Influence, Dr. Cialdini writes of a study at three Midwestern

hospitals in which twenty-two separate nurses' stations were contacted by

a caller who claimed to be a hospital physician, and given instructions for

administering a prescription drug to a patient on the ward. The nurses who

received these instructions did not know the caller. They did not even

know whether he was really a doctor (he was not). They received the

instructions for the prescription by telephone, which was a violation of

hospital policy. The drug they were told to administer was not authorized

for use on the wards, and the dosage they were told to administer was

twice the maximum daily dosage, and thus could have endangered the life

of the patient. Yet in 95 percent of the cases, Cialdini reported, "the nurse

proceeded to obtain the necessary dosage from the ward medicine cabinet

and was on her way to administer it to the patient" before being

intercepted by an observer and told of the experiment.Examples of attacks: A social engineer attempts to cloak himself in the

mantle of authority by claiming that he is with the IT department, or that

he is an executive or works for an executive in the company.Liking

People have the tendency to comply when the person making a request

has been able to establish himself as likable, or as having similar interests,

beliefs, and attitudes as the victim.Examples of attacks: Through conversation, the attacker manages to

learn a hobby or interest of the victim, and claims an interest and

enthusiasm for the same hobby or interest. Or he may claim to be from the

same state or school, or to have similar goals. The social engineer will

also attempt to mimic the behaviors of his target to create the appearance

of similarity.Reciprocation

We may automatically comply with a request when we have been given or

promised something of value. The gift may be a material item, or advice,

 

 

or help. When someone has done something for you, you feel an

inclination to reciprocate. This strong tendency to reciprocate exists even

in situations where the person receiving the gift hasn't asked for it. One of

the most effective ways to influence people to do us a "favor" (comply

with a request) is by giving some gift r assistance that forms an

underlying obligation.Members of the Hare Krishna religious cult were very effective at

influencing people to donate to their cause by first giving them a book or

flower as a gift. If the recipient tried to return the gift, the giver would

refuse remarking, "It's our gift to you." This behavioral principle of

reciprocation was used by the Krishnas to substantially increase

donations.Examples of attacks: An employee receives a call from a person who

identifies himself as being from the IT department. The caller explains

that some company computers have been infected with a new virus not

recognized by the antivirus software that can destroy all files on a

computer, and offers to talk the person through some steps to prevent

problems. Following this, the caller asks the person to test a software

utility that has just been recently upgraded for allowing users to change

passwords. The employee is reluctant to refuse, because the caller has just

provided help that will supposedly protect the user from a virus. He

reciprocates by complying with the caller's request.Consistency

People have the tendency to comply after having made a public

commitment or endorsement for a cause. Once we have promised we will

do something, we don't want to appear untrustworthy or undesirable and

will tend to follow through in order to be consistent with our statement or

promise.Example of attack: The attacker contacts a relatively new employee and

advises her of the agreement to abide by certain security policies and

procedures as a condition of being allowed to use company information

systems. After discussing a few security practices, the caller asks the user

for her password "to verify compliance" with policy on choosing a

difficult-to-guess password. Once the user reveals her password, the caller

makes a recommendation to construct future passwords in such a way that

the attacker will be able to guess it. The victim complies because of her

prior agreement to abide by company policies and her assumption that the

caller is merely verifying her compliance.

 

 

Social Validation 

People have the tendency to comply when doing so appears to be in line

with what others are doing. The action of others is accepted as validation

that the behavior in question is the correct and appropriate action. Examples of attacks: The caller says he is conducting a survey and

names other people in the department who he claims have already

cooperated with him. The victim, believing that cooperation by others

validates the authenticity of the request, agrees to take part. The caller

then asks a series of questions, among which are questions that draw the

victim into revealing his computer username and password. Scarcity 

People have the tendency to comply when it is believed that the object

sought is in short supply and others are competing for it, or that it is

available only for a short period of time. Example of attack: The attacker sends emails claiming that the first 500

people to register at the company's new Web site will win free tickets to a

hot new movie. When an unsuspecting employee registers at the site, he is

asked to provide his company email address and to choose a password.

Many people, motivated by convenience, have the propensity to use the

same or a similar password on every computer system they use. Taking

advantage of this, the attacker then attempts to compromise the target's

work and home computer systems with the username and password that

have been entered during the Web site registration process. CREATING TRAINING AND AWARENESS PROGRAMS 

Issuing an information security policy pamphlet or directing employees to

an intranet page that details security policies will not, by itself, mitigate

your risk. Every business must not only define the rules with written

policies, but must make the extra effort to direct everyone who works

with corporate information or computer systems to learn and follow the

rules. Furthermore, you must ensure that everyone understands the reason

behind each policy so that people don't circumvent the rule as a matter of

convenience. Otherwise, ignorance will always be the worker's excuse,

and the precise vulnerability that social engineers will exploit. The central goal of any security awareness program is to influence people

to change their behavior and attitudes by motivating every employee 

 

 

to want to chip in and do his part to protect the organization's information

assets. A great motivator in this instance is to explain how their

participation will benefit not just the company, but the individual

employees as well. Since the company retains certain private information

about every worker, when employees do their part to protect information

or information systems, they are actually protecting their own

information, too. A security training program requires substantial support. The training

effort needs to reach every person who has access to sensitive information

or corporate computer systems, must be on-going, and must be

continuously revised to update personnel on new threats and

vulnerabilities. Employees must see that senior management is fully

committed to the program. That commitment must be real, not just a

rubber-stamped "We give our blessings" memo. And the program must be

backed up with sufficient resources to develop, communicate, test it, and

to measure success. Goals 

The basic guideline that should be kept in mind during development of an

information security training and awareness program is that the program

needs to focus on creating in all employees an awareness that their

company might be under attack at any time. They must learn that each

employee plays a role in defending against any attempt to gain entry to

computer systems or to steal sensitive data. Because many aspects of information security involve technology, it's too

easy for employees to think that the problem is being handled by firewalls

and other security technologies. A primary goal of training should be to

create awareness in each employee that they are the front line needed to

protect the overall security of the organization. Security training must have a significantly greater aim than simply

imparting rules. The training program designer must recognize the strong

temptation on the part of employees, under pressure of getting their jobs

done, to overlook or ignore their security responsibilities. Knowledge

about the tactics of social engineering and how to defend against the

attacks is important, but it will only be of value if the training is designed

to focus heavily on motivating employees to use the knowledge. 

The company can count the program as meeting its bottom-line goal if

everyone completing the training is thoroughly convinced and motivated

by one basic notion: that information security is part of his or her job. Employees must come to appreciate and accept that the threat of social

engineering attacks is real, and that a serious loss of sensitive corporate 

 

 

information could endanger the company as well as their own personal

information and jobs. In a sense, being careless about information security

at work is equivalent to being careless with one's ATM PIN or credit card

number. This can be a compelling analogy for building enthusiasm for

security practices. Establishing the Training and Awareness Program

The person responsible for designing the information security program

needs to recognize that this is not a one-size-fits-all project. Rather, the

training needs to be developed to suit the specific requirements of several

different groups within the enterprise. While many of the security policies

outlined in Chapter 16 apply to all employees across the board, many

others are unique. At a minimum, most companies will need training

programs tailored to these distinct groups: managers; IT personnel;

computer users; non-technical personnel; administrative assistants;

receptionists; and security guards. (See the breakdown of policies by job

assignment in Chapter 16.) Since the personnel of a company's industrial security force are not

ordinarily expected to be computer proficient, and, except perhaps in a

very limited way, do not come into contact with company computers, they

are not usually considered when designing training of this kind. However,

social engineers can deceive security guards or others into allowing them

into a building or office, or into performing an action that results in a

computer intrusion. While members of the guard force certainly don't

need the full training of personnel who operate or use computers,

nonetheless they must not be overlooked in the security awareness

program. Within the corporate world there are probably few subjects about which 

all employees need to be educated that are simultaneously as important

and as inherently dull as security. The best designed information security

training programs must both inform and capture the attention and

enthusiasm of the learners. The aim should be to make security information awareness and training 

an engaging and interactive experience. Techniques could include

demonstrating social engineering methods through role-playing;

reviewing media reports of recent attacks on other less fortunate

businesses and discussing the ways the companies could have prevented

the loss; or showing a security video that's entertaining and educational at

the same time. There are several security awareness companies that

market videos and related materials.  

NOTE

For those businesses that do not have the resources to develop a program

in-house, there are several training companies that offer security

awareness training services. Trade shows such as Secure World Expo

(www.secureworldexpo.com) are gathering places for these companiesThe stories in this book provide plenty of material to explain the methods

and tactics of social engineering, to raise awareness of the threat, and to

demonstrate the vulnerabilities in human behavior. Consider using their

scenarios as a basis for role-playing activities. The stories also offer

colorful opportunities for lively discussion on how the victims could have

responded differently to prevent the attacks from being successful.A skillful course developer and skillful trainers will find plenty of

challenges, but also plenty of opportunities, for keeping the classroom

time lively, and, in the process, motivate people to become part of the

solution.Structure of the Training

A basic security awareness training program should be developed that all

employees are required to attend. New employees should be required to

attend the training as part of their initial indoctrination. I recommend that

no employee be provided computer access until he has attended a basic

security awareness session.For this initial awareness and training, I suggest a session focused enough

to hold attention, and short enough that the important messages will be

remembered. While the amount of material to be covered certainly

justifies longer training, the importance of providing awareness and

motivation along with a reasonable number of essential messages in my

view outweighs any notion of half-day or full-day sessions that leave

people numb with too much information.The emphasis of these sessions should be on conveying an appreciation of

the harm that can be done to the company, and to employees individually,

unless all employees follow good security work habits. More important

than learning about specific security practices is the motivation that leads

employees to accept personal responsibility for security.

In situations where some employees cannot readily attend classroom

sessions, the company should consider developing awareness training

using other forms of instruction, such as videos, computer-based training,

online courses, or written materials. 

After the initial short training session, longer sessions should be designed

to educate employees about specific vulnerabilities and attack techniques

relative to their position in the company. Refresher training should be

required at least once a year. The nature of the threat and the methods

used to exploit people are ever-changing, so the content of the program

should be kept up to date. Moreover, people's awareness and alertness

diminish over time, so training must be repeated at reasonable intervals to

reinforce security principles. Here again the emphasis needs to be as much

on keeping employees convinced of the importance of security policies

and motivated to adhere to them, as on exposing specific threats and

social engineering methods. Managers must allow reasonable time for their subordinates to become

familiar with security policies and procedures, and to participate in the

security awareness program. Employees should not be expected to study

security policies or attend security classes on their own time. New

employees should be given ample time to review security policies and

published security practices prior to beginning their job responsibilities. Employees who change positions within the organization to a job that

involves access to sensitive information or computer systems should, of

course, be required to complete a security training program tailored to

their new responsibilities. For example, when a computer operator

becomes a systems administrator, or a receptionist becomes an

administrative assistant, new training is required. Training Course Contents 

When reduced to their fundamentals, all social engineering attacks have

the same common element: deception. The victim is led to believe that the

attacker is a fellow employee or some other person who is authorized to

access sensitive information, or authorized to give the victim instructions

that involve taking actions with a computer or computer-related

equipment. Almost all of these attacks could be foiled if the targeted

employee simply follows two steps: Verify the identity of the person making the request: Is the person making

the request really who he claims to be? Verify whether the person is authorized: Does the person have the need to

know, or is he otherwise authorized to make this request? 

 

 

NOTE 

Because security awareness and training are never perfect, use security

technologies whenever possible to create a system of defense in depth.

This means that the security measure is provided by the technology rather

than by individual employees, for example, when the operating system is

configured to prevent employees from downloading software from the

Internet, or choosing a short, easily guessed password. If awareness training sessions could change behavior so that each

employee would always be consistent about testing any request against

these criteria, the risk associated with social engineering attacks would be

dramatically reduced. A practical information security awareness and training program that

addresses human behavior and social engineering aspects should include

the following: A description of how attackers use social engineering skills to deceivepeople. The methods used by social engineers to accomplish their objectives. How to recognize a possible social engineering attack. The procedure for handling a suspicious request. Where to report social engineering attempts or successful attacks. The importance of challenging anyone who makes a suspicious request,

regardless of the person's claimed position or importance. The fact that they should not implicitly trust others without proper

verification, even though their impulse is to give others the benefit of the

doubt. The importance of verifying the identity and authority of any person

making a request for information or action. (See "Verification and

Authorization Procedures," Chapter 16, for ways to verify identity.) 

Procedures for protecting sensitive information, including familiarity with

any data classification system. 

 

 

The location of the company's security policies and procedures, and their

importance to the protection of information and corporate information

systems. A summary of key security policies and an explanation of their meaning.

For example, every employee should be instructed in how to devise a

difficult-to-guess password. The obligation of every employee to comply with the policies, and the

consequences for non-compliance. Social engineering by definition involves some kind of human interaction.

An attacker will very frequently use a variety of communication methods

and technologies in attempting to achieve his or her goal. For this reason,

a well-rounded awareness program should attempt to cover some or all of

the following: Security policies related to computer and voice mail passwords. The procedure for disclosing sensitive information or materials. Email usage policy, including the safeguards to prevent malicious code

attacks including viruses, worms, and Trojan Horses. Physical security requirements such as wearing a badge. The responsibility to challenge people on the premises who aren't wearing

a badge. Best security practices of voice mail usage. How to determine the classification of information, and the proper

safeguards for protecting sensitive information. Proper disposal of sensitive documents and computer media that contain,

or have at any time in the past contained, confidential materials. Also, if the company plans to use penetration testing to determine the

effectiveness of defenses against social engineering attacks, a warning

should be given putting employees on notice of this practice. Let

employees know that at some time they may receive a phone call or other

communication using an attacker's techniques as part of such a test. Use

the results of those tests not to punish, bur to define the need for

additional training in some areas. Details concerning all of the above items will be found in Chapter 16. 

 

 

TESTING

Your company may want to test employees on their mastery of the

information presented in the security awareness training, before allowing

computer system access. If you design tests to be given on line, many

assessment design software programs allow you to readily analyze test

results to determine areas of the training that need to be strengthened.Your company may also consider providing a certificate testifying to the

completion of the security training as a reward and employee motivator.As a routine part of completing the program, it is recommended that each

employee be asked to sign an agreement to abide by the security policies

and principles taught in the program. Research suggests that a person who

makes the commitment of signing such an agreement is more likely to

make an effort to abide by the procedures.ONGOING AWARENESS

Most people are aware that learning, even about important matters, tends

to fade unless reinforced periodically. Because of the importance of

keeping employees up to speed on the subject of defending against social

engineering attacks, an ongoing awareness program is vital.One method to keep security at the forefront of employee thinking is to

make information security a specific job responsibility for every person in

the enterprise. This encourages employees to recognize their crucial role

in the overall security of the company. Otherwise there is a strong

tendency to feel that security "is not my job."While overall responsibility for an information security program is

normally assigned to a person in the security department or the

information technology department, development of an information

security awareness program is probably best structured as a joint project

with the training department.The ongoing awareness program needs to be creative and use every

available channel for communicating security messages in ways that are

memorable so that employees are constantly reminded about good

security habits. Methods should use all of the traditional channels, plus as

many non-traditional ones as the people assigned to develop and

implement the program can imagine. As with traditional advertising,

humor and cleverness help. Varying the wording of messages keeps them

from becoming so familiar that they are ignored. 

The list of possibilities for an ongoing awareness program might include: Providing copies of this book to all employees. Including informational items in the company newsletter: articles, boxed

reminders (preferably short, attention-getting items), or cartoons, for

example. Posting a picture of the Security Employee of the Month. Hanging posters in employee areas. Posting bulletin-board notices. Providing printed enclosures in paycheck envelopes. Sending email reminders. Using security-related screen savers. Broadcasting security reminder announcements through the voice mail

system. Printing phone stickers with messages such as "Is your caller who he says

he is?'! Setting up reminder messages to appear on the computer when logging in,

such as "If you are sending confidential information in an email, encrypt

it." Including security awareness as a standard item on employee performance

reports and annual reviews. Providing security awareness reminders on the intranet, perhaps using

cartoons or humor, or in some other way enticing employees to read them.Using an electronic message display board in the cafeteria, with a

frequently changing security reminder. Distributing flyers or brochures. 

And think gimmicks, such as free fortune cookies in the cafeteria,  each

containing a security reminder instead of a fortune. The threat is constant; the reminders must be constant as well. WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME?" 

In addition to security awareness and training programs, I strongly

recommend an active and well-publicized reward program. You must 

 

 

acknowledge employees who have detected and prevented an attempted

social engineering attack, or in some other way significantly contributed

to the success of the information security program. The existence of the

reward program should be made known to employees at all security

awareness sessions, and security violations should be widely publicized

throughout the organization. On the other side of the coin, people must be made aware of the

consequences of failing to abide by information security policies, whether

through carelessness or resistance. Though we all make mistakes,

repeated violations of security procedures must not be tolerated.  

 

Chapter 16

Recommended Corporate Information Security Policies 

Nine out of every ten large corporations and government agencies have

been attacked by computer intruders, to judge from the results of a survey

conducted by the FBI and reported by the Associated Press in April 2002.

Interestingly, the study found that only about one company in three

reported or publicly acknowledged any attacks. That reticence to reveal

their victimization makes sense. To avoid loss of customer confidence and

to prevent further attacks by intruders who learn that a company may be

vulnerable, most businesses do not publicly report computer security

incidents. It appears that there are no statistics on social engineering attacks, and if

there were, the numbers would be highly unreliable; in most cases a

company never knows when a social engineer has "stolen" information, so

many attacks go unnoticed and unreported. Effective countermeasures can be put into place against most types of

social engineering attacks. But let's face reality here--unless everyone in

the enterprise understands that security is important and makes it his or

her business to know and adhere to a company's security policies, social

engineering attacks will always present a grave risk to the enterprise. 

 

In fact, as improvements are made if I the technological weapons against

security breaches, the social engineering approach to using people to

access proprietary company information or penetrate the corporate

network will almost certainly become significantly more frequent and

attractive to information thieves. An industrial spy will naturally attempt

to 

 

 

accomplish his or her objective using the easiest method and the one

involving the least risk of detection. As a matter of fact, a company that

has protected its computer systems and network by deploying state-of the-

art security technologies may thereafter be at more risk from attackers

who use social engineering strategies, methods, and tactics to accomplish

their objectives. This chapter presents specific policies designed to minimize a company's

risk with respect to social engineering attacks. The policies address

attacks that are based not strictly on exploiting technical vulnerabilities.

They involve using some kind of pretext or ruse to deceive a trusted

employee into providing information or performing an action that gives

the perpetrator access to sensitive business information or to enterprise

computer systems and networks. WHAT IS A SECURITY POLICY? 

Security policies are clear instructions that provide the guidelines for

employee behavior for safeguarding information, and are a fundamental

building block in developing effective controls to counter potential

security threats. These policies are even more significant when it comes to

preventing and detecting social engineering attacks. Effective security controls are implemented by training employees with

well-documented policies and procedures. However, it is important to

note that security policies, even if religiously followed by all employees,

are not guaranteed to prevent every social engineering attack. Rather, the

reasonable goal is always to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level. The policies presented here include measures that, while not strictly

focused on social engineering issues, nonetheless belong here because

they deal with techniques commonly used in social engineering attacks.

For example, policies about opening email attachments--which could

install malicious Trojan Horse software allowing the attacker to take over

the victim's computer--address a method frequently used by computer

intruders. Steps to Developing a Program 

A comprehensive information security program usually starts with a risk

assessment aimed at determining: 

What enterprise information assets need to be protected? What specific threats exist against these assets? 

 

 What damage would be caused to the enterprise if these potential threats

were to materialize?

The primary goal of risk assessment is to prioritize which information

assets are in need of immediate safeguards, and whether instituting

safeguards will be cost-effective based on a cost-benefit analysis. Simply

put, what assets are going to be protected first, and how much money

should be spent to protect these assets?It's essential that senior management buy into and strongly support the

necessity of developing security policies and an information security

program. As with any other corporate program, if a security program is to

succeed, management must do more than merely provide an endorsement,

it must demonstrate a commitment by personal example. Employees need

to be aware that management strongly subscribes to the belief that

information security is vital to the company's operation, that protection of

company business information is essential for the company to remain in

business, and that every employee's job may depend on the success of the

program.The person assigned to draft information security policies needs to

understand that the policies should be written in a style free of technical

jargon and readily understood by the non-technical employee. It's also

important that the document make clear why each policy is important;

otherwise employees may disregard some policies as a waste of time. The

policy writer should create a document that presents the policies, and a

separate document for procedures, because policies will probably change

much less frequently than the specific procedures used to implement

them.In addition, the policy writer should be aware of ways in which security

technologies can be used to enforce good information security practices.

For example, most operating systems make it possible to require that user

passwords conform to certain specifications such as length. In some

companies, a policy prohibiting users from downloading programs can be

controlled via local or global policy settings within the operating system.

The policies should require use of security technology whenever cost-

effective to remove human-based decision-making.Employees must be advised of the consequences for failing to comply

with security policies and procedures. A set of appropriate consequences

for violating the policies should be developed and widely publicized.

Also, a reward program should be created for employees who demonstrate

good security practices or who recognize and report a security incident.

Whenever an employee is rewarded for foiling a security breach, it should 

be widely publicized throughout the company, for example in an article in

the company newsletter.One goal of a security awareness program is to communicate the

importance of security policies and the harm that can result from failure to

follow such rules. Given human nature, employees will, at times, ignore

or circumvent policies that appear unjustified or too time-consuming. It is

a management responsibility to insure that employees understand the

importance of the policies and are motivated to comply, rather than

treating them as obstacles to be circumvented.It's important to note that information security policies cannot be written

in stone. As business needs change, as new security technologies come to

market, and as security vulnerabilities evolve, the policies need to be

modified or supplemented. A process for regular review and updating

should be put into place. Make the corporate security policies and

procedures available via the corporate intranet or maintain such policies in

a publicly available folder. This increases the likelihood that such policies

and procedures will be reviewed more frequently, and provides a

convenient method for employees to quickly find the answer to any

information-security related question.Finally, periodic penetration tests and vulnerability assessments using

social engineering methods and tactics should be conducted to expose any

weakness in training or lack of adherence to company policies and

procedures. Prior to using any deceptive penetration-testing tactics,

employees should be put on notice that such testing may occur from time

to time.How to Use These Policies

The detailed policies presented in this chapter represent only a subset of

the information security policies I believe are necessary to mitigate all

security risks. Accordingly, the policies included here should not be

considered as a comprehensive list of information security policies.

Rather, they are the basis for building a comprehensive body of security

policies appropriate to the specific needs of your company.Policy writers for an organization will have to choose the policies that are

appropriate based on their company's unique environment and business

goals. Each organization, having different security requirements based on

business needs, legal requirements, organizational culture, and the

information systems used by the company, will take what it needs from

the policies presented, and omit the rest. 

There are also choices to be made about how stringent policies will be in

each category. A smaller company located in a single facility where most

employees know one another does not need to be much concerned about

an attacker calling on the phone and pretending to be an employee

(although of course an imposter may masquerade as a vendor). Also,

despite the increased risks, a company framed around a casual, relaxed

corporate culture may wish to adopt only a limited subset of

recommended policies to meet its security objectives.DATA CLASSIFICATION

A data classification policy is fundamental to protecting an organization's

information assets, and sets up categories for governing the release of

sensitive information. This policy provides a framework for protecting

corporate information by making all employees aware of the level of

sensitivity of each piece of information.Operating without a data classification policy--the status quo in almost

all companies today--leaves most of these decisions in the hands of

individual workers. Naturally, employee decisions are largely based on

subjective factors, rather than on the sensitivity, criticality, and value of

information. Information is also released because employees are ignorant

of the possibility that in responding to a request for the information, they

may be putting it into the hands of an attacker.The data classification policy sets forth guidelines for classifying valuable

information into one of several levels. With each item assigned a

classification, employees can follow a set of data-handling procedures that

protect the company from inadvertent or careless release of sensitive

information. These procedures mitigate the possibility that employees will

be duped into revealing sensitive information to unauthorized persons.Every employee must be trained on the corporate data classification

policy, including those who do not typically use computers or corporate

communications systems. Because every member of the corporate

workforce--including the cleaning crew, building guards, and copy-room

staff, as well as consultants, contractors, and even interns--may have

access to sensitive information, anyone could be the target of an attack.Management must assign an Information Owner to be responsible for any

information that is currently in use at the company. Among other things,

the Information Owner is responsible for the protection of the information

assets. Ordinarily, the Owner decides what level of classification to assign

based on the need to protect the information, periodically 

reassesses the classification level assigned, and decides if any changes are

needed. The Information Owner may also delegate the responsibility of

protecting the data to a Custodian or Designee.Classification Categories. and Definitions

Information should be separated into varying levels of classification based

on its sensitivity. Once a particular classification system is set up, it's an

expensive and time-consuming process to reclassify information into new

categories. In our example policy I chose four classification levels, which

is appropriate for most medium-to-large businesses. Depending on the

number and types of sensitive information, business may choose to add

more categories to further control specific types of information. In smaller

businesses, a three-level classification scheme may be sufficient.

Remember--the more complex the classification scheme, the more

expense to the organization in training employees and enforcing the

system.Confidential. This category of information is the most sensitive.

Confidential information is intended for use only within the organization.

In most cases, it should only be shared with a very limited number of

people with an absolute need to know. The nature of Confidential

information is such that any unauthorized disclosure could seriously

impact the company, its shareholders, its business partners, and/or its

customers. Items of Confidential information generally fall into one of

these categories:Information concerning trade secrets, proprietary source code, technical or

functional specifications, or product information that could be of

advantage to a competitor.Marketing and financial information not available to the public.Any other information that is vital to the operation of the company such

as future business strategies.Private. This category covers information of a personal nature that is

intended for use only within the organization. Any unauthorized

disclosure of Private information could seriously impact employees, or the

company if obtained by any unauthorized persons (especially social

engineers). Items of Private information would include employee medical

history, health benefits, bank account information, salary history, or any

other personal identifying information that is not of public record. 

NOTE

The Internal category of information is often termed Sensitive by security

personnel. I have to use Internal because the term itself explains the

intented audience. I have used the term Sensitive not as a security

classification but as a convenient method of referring to Confidential,

Private, and Internal information; put another way, Sensitive refers to any

company information that is not specifically designated as Public.Internal. This category of information can be freely provided to any

persons employed by the organization. Ordinarily, unauthorized

disclosure of Internal information is not expected to cause serious harm to

the company, its shareholders, its business partners, its customers, or its

employees. However, persons adept in social engineering skills can use

this information to masquerade as an authorized employee, contractor, or

vendor to deceive unsuspecting personnel into providing more sensitive

information that would result in unauthorized access to corporate

computer systems.A confidentiality agreement must be signed before Internal information

may be disclosed to third parties, such as employees of vendor firms,

contractor labor, partner firms, and so on. Internal information generally

includes anything used in the course of daily business activity that should

not be released to outsiders, such as corporate organizational charts,

network dial-up numbers, internal system names, remote access

procedures, cost center codes, and so on.Public. Information that is specifically designated for release to the

public. This type of information can be freely distributed to anyone, such

as press releases, customer-support contact information, or product

brochures. Note that any information not specifically designated as Public

should be treated as Sensitive information.Classified Data Terminology

Based on its classification, data should be distributed to certain categories

of people. A number of policies in this chapter refer to information being

given to an Unverified Person. For the purposes of these policies, an

Unverified Person is someone whom the employee does not personally

know to be an active employee or to b an employee with the proper rank

to have access to information, or who has not been vouched for by a

trusted third party.

For the purposes of these policies, a Trusted Person is a person you have

met face-to-face who is known to you as a company employee, customer,

or consultant to the company with the proper rank to have access to

information. A Trusted Person might also be an employee of a company

having an established relationship, with your company (for example, a

customer, vendor, or strategic business partner that has signed a

nondisclosure  agreement). In third party vouching, a Trusted Person provides verification of a

person's employment or status, and the person's authority to request

information or an action. Note that in some instances, these policies

require you to verify that the Trusted Person is still employed by the

company before responding to a request for information or action by

someone for whom they have vouched. A privileged account is a computer or other account requiring access

permission beyond the basic user account, such as a systems administrator

account. Employees with privileged accounts typically have the ability to

modify user privileges or perform system functions. A general departmental mailbox is a voice mailbox answered with a

generic message for the department. Such a mailbox is used in order to

protect names and phone extensions of employees who work in a

particular department. VERIFICATION AND AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES 

Information thieves commonly use deceptive tactics to access or obtain

confidential business information by masquerading as legitimate

employees, contractors, vendors, or business partners. To maintain

effective information security, an employee receiving a request to perform

an action or provide sensitive information must positively identify the

caller and verify his authority prior to granting a request. The recommended procedures given in this chapter are designed to help

an employee who receives a request via any communication method such

as telephone, email, or fax to determine whether the request and the

person making it are legitimate. Requests from a Trusted Person 

A request for information or action from a Trusted Person may require: 

 

Verification that the company actively employs or has a relationship with

the person where such a relationship is a condition of access to this

category of information. This is to prevent terminated employees,

vendors, contractors, and others who no longer are associated with the

company from masquerading as active personnel.Verification that the person has a need to know, and is authorized to have

access to the information or to request the action.Requests from an Unverified Person

When a request is made by an Unverified Person, a reasonable

verification process must be deployed to positively identify the person

making the request as authorized to receive the requested information,

especially when the request in any way involves computers or computer-

related equipment. This process is the fundamental control to prevent

successful social engineering attacks: If these verification procedures are

followed, they will dramatically reduce successful social engineering

attacks.It is important that you not make the process so cumbersome that it is

cost-prohibitive, or that employees ignore it.As detailed below, the verification process involves three steps:Verifying that the person is who he or she claims to be.Determining that the requester is currently employed or shares a need-to-

know relationship with the company.Determining that the person is authorized to receive the specific

information or to call for the requested action.Step One: Verification of Identity

The recommended steps for verification are listed below in order of

effectiveness--the higher the number, the more effective the method. Also

included with each item is a statemen.t about the weakness of that

particular method, and the way in which a social engineer can defeat or

circumvent the method to deceive an employee. 

1. Caller ID (assuming this feature is included in the companytelephone system). From the caller ID display, ascertain

whether the call is from inside or outside the company, and

that the name or telephone number displayed matches the

identity provided by the caller.Weakness: External caller ID information can be falsified by anyone with

access to a PBX or telephone switch connected to digital phone service.2. Callback. Look up the requester in the company directory,and call back to the listed extension to verify that the

requester is an employee.Weakness: An attacker with sufficient knowledge can call-forward a

company extension so that, when the employee places the verification call

to the listed phone number, the call is transferred to the attacker's outside

phone number.3.Vouching. A Trusted Person who vouches for the requester's

identity verifies the requester.Weakness: Attackers using a pretext are frequently able to convinceanother employee of their identity, and get that employee to vouch for

them.4.Shared Secret. Use an enterprise-wide shared secret, such as apassword or daily code.Weakness." If many people know the shared secret, it may be easy for an

attacker to learn it.5. Employee's Supervisor/Manager. Telephone the employee'simmediate supervisor and request verification.Weakness: If the requester has provided the telephone number forreaching his or her manager, the person the employee reaches when

calling the number may not be the real manager but may, in fact, be an

accomplice of the attacker.

 

6. Secure Email. Request a digitally signed message.Weakness: If an attacker has already compromised an employee's

computer and installed a keystroke logger to obtain the employee's pass

phrase, he can send digitally signed email that appears to be from the

employee.7. Personal Voice Recognition. The person receiving therequest has dealt with the requester (preferably face-to-face),

knows for certain that the person actually is a Trusted Person,

and is familiar enough with the person to recognize his or her

voice on the telephone.Weakness: This is a fairly secure method, not easily circumvented by an

attacker, but is of no use if the person receiving the request has never met

or spoken with the requester.8. Dynamic Password Solution. The requester authenticates himself orherself through the use of a dynamic password solution such as a

Secure ID.Weakness: To defeat this method, an attacker would have to obtain one of

the dynamic password devices, as well the accompanying PIN of the

employee to whom the device rightfully belongs, or would have to

deceive an employee into reading the information on the display of the

device and

providing the PIN.9. In Person with ID. The requester appears in person andpresents an employee badge or other suitable identification,

preferably a picture ID.Weakness: Attackers are often able to steal an employee badge, or create

a phony badge that appears authentic; however, attackers generally shun

this approach because appearing in person puts the attacker at significant

risk of being identified and apprehended. 

Step Two: Verification of Employment Status The greatest information security threat is not from the professional social

engineer, nor from the skilled computer intruder, but from someone much

closer: the just-fired employee seeking revenge or hoping to set himself

up in business using information stolen from the company. (Note that a

version of this procedure can also be used to verify that someone still

enjoys another kind of business relationship with your company, such as a

vendor, consultant, or contract worker.) Before providing Sensitive information to another person or accepting

instructions for actions involving the computer or computer-related

equipment, verify that the requester is still a current employee by using

one of these methods: Employee Directory Check. If the company maintains an onlineemployee directory that accurately reflects active employees, verify that

the  requester is still listed. Requester's Manager Verification. Call the requester's manager using a

phone number listed in the company directory, not a number provided by

the requester. Requester's Department or Workgroup Verification. Call the requester's

department or workgroup and determine from anyone in that department

or workgroup that the requester is still employed by the company. Step Three: Verification of Need to Know 

Beyond verifying that the requester is a current employee or has a

relationship  with your company, there still remains the issue of whether

the requester is authorized to have access to the information being

requested, or is authorized to request that specific actions affecting

computers or computer-related equipment be taken. This determination may be made by using one of these methods: Consult job title/workgroup/responsibilities lists. A company can provideready access to authorization information by publishing lists of which

employees are entitled to what information. These lists may be organized

in terms of employee job title, employee departments and workgroups,

employee responsibilities, or by some combination of these. Such lists

would need to be maintained on line to be kept current and provide quick

access to authorization information. Ordinarily, Information Owners

would be responsible for overseeing the creation and maintenance of the

lists for access to information under the Owner's control.  

NOTE

It is important to note that maintaining such lists is an invitation to the

social engineer. Consider: If an attacker targets a company becomes

aware that the company maintains such lists, there is a strong motivation

to obtain one. Once in hand, such a list opens many doors to the attacker

and puts the company at serious risk.Obtain Authority from a Manager. An employee contacts his or her own

manager, or the manager of the requester, for authority to comply with the

request.Obtain Authority from the Information Owner or a Designee. The

information Owner is the ultimate judge of whether a particular person

should be granted access. The process for computer-based access control

is for the employee to contact his or her immediate manager to approve a

request for access to information based on existing job profiles. If such a

profile does not exist, it is the manager's responsibility to contact the

relevant data Owner for permission. This chain of command should be

followed so that Information Owners are not barraged with requests when

there is a frequent need to know.Obtain Authority by Means of a Proprietary Software Package. For a large

company in a highly competitive industry, it may be practical to develop a

proprietary software package that provides need-to-know authorization.

Such a database stores employee names and access privileges to classified

information. Users would not be able to look up each individual's access

rights, but instead would enter the requester's name, and the identifier

associated with the information being sought. The software then provides

a response indicating whether or not the employee is authorized to access

such information. This alternative avoids the danger of creating a list of

personnel with respective access rights to valuable, critical, or sensitive

information that could be stolen.MANAGEMENT POLICIES

The following policies pertain to management-level employees. These are

divided into the areas of Data Classification, Information Disclosure,

Phone Administration, and Miscellaneous Policies. Note that each

category of policies uses a unique numbering structure for easy

identification of individual policies. 

Data Classification Policies

Data Classification refers to how your company classifies the sensitivity

of information and who should have access to that information.1-1 Assign data classification

Policy: All valuable, sensitive, or critical business information must be

assigned to a classification category by the designated Information Owner

or delegate.Explanation/Notes: The designated Owner or delegate will assign the

appropriate data classification to any information routinely used to

accomplish business goals. The Owner also controls who can access such

information and what use can be made of it. The Owner of the

information may reassign the classification and may designate a time

period for automatic declassification.

Any item not otherwise marked should be classified as Sensitive.1-2 Publish classified handling procedures

Policy: The company must establish procedures governing the release of

information in each category.Explanation/Notes." Once classifications are established, procedures for

release of information to employees and to outsiders must be set up, as

detailed in the Verification and Authorization Procedures outlined earlier

in this chapter.1-3 Label all items

Policy." Clearly mark both printed materials and media storage containing

Confidential, Private, or Internal information to show the appropriate data

classification.Explanation/Notes." Hard copy documents must have a cover sheet, with

a classification label prominently displayed, and a classification label on

every page that is visible when the document is open.All electronic files that cannot easily be labeled with appropriate data

classifications (database or raw data files) must be protected via access

controls to insure that such information is not improperly disclosed, and

that it cannot be changed, destroyed, or made inaccessible.

All computer media such as floppy disks, tapes, and CD-ROMs must be

labeled with the highest classification of any information contained

therein.

 

Information Disclosure 

Information disclosure involves the release of information to various

parties based on their identity and need to know. 2-1 Employee verification procedure 

Policy: The company should establish comprehensive procedures to be 

used by employees for verifying the identity, employment status, and

authorization of an individual before releasing Confidential or Sensitive

information or performing any task that involves use of any computer

hardware or software. Explanation/Notes: Where justified by size of company and securityneeds, advanced security technologies should be used to authenticate

identity. The best security practice would be to deploy authentication

tokens in combination with a shared secret to positively identify persons

making requests. While this practice would substantially minimize risk,

the cost may be prohibitive for some businesses. In those circumstances,

the company should use a company-wide shared secret, such as a daily

password or code. 2-2 Release of information to third parties 

Policy: A set of recommended information disclosure procedures must 

be made available and all employees should be trained to follow them. Explanation/Notes: Generally, distribution procedures need to beestablished for: Information made available within the company. Distribution of information to individuals and employees of organizations

having an established relationship with the company, such as consultants,

temporary workers, interns, employees of organizations that have a

vendor relationship or strategic partnership arrangement with the

company, and so on. Information made available outside the company. Information at each classification level, when the information is being

delivered in person, by telephone, by email, by facsimile,  by voice mail,

by postal service, by signature delivery service, and by electronic transfer.

 

2-3 Distribution of Confidential information 

Policy: Confidential information, which is company information that

could cause substantial harm if obtained by unauthorized persons, may be

delivered only to a Trusted Person who is authorized to receive it. Explanation/Notes: Confidential information in a physical form (that is,

printed copy or on a removable storage medium) may be delivered: In person. By internal mail, sealed and marked with the Confidential classification. Outside the company by a reputable delivery service (that is, FedEx, UPS,

and so on) with signature of recipient required, or by a postal service

using a certified or registered class of mail. Confidential information in electronic form (computer files, database

files, email) may be delivered: Within the body of encrypted email. By email attachment, as an encrypted file. By electronic transfer to a server within the company internal network. By a fax program from a computer, provided that only the intended

recipient uses the destination machine, or that the intended recipient is

waiting at the destination machine while the fax is being sent. As an

alternative, facsimiles can be sent without the recipient present if sent

over an encrypted telephone link to a password-protected fax server. Confidential information may be discussed in person; by telephone within

the company; by telephone outside the company if encrypted; by

encrypted satellite transmission; by encrypted videoconferencing link; and

by encrypted Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP). For transmission by fax machine, the recommended method calls for the

sender to transmit a cover page; the recipient, on receiving the page,

transmits a page in response, demonstrating that he/she is at the fax

machine. The sender then transmits the fax.   

The following means of communication are not acceptable for discussing

or distributing Confidential information: unencrypted email, voice mail

message, regular mail, or any wireless communication method (cellular,

Short Message Service, or cordless). 2-4 Distribution of Private information 

Policy: Private information, which is personal information about an

employee or employees that, if disclosed, could be used to harm

employees or the company, may be delivered only to a Trusted Person

who is authorized to receive it. Explanation/Notes: Private information in a physical form (that is, hard-

copy or data on a removable storage medium) may be delivered: In person By internal mail, sealed and marked with the Private classification By regular mail   Private information in electronic form (computer files, database files,

email) may be delivered: By internal email. By electronic transfer to a server within the company internal network. By facsimile, provided that only the intended recipient uses the

destination machine, or that the intended recipient is waiting at the

destination machine while the fax is being sent. Facsimiles can also be

sent to password-protected fax servers. As an alternative, facsimiles can

be sent without the recipient present if sent over an encrypted telephone

link to a password-protected fax server. Private information may be discussed in person; by telephone; by satellite

transmission; by videoconferencing link; and by encrypted Vole The following means of communication are not acceptable for discussing

or distributing Private information: unencrypted email, voice mail

message, regular mail, and by any wireless communication method

(cellular, SMS, or cordless). 

 

2-5 Distribution of Internal information

Policy: Internal information is information to be shared only within the

company or with other Trusted persons who have signed a nondisclosure

agreement. You must establish guidelines for the distribution of Internal

information.Explanation/Notes: Internal information may be distributed in any form,

including internal email, but may not be distributed outside the company

in email form unless encrypted.2-6 Discussing Sensitive information over the telephone

Policy: Prior to releasing any information that is not designated as Publicover the telephone, the person releasing such information must personally

recognize the requester's voice through prior business contact, or the

company phone system must identify the call as being from an internal

telephone number that has been assigned to the requester.Explanation/Notes: If the requester's voice is not known, call the

requester's internal phone number to verify the requester voice through a

recorded voice mail message, or have the requester's manager verify the

requester's identity and need to know.2-7 Lobby or reception personnel procedures

Policy: Lobby personnel must obtain photo identification prior to

releasing any package to any person who is not known to be an active

employee. A log should be kept for recording the person's name, driver's

license number, birth date, the item picked up, and the date and time of

such pickup.Explanation/Notes: This policy also applies to handing over outgoing

packages to any messenger or courier service such as FedEx, UPS, or

Airborne Express. These companies issue identification cards that can be

used to verify employee identity.2-8 Transfer of software to third parties

Policy: Prior to the transfer or disclosure of any software, program, or

computer instructions, the requester's identity must be positively verified,

and it must be established whether such release is consistent with the data

classification assigned to such information. Ordinarily, software

developed in-house in source-code format is considered highly

proprietary, and classified Confidential.

 

Explanation/Notes: Determination of authorization is usually based on

whether the requester needs access to the software to do his or her job.2-9 Sales and marketing qualification of customer leads

Policy: Sales and marketing personnel must qualify leads before releasing

internal callback numbers, product plans, product group contacts, or other

Sensitive information to any potential customer.Explanation/Notes: It is a common tactic for industrial spies to contact a

sales and marketing representative and make him believe that a big

purchase may be in the offing. In an effort to take advantage of the sales

opportunity, sales and marketing reps often release information that can

be used by the attacker as a poker chip to obtain access to Sensitive

information.2-10 Transfer of files or data

Policy: Files or other electronic data should not be transferred to any

removable media unless the requester is a Trusted Person whose identity

has been verified and who has a need to have such data in that format.Explanation/Notes: A social engineer can easily dupe an employee by

providing a plausible request for having Sensitive information copied to a

tape, Zip disc, or other removable media, and sent to him or held in the

lobby for pickup.Phone Administration

Phone administration policies ensure that employees can verify caller

identity, and protect their own contact information from those calling into

the company.3-1 Call forwarding on dial-up or fax numbers

Policy: Call forwarding services that permit forwarding calls to external

telephone numbers will not be placed on any dial-up modem or fax

telephone numbers within the company.Explanation/Notes: Sophisticated attackers may attempt to dupe telephone

company personnel or internal telecom workers into forwarding internal

numbers to an external phone line under control of an attacker. This attack

allows the intruder to intercept faxes, request Confidential information to

be faxed within the company (personnel assume that faxing within the

organization must be safe) or dupe dial-in users into

 

providing their account passwords by forwarding the dial-up lines to a

decoy computer that simulates the login process.Depending on the telephone service used within the company, the call

forwarding feature may be under control of the communications provider,

rather than the telecommunications department. In such circumstances, a

request will be made to the communications provider to insure the call

forwarding feature is not present on the telephone numbers assigned to

dial-up and fax lines.3-2 Caller ID

Policy: The corporate telephone system must provide caller line

identification (caller ID) on all internal telephone sets, and, if possible,

enable distinctive ringing to indicate when a call is from outside the

company.Explanation/Notes: If employees can verify the identity of telephone calls

from outside the company it may help them prevent an attack, or identify

the attacker to appropriate security personnel.3-3 Courtesy phones

Policy: To prevent visitors from masquerading as company workers,

every courtesy telephone will clearly indicate the location of the caller

(for example, "Lobby") on the recipient's caller ID.Explanation/Notes." If the caller ID for internal calls shows extension

number only, appropriate provision must be made for calls placed from

company phones in the reception area and any other public areas. It must

not be possible for an attacker to place a call from one of these phones

anddeceive an employee into believing that the call has been placedinternally from an employee telephone.3-4 Manufacturer default passwords shipped with phone systems

Policy: The voice mail administrator should change all default passwords

that were shipped with the phone system prior to use by company

personnel.Explanation/Notes: Social engineers can obtain lists of default passwords

from manufacturers and use these to access administrator accounts. 

3-5 Department voice mailboxes

Policy." Set up a generic voice mailbox for every department that

ordinarily has contact with the public.Explanation/Notes: The first step of social engineering involves gathering

information about the target company and its personnel. By limiting the

accessibility of the names and telephone numbers of employees, a

company makes it more difficult for the social engineer to identify targets

in the company, or names of legitimate employees for use in deceiving

other personnel.3-6 Verification of telephone system vendor

Policy: No vendor-support technicians will be permitted to remotely

access the company telephone system without positive identification of

vendor and authorization to perform such work.Explanation/Notes: Computer intruders who gain access to corporate

telephone systems gain the ability to create voice mailboxes, intercept

messages intended for other users, or make free phone calls at the

corporation's expense.3-7 Configuration of phone system

Policy." The voice mail administrator will enforce security requirements

by configuring the appropriate security parameters in the telephone

system.Explanation/Notes: Phone systems can be set up with greater or lesser

degrees of security for voice mail messages. The administrator should be

aware of company security concerns, and work with security personnel to

configure the phone system to protect Sensitive data.3-8 Call trace feature

Policy: Depending on limitations of the communications provider, the

call trace feature will be enabled globally to allow employees to activate

the trap-and-trace feature when the caller is suspected of being an

attacker.Explanation/Notes: Employees must be trained on call trace usage and

the appropriate circumstances when it should be used. A call trace should

be initiated when the caller is clearly attempting to gain unauthorized

access to corporate computer systems or requesting Sensitive information.

Whenever an employee activates the call trace feature, immediate

notification must be sent to the Incident Reporting Group.

 

3-9 Automated phone systems 

Policy." If the company uses an automated phone answering system, the

system must be programmed so that telephone extensions are not

announced when transferring a call to an employee or department. Explanation/Notes: Attackers can use a company's automated telephone

system to map employee names to telephone extensions. Attackers can

then use knowledge of those extensions to convince call recipients that

they are employees with a right to insider information. 3-10 Voice mailboxes to become disabled after successive invalid access

attempts 

Policy: Program the corporate telephone system to lock out any voice

mail account whenever a specified number of successive invalid access

attempts have been made. Explanation/Notes." The Telecommunications administrator must lock out

a voice mailbox after five successive invalid attempts to log in. The

administrator must then reset any voice mail lockouts manually. 3-11 Restricted telephone extensions Policy." All internal telephone extensions to departments or workgroups

that ordinarily do not receive calls from external callers (help desk,

computer room, employee technical support, and so on) should be

programmed  so that these telephones can be reached only from internal

extensions. Alternately, they can be password-protected so that employees

and other authorized persons calling from the outside must enter the

correct password. Explanation/Notes: While use of this policy will block most attempts byamateur social engineers to reach their likely targets, it should be noted

that a determined attacker will sometimes be able to talk an employee into

calling the restricted extension and asking the person who answers the

phone to call the attacker, or simply conference in the restricted extension.

During security training, this method of tricking employees into assisting

the intruder should be discussed to raise employee awareness about these

tactics. Miscellaneous 

4-1 Employee badge design 

Policy: Employee badges must be designed to include a large photo that

can be recognized from a distance.  

Explanation/Notes: The photograph on corporate ID badges of standard

design is, for security purposes, only slightly better than worthless. The

distance between a person entering the building and the guard or

receptionist who has the responsibility to check identification is usually

great enough that the picture is too small to recognize when the person

walks by. For the photo to be of value in this situation, a redesign of the

badge is necessary. 4-2 Access rights review when changing position or responsibilities 

Policy: Whenever a company employee changes positions or is given

increased or decreased job responsibilities, the employee's manager will

notify IT of the change in the employee's responsibilities so that the

appropriate security profile can be assigned. Explanation/Notes: Managing the access rights of personnel is necessaryto limit disclosure of protected information. The rule of least privilegewill apply: The access rights assigned to users will be the minimum

necessary to perform their jobs. Any requests for changes that result in

elevated access rights must be in accordance with a policy on granting

elevated access rights. The worker's manager or the human resources department will have the

responsibility of notifying the information technology department to

properly adjust the account holder's access rights as needed. 4-3 Special identification for non employees 

Policy: Your company should issue a special photo company badge to

trusted delivery people and non employees who have a business need to

enter company premises on a regular basis. Explanation/Notes: Non employees who need to enter the building

regularly (for example, to make food or beverage deliveries to the

cafeteria, or to repair copying machines or make telephone installations)

can pose a threat to your company. In addition to issuing identification to

these visitors, make sure your employees are trained to spot a visitor

without a badge and know how to act in that situation. 4-4 Disabling computer accounts for contractors Policy: Whenever a contractor who has been issued a computer account 

has completed his or her assignment, or when the contract expires, the

responsible manager will immediately notify the information technology 

 

department to disable the contractor's computer accounts, including any

accounts used for database access, dial-up, or Internet access from remote

locations. Explanation/Notes: W-hen a worker's employment is terminated, there isa danger that he or she will use knowledge of your company's systems and

procedures to gain access to data. All computer accounts used by or

known to the worker must be promptly disabled. This includes accounts

that provide access to production databases, remote dial-in accounts, and

any accounts used to access computer-related devices. 4-5 Incident reporting organization 

Policy: An incident reporting organization must be established or, insmaller companies, an incident reporting individual and backup person

designated, for receiving and distributing alerts concerning possible

security  incidents in progress. Explanation/Notes: By centralizing the reporting of suspected security

incidents, an attack that may otherwise have gone unnoticed can be detected. In the event that systematic attacks across the organization aredetected and reported, the incident reporting organization may be able to

determine what the attacker is targeting so that special efforts can be made

to protect those assets. Employees assigned to receive incident reports must become familiarwith  social engineering methods and tactics, enabling them to evaluate to reports and recognize when an attack may be in progress. 4-6 Incident reporting hotline 

Policy: A hotline to the incident reporting organization or person, which

may consist of an easy-to-remember phone extension, must be

established. Explanation/Notes: When employees suspect that they are the target of a

social engineering attack, they must be able to immediately notify the

incident reporting organization. In order for the notification to be timely,

all company telephone operators and receptionists must have the number

posted or otherwise immediately available to them. A company-wide early warning system can substantially aid the

organization in detecting and responding to an ongoing attack. Employees

must be sufficiently well trained that one who suspects he or she has been

the target of a social engineering attack will immediately call the incident

reporting hotline. In accordance with published procedures, the incident 

 

reporting personnel will immediately notify the targeted groups that an

intrusion may be in progress so personnel will be on alert. In order for the

notification to be timely, the reporting hotline number must be widely

distributed throughout the company. 4-7 Sensitive areas must be secured 

Policy: A security guard will screen access to sensitive or secure areas and

should require two forms of authentication. Explanation/Notes: One acceptable form of authentication uses a digital

electronic lock that requires an employee to swipe his employee badge

and enter an access code. The best method to secure sensitive areas is to

post a security guard who observes any access-controlled entry. In

organizations where this is not cost-effective, two forms of authentication

should be used to validate identity. Depending on risk and cost, a

biometric-enabled access card is recommended. 4-8 Network and phone cabinets Policy: Cabinets, closets, or rooms containing network cabling, phone

wiring, or network access points must be secured at all times. Explanation/Notes: Only authorized personnel will be permitted 

access to telephone and network closets, rooms, or cabinets. Any outside

maintenance people or vendor personnel must be positively identified

using the procedures published by the department responsible for

information security. Access to phone lines, network hubs, switches,

bridges, or other related equipment could be used by an attacker to

compromise computer and network security. 4-9 Intracompany mail bins 

Policy: Intracompany mail bins must not be located in publicly accessible

areas. Explanation/Notes: Industrial spies or computer intruders who have 

access to any intracompany mail pickup points can easily send forged

authorization letters or internal forms that authorize personnel to release

Confidential information or to perform .an action that assists the attacker.

Additionally, the attacker can mail a floppy disk or electronic media with

instructions to install a software update, or open a file that has embedded

macro commands that serve the intruder's objectives. Naturally, any

request received by intracompany mail is assumed to be authentic by the

party who receives it. 

 

4-10 The company bulletin board Policy: Bulletin boards for the benefit of company workers should not be

posted in locations where the public has access. Explanation/Notes: Many businesses have bulletin boards where private

company or personnel information is posted for anyone to read. Employer

notices, employee lists, internal memorandums, employee home contact

numbers listed in advertisements, and other, similar information are

frequently posted on the board. Bulletin boards may be located near company cafeterias, or in close

proximity to smoking or break areas where visitors have free access. This

type of information should not be made available to visitors or the public. 4-1 1 Computer center entrance Policy: The computer room or data center should be locked at all times

and personnel must authenticate their identity prior to entering. Explanation/Notes: Corporate security ought to consider deploying an

electronic badge or access card reader so all entries can be electronically

logged and audited. 4-12 Customer accounts with service providers 

Policy: Company personnel who place service orders with vendors thatsupply critical services to the company must set up an account password to prevent unauthorized persons from placing orders on behalf of thecompany. Explanation/Notes: Utility companies and many other vendors allow

customers to set up a password on request; the company should establish

passwords with all vendors that provide mission-critical services. This

policy  is especially critical to telecommunication and Internet services.

Any time critical services can be affected, a shared secret is necessary to

verify that the caller is authorized to place such orders. Note, too,

identifiers  such as social security number, corporate taxpayer

identification number, mother's maiden name, or similar identifiers must not be used. A socialengineer might, for example, call the telephone company and give orders

to add features such as call forwarding to dial-in modem lines,  or make a

request to the Internet Service Provider to change translation information

to provide a bogus IP address when users perform a hostname lookup.  

4-1 3 Departmental contact person

Policy: Your company may institute a program under which each

department or workgroup assigns an employee the responsibility of acting

as a point contact so that any personnel can easily verify the identity of

unknown persons claiming to be from that department. For example, the

help desk may contact the departmental point person to verify the identity

of an employee who is requesting support.Explanation/Notes: This method of verifying identity reduces the pool of

employees who are authorized to vouch for employees within their

department when such employees request support such as resetting

passwords or other computer account-related issues.Social engineering attacks are successful in part because technical support

personnel are pressed for time and do not properly verify the identity of

requesters. Typically support staff cannot personally recognize all

authorized personnel because of the number of employees in larger

organizations. The point-person method of vouching limits the number of

employees that technical support staff need to be personally familiar with

for verification purposes.4-14 Customer passwords

Policy: Customer service representatives shall not have the ability to

retrieve customer account passwords.Explanation/Notes: Social engineers frequently call customer service

departments and, under a pretext, attempt to obtain a customer's

authentication information, such as the password or social security

number. With this information, the social engineer can then call another

service representative, pretend to be the customer, and obtain information

or place fraudulent orders.

To prevent these attempts from succeeding, customer service software

must be designed so that representatives can only type in the

authentication information provided by the caller, and receive a response

from the system indicating whether the password is correct or not.4-1 5 Vulnerability testing

Policy: Notification of company use of social engineering tactics to test

security vulnerabilities is required during security awareness training and

employee orientation. 

Explanation/Notes: Without notification of social engineering-penetration

testing, company personnel may suffer embarrassment, anger, or other

emotional trauma from the use of deceptive tactics used against them by

other employees or contractors. By placing new hires on notice during the

orientation process that they may be subject to this testing, you prevent

such conflict.4-16 Display of company Confidential information

Policy: Company information not designated for public release shall not

be displayed in any publicly accessible areas.Explanation/Notes: In addition to Confidential product or procedure

information, internal contact information such as internal telephone or

employee lists, or building rosters that contain a list of management

personnel for each department within the company must also be kept out

of view.4-17 Security awareness training

Policy: All persons employed by the company must complete a security

awareness training course during employee orientation. Furthermore, each

employee must take a security awareness refresher course at periodic

intervals, not to exceed twelve months, as required by the department

assigned with security-training responsibility.Explanation/Notes: Many organizations disregard end-user awareness

training altogether. According to the 2001 Global Information Security

Survey, only 30 percent of the surveyed organizations spend money on

awareness training for their user-community. Awareness training is an

essential requirement to mitigate successful security breaches utilizing

social engineering techniques.4-18 Security training course for computer accessPolicy: Personnel must attend and successfully complete a securityinformation course before being given access to any corporate computer

systems.Explanation/Notes: Social engineers frequently target new employees,knowing that as a group they are generally the people least likely to be

aware of the company's security policies and the proper procedures to

determine classification and handling of sensitive information.

Training should include an opportunity for employees to ask questions

about security policies. After training, the account holder should be

required to sign a document acknowledging their understanding of the

security policies, and their agreement to abide by the policies. 4-19 Employee badge must be color-coded Policy: Identification badges must be color-coded to indicate whether the

badge holder is an employee, contractor, temporary, vendor, consultant,

visitor, or intern. Explanation/Notes: The color of the badge is an excellent way to

determinethe status of a person from a distance. An alternative would be to uselarge lettering to indicate the badge holder's status, but using a color-

coded scheme is unmistakable and easier to see. A common social engineering tactic to gain access to a physical building

is to dress up as a delivery person or repair technician. Once inside the

facility, the attacker will masquerade as another employee or lie about his

status to obtain cooperation from unsuspecting employees. The purpose of

this policy is to prevent people from entering the building legitimately and

then entering areas they should not have access to. For example, a person

entering the facility as a telephone repair technician would not be able to

masquerade as an employee: The color of the badge would give him

away. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 

The information technology department of any company has a special

need for policies that help it protect the organizations information assets.

To reflect the typical structure of IT operations in an organization, I have

divided the IT policies into General, Help Desk, Computer

Administration, and Computer Operations. General 

5-1 IT department employee contact information 

Policy: Phone numbers and email addresses of individual IT department

employees should not be disclosed to any person without a need to know. Explanation/Notes: The purpose of this policy is to prevent contact

information from being abused by social engineers. By only disclosing a 

 

general contact number or email address for IT, outsiders will be blocked

from contacting IT department personnel directly. The email address for

site administrative and technical contacts should only consist of generic

names such as admin@companyname.com; published telephone numbers

should connect to a departmental voice mailbox, not to individual

workers. When direct contact information is available, it becomes easy for a

computer intruder to reach specific IT employees and trick them into

providing information that can be used in an attack, or to impersonate IT

employees by using their names and contact information. 5-2 Technical support requests 

Policy: All technical support requests must be referred to the group that

handles such requests. Explanation/Notes: Social engineers may attempt to target IT personnel

who do not ordinarily handle technical support issues, and who may not

be aware of the proper security procedures when handling such requests.

Accordingly, IT staff must be trained to deny these requests and refer the

caller to the group that has the responsibility of providing support. Help Desk 

6-1 Remote access procedures Policy: Help desk personnel must not divulge details or instructionsregarding remote access, including external network access points or

dialup  numbers, unless the requester has been: Verified as authorized to receive Internal information; and, Verified as authorized to connect to the corporate network as an external

user. Unless known on a person-to-person basis, the requester must be

positively identified in accordance with the Verification and

Authorization Procedures outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Explanation/Notes: The corporate help desk is often a primary target for

the social engineer, both because the nature of their work is to assist users

with computer-related issues, and because they usually have elevated

system privileges. All help desk personnel must be trained to act as a

human firewall to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information that 

 

will assist any unauthorized persons from gaining access to company

resources. The simple rule is to never disclose remote access procedures

to anyone until positive verification of identity has been made. 6-2 Resetting passwords 

Policy: The password to a user account may be reset only at the request of

the account holder. Explanation/Notes: The most common ploy used by social engineers is to

have another person's account password reset or changed. The attacker

poses as the employee using the pretext that their password was lost or

forgotten. In an effort to reduce the success of this type of attack, an IT

employee receiving a request for a password reset must call the employee

back prior to taking any action; the call back must not be made to a phone

number provided by the requester, but to a number obtained from the

employee telephone directory. See Verification and Authorization

Procedures for more about this procedure. 6-3 Changing access privileges 

Policy: All requests to increase a user's privileges or access rights must be

approved in writing by the account holder's manager. When the change is

made a confirmation must be sent to the requesting manager via

intracompany mail. Furthermore, such requests must be verified as

authentic in accordance with the Verification and Authorization

Procedures. Explanation/Notes: Once a computer intruder has compromised a standard

user account, the next step is to elevate his or her privileges so that the

attacker has complete control over the compromised system. An attacker

who has knowledge of the authorization process can spoof an authorized

request when email, fax, or telephone are used to transmit it. For example,

the attacker may phone technical support or the help desk and attempt to

persuade a technician to grant additional access rights to the compromised

account. 6-4 New account authorization 

Policy: A request to create a new account for an employee, contractor, 

or other authorized person must be made either in writing and signed by

the employee's manager, or sent by digitally signed electronic mail. These

requests must also be verified by sending a confirmation of the request

through intracompany mail. 

Explanation/Notes: Because passwords and other information useful in

breaking into computer systems are the highest priority targets of

information thieves for gaining access, special precautions are necessary.

The intention of this policy is to prevent computer intruders from

impersonating authorized personnel or forging requests for new accounts.

Therefore, all such requests must be positively verified using the

Verification and Authorization Procedures. 6-5 Delivery of new passwords 

Policy: New passwords must be handled as company Confidentialinformation, delivered by secure methods including in person; by a

signature-required delivery service such as registered mail; or by UPS or

FedEx. See policies concerning distribution of Confidential information. Explanation/Notes: Intracompany mail may also be used, but it is

recommended  that passwords be sent in secure envelopes that obscure the

content. A suggested method is to establish a computer point person in

each department who has the responsibility of handling distribution of

new account details and vouching for the identity of personnel who lose

or forget their passwords. In these circumstances, support personnel

would always be working with a smaller group of employees that would

be personally recognized. 6-6 Disabling an account 

Policy: Prior to disabling a user's account you must require positive

verification that the request was made by authorized personnel. Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an attacker

from spoofing a request to disable an account, and then calling to

troubleshoot the user's inability to access the computer system. When the

social engineer calls posing as a technician with pre-existing knowledge

of the user's inability to log in, the victim often complies with a request to

reveal his or her password during the troubleshooting process. 6-7 Disabling network ports or devices 

Policy: No employee should disable any network device or port for any

unverified technical support personnel. Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an attacker

from spoofing a request to disable a network port, and then calling the

worker to troubleshoot his or her inability to access the network. 

 

When the social engineer, posing as a helpful technician, calls with pre-

existing knowledge of the user's network problem, the victim often

complies with a request to reveal his or her password during the

troubleshooting process.6-8 Disclosure of procedures for wireless access

Policy: No personnel should disclose procedures for accessing company

systems over wireless networks to any parties not authorized to connect to

the wireless network.Explanation/Notes: Always obtain prior verification of a requester as a

person authorized to connect to the corporate network as an external user

before releasing wireless access information. See Verification and

Authorization Procedures.6-9 User trouble ticketsPolicy: The names of any employees who have reported computer-related

problems should not be revealed outside the information technology

department.Explanation/Notes: In a typical attack, a social engineer will call thehelp desk and request the names of any personnel who have reported

recent computer problems. The caller may pretend to be an employee,

vendor, or an employee of the telephone company. Once he obtains the

names of persons reporting trouble, the social engineer, posing as a help

desk or technical support person, contacts the employee and says he/she is

calling to troubleshoot the problem. During the call, the attacker deceives

the victim into providing the desired information or into performing an

action that facilitates the attacker's objective.6-10 Initiating execute commands or running programs

Policy: Personnel employed in the IT department who have privileged

accounts should not execute any commands or run any application

programs at the request of any person not personally known to them.Explanation/Notes: A common method attackers use to install a Trojan

Horse program or other malicious software is to change the name of an

existing program, and then call the help desk complaining that an error

message is displayed whenever an attempt is made to run the program.

The attacker persuades the help desk technician to run the program

himself. When the technician complies, the malicious software inherits

the

 

privileges of the user executing the program and performs a task, which

gives the attacker the same computer privileges as the help desk

employee. This may allow the attacker to take control of the company

system. This policy establishes a countermeasure to this tactic by requiring thatsupport personnel verify employment status prior to running any program

at the request of a caller. Computer Administration 

7-1 Changing global access rights 

Policy: A request to change the global access rights associated with an

electronic job profile must be approved by the group assigned the

responsibility of managing access rights on the corporate network. Explanation/Notes: Authorized personnel will analyze each such request

to determine whether the change might entail a threat to information

security. If so, the responsible employee will address the pertinent issues

with the requester and jointly arrive at a decision about the changes to be

made. 7-2 Remote access requests 

Policy: Remote computer access will only be provided to personnel who

have a demonstrated need to access corporate computer systems from off-

site locations. The request must be made by an employee's manager and

verified as described in the Verification and Authorization Procedures

section. Explanation/Notes: Recognizing the need for off-site access into the

corporate network by authorized personnel, limiting such access only to

people with a need may dramatically reduce risk and management of

remote access users. The smaller the number of people with external

dialup privileges, the smaller the pool of potential targets for an attacker.

Never forget that the attacker also may target remote users with the intent

of hijacking their connection into the corporate network, or by

masquerading as them during a pretext call. 7-3 Resetting privileged account passwords 

Policy: A request to reset a password to a privileged account must be

approved by the system manager or administrator responsible for the

computer on which the account exists. The new password must be sent

through intracompany mail or delivered in person. 

Explanation/Notes." Privileged accounts have access to all system

resources and files stored on the computer system. Naturally, these

accounts deserve the greatest protection possible. 7-4 Outside support personnel remote access Policy: No outside support person (such as software or hardware vendor

personnel) may be given any remote access information or be allowed to

access any company computer system or related devices without positive

verification of identity and authorization to perform such services. If the

vendor requires privileged access to provide support services, the

password to the account used by the vendor shall be changed immediately

after the vendor services have been completed. Explanation/Notes: Computer attackers may pose as vendors to gain

access to corporate computer or telecommunication networks. Therefore,

it is essential that the identity of the vendor be verified in addition to their

authorization to perform any work on the system. Moreover, the doors

into the system must be slammed shut once their job is done by changing

the account password used by the vendor. No vendor should be allowed to pick his or her own password for any

account, even temporarily. Some vendors have been known to use the

same or similar passwords across multiple customer systems. For

example, one network security company set up privileged accounts on all

their customers' systems with the same password, and, to add insult to

injury, with outside Telnet access enabled. 7-5 Strong authentication for remote access to corporate systems 

Policy: All connection points into the corporate network from remote

locations must be protected through the use of strong authentication

devices, such as dynamic passwords or biometrics. Explanation/Notes: Many businesses rely on static passwords as the solemeans of authentication for remote users. This practice is dangerous

because it is insecure: computer intruders target any remote access point

that might be the weak link in the victim's network. Remember that you

never know when someone else knows your password. 

Accordingly, any remote access points must be protected with strong

authentication such as time-based tokens, smart cards, or biometric

devices, so that intercepted passwords are of no value to an attacker. 

When authentication based on dynamic passwords is impractical,

computer users must religiously adhere to the policy for choosing hard-to-

guess passwords. 7-6 Operating system configuration 

Policy: Systems administrators shall ensure that, wherever possible,

operating systems are configured so that they are consistent with all

pertinent security policies and procedures. Explanation/Notes: Drafting and distributing security policies is a

fundamental step toward reducing risk, but in most cases, compliance is

necessarily left up to the individual employee. There are, however, any

number of computer-related policies that can be made mandatory through

operating-system settings, such as the required length of passwords.

Automating security policies by configuration of operating system

parameters effectively takes the decision out of the human element's

hands, increasing the overall security of the organization. 7-7 Mandatory expiration Policy: All computer accounts must be set to expire after one year. Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to eliminate theexistence of computer accounts that are no longer being used, since

computer intruders commonly target dormant accounts. The process

insures that to any computer accounts belonging to former employees or

contractors that have been inadvertently left in place are automatically

disabled. At management discretion, you may require that employees must take a

security refresher training course at renewal time, or must review

information security policies and sign an acknowledgment of their

agreement to adhere to them. 7-8 Generic email addresses 

Policy: The information technology department shall set up a generic

email address for each department within the organization that ordinarily

communicates with the. public. Explanation/Notes: The generic email address can be released to the

public by the telephone receptionist or published on the company Web

site. Otherwise, each employee shall only disclose his or her personal

email address to people who have genuine need to know. 

During the first phase of a social engineering attack, the attacker often

tries to obtain telephone numbers, names, and titles of employees. In most

cases, this information is publicly available on the company Web site or

just for the asking. Creation of generic voice mailboxes and/or email

addresses makes it difficult to associate employee names with particular

departments or responsibilities. 7-9 Contact information for domain registrations 

Policy: When registering for acquisition of Internet address space or 

host names, the contact information for administrative, technical, or other

personnel should not identify any individual personnel by name. Instead,

you should list a generic email address and the main corporate telephone

number. Explanation/Notes: The purpose of this policy is to prevent contact

information from being abused by a computer intruder. When the names

and phone numbers of individuals are provided, an intruder can use this

information to contact the individuals and attempt to deceive them into

revealing system information, or to perform an action item that facilitates

an attacker's objective. Or the social engineer can impersonate a listed

person in an effort to deceive other company personnel. 

Instead of an email address to a particular employee, contact informationmustbeintheformofadministrator@company.com.Telecommunications department personnel can establish a generic voice

mailbox for administrative or technical contacts so as to limit information

disclosure that would be useful in a social engineering attack. 7-10 Installation of security and operating system updates Policy: All security patches for operating system and application software

shall be installed as soon as they become available. If this policy conflicts

with the operation of mission-critical productions systems, such updates

should be performed as soon as practicable.   Explanation/Notes: Once a vulnerability has been identified, the

software manufacturer should be contacted immediately to

determine whether a patch or a temporary fix ha been made

available to close the vulnerability. An un-patched computer

system represents one of the greatest security threats to the

enterprise. When system administrators procrastinate about

applying the necessary fixes, the window of exposure is open wide

so that any attacker can climb through.

Dozens of security vulnerabilities are identified and published weekly on

the Internet. Until information technology staff are vigilant in their efforts

to apply all security patches and fixes as soon as practical, despite these

systems being behind the company firewall, the corporate network will

always be at risk of suffering a security incident. It is extremely important

to keep apprised of published security vulnerabilities identified in the

operating system or any application programs used during the course of

business. 7-1 1 Contact information on Web sites 

Policy: The company's external Web site shall not reveal any details of

corporate structure or identify any employees by name. Explanation/Notes: Corporate structure information such as organization

charts, hierarchy charts, employee or departmental lists, reporting

structure, names, positions, internal contact numbers, employee numbers,

or similar information that is used for internal processes should not be

made available on publicly accessible Web sites. Computer intruders often obtain very useful information on a target's Web

site. The attacker uses this information to appear as a knowledgeable 206

employee when using a pretext or ruse. The social engineer is more likely

to establish credibility by having this information at his or her disposal. 

Moreover,  the attacker can analyze this information to find out the likely

targets who have access to valuable, sensitive, or critical information. 7-12 Creation of privileged accounts 

Policy." No privileged account should be created or system privileges

granted to any account unless authorized by the system administrator or

system manager. Explanation/Notes." Computer intruders frequently pose as hardware or

software vendors in an attempt to dupe information technology personnel

into creating unauthorized accounts. The intention of this policy is to

block these attacks by establishing greater control over the creation of

privileged accounts. The system manager or administrator of the computer

system must approve any request to create an account with elevated

privileges. 7-1 3 Guest accounts 

Policy: Guest accounts on any computer systems or related networked

devices shall be disabled or removed, except for an FTP (file transfer

protocol) server approved by management with anonymous access

enabled. 

Explanation/Notes: The intention of the guest account is to provide

temporary access for persons who do not need to have their own account.

Several operating systems are installed by default with a guest account

enabled. Guest accounts should always be disabled because their

existence violates the principle of user accountability. IT should be able to

audit any computer-related activity and relate it to a specific user. Social engineers are easily able to take advantage of these guest accounts

for gaining unauthorized access, either directly or by duping authorized

personnel into using a guest account. 7-14 Encryption of off-site backup data 

Policy: Any company data that is stored off site should be encrypted to

prevent unauthorized access. Explanation/Notes: Operations staff must insure that all data is

recoverable in the event that any information needs to be restored. This

requires regular test decryption of a random sampling of encrypted files to

make sure the data can be recovered. Furthermore, keys used to encrypt

data shall be escrowed with a trusted manager in the event the encryption

keys are lost or unavailable. 7-1 5 Visitor access to network connections Policy: All publicly accessible Ethernet access points must be on a

segmented network to prevent unauthorized access to the internal

network. Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent any outsiders

from connecting to the internal network when on company premises.

Ethernet jacks installed in conference rooms, the cafeteria, training

centers, or other areas accessible to visitors shall be filtered to prevent

unauthorized access by visitors to the corporate computer systems. The network or security administrator may choose to set up a virtual 

LAN in a switch, if available, to control access from these locations. 7-16 Dial-in modems 

Policy: Modems used for dial-in calls shall be set to answer no earlier 

than the fourth ring. 

Explanation/Notes: As depicted in the movie War Games, hackers use a

technique known as war dialing to locate telephone lines that have

modems connected to them. The process begins with the attacker

identifying the telephone prefixes used in the area where the target

company is located. A scanning program is then used to try every

telephone number 

 

in those prefixes, to locate those that answer with a modem. To speed up

the process, these programs are configured to wait for one or two rings for

a modem response before going on to try the next number. When a

company sets the auto answer on modem lines to at least four rings,

scanning programs will fail to recognize the line as a modem line. 7-1 7 Antivirus software 

Policy: Every computer system shall have current versions of antivirus

software installed and activated. Explanation/Notes: For those businesses that do not automatically push

down antivirus software and pattern files (programs that recognize

patterns common to virus software to recognize new viruses) to user

desktops or workstations, individual users must take the responsibility for

installing and maintaining the software on their own systems, including

any computer systems used for accessing the corporate network remotely. If feasible, this software must be set for automatic update of virus and

Trojan signatures nightly. When pattern or signature flies are not pushed

down to user desktops, computer users shall have the responsibility to

update pattern files at least on a weekly basis. These provisions apply to all desktop machines and laptops used to access

company computer systems, and apply whether the computer is company

property or personally owned. 7-18 Incoming email attachments (high security requirements) Policy: In an organization with high security requirements, the corporate

firewall shall be configured to filter out all email attachments. Explanation/Notes: This policy applies only to businesses with high

security requirements, or to those that have no business need to receive

attachments through electronic mail. 7-19 Authentication of software 

Policy: All new software or software fixes or upgrades, whether on

physical media or obtained over the Internet, must be verified as authentic

prior to installation. This policy is especially relevant to the information

technology department when installing any software that requires system

privileges. 

Explanation/Notes: Computer software referred to in this policy includes

operating system components, application software, hot fixes,  

patches, or any software updates. Many software manufacturers have

implemented methods whereby customers can check the integrity of any

distribution, usually by a digital signature. In any case where the integrity

cannot be verified, the manufacturer must be consulted to verify that the

software is authentic.Computer attackers have been known to send software to a victim,

packaged to appear as if the software manufacturer had produced it and

shipped it to the company. It is essential that you verify any software you

receive as authentic, especially if unsolicited, before installing it on

company systems.Note that a sophisticated attacker might find out that your organization

has ordered software from a manufacturer. With that information in hand,

the attacker can cancel the order with the real manufacturer, and order the

software himself. The software is then modified to perform some

malicious function, and is shipped or delivered to your company, in the

original packaging, with shrink-wrapping if necessary. Once the product

is installed, the attacker is in control.7-20 Default passwords

Policy: All operating system software and hardware devices that initially

have a password set to a default value must have their passwords reset in

accordance with the company password policy.Explanation/Notes: Several operating systems and computer-related

devices are shipped with default passwords--that is, with the same

password enabled on every unit sold. Failure to change default passwords

is a grave mistake that places the company at risk.

Default passwords are widely known and are available on Internet Web

sites. In an attack, the first password an intruder tries is the manufacturer s

default password.7-21 Invalid access attempts lockout (low to medium security)

Policy: Especially in an organization with low to medium security

requirements, whenever a specified number of successive invalid login

attempts to a particular account have been made, the account should be

locked out for a period of time.Explanation/Notes: All company workstations and servers must be set

to limit the number of successive invalid attempts to sign in. This policy

is necessary to prevent password guessing by trial and error, dictionary

attacks, or brute force attempts to gain unauthorized access. 

The system administrator must configure the security settings to lock out

an account whenever the desired threshold of successive invalid attempts

has been reached. It is recommended that an account be locked out for at

least thirty minutes after seven successive login attempts.7-22 Invalid access attempts account disabled (high security)

Policy: In an organization with high security requirements, whenever a

specified number of successive invalid login attempts to a particular

account has been made, the account should be disabled until reset by the

group responsible for providing account support.Explanation/Notes: All company workstations and servers must be set to

limit the number of successive invalid attempts to sign in. This policy is a

necessary control to prevent password guessing by trial and error,

dictionary attacks, or brute force attempts to gain unauthorized access.The system administrator must configure the security settings to disable

the account after five invalid login attempts. Following such an attack, the

account holder will need to call technical support or the group responsible

for account support to enable the account. Prior to resetting the account,

the department responsible must positively identify the account holder,

following the Verification and Authorization Procedures.7-23 Periodic change of privileged

Policy: All privileged account holders shall be required to change their

passwords at least every thirty days.Explanation/Notes: Depending on operating system limitations, the

systems administrator must enforce this policy by configuration of

security parameters in system software.7-24 Periodic change of user passwords

Policy: All account holders must change their passwords at least every

sixty days.Explanation/Notes: With operating systems that provide this feature, the

systems administrator must enforce this policy by configuration of

security parameters in the software.

 

7-25 New account password set up 

Policy: New computer accounts must be established with an initial

password that is pre-expired, requiring the account holder to select a new

password upon initial use. Explanation/Notes: This requirement ensures that only the account holder

will have knowledge of his or her password. 7-26 Boot-up passwords Policy: All computer systems must be configured to require a bootup

password. Explanation/Notes: Computers must be configured so that when the

computer is turned on, a password is required before the operating system

will boot. This prevents any unauthorized person from turning on and

using another person's computer. This policy applies to all computers on

company premises. 7-27 Password requirements for privileged accounts 

Policy: M1 privileged accounts must have a strong password: The

password must: Not be a word found in a dictionary in any language Be mixed upper and lower case with at least one letter, one symbol, and

one numeral Be at least 12 characters in length Not be related to the company or individual in any way. Explanation/Notes: In most cases computer intruders will target specific

 accounts that have system privileges. Occasionally the attacker will

exploit other vulnerabilities to gain full control over the system. The first passwords an intruder will try are the simple, commonly used

words found in a dictionary. Selecting strong passwords enhances the

security by reducing the chance an attacker will find the password by trial

and error, dictionary attack, or brute force attack. 7-28 Wireless access points 

Policy: All users who access a wireless network must use VPN (Virtual

Private Network) technology to protect the corporate network.  

Explanation/Notes: Wireless networks are being attacked by a new

technique called war driving. This technique involves simply driving or

walking around with a laptop equipped with an 802.11B NIC card until a

wireless network is detected.Many companies have deployed wireless networks without even enabling

WEP (wireless equivalency protocol), which is used to secure the wireless

connection through use of encryption. But even when activated, the

current version of WEP (mid-2002) is ineffective: It has been cracked

wide open, and several Web sites are devoted to providing the means for

locating open wireless systems and cracking WEP-enabled wireless

access points.Accordingly, it is essential to add a layer of protection around the

802.11B protocol by deploying VPN technology.7-29 Updating antivirus pattern files

Policy: Every computer system must be programmed to automatically

update antivirus/anti-Trojan pattern files.Explanation/Notes: At a minimum, such updates shall occur at least

weekly. In businesses where employees leave their computers turned on,

it 302 is highly recommended that pattern files be updated on a nightly

basis.Antivirus software is ineffective if it is not updated to detect all new

forms of malicious code. Since the threat of virus, worm, and Trojan

Horse infections is substantially increased if pattern files are not updated,

it is essential that antivirus or malicious code products be kept up to date.Computer Operations

8-1 Entering commands or running programs

Policy.: Computer operations personnel must not enter commands or run

programs at the request of any person not known to them. If a situation

arises where an Unverified Person seems to have reason to make such a

request, it should not be complied with without first getting manager

approval.Explanation/Notes.: Computer operations employees are popular targets

of social engineers, since their positions usually require privileged

account access, and the attacker expects that they will be less experienced

and less knowledgeable about company procedures than other IT workers.

The intention of this policy is to add an appropriate check and balance to

prevent social engineers from duping computer operations personnel.

 

8-2 Workers with privileged accounts 

Policy: Employees with privileged accounts must not provide assistance

or information to any Unverified Person. In particular this refers to not

providing computer help (such as training on application use), accessing

any company database, downloading software, or revealing names of

personnel who have remote access capabilities, Explanation/Notes: Social engineers often target employees with

privileged accounts. The intent of this policy is to direct IT staff with

privileged accounts to successfully handle calls that might represent social

engineering attacks. 8-3 Internal systems information 

Policy: Computer Operations staff must never disclose any information

related to enterprise computer systems or related devices without

positively verifying the identity of the requester. Explanation/Notes: Computer intruders often contact computer operations

employees to obtain valuable information such as system access

procedures, external points for remote access, and dial-in telephone

numbers that are of substantial value to the attacker. In companies that have technical support staff or a help desk, requests 

to the computer operations staff for information about computer systems

or related devices should be considered unusual. Any information request

should be scrutinized under the corporate data classification policy to

determine whether the requester is authorized to have such information.

When the class of information cannot be determined, the information

should be considered to be Internal. In some cases, outside vendor technical support will need to communicate

with persons who have access to enterprise computer systems. Vendors

must have specific contacts in the IT department so that those individuals

can recognize each other for verification purposes. 8-4 Disclosure of passwords 

Policy: Computer operations staff must never reveal their password, or 

any other passwords entrusted to them, without prior approval of an

information technology manager. 

Explanation/Notes: In general terms, revealing any password to another is

strictly prohibited. This policy recognizes that operations personnel may

need to disclose a password to a third party when exigent situations arise.

This exception to the general policy prohibiting disclosure  

of any password requires specific approval of an information technology

manager. For extra precaution, this responsibility of disclosing

authentication information should be limited to a small group of

individuals who have received special training on verification procedures.8-5 Electronic media

Policy: All electronic media that contains information not designated for

public release shall be locked in a physically secure location.Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent physical theft

of Sensitive information stored on electronic media.8-6 Backup media

Policy: Operations personnel should store backup media in a company

safe or other secure location.Explanation/Notes: Backup media is another prime target of computer

intruders. An attacker is not going to spend time attempting to

compromise a computer system or network when the weakest link in the

chain might be physically unprotected backup media. Once backup media

is stolen, the attacker can compromise the confidentiality of any data

stored on it, unless the data is encrypted. Therefore, physically securing

backup media is an essential process to protect the confidentiality of

corporate information.POLICIES FOR ALL EMPLOYEES

Whether in IT or human resources, the accounting department, or the

maintenance staff, there are certain security policies that every employee

of your company must know. These policies fall into the categories of

General, Computer Use, Email Use, policies for Telecommuters, Phone

Use, Fax Use, Voice Mail Use, and Passwords.General

9-1 Reporting suspicious calls

Policy: Employees who suspect that they may be the subject of a security

violation, including any suspicious requests to disclose information or to

perform action items on a computer, must immediately report the event to

the company's incident reporting group.

Explanation/Notes.: When a social engineer fails to convince his or her

target to comply with a demand, the attacker will always try someone

else. By reporting a suspicious call or event, an employee takes the first

step in alerting the company that an attack may be under way. Thus,

individual employees are the first line of defense against social

engineering attacks. 9-2 Documenting suspicious calls Policy: In the event of a suspicious phone call that appears to be a social

engineering attack, the employee shall, to the extent practical, draw out

the caller to learn details that might reveal what the attacker is attempting

to accomplish, and make notes of these details for reporting purposes. Explanation/Notes: When reported to the incident reporting group, such

details can help them spot the object or pattern of an attack. 9-3 Disclosure of dial-up numbers 

Policy: Company personnel must not disclose company modem telephone

numbers, but should always refer such requests to the help desk or to

technical support personnel. Explanation/Notes: Dial-up telephone numbers must be treated as Internal

information, to be provided only to employees who have a need to know

such information to carry out their job responsibilities. 

Social engineers routinely target employees or departments that are likely

to be less protective of the requested information. For example, the

attacker may call the accounts payable department masquerading as a

telephone company employee who is trying to resolve a billing problem.

The attacker then asks for any known fax or dial-in numbers in order to

resolve the problem. The intruder often targets an employee who is

unlikely to realize the danger of releasing such information, or who lacks

training with respect to company disclosure policy and procedures. 9-4 Corporate ID badges 

Policy: Except when in their immediate office area, all company

personnel, including management and executive staff, must wear their

employee badges at all times. Explanation/Notes: All workers, including corporate executives, should

be trained and motivated to understand that wearing an ID badge is

mandatory everywhere on company premises other than public areas and

the person's own office or workgroup area.  

9-5 Challenging ID badge violations

Policy: All employees must immediately challenge any unfamiliar person

who is not wearing an employee badge or visitor's badge.Explanation/Notes: While no company wants to create a culture where

eagle-eyed employees look for a way to ensnare co-workers for venturing

into the hallway without their badges, nonetheless any company

concerned with protecting its information needs to take seriously the

threat of a social engineer wandering its facilities unchallenged.

Motivation for employees who prove diligent in helping enforce the

badges-always policy may be acknowledged in familiar ways, such as

recognition in the company newspaper or on bulletin boards; a few hours

off with pay; or a letter of commendation in their personnel records.9-6 Piggybacking (passing through secure entrances)

Policy: Employees entering a building must not allow anyone not

personally known to them to follow behind them when they have used a

secure means, such as a card key, to gain entrance (piggybacking).Explanation/Notes." Employees must understand that it is not rude to

require unknown persons to authenticate themselves before helping them

enter a facility or access a secure area.

Social engineers frequently use a technique known as piggybacking, in

which they lie in wait for another person who is entering a facility or

Sensitive area, and then simply enter with them. Most people feel

uncomfortable challenging others, assuming that they are probably

legitimate employees. Another piggybacking technique is to carry several

boxes so that an unsuspecting worker opens or holds the door to help.9-7 Shredding Sensitive documents

Policy: Sensitive documents to be discarded must be cross-shredded;

media including hard drives that have ever contained Sensitive

information or materials must be destroyed in accordance with the

procedures set forth by the group responsible for information security.Explanation/Notes: Standard shredders do not adequately destroy

documents; cross-shredders turn documents into pulp. The best security

practice is to presume that the organization's chief competitors will be

rifling through discarded materials looking for any intelligence that could

be beneficial to them.

Industrial spies and computer attackers regularly obtain Sensitive

information from materials tossed in the trash. In some cases, business

competitors have been known to attempt bribery of cleaning crews to turn

over company trash. In one recent example, an employee at Goldman

Sachs discovered items that were used in an insider-trading scheme from

the trash. 9-8 Personal identifiers 

Policy: Personal identifiers such as employee number, social security

number, driver's license number, date and place of birth, and mother's

maiden name should never be used as a means of verifying identity. These

identifiers are not secret and can be obtained by numerous means. Explanation/Notes: A social engineer can obtain other people's personal

identifiers for a price. And in fact, contrary to popular belief, anyone with

a credit card and access to the Internet can obtain these pieces of personal

identification. Yet despite the obvious danger, banks, utility companies,

and credit card companies commonly use these identifiers. This is one

reason that identity theft is the fastest growing crime of the decade. 9-9 Organization charts 

Policy." Details shown on the company's organization chart must not be

disclosed to anyone other than company employees. Explanation/Notes: Corporate structure information includes organization

charts, hierarchy charts, departmental employee lists, reporting structure,

employee names, employee positions, internal contact numbers, employee

numbers, or similar information. 

In the first phase of a social engineering attack, the goal is to gather 

information about the internal structure of the company. This information

is then used to strategize an attack plan. The attacker can also analyze this

information to determine which employees are likely to have access to the

data that he seeks. During the attack, the information makes the attacker

appear as a knowledgeable employee; making it more likely he'll dupe his

victim into compliance. 9-10 Private information about employees 

Policy.: Any requests for private employee information must be referred   

to human resources.  

Explanation/Notes: An exception to this policy may be the telephone

number for an employee who needs to be contacted regarding a work-

related issue or who is acting in an on-call role. However, it is always

preferable to get the requester's phone number, and have the employee

call him or her back.Computer Use

10-1 Entering commands into a computer

Policy: Company personnel should never enter commands into a

computer or computer-related equipment at the request of another person

unless the requester has been verified as an employee of the information

technology department.Explanation/Notes: One common ploy of social engineers is to request

that an employee enter a command that makes a change to the system's

configuration, allows the attacker to access the victim's computer without

providing authentication, or allows the attacker to retrieve information

that can be used to facilitate a technical attack.10-2 Internal naming conventions

Policy: Employees must not disclose the internal names of computer

systems or databases without prior verification that the requester is

employed by the company.Explanation/Notes: Social engineers will sometimes attempt to obtain the

names of company computer systems; once the names are known, the

attacker places a call to the company and masquerades as a legitimate

employee having trouble accessing or using one of the systems. By

knowing the internal name assigned to the particular system, the social

engineer gains credibility.10-3 Requests to run programs

Policy: Company personnel should never run any computer applications

or programs at the request of another person unless the requester has been

verified as an employee of the information technology department.Explanation/Notes: Any request to run programs, applications, or perform

any activity on a computer must be refused unless the requester is

positively identified as an employee in the information technology

department. If the request involves revealing Confidential information

from any

 

file or electronic message, responding to the request must be in

accordance with the procedures for releasing Confidential information.

See Information Disclosure Policy. Computer attackers deceive people into executing programs that enable

the intruder to gain control of the system. When an unsuspecting user runs

a program planted by an attacker, the result may give the intruder access

to the victim's computer system. Other programs record the activities of

the computer user and return that information to the attacker. While a

social engineer can trick a person into executing computer instructions

that may do damage, a technically based attack tricks the computer's

operating system into executing computer instructions that may cause the

same sort of damage. 10-4 Downloading or installing software 

Policy: Company personnel must never download or install software at

the request of another person, unless the requester has been verified as an

employee with the information technology department. Explanation/Notes: Employees should be on the alert for any unusual

request that involves any sort of transaction with computer-related

equipment. A common tactic used by social engineers is to deceive unsuspecting

victims into downloading and installing a program that helps the attacker

accomplish his or her goal of compromising computer or network

security. In some instances, the program may covertly spy on the user or

allow the attacker to take control of the computer system through use of a

covert remote control application. 10-5 Plain text passwords and email 

Policy: Passwords shall not be sent through email unless encrypted.

Explanation/Notes: While it's discouraged, this policy may be waived 

by e-commerce sites in certain limited circumstances, such as: Sending passwords to customers who have registered on the site. Sending passwords to customers who have lost or forgotten their

passwords. 

 

10-6 Security-related software 

Policy: Company personnel must never remove or disable antivirus/

Trojan Horse, firewall, or other security-related software without prior

approval from the information technology department. Explanation/Notes: Computer users sometimes disable security-related

software without provocation, thinking it will increase the speed of their

computer. A social engineer may attempt to deceive an employee into disabling or

removing software that is needed to protect the company against security-

related threats. 10-7 Installation of modems 

Policy.. No modems may be connected to any computer until prior

approval has been obtained from the IT department. Explanation/Notes.: It is important to recognize that modems on desktops

or workstations in the workplace pose a substantial security threat,

especially if connected to the corporate network. Accordingly, this policy

controls modem connection procedures. Hackers use a technique called war dialing to identify any active modem

lines within a range of telephone numbers. The same technique may be

used to locate telephone numbers connected to modems within the

enterprise. An attacker can easily compromise the corporate network if he

or she identifies a computer system connected to a modem running

vulnerable remote access software, which is configured with an easily

guessed password or no password at all. 10-8 Modems and auto-answer settings 

Policy: M1 desktops or workstations with IT-approved modems shall

have the modem auto-answer feature disabled to prevent anyone from

dialing into the computer system. Explanation/Notes.- Whenever feasible, the information technology

department should deploy a dial-out modem pool for those employees

who need to dial out to external computer systems via modem. 10-9 Cracking tools 

Policy: Employees will not download or use any software tools designed

to defeat software protection mechanisms. 

Explanation/Notes: The Internet has dozens of sites devoted to software

designed to crack shareware and commercial software products. The use

of these tools not only violates a software owner's copyright, but also is

extremely dangerous. Because these programs originate from unknown

sources, they may contain hidden malicious code that may cause damage

to the user's computer or plant a Trojan Horse that gives the author of the

program access to the user's computer. 10-10 Posting company information on line Policy: Employees shall not disclose any details regarding company

hardware or software in any public newsgroup, forum, or bulletin board,

and shall not disclose contact information other than in accordance with

policy. Explanation/Notes: Any message posted to the Usenet, on-line forums, 

bulletin boards, or mailing lists can be searched to gather intelligence on a

target company or a target individual. During the research phase of a

social engineering attack, the attacker may search the Internet for any

posts that contain useful information about the company, its products or

its people. Some posts contain very useful tidbits of information that the attacker 

can use to further an attack. For example, a network administrator may

post a question about configuring firewall filters on a particular brand and

model of firewall. An attacker who discovers this message will learn

valuable information about the type and configuration of the companys

firewall that enables him to circumvent it to gain access to the enterprise

network. This problem can be reduced or avoided by implementing a policy that 

allows employees to post to newsgroups from anonymous accounts that

do not identify the company from which they originated. Naturally, the

policy must require employees not to include any contact information that

may identify the company. 10-11 Floppy disks and other electronic media 

Policy: If media used to store computer information, such as floppy 

disks or CD-ROMS have been left in a work area or on an employee's

desk, and that media is from an unknown source, it must not be inserted

into any computer system. 

Explanation/Notes: One method used by attackers to install malicious

code is to place programs onto a floppy or CD-ROM and label it with

something very enticing (for example, "Personnel Payroll Data--

Confidential"). They then drop several copies in areas used by employees.

If a single copy is inserted into a computer and the files on it opened, the

attacker's malicious code is executed. This may create a backdoor, which

is used to compromise the system, or may cause other damage to the

network. 10-1 2 Discarding removable media 

Policy: Before discarding any electronic media that ever contained

Sensitive company information, even if that information has been deleted,

the item shall be thoroughly degaussed or damaged beyond recovery. Explanation/Notes:Whileshreddinghard-copydocumentsiscommonplace these days, company workers may overlook the threat of

discarding electronic media that contained Sensitive data ar any rime.

Computer attackers attempt to recover any data stored on discarded

electronic media. Workers may presume that by just deleting files, they

ensure that those files cannot be recovered. This presumption is absolutely

incorrect and can cause confidential business information to fall into the

wrong hands. Accordingly, all electronic media that contains or

previously contained information not designated as Public must be wiped

clean or destroyed using the procedures approved by the responsible

group. 10-1 3 Password-protected screen savers 

Policy: All computer users must set a screen saver password and the

inactivity time-out limit to lock the computer after a certain period of

inactivity. Explanation/Notes: All employees are responsible for setting a screen

saver password, and setting the inactivity timeout for no more than ten

minutes. The intention of this policy is to prevent any unauthorized person

from using another person's computer. Additionally, this policy protects

company computer systems from being easily accessed by outsiders who

have gained access to the building. 10-1 4 Disclosure or sharing of passwords statement 

Policy: Prior to creation of a new computer account, the employee or

contractor must sign a written statement acknowledging that he or she  

understands that passwords must never be disclosed or shared with

anyone, and that he or she agrees to abide by this policy. Explanation/Notes: The agreement should also include a notice that

violation of such agreement may lead to disciplinary action up to and

including termination. Email Use 

1 1-1 Email attachments 

Policy: Email attachments must not be opened unless the attachment was

expected in the course of business or was sent by a Trusted Person. Explanation/Notes: All email attachments must be scrutinized closely.

You may require that prior notice be given by a Trusted Person that an

email attachment is being sent before the recipient opens any attachment.

This will reduce the risk of attackers using social engineering tactics to

deceive people into opening attachments. One method of compromising a computer system is to trick an 

employee into running a malicious program that creates a vulnerability,

providing the attacker with access to the system. By sending an email

attachment that has executable code or macros, the attacker may be able

to gain control of the user's computer. A social engineer may send a malicious email attachment, then call and 

attempt to persuade the recipient to open the attachment.11-2 Automatic forwarding to external addresses 

Policy: Automatic forwarding of incoming email to an external email

address is prohibited. Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an outsider

from receiving email sent to an internal email address. Employees occasionally set up email forwarding of their incoming mail to

an email address outside the company when they will be away from the

office. Or an attacker may be able to deceive an employee into setting up

an internal email address that forwards to an address outside the company.

The attacker can then pose as a legitimate insider by having an internal

company email address and get people to email Sensitive information to

the internal email address. 

 

1 1-3 Forwarding emails 

Policy: Any request from an Unverified Person to relay an electronic mail

message to another Unverified Person requires verification of the

requester's identity. 1 1-4 Verifying email 

Policy: An email message that appears to be from a Trusted Person that

contains a request to provide information not designated as Public, or to

perform an action with any computer-related equipment, requires an

additional form of authentication. See Verification and Authorization

Procedures. Explanation/Notes: An attacker can easily forge an email message and its

header, making it appear as if the message originated from another email

address. An attacker can also send an email message from a compromised

computer system, providing phony authorization to disclose information

or perform an action. Even by examining the header of an email message

you cannot detect email messages sent from a compromised internal

computer system. Phone Use 

12-1 Participating in telephone surveys 

Policy: Employees may not participate in surveys by answering any

questions from any outside organization or person. Such requests must be

referred to the public relations department or other designated person. Explanation/Notes: A method used by social engineers to obtain valuable

information that may be used against the enterprise is to call an employee

and claim to be doing a survey. It's surprising how many people are happy

to provide information about the company and themselves to strangers

when they believe they're taking part in legitimate research. Among the

innocuous questions, the caller will insert a few questions that the attacker

wants to know. Eventually, such information may be used to compromise

the corporate network. 12-2 Disclosure of internal telephone numbers 

Policy: If an Unverified Person asks an employee for his phone number

the employee may make a reasonable determination of whether disclosure

is necessary to conduct company business. 

Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to require employees to

make a considered decision on whether disclosure of their telephone  

extension is necessary. When dealing with people who have not

demonstrated a genuine need to know the extension, the safest course is to

require them to call the main company phone number and be transferred.1 2-3 Passwords in voice mail messages

Policy.: Leaving messages containing password information on anyone's

voice mailbox is prohibited.Explanation/Notes: A social engineer can often gain access to an

employee's voice mailbox because it is inadequately protected with an

easy-to-guess access code. In one type of attack, a sophisticated computer

intruder is able to create his own phony voice mailbox and persuade

another employee to leave a message relaying password information. This

policy defeats such a ruse.Fax Use

13-1 Relaying faxes

Policy: No fax may be received and forwarded to another party withoutverification of the requester's identity.Explanation/Notes: Information thieves may trick trusted employees into

faxing sensitive information to a fax machine located on the company's

premises. Prior to the attacker giving the fax number to the victim, the

imposter telephones an unsuspecting employee, such as a secretary or

administrative assistant, and asks if a document can be faxed to them for

later pickup. Subsequently, after the unsuspecting employee receives the

fax, the attacker telephones the employee and requests that the fax be sent

to another location, perhaps claiming that it is needed for an urgent

meeting. Since the person asked to relay the fax usually has no

understanding of the value of the information, he or she complies with the

request.1 3-2 Verification of faxed authorizations

Policy: Prior to carrying out any instructions received by facsimile, the

sender must be verified as an employee or other Trusted Person. Placing a

telephone call to the sender to verify the request is usually sufficient.Explanation/Notes: Employees must exercise caution when unusual

requests are sent by fax, such as a request to enter commands into a

computer or disclose information. The data in the header of a faxed

document can be falsified by changing the settings of the sending fax

machine. Therefore the header on a fax must not be accepted as a means

of establishing identity or authorization.

 

1 3-3 Sending sensitive information by fax 

Policy: Before sending Sensitive information by fax to a machine that is

located in an area accessible to other personnel, the sender shall transmit a

cover page. The recipient, on receiving the page, transmits a page in

response, demonstrating that he/he is physically present at the fax

machine. The sender then transmits the fax. Explanation/Notes: This handshake process assures the sender that the

recipient is physically present at the receiving end. Moreover, this process

verifies that the receiving fax telephone number has not been forwarded to

another location. 1 3-4 Faxing passwords prohibited 

Policy: Passwords must not be sent via facsimile under any

circumstances.Explanation/Notes: Sending authentication information by facsimile is not

secure. Most fax machines are accessible to a number of employees.

Furthermore, they rely on the public telephone switched network, which

can be manipulated by call forwarding the phone number for the receiving

fax machine so that the fax is actually sent to the attacker at another

number. Voice Mail Use 

14-1 Voice mail passwords 

Policy: Voice mail passwords must never be disclosed to anyone for any

purpose. In addition, voice mail passwords must be changed every ninety

days or sooner. Explanation/Notes: Confidential company information may be left in

voice mail messages. To protect this information, employees should

change their voice mail passwords frequently, and never disclose them. In

addition, voice mail users should not use the same or similar voice mail

passwords within a twelve-month period. 14-2 Passwords on multiple systems Policy.. Voice mail users must not use the same password on any other

phone or computer system, whether internal or external to the company. 

Explanation/Notes." Use of a similar or identical password for multiple

devices, such as voice mail and computer, makes it easier for social

engineers to guess all the passwords of a user after identifying only one. 

 

14-3 Setting voice mail passwords 

Policy: Voice mail users and administrators must create voice mail

passwords that are difficult to guess. They must not be related in any way

to the person using it, or the company, and should not contain a

predictable pattern that is likely to be guessed. Explanation/Notes: Passwords must not contain sequential or repeating

digits (i.e. 1111, 1234, 1010), must not be the same as or based on the

telephone extension number, and must not be related to address, zip code,

birth date, license plate, phone number, weight, I.Q., or other predictable

personal information. 1 4-4 Mail messages marked as "old" 

Policy: When previously unheard voice mail messages are not marked as

new messages, the voice mail administrator must be notified of a possible

security violation and the voice mail password must immediately be

changed. Explanation/Notes: Social engineers may gain access to a voice mailbox

in a variety of ways. An employee who becomes aware that messages

they have never listened to are not being announced as new messages

must assume that another person has obtained unauthorized access to the

voice mailbox and listened to the messages themselves. 1 4-5 External voice mail greetings Policy: Company workers shall limit their disclosure of information on

their external outgoing greeting on their voice mail. Ordinarily

information related to a worker's daily routine or travel schedule should

not be disclosed. Explanation/Notes: An external greeting (played to outside callers) should

not include last name, extension, or reason for absence (such as travel,

vacation schedule, or daily itinerary). An attacker can use this information

to develop a plausible story in his attempt to dupe other personnel. 1 4-6 Voice mail password patterns 

Policy: Voice mail users shall not select a password where one part of the

password remains fixed, while another part changes in a predictable

pattern. 

Explanation/Notes: For example, do not use a password such as 743501,

743502, 743503, and so on, where the last two digits correspond to the

current month. 

 

1 4-7 Confidential or Private information 

Policy: Confidential or Private information shall not be disclosed in a

voice mail message. Explanation/Notes: The corporate telephone system is typically more

vulnerable than corporate computer systems. The passwords are usually a

string of digits, which substantially limits the number of possibilities for

an attacker to guess. Further, in some organizations, voice mail passwords

may be shared with secretaries or another administrative staff who have

the responsibility of taking messages for their managers. In light of the

above, no Sensitive information should ever be left on anyone's voice

mail. Passwords 

1 5-1 Telephone security Policy: Passwords shall not be disclosed over the telephone at any time. Explanation/Notes: Attackers may find ways to listen in to phone

conversations, either in person or through a technological device. 1 5-2 Revealing computer passwords 

Policy: Under no circumstances shall any computer user reveal his or her

password to anyone for any purpose without prior written consent of the

responsible information technology manager. Explanation/Notes: The goal of many social engineering attacks involves

deceiving unsuspecting persons into revealing their account names and

passwords. This policy is a crucial step in reducing the risk of successful

social engineering attacks against the enterprise. Accordingly, this policy

needs to be followed religiously throughout the company.   1 5-3 Internet passwords 

Policy: Personnel must never use a password that is the same as or similar

to one they are using on any corporate system on an Internet site. Explanation/Notes: Malicious Web site operators may set up a site that

purports to offer something of value or the possibility of winning a prize.

To register, a visitor to the site must enter an email address, username,

and password. Since many people use the same or similar sign-on

information repeatedly, the malicious Web site operator will attempt to

use the chosen password and variations of it for attacking the target's

work- or home- computer system. The visitor's work computer can

sometimes be identified by the email address entered during the

registration process.   

    

1 5-4 Passwords on multiple systems 

Policy: Company personnel must never use the same or a similar

password in more than one system. This policy pertains to various types

of devices (computer or voice mail); various locations of devices (home

or work); and various types of systems, devices (router or firewall), or

programs (database or application). Explanation/Notes: Attackers rely on human nature to break into

computer systems and networks. They know that, to avoid the hassle of

keeping track of several passwords, many people use the same or a similar

password on every system they access. As such, the intruder will attempt

to learn the password of one system where the target has an account. Once

obtained, it's highly likely that this password or a variation thereof will

give access to other systems and devices used by the employee. 1 5-5 Reusing passwords Policy: No computer user shall use the same or a similar password within

the same eighteen-month period. Explanation/Note: If an attacker does discover a user's password, frequent

changing of the password minimizes the damage that can be done.

Making the new password unique from previous passwords makes it

harder for the attacker to guess it. 1 5-6 Password patterns 

Policy." Employees must not select a password where one part remains

fixed, and another element changes in a predictable pattern. Explanation/Notes: For example, do not use a password such as Kevin01,

Kevin02, Kevin03, and so on, where the last two digits correspond to the

current month. 1 5-7 Choosing passwords Policy: Computer users should create or choose a password that adheres 

to the following requirements. The password must: Be at least eight characters long for standard user accounts and at least

twelve characters long for privileged accounts. 

Contain at least one number, at least one symbol (such as $, -, I, &), at

least one lowercase letter, and at least one upper-case letter (to the extent

that such variables are supported by the operating system).     

Not be any of the following items: words in a dictionary in any language;

any word that is related to an employee's family, hobbies, vehicle, work,

license plate, social security number, address, telephone, pet's name,

birthday, or phrases containing those words. Not be a variation of a previously used password, with one element

remaining the same and another element changing, such as kevin, kevin 1,

kevin2; or kevinjan, kevinfeb. Explanation/Notes: The parameters listed above will produce a password

that is difficult for the social engineer to guess. Another option is the

consonant-vowel method, which provides an easy-to-remember and

pronounceable password. To construct this kind of password substitute

consonants for each letter C and vowels for the letter V, using the mask of

"CVCVCVCV." Examples would be MIXOCASO; CUSOJENA. 1 5-8 Writing passwords down 

Policy: Employees should write passwords down only when they storethem in a secure location away from the computer or other password

protected device. Explanation/Notes: Employees are discouraged from ever writing down

passwords. Under certain conditions, however, it may be necessary;  for

example, for an employee who has multiple accounts on different

computer systems. Any written passwords must be secured in a safe place away from the computer. Under no circumstances may a password be 

stored under the keyboard or attached to the computer display. 1 5-9 Plaintext passwords in computer files 

Policy: Plaintext passwords shall not be saved in any computer file or

stored as text called by pressing a function key. When necessary,

passwords may be saved using an encryption utility approved by the IT

department to prevent any unauthorized disclosures. Explanation/Notes: Passwords can be easily recovered by an attacker if

stored in unencrypted form in computer data files, batch files, terminal

function keys, login files, macro or scripting programs, or any data files

which contain passwords to FTP sites. 

 

POLICIES FOR TELECOMMUTERS 

Telecommuters are outside the corporate firewall, and therefore more

vulnerable to attack. These policies will help you prevent social engineers

from using your telecommuter employees as a gateway to your data. 16-1 Thin clients 

Policy: All company personnel who have been authorized to connect via

remote access shall use a thin client to connect to the corporate network. Explanation/Notes: When an attacker analyzes an attack strategy, he or

she will try to identify users who access the corporate network from

external locations. As such, telecommuters are prime targets. Their

computers are less likely to have stringent security controls, and may be a

weak link that may compromise the corporate network. Any computer that connects to a trusted network can be booby-trapped

with keystroke loggers, or their authenticated connection can be hijacked.

A thin client strategy can be used to avoid problems. A thin client is

similar to a diskless workstation or a dumb terminal; the remote computer

does not have storage capabilities but instead the operating system,

application programs, and data all reside on the corporate network.

Accessing the network via a thin client substantially reduces the risk

posed by un-patched systems, outdated operating systems, and malicious

code. Accordingly, managing the security of telecommuters is effective

and made easier by centralizing security controls. Rather than relying on

the inexperienced telecommuter to properly manage security-related

issues, these responsibilities are better left with trained system, network,

or security administrators. 16-2 Security software for telecommuter computer systems Policy: Any external computer system that is used to connect to the

corporate network must have antivirus software, anti-Trojan software, and

a personal firewall (hardware or software). Antivirus and anti-Trojan

pattern files must be updated at least weekly. Explanation/Notes: Ordinarily, telecommuters are not skilled on security-

related issues, and may inadvertently" or negligently leave their computer

system and the corporate network open to attack. Telecommuters 

 

therefore pose a serious security risk if they are not properly trained. In

addition to installing antivirus and anti-Trojan Horse software to protect

against malicious code, a firewall is necessary to block any hostile users

from obtaining access to any services enabled on the telecommuter's

system. The risk of not deploying the minimal security technologies to prevent

malicious code from propagating cannot be underestimated, as an attack

on Microsoft proves. A computer system belonging to a Microsoft

telecommuter, used to connect to Microsoft's corporate network, became

infected with a Trojan Horse program. The intruder or intruders were able

to use the telecommuter's trusted connection to Microsoft's development

network to steal developmental source code. POLICIES FOR HUMAN RESOURCES 

Human resources departments have a special charge to protect employees

from those attempting to discover personal information through their

workplace. HR professionals also have a responsibility to protect their

company from the actions of unhappy ex-employees. 1 7-1 Departing employees Policy:  Whenever a person employed by the company leaves or isterminated,  Human Resources must immediately do the following: Remove the person's listing from the on-line employee/telephonedirectory and disable or forward their voice mail; Notify personnel at building entrances or company lobbies; and Add the employee's name to the employee departure list, which shall be

emailed to all personnel no less often than once a week. Explanation/Notes: Employees who are stationed at building entrances

must be notified to prevent a former employee from re-entering the

premises. Further, notifying other personnel may prevent the former

employee from successfully masquerading as an active employee and

duping personnel into taking some action damaging to the company. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to require every user within

the former employee's department to change his or her passwords. (When

I was terminated from GTE solely because of my reputation as a hacker, 

 

the company required all employees throughout the company to change

their password.) 1 7-2 IT department notification 

Policy: Whenever a person employed by the company leaves or is

terminated, Human Resources should immediately notify the information

technology department to disable the former employee's computer

accounts, including any accounts used for database access, dial-up, or

Internet access from remote locations. Explanation/Notes: It's essential to disable any former worker's access toall computer systems, network devices, databases, or any other computer-

related devices immediately upon termination. Otherwise, the company

may leave the door wide open for a disgruntled employee to access

company computer systems and cause significant damage. 1 7-3 Confidential information used in hiring process 

Policy: Advertisements and other forms of public solicitation of

candidates to fill job openings should, to the extent possible, avoid

identifying computer hardware and software used by the company. Explanation/Notes: Managers and human resources personnel should onlydisclose information related to enterprise computer hardware and software

that is reasonably necessary to obtain resumes from qualified candidates. Computer intruders read newspapers and company press releases, and

visit Internet sites, to find job listings. Often, companies disclose too

much information about the types of hardware and software used to attract

prospective employees. Once the intruder has knowledge of the target's

information systems, he is armed for the next phase of attack. For

example, by knowing that a particular company uses the VMS operating

system, the attacker may place pretext calls to determine the release

version, and then send a phony emergency security patch made to appear

as if it came from the software developer. Once the patch is installed, the

attacker is in. 1 7-4 Employee personal information Policy: The human resources department must never release personal

information about any current or former employee, contractor, consultant,

temporary worker, or intern, except with prior express written consent of

the employee or human resources manager. 

Explanation/Notes: Head-hunters, private investigators, and identity

thieves target private employee information such as employee numbers,

social security numbers, birth dates, salary history, financial data

including direct deposit information, and health-related benefit

information. The social engineer may obtain this information so as to

masquerade as the individual. In addition, disclosing the names of new

hires may be extremely valuable to information thieves. New hires are

likely to comply with any request by persons with seniority or in a

position of authority, or anyone claiming to be from corporate security. 1 7-5 Background checks Policy: A background check should be required for all new hires,

contractors, consultants, temporary workers, or interns prior to an offer of

employment or establishing of a contractual relationship. Explanation/Notes: Because of cost considerations, the requirement for

background checks may be limited to specific positions of trust. Note,

however, that any person who is given physical access to corporate offices

may be a potential threat. For example, cleaning crews have access to

personnel offices, which gives them access to any computer systems

located there. An attacker with physical access to a computer can install a

hardware keystroke logger in less than a minute to capture passwords. Computer intruders will sometimes go to the effort of obtaining a job as a

means of gaining access to a target company's computer systems and

networks. An attacker can easily obtain the name of a company's cleaning

contractor by calling the responsible employee at the target company,

claiming to be from a janitorial company looking for their business, and

then obtaining the name of the company that is currently providing such

services. POLICIES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY 

Though social engineers try to avoid showing up in person at a workplace

they want to target, there are times when they will violate your space.

These policies will help you to keep your physical premises secure from

threat. 18-1 Identification for non employees 

Policy: Delivery people and other non employees who need to enter

company premises on a regular basis must have a special badge or other

form of identification in accordance with policy established by corporate

security. 

Explanation/Notes: Non employees who need to enter the building

regularly (for example, to make food or beverage deliveries to the

cafeteria, or to repair copying machines or install telephones) should be

issued a special form of company identification badge provided for this

purpose. Others who need to enter only occasionally or on a one-time

basis must be treated as visitors and should be escorted at all times. 18-2 Visitor identification 

Policy: All visitors must present a valid driver's license or other picture

identification to be admitted to the premises. Explanation/Notes: The security staff or receptionist should make a

photocopy of the identification document prior to issuing a visitor's badge.

The copy should be kept with the visitor's log. Alternatively, the

identification information can be recorded in the visitor's log by the

receptionist or guard; visitors should not be permitted to write down their

own ID information. 

Social engineers seeking to gain entrance to a building will always write 

false information in the log. Even though it's not difficult to obtain false

ID and to learn the name of an employee he or she can claim to be

visiting, requiring that the responsible employee must log the entry adds

one level of security to the process. 18-3 Escorting visitors 

Policy: Visitors must be escorted or in the company of an employee at all

times. Explanation/Notes.: One popular ruse of social engineers is to arrange 

to visit a company employee (for example, visiting with a product

engineer on the pretext of being the employee of a strategic partner). After

being escorted to the initial meeting, the social engineer assures his host

that he can find his own way back to the lobby. By this means he gains

the freedom to roam the building and possibly gain access to Sensitive

information. 1 8-4 Temporary badges 

Policy: Company employees from-another location who do not have their

employee badges with them must present a valid driver's license or other

picture ID and be issued a temporary visitor's badge. 

Explanation/Notes: Attackers often pose as employees from a different

office or branch of a company to gain entrance to a company. 

 

1 8-5 Emergency evacuation Policy: In any emergency situation or drill, security personnel must ensure

that everybody has evacuated the premises. Explanation/Notes: Security personnel must check for any stragglers that

may be left behind in restrooms or office areas. As authorized by the fire

department or other authority in charge of the scene, the security force

needs to be on the alert for anyone departing the building long after the

evacuation. Industrial spies or sophisticated computer intruders may cause a diversion

to gain access to a building or secure area. One diversion used is to

release a harmless chemical known as butyl mercaptan into the air. The

effect is to create the impression that there is a natural gas leak. Once

personnel start evacuation procedures, the bold attacker uses this

diversion to either steal information or to gain access to enterprise

computer systems. Another tactic used by information thieves involves

remaining behind, sometimes in a restroom or closet, at the time of a

scheduled evacuation drill, or after setting off a smoke flare or other

device to cause an emergency evacuation. 

 

18-6 Visitors in mail room 

Policy: No visitors should be permitted in the mail room without the

supervision of a company worker. Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an outsider

from exchanging, sending, or stealing intracompany mail. 1 8-7 Vehicle license plate numbers 

Policy: If the company has a guarded parking area, security staff shall log

vehicle license plate numbers for any vehicle entering the area. 1 8-8 Trash Dumpsters 

Policy: Trash Dumpsters must remain on company premises at all times

and should be inaccessible to the public. Explanation/Notes: Computer attackers and industrial spies can obtain

valuable information from company trash bins. The courts have held that

trash is considered legally abandoned property, so the act of Dumpster

diving is perfectly legal, as long as the trash receptacles are on public

property. For this reason, it is important that trash receptacles be situated

on 

 

company property, where the company has a legal right to protect the

containers and their contents.   POLICIES FOR RECEPTIONISTS 

Receptionists are often on the front lines when it comes to dealing with

social engineers, yet they are rarely given enough security training to

recognize and stop an invader. Institute these policies to help your

receptionist better protect your company and its data. 19-1 Internal directory Policy: Disclosure of information in the internal company directory

should be limited to persons employed by the company. Explanation/Notes: All employee titles, names, telephone numbers, and

addresses contained within the company directory should be considered

Internal information, and should only be disclosed in accordance with the

policy related to data classification and Internal information. Additionally, any calling party must have the name or extension of the

party they are trying to contact. Although the receptionist can put a call

through to an individual when a caller does not know the extension, telling the caller the extension number should be prohibited. (For thosecurious folks who follow by example, you can experience this procedure by calling any U.S. government agency and asking the operator toprovide an extension.) 19-2 Telephone numbers for specific departments/groups 

Policy: Employees shall not provide direct telephone numbers for the

company help desk, telecommunications department, computer

operations,  or system administrator personnel without verifying that the

requester has a legitimate need to contact these groups. The receptionist,

when transferring a call to these groups, must announce the caller's name. Explanation/Notes: Although some organizations may find this policy

overly restrictive, this rule makes it more difficult for a social engineer to

masquerade as an employee by deceiving other employees into

transferring the call from their extension (which in some phone systems

causes the call to appear to originate from within the company), or

demonstrating knowledge of these extensions to the victim in order to

create a sense of authenticity.

 

1 9-3 Relaying information 

Policy: Telephone operators and receptionists should not take messages or

relay information on behalf of any party not personally known to be an

active employee. Explanation/Notes: Social engineers are adept at deceiving employees

into inadvertently vouching for their identity. One social engineering trick

is to obtain the telephone number of the receptionist and, on a pretext, ask

the receptionist to take any messages that may come for him. Then, during

a call to the victim, the attacker pretends to be an employee, asks for some

sensitive information or to perform a task, and gives the main switchboard

number as a call back number. The attacker later calls back to the

receptionist and is given any message left for him by the unsuspecting

victim. 19-4 Items left for pickup 

Policy: Before releasing any item to a messenger or other Unverified

Person, the receptionist or security guard must obtain picture

identification and enter the identification information into the pickup log

as required by approved procedures. Explanation/Notes." One social engineering tactic is to deceive an

employee into releasing sensitive materials to another supposedly

authorized employee by dropping off such materials at the receptionist or

lobby desk for pickup. Naturally, the receptionist or security guard

assumes the package is authorized for release. The social engineer either

shows up himself  or has a messenger service pick up the package. POLICIES FOR THE INCIDENT REPORTING GROUP 

Every company should set up a centralized group that should be notified

when any form of attack on corporate security is identified. What follows

are some guidelines for setting up and structuring the activities of this

group. 20-1 Incident reporting group 

Policy: An individual or group must be designated and employees should

be instructed to report security incidents to them. All employees should be

provided with the contact information for the group. 

Explanation/Notes: Employees must understand how to identify a security

threat, and be trained to report any threat to a specific incident reporting

group. It is also important that an organization establish specific

procedures and authority for such a group to act when a threat is reported. 20-2 Attacks in progress 

Policy: Whenever the incident reporting group has received reports of an

ongoing social engineering attack they shall immediately initiate

procedures for alerting all employees assigned to the targeted groups. 

Explanation/Notes: The incident reporting group or responsible manager

should also make a determination about whether to send a company wide

alert. Once the responsible person or group has a good faith belief that an

attack may be in progress, mitigation of damage must be made a priority

by notifying company personnel to be on their guard.  

Security at a Glance The lists and charts reference version of following provide quick social

engineering methods discussed in Chapters 2 to 14, and verification

procedures detailed in Chapter 16. Modify this information for your

organization, and make it available for employees to refer to when an

information security question arises. IDENTIFYING A SECURITY ATTACK 

These tables and checklists will assist you in spotting a social engineering 

attack. The Social Engineering Cycle   ACTION / DESCRIPTION Research 

May include open source information such as SEC filings and annual

reports, marketing brochures, 

patent applications, press clippings, industry magazines,  Web site

content. Also Dumpster diving. Developing rapport and trust

Use of insider information, misrepresenting identity, citing those known

to victim, need for help, or authority. Exploiting trust 

Asking for information or an action on the part of the victim. In reverse

sting, manipulate victim to ask attacker for help. Utilize information

If the information obtained is only a step to final goal, attacker returns to

earlier steps in cycle till goal is reached.  

Common Social Engineering Methods Posing as a fellow employee Posing as an employee of a vendor, partner company, or law enforcement Posing as someone in authority Posing as a new employee requesting help Posing as a vendor or systems manufacturer calling to offer a system

patch or update Offering help if a problem occurs, then making the problem occur,

thereby manipulating the victim to call them for help Sending free software or patch for victim to install Sending a virus or Trojan Horse as an email attachment Using a false pop-up window asking user to log in again or sign on with

password Capturing victim keystrokes with expendable computer system or

program Leaving a floppy disk or CD around the workplace with malicious

software on it  Using insider lingo and terminology to gain trust Offering a prize for registering at a Web site with username and passwordDropping a document or file at company mail room for intraoffice

delivery Modifying fax machine heading to appear to come from an internal

location Asking receptionist to receive then forward a fax 

Asking for a file to be transferred to an apparently internal location Getting a voice mailbox set up so call backs perceive attacker as internal Pretending to be from remote office and asking for email access locally 

 

Warning Signs of an Attack Refusal to give call back number Out-of-ordinary request Claim of authority Stresses urgency Threatens negative consequences of non compliance Shows discomfort when questioned Name dropping Compliments or flattery Flirting Common Targets of Attacks 

TARGET TYPE / EXAMPLES Unaware of value of information

Receptionists, telephone operators, administrative assistants, security

guards. Special privileges 

Help desk or technical support, system administrators, computer

operators, telephone  system administrators. Manufacturer / vendor

Computer hardware, software manufacturers, voice mail systems vendors.Specific departments

Accounting, human resources. Factors That Make Companies More Vulnerable 

to Attacks 

Large number of employees Multiple facilities Information on employee whereabouts left in voice mail messages Phone extension information made available Lack of security training Lack of data classification system No incident reporting/response plan in place 

 

VERIFICATION AN D DATA CLASSIFICATION 

These tables and charts will help you to respond to requests for

information or action that may be social engineering attacks. Verification of Identity Procedure 

ACTION / DESCRIPTION 

Caller ID 

Verify call is internal, and name or extension number matches the identity

of the caller. Callback

Look up requester in company directory and call back the listed extension.Vouching

Ask a trusted employee to vouch for requester's identity. Shared common secret 

Request enterprise-wide shared secret, such as a password or daily code. Supervisor or manager

Contact employee's immediate supervisor and request verification of

identity and employment status. Secure email

Request a digitally signed message. Personal voice recognition

For a caller known to employee, validate by caller's voice. Dynamic passwords

Verify against a dynamic password solution such as Secure ID or other

strong authentication device. In personRequire requester to appear in person with an employee badge or other

identification. Verification of Employment Status Procedure 

ACTION / DESCRIPTION 

Employee directory check

Verify that requester is listed in online directory. Requester's manager verification

Call requester's manager using phone number listed in company directory.Requester's department or workgroup verification

Call requester's department or workgroup and determine that requester is

still employed by company. 

 

Procedure to Determine Need to Know 

ACTION / DESCRIPTION Consult job tide/ workgroup/ responsibilities list

Check published lists of which employees are entitled to specific

classified information. Obtain authority from manager

Contact your manager, or the manager of the requester, for authority to

comply with the request. Obtain authority  from the information Owner or designee

Ask Owner of information if requester has a need to know. Obtain authority with an automated tool

Check proprietary software database for authorized personnel. Criteria for Verifying Non-Employees 

CRITERION / ACTION Relationship 

Verify that requester's firm has a vendor, strategic partner, or other

appropriate relationship. Identity

Verify requester's identity and employment status at the vendor/partner

firm. Nondisclosure Verify that the requester has a signed nondisclosure  agreement on file. Access 

Refer the request to management when the information is classified above

Internal. Data Classification 

CLASSIFICATION / DESCRIPTION / PROCEDURE Public

Can be freely released to the public

No need to verify. Internal

For use within the companyVerify identity of requester as active employee or verify nondisclosure

agreement on file and management approval for non employees. 

 

Data Classification (Continued) 

CLASSIFICATION / DESCRIPTION / PROCEDURE

Private 

Information of a personal nature  intended for use  only within theorganization Verify identity of requester as active employee or only within non

employee with the organization, authorization. Check with human

resources department to disclose Private information to authorized

employees or external requesters. Confidential 

Shared only with people with an absolute need to know within the

organizationVerify identity of requester and need to know from designated

information Owner. Release only with prior written consent of manager,

or information  Owner or designee. Check for nondisclosure agreement

on file. Only management personnel may disclose to persons not

employed by the company.

SOURCESCHAPTER 1BloomBecker, Buck. 1990. Spectacular Computer Crimes: What They

Are and How They Cost American Business Half a Billion Dollars a Dar.

Irwin Professional Publishing.Littman, Jonathan. 1997. The Fugitive Game: Online with Kevin Mitnick.

Little Brown & Co.Penenberg, Adam L. April 19, 1999. "The Demonizing of a Hacker."

Forbes.CHAPTER 2The Stanley Rifldn story is based on the following accounts:Computer Security Insitute. Undated. "Financial losses due to Internet

intrusions, trade secret theft and other cyber crimes soar." Press release.

Epstein, Edward Jay. Unpublished. "The Diamond Invention." Holwick,

Rev. David. Unpublished account.Mr. Rifkin himself was gracious in acknowledging that accounts of his

exploit differ because he has protected his anonymity by declining to be

interviewed.CHAPTER 16Cialdini, Robert B. 2000. Influence: Science and Practice, 4th edition.

Allyn and Bacon.Cialdini, Robert B. February 2001. "The Science of Persuasion."

Scientific American. 284:2.

 

CHAPTER 1 7 

Some policies in this chapter are based on ideas contained in: Wood,

Charles Cresson. 1999. "Information Security Policies Made Easy."

Baseline Software. 

Acknowledgments FROM KEVIN MITNICK 

True friendship has been defined as one mind in two bodies; not many

people in anyone's life can be called a true friend. Jack Biello was a

loving and caring person who spoke out against the extraordinary

mistreatment I endured at the hands of unethical journalists and

overzealous government prosecutors. He was a key voice in the Free

Kevin movement and a writer who had an extraordinary talent for writing

compelling articles exposing the information that the government doesn't

want you to know. Jack was always there to fearlessly speak out on my

behalf and to work together with me preparing speeches and articles, and,

at one point, represented me as a media liaison. This book is therefore dedicated with love to my dearest friend Jack

Biello, whose recent death from cancer just as we finished the manuscript

has left me feeling a great sense of loss and sadness. This book would not have been possible without the love and support of

my family. My mother, Shelly Jaffe, and my grandmother, Reba

Vartanian, have given me unconditional love and support throughout my

life. I am so fortunate to have been raised by such a loving and dedicated

mother, who I also consider my best friend. My grandmother has been

like a second morn to me, providing me with the same nurturing and love

that only a mother could give. As caring and compassionate people,

they've taught me the principles of caring about others and lending a

helping hand to the less fortunate. And o, by imitating the pattern of

giving and caring, I in a sense follow the paths of their lives. I hope they'll

forgive me for putting them in second place during the process of writing

this book, passing up chances to see them with the excuse of work and

deadlines to meet. This book would not have been possible without their

continued love and support that I'll forever hold close to my heart.How I wish my dad, Alan Mitnick, and my brother, Adam Mitnick, would

have lived long enough to break open a bottle of champagne with me on

the day this book first appears in a bookstore. As a salesman and business

owner, my father taught me many of the finer things that I will never

forget. During the last months of my Dad's life I was fortunate enough to

be able to be at his side to comfort him the best I could, but it was a very

painful experience from which I still have not recovered.My aunt Chickie Leventhal will always have a special place in my heart;

although she was disappointed with some of the stupid mistakes I've

made, nevertheless she was always there for me, offering her love and

support. During my intense devotion to writing this book, I sacrificed

many opportunities to join her, my cousin, Mitch Leventhal, and her

boyfriend, Dr. Robert Berkowitz, for our weekly Shabbat celebration.I must also give my warmest thanks to my mother's boyfriend, Steven

Knittle, who was there to fill in for me and provide my mother with love

and support.My dad's brother clearly deserves much praise; one could say I inherited

my craft of social engineering from Uncle Mitchell, who knew how to

manipulate the world and its people in ways that I never even hope to

understand, much less master. Lucky for him, he never had my passion

for computing technology during the years he used his charming

personality to influence anyone he desired. He will always hold the title of

the grand-master social engineer.And as I write these acknowledgements, I realize I have so many people

to thank and to express appreciation to for offering their love, friendship,

and support. I cannot begin to remember the names of all the kind and

generous people that I've met in recent years, but suffice it to say I would

need a computer to store them all. There have been so many people from

all over the world who have written to me with words of encouragement,

praise, and support. These words have meant a great deal to me,

especially during the times I needed it most.I'm especially thankful to all my supporters who stood by me and spent

their valuable time and energy getting the word out to anyone who would

listen, voicing their concern and objection over my unfair treatment and

the hyperbole created by those who sought to profit from the "The Myth

of Kevin Mitnick."

 I have had the extraordinary fortune of being teamed up with best-selling 

author Bill Simon, and we worked diligently together despite our different

work patterns. Bill is highly organized, rises early, and works in a 

deliberate and well-planned style. I'm grateful that Bill was kind enough 

to accommodate my late-night work schedule. My dedication to this

project 

and long working hours kept me up well into the early morning that 

conflicted with Bill's regular working schedule. Not only was I lucky to be teamed with someone who could transform 

my ideas into sentences worthy of a sophisticated reader, but also Bill is 

(mostly) a very patient man who put up with my programmer's style of 

focusing on the details. Indeed we made it happen. Still, I want to

apologize 

to Bill in these acknowledgments that I will always regret being the 

one, because of my orientation to accuracy and detail, who caused him to 

be late for a deadline for the first and only time in his long writing career. 

He has a writer's pride that I have finally come to understand and share; 

we hope to do other books together. The delight of being at the Simon home in Rancho Santa Fe to work 

and to be pampered by Bill's wife, Arynne, could be considered a

highlight 

of this writing project. Arynne's conversation and cooking will battle in 

my memory for first place. She is a lady of quality and wisdom, full of

fun, 

who has created a home of warmth and beauty. And I'll never drink a diet 

soda again without hearing Arynne's voice in the back of my mind 

admonishing me on the dangers of Aspartame,Stacey Kirkland means a great deal to me. She has dedicated many hours 

of her time assisting me on the Macintosh to design the charts and

graphics 

that helped give visual authority to my ideas. I admire her wonderful 

qualities; she is truly a loving and compassionate person who deserves

only 

the good things in life. She gave me encouragement as a caring friend andis someone who I care deeply about. I wish to thank her for all her loving 

support, and for being there for me whenever I needed it. 

Alex Kasper, Nexspace, is not only my best friend, but also a business 

partner and colleague. Together we hosted a popular Internet talk radio 

show known as "The Darkside of the Internet" on KFI AM 640 in Los 

Angeles under the skillful guidance of Program Director David G. Hall. 

Alex graciously provided his invaluable assistance and advice to this bookproject. His influence has always been positive and helpful with a kind

ness  and generosity that often extended far beyond midnight. Alex and I 

recently completed a film/video to help businesses train their people on 

preventing social engineering attacks. 

Paul Dryman, Informed Decision, is a family friend and beyond. This 

highly respected and trusted private investigator helped me to understand 

trends and processes of conducting background investigations. Paul's 

knowledge and experience helped me address the personnel security

issues 

described in Part 4 of this book. One of my best friends, Candi Layman, has consistently offered me sup

port  and love. She is truly a wonderful person who deserves the best out 

of life. During the tragic days of my life, Candi always offered

encouragement 

and friendship. I am fortunate to have met such a wonderful, 

caring, and compassionate human being, and want to thank her for being 

there for me. Surely my first royalty check will go to my cellular phone company for 

all the time I spent talking with Erin Finn. Without a doubt, Erin is like 

my soul mate. We are alike in so many ways it's scary. We both have a

love 

for technology, the same tastes in food, music, and movies. AT&T 

Wireless is definitely losing money for giving me all the "flee nights and 

weekend" calls to her home in Chicago. At least I am not using the Kevin 

Mitnick plan anymore. Her enthusiasm and belief in this book boosted 

my spirits. How lucky I am to have her as a friend. I'm eager to thank those people who represent my professional career 

and are dedicated in extraordinary ways. My speaking engagements are 

managed by Amy Gray (an honest and caring person who I admire and 

adore) David Fugate, of Waterside Productions, is a book agent who went 

to bat for me on many occasions before and after the book contract was 

signed; and Los Angeles attorney Gregory Vinson, who was on my

defense 

team during my years-long battle with the government. I'm sure he can 

relate to Bill's understanding and patience for my close attention to detail; 

he has had the same experience working with me on legal briefs he has 

written on my behalf. I have had too many experiences with lawyers but I am eager to have a 

place to express my thanks for the lawyers who, during the years of my 

negative interactions with the criminal justice system, stepped up and 

offered to help me when I was in desperate need. From kind words to

deep 

involvement with my case, I met many who don't at all fit the stereotype 

of the self-centered attorney. I have come to respect, admire, and

appreciate

the kindness and generosity of spirit given to me so freely by so many. 

They each deserve to be acknowledged with a paragraph of favorable 

words; I will at least mention them all by name, for every one of them

lives 

in my heart surrounded by appreciation: Greg Aclin, Bob Carmen, John

Dusenbury, Sherman Ellison, Omar Figueroa, Carolyn Hagin, Rob Hale,

Alvin Michaelson, Ralph Peretz, Vicki Podberesky, Donald C. Randolph,

Dave Roberts, Alan Rubin, Steven Sadowski, Tony Serra, Richard

Sherman, Skip Slates, Karen Smith, Richard Steingard, the Honorable

Robert Talcott, Barry Tarlow, John Yzurdiaga, and Gregory Vinson.I very much appreciate the opportunity that John Wiley & Sons hasgiven me to author this book, and for their confidence in a first-time

author. I wish to thank the following Wiley people who made this dream

possible: Ellen Gerstein, Bob Ipsen, Carol Long (my editor and fashion

designer), and Nancy Stevenson.Other family members, personal friends, business associates who havegiven me advice and support, and have reached out in many ways, are

important to recognize and acknowledge. They are: J. J. Abrams, David

Agger, Bob Arkow, Stephen Barnes, Dr. Robert Berkowitz, Dale

Coddington, Eric Corley, Delin Cormeny, Ed Cummings, Art Davis,

Michelle Delio, Sam Downing, John Draper, Paul Dryman, Nick Duva,

Roy Eskapa, Alex Fielding, Lisa Flores, Brock Frank, Steve Gibson, Jerry

Greenblatt, Greg Grunberg, Bill Handle, David G. Halt, Dave Harrison,

Leslie Herman, Jim Hill, Dan Howard, Steve Hunt, Rez Johar, Steve

Knittle, Gary Kremen, Barry Krugel, Earl Krugel, Adrian Lamo, Leo

Laporte, Mitch Leventhal, Cynthia Levin, CJ Little, Jonathan Littman,

Mark Maifrett, Brian Martin, Forrest McDonald, Kerry McElwee, Alan

McSwain, Elliott Moore, Michael Morris, Eddie Munoz, Patrick Norton,

Shawn Nunley, Brenda Parker, Chris Pelton, Kevin Poulsen, Scott Press,

Linda and Art Pryor, Jennifer Reade, Israel and Rachel Rosencrantz,

Mark Ross, William Royer, Irv Rubin, Ryan Russell, Neil Saavedra,

Wynn Schwartu, Pete Shipley, Joh Sift, Dan Sokol, Trudy Spector, Matt

Spergel, Eliza Amadea Sultan, Douglas Thomas, Roy "Ihcker, Bryan

Turbow, Ron Wetzel, Don David Wilson, Darci Wood, Kevin Wortman,

Steve Wozniak, and all my friends on the W6NUT (147.435 MHz)

repeater in Los Angeles.And my probation officer, Larry Hawley, deserves special thanks for

giving me permission to act as advisor and consultant on security-related

matters by authoring this book.

And finally I must acknowledge the men and women of law enforcement.

I simply do not hold any malice towards these people who are just doing

their jobs. I firmly believe that putting the public's interest ahead of one's

own and dedicating your life to public service is something that deserves

respect, and while I've been arrogant at times, I want all of you

to know that I love this country, and will do everything in my power to

help make it the safest place in the world, which is precisely one of the

reasons why I've written this book. FROM BILL SIMON 

I have this notion that there is a right person out there for everyone; it's 

just that some people aren't lucky enough ever to find their Mr. or Ms. 

Right. Others get lucky. I got lucky early enough in life to spend a good 

many years already (and count on spending many more) with one of 

God's treasures, my wife, Arynne.. If I ever forget how lucky I am, I only 

need to pay attention to how many people seek and cherish her company. 

Arynne--I thank you for walking through life with me. During the writing of this book, I counted on the help of a loyal group 

of friends who provided the assurance that Kevin and I were achieving

our 

goal of combining fact and fascination into this unusual book. Each of 

these people represents true and loyal value and knows he or she may be 

called on as I get into my next writing project. In alphabetical order: Jean

Claude  Beneventi, Linda Brown, Walt Brown, It. Gen. Don Johnson, 

Dorothy Ryan, Guri Stark, Chris Steep, Michael Steep, and John Votaw. Special recognition goes to John Lucich, president of the Network 

Security Group, who was willing to take time for a friend-of a-friend 

request, and to Gordon Garb, who graciously fielded numerous phone 

calls about IT operations. Sometimes in life, a friend earns an exalted place by introducing you to 

someone else who becomes a good friend. At literary agency Waterside 

Productions, in Cardiff, California, Agent David Fugate was responsible 

for conceiving the idea for this book, and for putting me together with 

co-author-turned-friend Kevin. Thanks, David. And to the head of 

Waterside, the incomparable Bill Gladstone, who manages to keep me 

busy with one book project after another: I'm happy to have you in my 

corner. In our home and my office-at-home, Arynne is helped by an able staff 

that includes administrative assistant Jessica Dudgeon and housekeeper 

Josie Rodriguez.